Must Articles 39 EC, 43 EC, 56 EC and 58 EC be interpreted as precluding legislation of a MS, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which provides that, for the calculation of gift tax, the allowance to be set against the taxable value in the case of a gift of immovable property in that State is smaller where the donor and the acquirer are resident in another MS on the date of the gift than the deduction which would have applied if at least one of them had been resident in the former MS on that date?
Are the provisions of Article 6(1), first subparagraph, second sentence, and Article 6(2) of Directive 97/7 to be interpreted as precluding national legislation which allows the costs of delivering the goods to be charged to the consumer even where he has withdrawn from the contract?
Do Articles 56 TFEU and 57 TFEU preclude national legislation requiring an employer established in another MS who posts workers to the territory of the first MS to send a prior declaration of posting and also to keep available to the national authorities, during the posting, copies of documents equivalent to social or labour documents, such as an individual account or a pay slip, required under the law of the first MS?
Must Article 6(1) of Directive 2001/84 be interpreted as precluding a provision of national law which reserves the benefit of the resale right to the artist?s heirs at law alone, to the exclusion of testamentary legatees?
Must the derogating provisions in Article 8(2) and (3) of Directive 2001/84 be interpreted as authorising the transitional retention of the national IPC provision in question?
Must the directives on the common regulatory framework for electronic communications be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which prohibits the making of the conclusion of a contract for the provision of services contingent on the conclusion, by the end-user, of a contract for the provision of other services?
If the first question is answered in the affirmative, is the NRA competent, in the light of Community law, to monitor compliance with the prohibition laid down in Article 57(1)(1) of the (national) Law on Telecommunications?
Must, in a case such as the main proceedings, Article 71 of Regulation 44/2001 be interpreted as meaning that the rules governing jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement that are laid down by a specialised convention, such as the lis pendens rule set out in Article 31(2) of the CMR and the rule relating to enforceability set out in Article 31(3) of that convention, apply?
Does the Court of Justice have jurisdiction, with a view to forestalling divergent judgments with regard to the concurrence of rules referred to in the preceding question, to interpret ? in a manner binding on the courts of the Member States ? the CMR, in so far as the matters governed by Article 31 of that convention are concerned?
Must Article 17(2) and (3) and Article 28b(A)(2) of the Sixth Directive be interpreted as meaning that, if the place of an intra-Community acquisition is deemed, on the basis of the first subparagraph of the latter provision, to be within the territory of the MS which issued the VAT identification number under which the person acquiring made the acquisition, the aforementioned person acquiring the goods has the right immediately to deduct the VAT thus due in that MS?
Must Article 11(4) of the Second Directive and Article 17(6) of the Sixth Directive be interpreted as meaning that a MS wishing to take advantage of the possibility for which those provisions provide of (retaining) the exclusion of deduction with respect to categories of expenditure which are described as ?providing the opportunity for private transport? has satisfied the condition requiring the designation of a category of adequately defined goods and services?
Do Article 6(2) and Article 17(2) and (6) of the Sixth Directive preclude national legislation, adopted before that directive entered into force, under which a taxable person may deduct VAT paid on the acquisition of goods and services relating to one of the categories at issue in the cases in the main proceedings which are used partly for private purposes and partly for professional purposes not in full but only in proportion to their use for professional purposes?
Must the Directive (2005/29) be interpreted as precluding a national provision which lays down a general prohibition on sales with bonuses and is designed not only to protect consumers but also pursues other objectives, such as, for example, the safeguarding of pluralism of the press and protection of the weakest competitors?
If the first question is answered in the affirmative, must sales with bonuses be regarded as unfair commercial practices within the meaning of Article 5(2) of the Directive (2005/29), merely on the ground that the possibility of gain represents, for at least part of the public concerned, the deciding factor which causes it to buy the main product?
Does the application of a limitation rule providing for a time-limit of three years in which to make claims in cases such as that which is the subject of the main proceedings, in which on grounds of a domestic law situation incompatible with Community law, prior to the judgment in K?bler, migrant workers were refused special length-of-service increments, constitute for the purposes of Article 39 EC and Article 7(1) of Regulation 1612/68 indirect discrimination?
If the first question is answered in the affirmative: Do Article 39 EC and Article 7(1) of Regulation 1612/68 ? in cases such as that which is the subject of the main proceedings ? preclude the application of such a limitation rule to claims seeking payment of special length-of-service increments refused to migrant workers prior to the judgment in K?bler on grounds of a domestic law situation which was incompatible with Community law?
In circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings, in relation to claims seeking to enforce an entitlement to length-of-service increments previously denied ? contrary to Community law ? on the basis of unambiguously worded national legislation, does the principle of effectiveness preclude the application of limitation rules providing for a time-limit of three years in which to bring claims?
Must the first indent of the first subparagraph of Article 5(2) of Directive 92/12 be interpreted as meaning that products subject to excise duty which are manufactured from products not subject to excise duty and imported into the Community under the inward-processing procedure are to be deemed to be subject to duty-suspension arrangements?
If the first question is answered in the negative: Must Article 15(4) of Directive 92/12 be interpreted as meaning that proof that the consignee has taken delivery of the goods may also be provided otherwise than by means of the accompanying document referred to in Article 18 of Directive 92/12?
Must Article 5(1) of Directive 89/104 be interpreted as meaning that a trade mark proprietor is entitled to prohibit a third party from displaying ? on the basis of a keyword which is identical to that mark, and which that third party has chosen for an internet referencing service without the proprietor?s consent ? an ad for goods or services identical with, or similar to, those in respect of which that mark was registered?
Can an advertiser rely on the exception provided for in Article 6 of Directive 89/104, and in particular the exception provided for in Article 6(1)(b) and (c), to use a sign identical with, or similar to, a trade mark as a keyword for an internet referencing service, even though this may constitute a use coming under Article 5 of that directive?
Can an advertiser, in circumstances such as those in the case in the main proceedings, rely on the exception provided for in Article 7 of Directive 89/104 in order to use a sign identical with, or similar to, a trade mark as a keyword for an internet referencing service, even though this may amount to use coming under Article 5 of that directive?
Is a trade mark proprietor entitled, under the same circumstances as those applicable in the event of a third party using a keyword which is identical with the mark, to prohibit a third party from using keywords which reproduce the mark with ?minor spelling mistakes'?
Are the Member States entitled, in relation to the use of keywords such as those at issue in this case, simply to grant protection, under Article 5(5) of Directive 89/104, against use of that sign which, in the opinion of the national courts, without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark?
Do Article 6(1) of Regulation 999/2001 and Annex III, Chapter A, Part I to that regulation, as amended by Regulation 1248/2001, preclude national rules under which all bovine animals over 24 months of age must be screened for BSE?
Is Article 21(1)(a) of Regulation 874/2004 to be interpreted as meaning that a right within the meaning of that provision exists if, without any intention to use it for goods or services, a trade mark is acquired only for the purpose of being able to register in the first phase of phased registration a domain corresponding to a German-language generic term?
Is Article 21(1)(a) of Regulation 874/2004 to be interpreted as meaning that a right within the meaning of that provision exists if the trade mark underlying the domain registration and coinciding with a German-language generic term deviates from the domain in so far as the trade mark contains special characters which were eliminated from the domain name?
Is Article 21(1)(a) of Regulation 874/2004 to be interpreted as meaning that a legitimate interest exists only in the cases mentioned in Article 21(2)(a) to (c)?
If the previous question is answered in the negative, does a legitimate interest within the meaning of Article 21(1)(a) of the Regulation also exist if the domain holder intends to use the domain ? coinciding with a German-language generic term ? for a thematic internet portal?
Are the circumstances capable of establishing bad faith listed exhaustively in Article 21(3)(a) to (e) of Regulation 874/2004?
Does bad faith within the meaning of Article 21(1)(b) of the Regulation also exist if a domain was registered in the first phase of phased registration on the basis of a trade mark, coinciding with a German-language generic term, which the domain holder acquired only for the purpose of being able to register the domain in the first phase of phased registration and thereby to pre-empt other interested parties, including the holders of rights to the mark?
Does Article 2(8) of Directive 89/665 recognise contracting authorities as having a right to judicial review of cancellation decisions by bodies responsible for review procedures which are not judicial bodies?
Is the phrase "recourse to the social assistance system" in Article 7(1)(c) of the Directive to be interpreted as permitting a MS to adopt rules in respect of family reunification which result in such reunification being refused to a sponsor who has proved that he has stable and regular resources sufficient to maintain himself and the members of his family, but who will nevertheless be entitled to claim special assistance to meet living expenses, tax refunds, or income-support measures?
Should the Directive, in particular Article 2(d), be interpreted as precluding national legislation which, in applying the resource requirement pursuant to Article 7(1)(c), makes a distinction according to whether a family relationship arose before or after the entry of the resident into the Member State?
What are the essential characteristics of a ?sample? within the meaning of the last sentence of Article 5(6) of the Sixth Directive?
Is a MS permitted to limit the interpretation of ?gifts of small value? in the last sentence of Article 5(6) of the Sixth Directive in such a way as to exclude a gift of goods forming part of a series or succession of gifts made to the same person from time to time (to October 2003), and any business gifts made to the same person in any 12-month period where the total cost exceeds [GBP] 50 (October 2003 onwards)?
In the light of the application of certain ceilings, may national legislation treat gifts distributed by a taxable person to different individuals having the same employer as being gifts made to the same person?
Would the answers to the previous questions be affected by the recipient being, or being employed by, a fully taxable person, who would be able to deduct any input tax payable on the provision of the goods consisting of the sample?
Does a ?voyage by freighter? constitute package travel for the purposes of Article 15(3) of Regulation 44/2001?
If the answer to Question 1 is in the affirmative: Is the fact that an intermediary?s website can be consulted on the internet sufficient to justify a finding that activities are being ?directed? to the Member State of the consumer?s domicile within the meaning of Article 15(1)(c) of Regulation 44/2001?
What ? for VAT purposes, and in accordance with Article 9(2)(e) of the Sixth Directive ? is the place of supply in the case of advertising services supplied by a person established in a MS to a recipient which is established outside the Community but has a tax representative in the territory of a Member State?
Should Article 6 of Directive 98/59 be interpreted as precluding a provision of national law which reduces the possibilities for a worker to challenge compliance with the procedure for informing and consulting?
Assuming that Article 6 of Directive 98/59 may be interpreted as allowing MSs to adopt such provisions of national law, is such a system compatible with the fundamental rights of the individual which form an integral part of the general principles of law and more particularly with Article 6 of the ECHR?
Can a national court seized of a dispute between two individuals disapply a provision of national law which is contrary to the provisions of a Community directive in order to give effect to other provisions of national law which transpose, apparently correctly, a Community directive whose effective application is frustrated by the provision of national law which is contrary to a Community directive?
Must Article 2 of Directive 98/59, particularly paragraphs (1), (2) and (3) thereof, be interpreted as precluding a provision of national law in so far as it provides that an employer who intends to satisfy his obligations in the context of collective redundancies is only bound to provide evidence that he has fulfilled certain conditions in the provision?
Must Article 2 of Directive 98/59 be interpreted as precluding a provision of national law in so far as it provides that a worker made redundant can challenge compliance with the procedure for informing and consulting only on the ground that the employer has not complied with the conditions laid down in the provision?
Are the references to the equality of shareholders and, more specifically, to the protection of minority shareholders, in Articles 20 and 42 of the Second Company Directive 77/91, in the third general principle and Supplementary principle 17 of Recommendation 77/534, in Schedule C, point 2(A) annexed to Directive 79/279 carried over in Directive 2001/34, in Article 3(1)(a) of Directive 2004/25 in the light of recital 8 in the preamble thereto, manifestations of a general principle of Community law?
If the answer to the previous question is in the affirmative, is that general principle of Community law to be applied only to the relations between a company and its shareholders or does it also apply to the relations between majority shareholders exercising or acquiring control of a company and the minority shareholders of that company?
If the answer to the foregoing two questions is in the affirmative, must that general principle of Community law be regarded as having existed and being binding on the relations between majority and minority shareholders before the entry into force of the abovementioned Directive 2004/25/EC and before the facts at issue, which occurred in the first half of 2001?
May the Member States treat activities bodies governed by public law, which are exempt from tax under Article 13 of the Sixth Directive, as activities in which they engage as public authorities within the meaning of the fourth subparagraph of Article 4(5) of that Directive only where the Member States make express legal provision to that effect?
Must the second subparagraph of Article 4(5) of the Directive be interpreted as meaning that bodies governed by public law be considered taxable persons in respect of activities in which they engage as public authorities, not only where their treatment as non-taxable persons under the first or fourth subparagraphs of that provision would lead to significant distortions of competition to the detriment of their private competitors, but also where it would lead to such distortions to their own detriment?
Is Article 12 EC to be interpreted as precluding the application of a provision of national law which provides that an annual disc in respect of a motor vehicle for the use of federal toll roads is made available free of charge only to those persons with a defined disability who are resident or ordinarily resident in national territory?
Does a decision by which a court of another MS has held a transfer of shares effected in the context of insolvency proceedings to be invalid, on the ground that the liquidator who made the transfer lacked the power to dispose of assets situated in that MS, fall under the exception in Article 1(2)(b) of Regulation 44/2001?
Does the OGH's application of national law, which leads to a difference in treatment between installations which have been granted official authorisation by the Austrian authorities and those which have been granted authorisation by the authorities of another Member State, infringe Articles 10 EC, 12 EC, 28 EC or 43 EC, under circumstances such as those in the main proceedings?
Must Clause 2.6 and 2.7 of the framework agreement on parental leave (as annexed to the Directive) be interpreted as precluding, where an employer unilaterally terminates a worker?s full-time employment contract of indefinite duration, without urgent cause or without observing the statutory period of notice, whilst the worker is on part-time parental leave, the compensation to be paid from being determined on the basis of the reduced salary being received when the dismissal takes place?
Is it contrary to the principles of equivalence and effectiveness and Community law that the Tribunal Supremo should apply differing legal principles in the [contested case-law] to actions to establish the financial liability of the State as legislature in respect of administrative measures enacted pursuant to legislation which has been declared unconstitutional and to such actions in respect of measures enacted pursuant to a rule which has been held to be contrary to Community law?
Which provision is applicable for resolving the conflict between a name validly registered as a PGI in accordance with the simplified procedure under Article 17 of Regulation 2081/92 and a trade mark the application for registration of which was submitted both before the registration of that name and before the entry into force of Regulation 692/2003?
Which reference date is applicable for resolving the conflict between a name validly registered as a PGI in accordance with the simplified procedure under Article 17 of Regulation 2081/92 and a trade mark the application for registration of which was submitted both before the registration of that name and before the entry into force of Regulation 692/2003?
Do rules on pay in a collective agreement for public sector contractual employees which, like Paragraph 27 of the [BAT] in conjunction with Collective Pay Agreement No 35 pursuant to the BAT, determine basic pay in the individual salary groups by age categories infringe the prohibition of age discrimination in primary law (now Article 21(1) of the Charter) as given expression by Directive 2000/78, taking into account also the right of parties to a collective agreement to collective bargaining which is guaranteed by primary law (now Article 28 of the Charter)?
Must Article 49 EC be interpreted as precluding national legislation of a Member State under which payments for supplies or services are not to be regarded as deductible business expenses where they are made or attributed directly or indirectly to a taxpayer resident in another Member State, or to a foreign establishment, which, by virtue of the legislation in the country of establishment, is not subject there to a tax on income or is subject there, as regards the relevant income, to a tax regime which is appreciably more advantageous than the applicable tax regime in the Member State whose national legislation is at issue, unless the taxpayer proves, by any legal means, that such payments relate to genuine and proper transactions and do not exceed the normal limits, whereas such proof is not required as a precondition for the deduction of payments for supplies or services made to a taxpayer residing in that Member State, even if that taxpayer is not subject to any tax on income or is subject to a tax regime which is appreciably more advantageous than the tax regime provided for under the ordinary law of that State?
Is Article 183 of the VAT Directive, in conjunction with the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, to be interpreted as precluding national legislation which provides, with retrospective effect, for the extension of the time period within which excess VAT is to be refunded?
Is Article 183 of the VAT Directive, in the light of the principle of fiscal neutrality, to be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, under which the period for refunding excess VAT is usually 45 days, at the end of which default interest is payable on the sum to be refunded, but which also provides that that period may be extended if a tax investigation is instigated, the effect of the extension being that interest is payable only from the date on which the investigation is completed?
Does Article 183 of the VAT Directive preclude the refund of excess VAT by means of set-off?
Is point (a) of the first paragraph of Article 78, read in conjunction with point (c) of the first paragraph of Article 79, of Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 to be interpreted as prohibiting, in the case of intra-Community purchases, the inclusion in the taxable amount for VAT of the vehicle tax introduced by Law No 22-A/2007 of 29 June 2007?
Must Directive 77/187 and/or Directive 2001/23 be interpreted as meaning that the latter are applicable to a situation in which staff providing auxiliary cleaning and maintenance services in State educational establishments are transferred from local authorities to the employment of the State, where the transfer has led to the assumption of obligations not only in respect of the activities in question and the legal relationships with all the staff concerned, but also in respect of the contracts entered into with private companies for the provision of those services?
Must Article 3 of Directive 77/187 and/or Directives 98/50 and 2001/23 be interpreted as meaning that the employee’s rights transferred to the transferee also include the advantages acquired by that employee while employed by the transferor, such as those relating to length of service, if rights of a financial nature are attached thereto under the collective agreement applicable to the transferee?
Must the general EU-law principles of legal certainty, the protection of legitimate expectations, procedural equity, effective judicial protection, and the right to an independent tribunal and, more generally, to a fair hearing, guaranteed by Article 6 TEU in conjunction with Article 6 of the ECHR and with Articles 46, 47 and 52(3) of the Charter, as incorporated in the Treaty of Lisbon, be interpreted as precluding the adoption by the Italian State, after 5 years, of a specific interpretative provision which is at variance with the wording to be interpreted and in conflict with the consistent and settled interpretation of the institution responsible for ensuring uniform interpretation of the law, a provision which, moreover, is relevant for the purpose of resolving disputes to which the Italian State is itself a party?
Does the term “the conditions laid down” in Article 3(4)(a) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings also cover conditions relating to the capacity or the interest of a person – such as the public prosecution service of another Member State – to request the opening of insolvency proceedings, or do those conditions relate only to the substantive conditions for being made subject to such proceedings?
Can the term “creditor” in Article 3(4)(b) of Regulation No 1346/2000 be interpreted broadly to mean that a national authority which, under the law of the Member State to which it belongs, has power to request the opening of insolvency proceedings and acts in the public interest and as the representative of all the creditors, may also, in the present case, validly request the opening of territorial insolvency proceedings pursuant to Article 3(4)(b) of that regulation?
If the term “creditor” can also refer to a national authority with the power to request the opening of insolvency proceedings, does the application of Article 3(4)(b) of Regulation No 1346/2000 require that national authority to demonstrate that it is acting in the interests of creditors who themselves have their domicile, habitual residence or registered office in the country of that national authority?’
Must the concept of “operating restriction” in Article 2(e) of Directive 2002/30/EC be interpreted as including rules imposing limits on noise levels, as measured on the ground, to be complied with by aircraft overflying areas located near the airport and providing that any person responsible for exceeding those limits may incur a penalty, it being understood that aircraft are required to keep to the designated routes and comply with the landing and take-off procedures laid down by other administrative authorities without taking account of the need to comply with those noise limitations?
Must Articles 2(e) and 4(4) of Directive 2002/30 be interpreted as meaning that all “operating restrictions” must be “performance-based”, or do those provisions allow other provisions, relating to environmental protection, to restrict access to the airport on the basis of the noise level, as measured on the ground, to be observed by aircraft overflying areas located near the airport, it being provided that any person responsible for exceeding that level may incur a penalty?
Must Article 4(4) of Directive 2002/30 be interpreted as precluding the existence, in addition to performance-based operating restrictions based on the noise emitted by aircraft, of rules on environmental protection which impose limits on noise levels, as measured on the ground, to be complied with by aircraft overflying areas located near the airport?
Must Article 6(2) of Directive 2002/30 be interpreted as precluding rules which impose limits on noise levels, as measured on the ground, to be complied with by aircraft overflying territories located near the airport, and which provide that any person exceeding those limits may incur a penalty, where those rules are capable of being infringed by aircraft which comply with the standards in Volume 1, Part II, Chapter 4 of Annex 16 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation?’
Is the mere “filling” of packaging which bears a sign to be regarded as using that sign in the course of trade within the meaning of Article 5 of Directive 89/104, even if that filling takes place as a service provided to and on the instructions of another person, for the purposes of distinguishing that person’s goods?
Does it make any difference to the answer to Question 1(a) if there is an infringement for the purposes of Article 5(1)(a) or (b) of Directive 89/104?
If the answer to question 1(a) is in the affirmative: Can using the sign be prohibited in the Benelux on the basis of Article 5 of Directive 89/104 if the goods bearing the sign are destined exclusively for export to countries outside the Benelux area or the European Union, and they cannot – except in the undertaking where the filling took place – be seen therein by the public?
If the answer to question 2 is in the affirmative: What criterion must be used when answering the question whether there has been trademark infringement?
Can an [SPC] for medicinal products be granted if the period of time between the filing of the application for the basic patent and the date of the first [marketing authorisation] in the Community is shorter than five years?
What are the meaning and effect of Article 11(1)(a) of Directive [90/434] and, in particular, what is the meaning of “valid commercial reasons” and “restructuring or rationalisation of the activities” of companies participating in operations covered by Directive [90/434]?
Is the view taken by the tax authorities, that there are no serious commercial reasons for the acquiring company’s request to transfer tax losses, leading them to conclude that, from the acquiring company’s point of view, there was no apparent commercial interest in acquisition, since the acquired company had developed no activity as a holding company and had no financial holdings, and would consequently transfer only substantial losses, although the merger might represent a positive effect in terms of the cost structure of the group, compatible with that provision of Community law?’
Does Community law preclude the application of a provision of national law laying down the principle of res judicata, where the application of that provision would lead to a result incompatible with Community law in matters relating to VAT?
Is Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38 compatible with Article 12 and 39 EC?
If the answer to question 1 is in the negative, do Article 12 and 39 EC preclude national rules which exclude Union citizens from receipt of social assistance if the maximum period of residence permitted under Article 6 of Directive 2004/38 has been exceeded and there is no right of residence under other provisions?
If the answer to question 1 is in the affirmative, does Article 12 EC preclude national rules which exclude nationals of MSs even from receipt of the social assistance benefits which are granted to illegal immigrants?
Must Article 56 EC be interpreted as prohibiting a restriction, arising from a bilateral tax convention, which allows partial double taxation of dividends from shares of companies established in France to subsist and which renders the taxation of those dividends more onerous than Belgian withholding tax alone applied to dividends distributed by a Belgian company to a Belgian resident shareholder?
Must Article 293 EC be interpreted as rendering wrongful Belgium?s inaction in not renegotiating with France a new way of abolishing double taxation of dividends from shares of companies established in France?
Is it contrary to Community law for Union citizenship to be lost as the legal consequence of the fact that the withdrawal in one MS, lawful as such under national law, of a naturalisation acquired by intentional deception, has the effect of causing the person concerned to become stateless because he does not recover the nationality of another MS which he originally possessed, by reason of the applicable provisions of the law of that other MS?
If the answer to the previous question is in the affirmative, must the MS which has naturalised a citizen of the Union and now intends to withdraw the naturalisation obtained by deception, having due regard to Community law, refrain from withdrawing the naturalisation if or so long as that withdrawal would have the legal consequence of loss of citizenship of the Union, or is the MS of the former nationality obliged, having due regard to Community law, to interpret and apply, or even adjust, its national law so as to avoid that legal consequence?
Is the procedure laid down in Article 44(3) of Directive 2004/18, which replaced Article 22 of Directive 93/37 applicable where the procurement procedure was initiated at a time when Directive 2004/18 had already entered into force, but the time-limit for implementing that directive had not yet expired?
If Directive 2004/18 is applicable: In the case of negotiated procedures ? having regard to the fact that Article 44(3) of Directive 2004/18 provides that ?in any event the number of candidates invited shall be sufficient to ensure genuine competition? ? is the limitation of the number of suitable candidates to be interpreted as meaning that in the second stage there must invariably be a minimum number of candidates (three)?
If Directive 93/37 is applicable, is the requirement that ?there be a sufficient number of suitable candidates?, under Article 22(3) of Council Directive 93/37, to be interpreted as meaning that where the minimum number of suitable candidates invited to take part is not reached (three), the procedure cannot continue to the stage of invitation to tender?
If the answer to the previous question is in the negative, is the second subparagraph of Article 22(2) of Directive 93/37 ? in the rules on restricted procedures ? applicable to two-stage negotiated procedures, governed by Article 22(3)?
Must mechanically separated meat be classified under CN code 0207 14 10 or CN code 0207 14 99?
Does Article 4(1) and (2) of Regulation No 1972/2003 preclude the ascertainment of the amount of the operator?s surplus stock by automatically deducting the operator?s average stock as at 1 May of the four years of activity preceding 1 May 2004, multiplied by 1.2?
Is it compatible with the objective of Regulation No 1972/2003 to levy the surplus stock charge where the operator is found to have a surplus stock as at 1 May 2004 but the operator shows that he has not obtained a real advantage in terms of a price difference from marketing the surplus stock after 1 May 2004?
Does a contract, by which the contracting authority entrusts to the contracting undertaking the management of a casino business and the execution of a development plan and which contains a term under which the contracting authority is obliged to pay the contracting undertaking compensation if another casino lawfully operate in the area in which the casino in question operates, constitute a concession, not governed by Directive 92/50?
If the previous question is answered in the negative, does a legal action which is brought by persons who have participated in the procedure for the award of a public contract of mixed form providing inter alia for the supply of services subject to Annex I B to Directive 92/50, and in which they plead breach of the principle of equal treatment of participants in tender procedures, fall within the field of application of Directive 89/665?
If the previous question is answered in the affirmative, accepting that a national provision in accordance with which only all the members of a consortium without legal personality which has participated unsuccessfully in a public procurement procedure can bring a legal action against the act awarding the contract is not in principle contrary to Community law and specifically to Directive 89/665, and where the legal action has initially been brought by all the members of the consortium but ultimately proves, as regards some of them, to be inadmissible, is it in addition necessary to examine, in order to make a declaration of inadmissibility, whether those individual members thereafter retain the right to claim before another national court any damages which may be envisaged by a provision of national law?
When it has been held by settled case-law of a national court that an individual member of a consortium may also bring an admissible legal action against an act falling within a public procurement procedure, is it compatible with Directive 89/665, interpreted in the light of Article 6 of the ECHR as a general principle of Community law, to dismiss a legal action as inadmissible without the person who has brought that legal action first being given either the opportunity to cure the inadmissibility?
Do fermented alcohol-based beverages, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, corresponding originally to heading 2206 of the CN come under heading 2206 of the CN as fermented beverages or under heading 2208 of the CN as distillates?
To what extent are the provisions of Article 13 of Regulation 384/96 applicable to a dispute such as that at issue in the main proceedings?
Must the operation by which a company imports goods under the inward processing procedure which attract anti-dumping duties, processes them into a product which is not subject to such duties and re-exports them to an associated company in a neighbouring third country which re-exports the goods into the Community and sells them back to the first company be regarded as a definitive import into the customs territory of the Community?
Is a creditor who pursues a claim in the name and for the account of his debtor a party within the meaning of Article 43(1) of Regulation No 44/2001, that is, a party who can lodge an appeal against a decision on the request for a declaration of enforceability, even if he has not formally appeared as a party in the proceedings in which another creditor of that debtor applied for that declaration?
Is Article 3(1)(b) of Regulation No 2201/2003 to be interpreted as meaning that, in a situation where the spouses hold both the nationality of the State of the court seized and the nationality of another MS, the nationality of the State of the court seized must prevail?
If the answer to the previous question is in the negative, is that provision to be interpreted as referring, in a situation where the spouses each hold dual nationality of the same two MSs, to the more effective of the two nationalities or should be considered that that provision offers the spouses an additional option, allowing those spouses the choice of seizing the courts of either of the two States of which they both hold the nationality?
Is Article 49 EC to be interpreted as precluding the application of a national rule under which the regional tax on stopovers for tourist purposes by aircraft and recreational craft is levied only on undertakings, operating aircraft which they use for the transport of persons in the course of ?general business aviation? activities and recreational craft whose commercial operations involve making such craft available to third parties, which have their tax domicile outside the territory of the Region of Sardinia?
Does Article 4 of the Regional Law, by providing for the imposition of the regional tax on stopovers for tourist purposes by aircraft and recreational craft only on undertakings, operating aircraft which they use for the transport of persons in the course of ?general business aviation? activities and recreational craft whose commercial operations consist in making such craft available to third parties, which have their tax domicile outside the territory of the Region of Sardinia, constitute, within the meaning of Article 87 EC, State aid to undertakings carrying on the same activities which have their tax domicile in the Region of Sardinia?
Is the national legislation in question compatible with Community law, in particular with Articles 12, 14, 43 and 46 EC, Article 10 of Directive 1999/31 and Directive 2000/35?
Is Regulation No 384/2004 valid in so far as, according to that Regulation, subheading 8414 59 30 of the CN covers the goods consisting of a heat sink and a fan?
If Regulation No 384/2004 is invalid, can the Common Customs Tariff then be interpreted to mean that those goods should be classified as ?parts and accessories of the machines of heading 8471? as referred to in subheading 8473 30 90 of the CN?
Is the term ?incidental real estate transactions? in Article 19(2) of the Sixth Directive to be interpreted as covering the activities of a taxable building business in connection with the subsequent sale of buildings constructed by the building business on its own account, as an activity fully subject to VAT, with a view to resale?
Does the answer to the previous question depend on the extent to which the sales activities, viewed separately, entail the use of goods and services on which VAT is payable?
Is it consistent with the principle of neutrality of VAT for a building business which is required to pay VAT on its internal supplies in connection with the construction of buildings on its own account with a view to their subsequent sale, to have only a partial right to deduct VAT for general costs incurred in the building business, on the ground that the subsequent sale of the real estate is exempt from VAT on the basis of Article 28(3)(b) of the Sixth Directive?
Is Article 11(1)(e) of Directive 2004/83/EC to be interpreted as meaning that refugee status ceases to exist if the refugee?s well-founded fear of persecution within the terms of Article 2(c) of that directive, on the basis of which refugee status was granted, no longer exists and he also has no other reason to fear persecution?
If Question 1 is to be answered in the negative: Does the cessation of refugee status under Article 11(1)(e) of the Directive also require that, in the country of the refugee?s nationality, an actor of protection within the meaning of Article 7(1) of the Directive be present, and is it sufficient in that regard if protection can be assured only with the help of multinational troops?
If Question 1 is to be answered in the negative: Does the cessation of refugee status under Article 11(1)(e) of the Directive also require that, in the country of the refugee?s nationality, the refugee should not be threatened with serious harm, within the meaning of Article 15 of the Directive?
If Question 1 is to be answered in the negative: Does the cessation of refugee status under Article 11(1)(e) of the Directive also require that, in the country of the refugee?s nationality, the security situation be stable and the general living conditions ensure a minimum standard of living?
In a situation in which the previous circumstances, on the basis of which the person concerned was granted refugee status, have ceased to exist, are new, different circumstances founding persecution to be measured against the standard of probability applied for recognising refugee status, or is another standard to be applied in favour of the person concerned?
In a situation in which the previous circumstances, on the basis of which the person concerned was granted refugee status, have ceased to exist, are new, different circumstances founding persecution to be assessed having regard to the relaxation of the burden of proof under Article 4(4) of the Directive?
Do Article 43 or 56 of the Treaty preclude legislation of a MS which, in the framework of a national imputation system for corporation tax, excludes the reduction in value of shares as a result of a distribution of dividends from the basis of assessment for that tax when a taxpayer who is entitled to a corporation tax credit has acquired shares in a capital company which is fully taxable from a shareholder who is not entitled to such a tax credit whereas, had the shares been acquired from a shareholder who was entitled to a tax credit, such a reduction in value would have reduced the acquirer?s basis of assessment?
Do Class A 1 anchor devices within the meaning of European standard EN 795 fall exclusively within the scope of Directive 89/106?
If the answer to the previous question is in the negative, do these anchor devices as an item of personal protective equipment fall within the scope of Directive 89/686?
If the answers to the previous questions are in the negative, is it necessary, in the light of Annex II to Directive 89/686 to assess whether personal protective equipment (PPE) that is covered by that directive by itself fulfils the basic requirements of that directive, or is it necessary also to consider whether the anchor device to which the PPE concerned is connected is safe in the foreseeable conditions of use?
Does Community law and, in particular, Decision 93/465 allow for the option of applying a CE marking to an anchor device as evidence of compliance with Directive 89/686 and/or Directive 89/106?
If the answer to the previous question is either wholly or partly in the affirmative, what procedure(s) should be followed in determining compliance in respect of Directive 89/686 and/or Directive 89/106?
Is European standard EN 795 to be regarded as European Union law to be interpreted by the ECJ?
If the answer to the previous question is in the affirmative, is European standard EN 795 to be interpreted as meaning that the anchor device must be tested under foreseeable conditions of use?
If the answer to the previous question is in the affirmative, must the tests be carried out in accordance with user restrictions?
Which damage is, in the case of unlawful conduct to be treated as the initial damage resulting from that conduct; the damage which arises by virtue of the delivery of the defective product or the damage which arises when normal use is made of the product for the purpose for which it was intended?
If the latter is the case, can then the place where that damage occurred be treated as ?the place where the harmful event occurred? within the meaning of Article 5(3) of Regulation 44/2001 only if that damage consists of physical damage to persons or goods, or is this also possible if (initially) only financial damage has been incurred?
Is Article 4(1) of Directive 2002/19/EC, when read in conjunction with recitals 5, 6 and 8 in the preamble to that directive and with Article 5 and Article 8 thereof, to be interpreted as meaning that national legislation, such as that at issue, may provide that any telecommunications operator has an obligation to negotiate on interconnection with another telecommunications operator?
May a national regulatory authority take the view that the obligation to negotiate an interconnection, provided for under Article 4(1) of the Directive, has been breached where an undertaking which does not have significant market power offers another undertaking interconnection under unilateral conditions which are likely to hinder the emergence of a competitive market at the retail level where those conditions prevent the clients of the other undertaking from benefiting from its services?
May a national regulatory authority  require an undertaking which does not have significant market power to negotiate in good faith with another undertaking on the interconnection of SMS and MMS message services between the systems of those two undertakings?
Does the nature of [iMEZ?s] network or whether iMEZ should be regarded as an operator of public electronic communications networks have any bearing on the assessment of the questions set out above?
Is Article 4(1) of Directive 2002/19/EC, recitals 5, 6 and 8 in the preamble to that directive and Article 5 and 8, to be interpreted as meaning that national legislation may provide that any telecommunications operator has an obligation to negotiate on interconnection with another telecommunications operator?
If so, is Article?4(1) of Directive 2002/19/EC, recitals 5, 6 and 8 in the preamble to that directive and Article?5 and?8, to be interpreted as meaning that a national regulatory authority can take the view that the obligation to negotiate has not been complied with where a telecommunications operator which does not have significant market power has offered another undertaking interconnection under conditions which the authority regards as wholly unilateral and likely to hinder the emergence of a competitive market at the retail level?
If so, is Article?4(1) of Directive 2002/19/EC, recitals 5, 6 and 8 in the preamble to that directive and Article?5 and 8, to be interpreted as meaning that the national regulatory authority can in its decision require the aforementioned telecommunications operator, which therefore does not have significant market power, to negotiate in good faith on the interconnection of communications services between the systems of the two undertakings concerned?
Does the nature of the other telecommunications operator's network or whether that operator should be regarded as an operator of public electronic communications networks have any bearing on the assessment of the questions set out above?
Does Article 11(1), (2) and (3) of Directive 92/85 have direct effect?
If those provisions do have direct effect are they to be construed as meaning that there is a continued entitlement to payment of an allowance for on-call duty during periods in which expectant mothers are prohibited from working and/or during maternity leave?
Does it preclude a  MS to adopt a system of continuation of ?pay? which in principle encompasses total income, with the exception, however, of so-called ?extra emoluments? based on tasks performed, such as the allowance for on-call duty at issue here?
Do Articles 43 EC, 49 EC and 86 EC preclude the direct award of a public service which entails the prior execution of certain works, such as the service in question, to a semi-public company formed specifically for the purpose of providing that service and possessing a single corporate purpose, the private participant in the company being selected by means of a public and open procedure, such as that at issue in the main proceedings?
Is the model of a semi-public company formed specifically to provide a particular public service of industrial importance and possessing a single corporate purpose, to which that service is awarded directly consistent with Community law and in particular with the obligations of transparency and free competition referred to in Articles 43 EC, 49 EC and 86 EC?
Is Article 4(1)(a) of Directive 87/344 is to be interpreted as precluding the legal expenses insurer to reserve the right, where a large number of insured persons suffer losses as a result of the same event, itself to select the legal representative of all the insured persons concerned?
Is Article 4(1) of Council Directive 87/344 to be interpreted to the effect that it precludes a clause which entitles the insurer, in respect of insurance claims concerning losses suffered by a large number of insured persons as a result of the same event, to select a legal representative and which thereby restricts the right of the individual insured person to choose his own lawyer?
Is a national provision which does not accord an advantage to that part of a fuel blend consisting of a biofuel composed of vegetable oil meeting the DIN V 51605 standard contrary to Article 3 of Directive 2003/30?
Do the Community law principles of legal certainty and protection of legitimate expectations require that it should be permissible only in wholly exceptional circumstances for a MS which adopts rules for the implementation of Directive 2003/30 and, in doing so, has established a promotion scheme consisting of tax advantages spread over several years, to amend that scheme, during the period laid down, to the disadvantage of an undertaking which previously enjoyed an advantage?
Should Article 49 EC be interpreted as meaning that, where a closed licensing system is applied in a MS to the provision of services relating to games of chance, the application of that article precludes the competent authority of that MS from prohibiting a service provider to whom a licence has already been granted in another MS to provide those services via the internet from also offering those services via the internet in the first MS?
Is the interpretation which the ECJ has given to Article 49 EC, and in particular to the principle of equality and the obligation of transparency arising therefrom, applicable to the procedure for the granting of a licence to offer services relating to games of chance under a statutorily established single-licence system?
Under a statutorily established single-licence system, can the extension of the licence of the existing licence-holder, without potential applicants being given an opportunity to compete for that licence, be a suitable and proportionate means of meeting the overriding reasons in the public interest as justifying restriction of the freedom to provide services in respect of games of chance?
Does it make a difference to the answer to the previous question whether question 2 is answered in the affirmative or the negative?
Is the second indent of Article 5(1)(b) of Regulation 44/2001 to be interpreted as meaning that in the case also of journeys by air from one MS to another MS, the single place of performance for all contractual obligations must be taken to be the place of the main provision of services, determined according to economic criteria?
Where a single place of performance is to be determined: Is the single place of performance determined, in particular, by the place of departure or the place of arrival of the aircraft?
Is a contract for the supply of services, the content of which does not provide for the contracting authority to make a direct payment of consideration to the supplier but for the supplier to be afforded the right to collect payment under private law from third parties, to be classified for that reason alone as a ?service concession? within the meaning of Article 1(3)(b) of Directive 2004/17?
If the previous question is answered in the negative, does a contract of the kind described in the first question constitute a service concession if the risk connected with operating the service in question, because of the rules of public law governing it is significantly limited from the outset?
If the previous question is also answered in the negative, is Article 1(3)(b) of Directive 2004/17 to be interpreted as meaning that the degree of risk connected with operating the service must in qualitative terms be comparable to that which normally exists under conditions in a free market with more than one competing tenderer?
Are Articles [49 EC] and [50 EC] to be interpreted as precluding national legislation which has established a system whereby off-course betting on horseracing is managed exclusively by a single, non-profit-making operator under circumstancs such as those at hand?
Is it appropriate, in order to determine whether national legislation such as that in force in France, to assess the restriction on freedom to provide services solely from the point of view of the restrictions placed on offering on-line horse-race betting?
Must Article 1(1) of Directive 85/577/EEC be interpreted as meaning that it applies to a consumer?s entry into a partnership, commercial partnership, association or cooperative if the principal purpose of joining is not to become a member of the partnership, but participation as a member is simply another means of capital investment or of obtaining services which are typically the object of reciprocal contracts?
Must Article 5(2) of the Directive be interpreted as meaning that it precludes a legal effect under national judge-made law which states that, where a consumer becomes a member following a doorstep transaction, the consequence is that, if the membership is cancelled, the consumer cancelling the membership has a claim against the partnership, calculated at the time that the cancellation takes effect, to his severance balance, that is, a sum corresponding to the value of his interest in the partnership, at the time of retirement from membership?
Does the first subparagraph of Article 4(2) of the Habitats Directive allow a MS to refuse to agree to the Commission?s draft list of SCIs, in relation to one or more sites, on grounds other than nature conservation?
If the previous question is answered in the affirmative: Do those grounds include the interests of municipalities and associations of municipalities, in particular their plans, planning intentions and other interests with regard to the further development of their area?
If the previous questions are answered in the affirmative: Does the third recital in the preamble to the Habitats Directive, Article 2(3) of the directive or other provisions of Community law even require that such grounds be taken into account by the MS and the Commission when giving agreement and establishing the list of SCIs?
If the previous question?is answered in the affirmative: Would it be possible for a municipality which is affected by the inclusion of a particular site in the list to claim in legal proceedings after final adoption of the list that the list infringes Community law, because its interests were not, or not sufficiently, taken into account?
Must ongoing maintenance works in the navigable channels of estuaries, which were definitively authorised under national law before the expiry of the time-limit for transposition of the Habitats Directive, undergo an assessment of their implications pursuant to Article 6(3) or (4) of the directive where they are continued after inclusion of the site in the list of SCIs?
Must Article 153 EC, in conjunction with Articles 3 EC and 95 EC, Article 38 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 4 of Directive 85/577/EEC, be interpreted as meaning that a court seized of an appeal against a judgment given at first instance may, of its own motion, declare a contract which falls within the scope of that directive void, where no plea of nullity was raised at any point by the defendant consumer at the hearing or during the appeal?
On a proper interpretation of Article 6(1) of Directive 2000/78, is it possible to justify national legislation which lays down an age limit of 30 for recruitment to an intermediate career post in the fire service?
Are the provisions in the national law compatible with Article 17 of Directive 2000/78?
Is the expression ?seized and simultaneously or subsequently confiscated? in point (d) of the first paragraph of Article 233 of the Customs Code to be interpreted as meaning that the provision covers situations where goods detained on unlawful introduction are simultaneously or subsequently destroyed by the authorities without their having left the authorities? possession?
Is the Excise Duty Directive to be interpreted as meaning that unlawfully introduced goods which are seized on importation and simultaneously or subsequently destroyed by the authorities are to be regarded as placed under ?a suspension arrangement? with the effect that the excise duty is not incurred or is extinguished?
Is the Sixth Directive (77/388) to be interpreted as meaning that unlawfully introduced goods seized on importation and simultaneously or subsequently destroyed by the authorities are to be regarded as being placed under a ?customs warehousing procedure? with the effect that the VAT debt is not incurred or is extinguished?
Are the Customs Code, the Implementing Regulation, the Excise Duty Directive and the Sixth Directive to be interpreted as meaning that the customs authorities in the MS where unlawful introduction of goods during a TIR operation is detected are competent to charge customs duty, excise duty and VAT on the operation where the authorities in another MS, where the unlawful introduction into the Community occurred, did not detect the irregularity?
Must Article 12(3) of Council Directive 76/308 be interpreted as meaning that, where measures for enforcement of a claim are contested before the court of a MS in which the requested authority has its seat, that court is entitled to review whether the instrument permitting enforcement is enforceable?
Must Article 12(3) of Council Directive 76/308 be interpreted as meaning that, where measures for enforcement of a claim are contested before the court of a MS in which the requested authority has its seat, that court is entitled to review whether the instrument permitting enforcement has been properly served on the debtor?
Does it follow from general legal principles of Community law that service of the instrument permitting enforcement on the debtor in a language other than one he understands, which, moreover, is not an official language of the State in which it is served on the debtor, constitutes a defect which makes it possible to refuse to enforce on the basis of such an instrument permitting enforcement??
Must Article 5(1)(a) and (b) of Directive 89/104 and Article 9(1)(a) and (b) of Regulation 40/94 be interpreted as meaning that a provider of a paid referencing service who makes available to advertisers keywords reproducing or imitating registered trade marks and arranges to create and favourably display advertising links to sites offering infringing goods is using those trade marks in a manner which their proprietor is entitled to prevent?
In the event that the trade marks have a reputation, may the proprietor oppose such use under Article 5(2) of Directive 89/104 and Article 9(1)(c) of Regulation 40/94?
May the provider of the paid referencing service be regarded as providing an information society service consisting of the storage of information provided by the recipient of the service, within the meaning of Article 14 of Directive 2000/31, so that that provider cannot incur liability until it has been notified by the trade mark proprietor of the unlawful use of the sign by the advertiser?
‘Is point 2 of the first paragraph of Article 137 of the Inheritance Tax Code …, in conjunction with Article 111 of the Inheritance Tax Code, compatible with Articles 26 [TFEU], 49 [TFEU], 63 [TFEU] and 65 [TFEU], given that the limitation period in respect of inheritance tax payable on registered shares is two years where the company’s centre of effective management is in Belgium, but 10 years where the company’s centre of effective management is not in Belgium?’
Must Article 282 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, in particular the phrase “to this end, the Community shall be represented by the Commission”, be interpreted as meaning that an institution is properly authorised to represent the Community simply by virtue of the existence of an authority by which the Commission has delegated to that institution its powers of representation in legal proceedings, irrespective of whether or not that authority has appointed by name a natural person empowered to represent the delegate institution?
If the first question is answered in the negative: May a national court such as the Conseil d’Etat determine the admissibility of an action brought by a European institution duly authorised to bring legal proceedings by the Commission, pursuant to the second sentence of Article 282 EC, by examining whether that institution is represented by the appropriate natural person empowered to bring proceedings before the national court?
In the alternative, and in the event of an affirmative reply to Question two: Must the first sentence of the first subparagraph of Article 207 EC, more specifically the phrase “assisted by a Deputy Secretary-General responsible for the running of the General Secretariat”, be interpreted as meaning that the Deputy Secretary-General of the Council may properly represent the Council for the purposes of bringing proceedings before the national courts?
Are the 30th ATP Directive and/or the 1st ATP Regulation, to the extent that they purport to classify or reclassify the nickel carbonates for the relevant endpoints, invalid?
Are the 31st ATP Directive and/or the 1st ATP Regulation, to the extent that they purport to classify or reclassify the nickel hydroxides and the grouped nickel substances, invalid?
Is the 1st ATP Regulation, so far as it concerns the nickel carbonates and the contested nickel substances, invalid?
Does Article 45 of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 preclude the court with which an appeal is lodged under Article 43 or Article 44 of that regulation from refusing or revoking the declaration of enforceability on a ground, other than one of those specified in Articles 34 and 35 of that regulation, which has been advanced against enforcement of the judgment declared enforceable and which arose after that judgment had been delivered, such as the ground that there has been compliance with that judgment?’
Are the [Rome Convention], the [TRIPs Agreement] and the [WPPT] directly applicable within the Community legal order?
Are the above-mentioned sources of uniform international law also directly effective within the context of private-law relationships?
Do the concepts of ‘communication to the public’ contained in the above-mentioned treaty-law texts mirror the Community concepts contained in Directives 92/100 and 2001/29 and, if not, which source should take precedence?
Does the broadcasting, free of charge, of phonograms within private dental practices engaged in professional economic activity, for the benefit of patients of those practices and enjoyed by them without any active choice on their part, constitute ‘communication to the public’ or ‘making available to the public’ for the purposes of the application of Article 3(2)(b) of Directive 2001/29 and are phonogram producers therefore entitled to remumeration?
Is Article 4 of Directive 79/7 to be interpreted as meaning that the annual pension adjustment scheme (indexation) provided for in the law on the statutory pension insurance scheme comes within the scope of the prohibition of discrimination in Article 4(1) of that directive?
If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, is Article 4 of Directive 79/7 to be interpreted as precluding a national provision concerning an annual pension adjustment whereby a potentially smaller increase is provided for a particular category of pensioners receiving a minimum pension than for other pensioners, in so far as the provision in question adversely affects 25% of male pensioners, but 57% of female pensioners, and there are no objective grounds for discrimination?
If the answer to the second question is in the affirmative, may a disadvantage for female pensioners arising from the annual increase in their pensions be justified by the earlier age at which they become entitled to a pension and/or the longer period during which they receive a pension and/or by the fact that the standard amount for a minimum income, provided for under social law (compensatory supplement standard amount), was disproportionately increased, where the provisions concerning the payment of the minimum income provided for under social law (compensatory supplement) require account to be taken of the pensioner’s other income and the income of a spouse living in the common household, whereas in the case of other pensioners the pension increase takes place without account being taken of the pensioner’s other income or the income of the pensioner’s spouse?’
In the circumstances of the main proceedings, is Article 63 of the Customs Code to be interpreted as requiring the customs authority to carry out only an examination of the conformity of the customs declaration with the requirements of Article 62 of that Code by merely undertaking an examination of documents to the extent specified in Article 68 of the Code, and to take a decision concerning acceptance of the customs declaration solely on the basis of the documents presented, where a doubt has arisen as to the correctness of the tariff code of the goods and an expert report is necessary in order to determine that code?
In the circumstances of the main proceedings, is the decision of the customs authority concerning immediate acceptance of the customs declaration pursuant to Article 63 of the Customs Code to be regarded as a decision of a customs authority in accordance with Article 4(5), in conjunction with Article 8(1), first indent, of that Code, and this in respect of the entire content of the customs declaration made?
In the circumstances of the main proceedings, is Article 63 of the Customs Code to be interpreted as meaning that it allows the lawfulness of acceptance of the customs declaration to be contested before a court after release of the goods, or that acceptance of the customs declaration is not contestable, because it merely records the declaration of the goods to the customs authorities and determines the date on which the customs debt on importation is incurred and does not constitute a decision by the customs authority as to the correct tariff classification and the amount of duties due on the basis of that declaration?
Must the provisions of Directive 97/67, as amended by Directive 2002/39, and in particular, but not exclusively, Article 19 thereof, in view of the amendments introduced by Directive 2008/6, be understood and interpreted as precluding Member States from imposing a mandatory external complaints scheme on providers of non&#8209;universal postal services on the ground that as regards the applicable complaints procedures for the protection of the users of postal services, the Directive provides for full harmonisation; or on the ground that that obligation was imposed by Directive 2002/39 only on the universal service provider and, following Directive 2008/6, is imposed on all universal service providers, even though, according to the wording of the third subparagraph of Article 19(1) of Directive 97/67 as amended by Directive 2008/6, Member States may only encourage, but may not impose, the development of independent schemes for the resolution of disputes between the providers of postal services, other than universal postal services, and end-users?
If the answer to the first question is that the Postal Directive does not, as such, preclude Member States from imposing on the providers of non&#8209;universal postal services a mandatory external complaints scheme as envisaged by the first subparagraph of Article 19(2) of Directive 97/67, as amended by Directive 2008/6 for the providers of universal postal services, must the principles relating to the free movement of services (Article 49 et seq. EC; now Article 56 et seq. TFEU) be interpreted in such a way that restrictions on the free movement of services, introduced by a Member State on grounds of overriding reasons in the public interest relating to consumer protection, whereby the providers of non-universal postal services are made subject to a mandatory external complaints scheme as provided for in the first subparagraph of Article 19(2) of Directive 97/67, as amended by Directive 2008/6 for the providers of universal postal services, can be considered compatible with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union even if, in the application of the complaints scheme concerned, no distinction is made between the complaints of consumers and those of other end-users, although the vast majority of the users of those services (in the present case, express delivery and courier services) are business users?
Are the challenged borate classifications in the 30th ATP Directive and/or the 1st ATP Regulation invalid on one or more of the following grounds: the classifications were included in the 30th ATP Directive in breach of essential procedural requirements; the classifications were included in the 30th ATP Directive in breach of Directive 67/548 and/or as a result of manifest errors of assessment; the classifications were included in the 30th ATP Directive in breach of the fundamental Community law principle of proportionality; the 1st ATP Regulation was wrongly adopted using the procedure set out in Article 53 of the CLP Regulation as its legal basis; the criteria for a new harmonised classification under Annex I to the CLP Regulation were not applied, and instead Annex VII to the CLP Regulation was wrongly applied?’
Are the transitional quotas allocated to an undertaking producing sugar on the basis of Article 9 of Regulation No 493/2006 exempt from the temporary restructuring scheme established by Regulation No 320/2006 and by Regulation No 968/2006?
Even if the reply to Question 1 is in the negative, are transitional quotas quotas in their own right, independent of the normal basic quotas?
If the reply to either or both of Questions 1 and 2 is in the affirmative, does an undertaking producing sugar which has applied for restructuring aid for the marketing year 2006/2007 in accordance with Article 3 of Regulation No 320/2006 have a right to a transitional quota allocated for the marketing year 2006/2007 in accordance with Article 9 of Regulation No 493/2006, or to use that quota during the marketing year even though the undertaking has been granted restructuring aid by reference to its normal basic quota, beginning with the marketing year 2006/2007?
If the reply to Question 3 is in the negative, can the penalty applied consist in recovery of part of the restructuring aid granted, together with recovery of the transitional quota?
How must the amount of aid to be recovered under Article 26(1) and the penalty provided for under Article 27 of Regulation No 968/2006 be calculated where an undertaking producing sugar has received restructuring aid (for the 2006/2007 marketing year) and has used its transitional quota (for which no restructuring aid was granted)?
Notwithstanding the preceding questions, when do the commitments entered into on the basis of a restructuring plan take effect, that is to say, when do they become binding on the claimant?
If the reply to either or both of Questions 1 and 2 is in the affirmative, is an undertaking producing sugar which has been allocated a transitional quota for the marketing year 2006/2007 authorised to use that quota during the marketing year even though the undertaking has been granted restructuring aid by reference to its normal basic quota, beginning with the marketing year 2006/2007?
If the reply to Questions 1, 2 and 6 is in the negative, is a competent national authority of a Member State authorised, in the event of failure to fulfil the commitments entered into on the basis of the restructuring plan, to combine recovery of the restructuring aid and the penalty under Articles 26 and 27 of Regulation No 968/2006 with the imposition of a levy on surpluses in accordance with Article 4 of Regulation No 967/2006 or is the combination of penalties in that way inconsistent with the principle ne bis in idem and the principles of proportionality and non-discrimination?
Does the scope of Article 22(2) of [Regulation No 44/2001] also extend to proceedings in which a company or legal person objects, with regard to a claim made against it stemming from a legal transaction, that decisions of its organs which led to the conclusion of the legal transaction are ineffective as a result of infringements of its statutes?
If the [first question] is answered in the affirmative, is Article 22(2) of Regulation No 44/2001 also applicable to legal persons governed by public law in so far as the effectiveness of the decisions of its organs is to be reviewed by civil courts?
If the [second question] is answered in the affirmative, is the court of the Member State last seised in legal proceedings required to stay the proceedings pursuant to Article 27 of Regulation No 44/2001 even if it is claimed that, because a decision of the organs of one of the parties is ineffective under its statutes, an agreement conferring jurisdiction is likewise ineffective?’
Is Article 40(3)(b) of Regulation 1408/71 contrary to Article 18 and 39 of the EC Treaty in that, where a worker lives and works in a type A country and moves to a type B country, it does not permit, during the first year of incapacity to work, the grant of an allowance that takes into account the length of time worked and the period of contribution in the type A country?
Is Article 40(3)(b) of Regulation 1408/71 contrary to Article 18 and 39 of the EC Treaty in that, where a worker lives and works in a type A country and moves to a type B country, it gives rise to discrimination to the detriment of a worker exercising her right of free movement in not permitting the grant to her, during the first year of incapacity to work, of an allowance that takes into account the length of time worked and the period of contribution in the type A country?
Is the definition of medicinal product in Article 1(2) of Directive 2001/83 to be interpreted to the effect that a product intended for human consumption and described as a food supplement is a medicinal product by function if it contains substances which pose a risk to health in the low dose contained in the product when the recommended intake printed on the packaging is observed, without being capable of producing therapeutic effects, but which have therapeutic effects in high doses?
Are Articles 2 and 4 of the Sixth Directive ? and Articles 2 and 9 of Directive 2006/112 ? to be interpreted as meaning that, where a taxable person liable for [VAT] on supplies of services to a subsidiary disposes of shares in that subsidiary, that disposal is a transaction subject to [VAT]?
If yes, is it then covered by the exemption provided for by Article 13B(d)(5) of the [Sixth] Directive ? and Article 135(1)(f) of Council Directive 2006/112 in respect of transactions in shares?
Can there be a right to deduct for expenditure directly attributable to the disposal transaction, in the same way as there is for general costs?
Is it of significance for the answers to the above questions whether the disposal of interests in a subsidiary takes place in stages??
Must article 14(3) of Regulation No 6/2002 be interpreted as referring only to Community designs in the context of an employment relationship where the designer is bound by a contract governed by employment law whose provisions are such that the designer works under the direction and in the employ of another?
Is it necessary to apply the general rule in Article 14(1) of Regulation No?6/2002 and, consequently, must the designs be construed as belonging to the designer, unless the parties stipulate otherwise in the contract?
In the event that national law is to be relied on, is it possible to apply national law where it places on an equal footing designs produced in the context of an employment relationship and designs produced as a result of a commission?
Is regulation No 1788/2003 compatible with article 32 of the Treaty and with the aims of the common agricultural policy which that article sets out?
Is regulation No 1788/2003 compatible with article 33 EC, in so far as the latter provides for organisation of the common market yet at the same time excludes all discrimination between producers or consumers in the Community?
Is regulation No 1788/2003 compatible with article 34 EC in so far as the latter provides that pursuit of the aims laid down in article 33 EC "shall exclude any discrimination between producers or consumers within the Community"?
Is regulation No 1788/2003 compatible with the principle of proportionality laid down in article 5 EC in so far as the latter states that Community action is not to go beyond "what is necessary to achieve the objects of the Treaty"?
Is it contrary to Article 56 EC for a natural person with unlimited tax liability in Germany to be unable to deduct losses from the letting or leasing of real estate located in another Member State ? in contrast to a loss from real estate on national territory ? when calculating taxable income in Germany in the year in which the loss arises?
Is it relevant whether the natural person made the real estate investment himself or does an infringement arise also where the natural person has become the owner of the real estate located in another Member State by way of inheritance?
Is it contrary to Article 56 EC for a natural person with unlimited tax liability in Germany to be able to apply only the normal method of depreciation in calculating income from the letting or leasing of real estate located in another Member State, whilst being able to apply the higher decreasing-balance method of depreciation in the case of real estate on national territory?
If Questions 1 and 2 must be answered in the negative, are the national provisions at issue contrary to the freedom of movement laid down in Article 18 EC?
Are the services supplied "connected with" immovable property within the meaning of Article 9(2)(a) of the Sixth Directive?
If any or all of the services supplied are "connected with" immovable property, is the immovable property with which each or all of the services are connected the immovable property deposited into the pool?
In the meaning of the Sixth Directive, does the "exchange fee" income of a taxable person received for the supplies constitute consideration for a service connected with immovable property?
Must Article 2(a) of Directive 90/435, read in conjunction with point (f) of the annex thereto, be interpreted as meaning that a French company in the form of a ?societe par actions simplifiee? may be regarded as a ?company of a Member State? within the meaning of that directive even before it was amended by Directive 2003/123?
Does Article 2(a) of Directive 90/435 in conjunction with point (f) of the annex thereto and Article 5(1) of that Directive infringe Articles 43 EC and 48 EC or Article 56(1) EC and Article 58(1)(a) and (3) EC in that, in the event of a profit distribution by a German subsidiary it does not include an exemption from withholding tax for French parent companies taking the legal form of a ?societe par actions simplifiee??
Can national legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, be regarded as limiting betting activities in a consistent and systematic manner (in accordance with the Court's case-law) even where the holder(s) of an exclusive licence are entitled to make what they are offering on the market attractive by introducing new games and by means of advertising?
For the purpose of applying legislation of a MS on games of chance which is compatible with Article 49 EC, is it for the national courts to determine, in each case, whether the implementing measure intended to ensure compliance with that legislation is suitable for achieving the objective of that legislation and is compatible with the principle of proportionality?
Does it make any difference if the measure to be taken is required not by the public authorities but by an individual in the context of a civil action?
Should Article 49 EC be interpreted in such a way that the application of it results in the competent authority of a MS being unable to prohibit a service provider which has already been granted a licence in another MS for the online provision of such services from also offering those services online in the first MS?
Is the only substantial processing or working of goods coming under heading 7312 of the [CN] which confers non-preferential origin that which has the effect that the product resulting from that processing or working is to be classified under a different heading of the [CN]?
Is the term activity ?closely related? to hospital care in Article 13A(1)(b) of the Sixth Directive 77/388 to be interpreted so that the services supplied by a stem cell bank, consisting in the collection, transportation, analysis and storage of umbilical cord blood from newborns for autologous use, are covered by it?
Is Article 13A(1)(b) of the Sixth Directive to be interpreted as covering general preventive services where the services are supplied before the hospital or medical care takes place and before the hospital or medical care is required in both temporal and health terms?
Is the term ?other duly recognised establishments of a similar nature? in Article 13A(1)(b) of the Sixth Directive to be interpreted as covering private stem cell banks which has obtained authorisation from a MS?s competent health authorities to handle tissue and cells?
Is the answer to the previous questions affected by whether the above services are supplied with a view to possible allogeneic use and provided by a private stem cell bank which has obtained authorisation from a MS?s competent health authorities to handle tissue and cells?
Is a project of the type at issue covered by "groundwater abstraction and artificial groundwater recharge schemes not included in Annex I" to Directive 85/337?
Does Art. 10 of Directive 85/337 allow "the public concerned" unrestricted access to the courts when the public has participated in the planning consent procedure?
May Member States provide that small, locally established environmental protection associations have a right to participate in the decision-making procedures referred to in Article 2(2) but no right of access to review to challenge the final decision?
On a proper interpretation, in accordance with the principles enshrined in the EU Treaty, of Article 23, read in conjunction with Article 3, of Directive 2003/55, is a national provision contrary to those provisions of Community law which allows a public authority to set a reference price for natural gas which has to be quoted by every supplier in its commercial offers to its domestic customers within the scope of the universal service concept, despite the fact that all customers must be treated as ?free??
Is Article 4(1) of the Sixth VAT Directive to be interpreted in such a way that ?external advertising? by the legally independent provincial organisation of a political party is to be regarded as an economic activity?
In determining whether there is ?economic activity?, should subsidies from public funds which do not form part of the taxable consideration be taken into consideration as if it were as economic advantages?
Are the activities performed by the appellant and described by it as ?external advertising? of such a nature as to be comparable with activities carried out by commercial advertising agencies for the purposes of Annex D (number 10) to the Sixth VAT Directive?
Must Article 7(1) of Directive 2003/88/EC be interpreted as meaning that when the period of leave allocated in the undertaking?s annual planning of leave coincides in time with a temporary disability following an accident at work which happened before that period of leave began, the employee affected, once he returns to work, has the entitlement to use his leave on dates different from those originally allocated?
Must Article 5(1) of Directive 89/104 be interpreted as meaning that a trade mark is used in a manner reserved for the proprietor of the trade mark if the trade mark or a sign similar to it is reserved as a keyword with a search engine operator and advertising for identical or similar goods or services therefore appears on the screen when the trade mark or the sign similar to it is entered as a search term?
Is the trade mark proprietor?s exclusive right infringed by the utilisation of a search term identical with the trade mark for an advertisement for identical goods or services, regardless of whether the accessed advertisement appears in the list of hits or in a separate advertising block and whether it is marked as a ?sponsored link??
Is the fact that the advertisement is marked as a ?sponsored link? and/or appears not in the list of hits but in a separate advertising block sufficient to exclude any likelihood of confusion?
Are the provisions of Directive 93/42 to be interpreted as precluding the application of a national prohibition on commercial exports from the country in question of dental amalgam containing mercury which is based on considerations of environmental and health protection?
Does the fact that the product concerned bears the CE marking have any bearing on that interpretation?
If the answer to the first question is negative, is the national legislation in question compatible with Articles 29 EC and 30 EC where those provisions are applied to dental amalgam which contains mercury and which bears the CE marking?
Does the Warsaw Convention, to which Regulation 2027/97 refers, form part of the rules of the Community legal order which the Court of Justice has jurisdiction to interpret under Article 234 EC?
Must Regulation 2027/97, be interpreted as meaning that, with regard to issues for which no express provision is made, the provisions of the Warsaw Convention, in this case Article 29, continue to apply to a flight between MSs of the Community?
If the answers to the previous questions are in the affirmative, are Article 29 of the Warsaw Convention and Regulation 2027/97, to be interpreted as meaning that the period of two years laid down in that article can be suspended or interrupted or that the carrier or its insurer can waive that time-limit, by an act deemed by the national court to constitute recognition of liability?
Is Article 5(2) of Directive 2005/29 to be interpreted as meaning that it precludes a national provision which states that a commercial practice whereby the participation of consumers in a prize competition or lottery is made conditional on the purchase of goods or the use of services is in principle unlawful, irrespective of whether, in any particular case, the advertising in question affects consumers? interests?
Where a non-EU national spouse and her EU national children accompanied an EU national who came to another MS, where he was a worker and then ceased to be a worker and left the MS, but the spouse and children, who are not self-sufficient, remained in the host MS where the children commenced primary education shortly after their arrival there while the EU national was a worker, do the spouse and children only enjoy a right of residence in the host MS if they satisfy the conditions set out in Directive 2004/38 or do they enjoy a right to reside derived from Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68 without being required to satisfy the conditions set out in Directive 2004/38?
If they enjoy a right to reside derived from Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68, must they have access to sufficient resources so as not to become a burden on the social assistance system of the host MS and have comprehensive sickness insurance cover in the host MS?
If they enjoy a right to reside only if they satisfy the conditions in Directive 2004/38, is the position different in circumstances where the children commenced primary education and the EU-national worker ceased working prior to the date by which Directive 2004/38 was to be implemented by the Member States?
Must Article 43 EC, read in conjunction with Article 48 EC and 12 EC, and/or Article 56 EC be interpreted as precluding legislation of a MS, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, under which a resident company is taxed in respect of an ?unusual? or ?gratuitous? advantage which it has granted to a company established in another MS with which it has, directly or indirectly, a relationship of interdependence, whereas a resident company cannot be taxed on such an advantage where the advantage has been granted to another resident company with which it has such a relationship?
Must Community law and the principle of effective judicial protection be interpreted as precluding legislation of a MS under which the admissibility before the courts of actions relating to electronic communications services between end-users and providers of those services, concerning the rights conferred by that directive, is conditional upon an attempt to settle the dispute out of court?
In the case where goods bearing a trade mark proprietor?s mark have first been placed on the market within the EEA, but not by him or with his express consent, must the same criteria be applied in determining whether this has occurred with the (implied) consent of the trade mark proprietor, within the meaning of Article 7(1) of Directive 89/104, as are applied in the case where such goods have previously been placed on the market outside the EEA by the trade mark proprietor or with his consent?
Does the principle of the freedom of movement for workers laid down in Article 39 EC preclude a provision of national law pursuant to which a ?joueur espoir? who at the end of his training period signs a professional player?s contract with a club of another Member State of the European Union may be ordered to pay damages?
If so, does the need to encourage the recruitment and training of young professional players constitute a legitimate objective or an overriding reason in the general interest capable of justifying such a restriction?
Does the Community law at hand preclude a provision of national law pursuant to which a ?joueur espoir? who at the end of his training period signs a professional player?s contract with a club of another Member State of the European Union may be ordered to pay damages?
Does the need to encourage the recruitment and training of young professional players constitute a legitimate objective or an overriding reason in the general interest capable of justifying such a restriction?
Do Articles 43 EC and 48 EC preclude legislation of a MS which makes it possible for a parent company to form a single tax entity with its resident subsidiary but which prevents the formation of such a single tax entity with a non-resident subsidiary, in that the profits of that non-resident subsidiary are not subject to the fiscal legislation of that MS?
Must the Community law at hand be interpreted as precluding national law which allow a parent company and its subsidiary to opt to have the tax for which they are liable levied on the parent company established in that Member State as if they were a single taxpayer, but which reserve that option to companies which, for the taxation of their profits, are subject to the fiscal jurisdiction of the Member State concerned?
Does Regulation 881/2002  apply to the provision by the State of social security or social assistance benefits to the spouse of a person designated by the Sanctions Committee on the ground only that the spouse lives with the designated person and will or may use some of the money to pay for goods and services which the latter will consume or from which he will benefit?
Does Directive 2000/78 preclude a national measure setting a maximum age for practising as a panel dentist in order to protect the health of patients insured under the statutory health insurance scheme?
May national law enacted prior to the adoption of Directive 2000/78 which is incompatible with that Directive be disapplied by virtue of the primacy of European law?
Is it compatible with Article 39 EC that a finding of equivalence under national legislation is made only if it can be established on the basis of the documentary evidence submitted that the European Union citizen has the knowledge and skills as tested in the MS examination of compulsory subjects provided for in national legislation?
Is it compatible with Article 39 EC that the finding of equivalence under national law takes the material examined in the compulsory subjects of the first MS examination as its reference point, but in the light of the legal education successfully completed elsewhere in the Community only somewhat ?lowered? requirements are imposed?
Is Regulation 44/2001 to be interpreted as meaning that a social security institution may bring an action directly against the insurer in the courts for the place in a Member State where the social security institution is established, provided that such a direct action is permitted and the insurer is domiciled in a Member State?
Is the Community law at hand to be interpreted as meaning that it precludes a rule which obliges a member of a managing board of a company limited by shares governed by Swiss law who is employed in Germany to be insured in the German statutory pension insurance scheme, whereas members of managing boards of companies limited by shares governed by German law are exempt from that obligation?
Must Directive 85/374 be interpreted as precluding national legislation which allows the substitution of one defendant for another after the expiry of the 10-year period laid down in the Community law at hand?
Is Regulation 1408/71 interpreted as meaning that the divorced wife of a man who is resident in another MS, maintains her right to family allowances (in respect of a child) vis-a-vis the MS where the ex-husband lives if she establishes residence in another MS?
Is Regulation 1408/71 to be interpreted as meaning that the divorced wife has a right to family allowances (in respect of a child)  vis-a-vis the MS where the ex-husband lives if she takes up employment in the new MS?
Must Article 16 of Regulation 318/2006 be interpreted as meaning that even a sugar quota which cannot be utilised as a consequence of a preventive withdrawal must be included in the assessment of the production charge?
If the answer to the previous question is in the affirmative: Is Article 16 of Regulation 318/2006 compatible with primary law, in particular with the principle of proportionality and the principle of non-discrimination derived from Article 34 EC?
Is the term low-sugar jams in Part A of Annex III to Directive 95/2 to be interpreted as also covering jams described as extra jam?
How is the term low-sugar jams in Part A of Annex III to Directive 95/2 to be interpreted otherwise?
Does the term low-sugar jams also cover jams described as extra jam with a soluble dry matter content of 58%?
Is the second paragraph of Part II of Annex I to Directive 2001/113 to be interpreted as meaning that the term extra jam can be authorised also in respect of jams which have a soluble dry matter content of less than 60% where in the case of such jams no less strict requirements are imposed on the term jam?
Is Note 5(B) to Chapter 84 of the CN to be so interpreted that it allows an electrical adapter, which is designed to provide the electrical connection between an automatic programming machine and electrical components to be programmed, to be classified under heading 8471 of the CN?
If the previous question is answered in the negative: Is the aforementioned adapter then to be classified under heading 8471 of the CN if it contains a so-called memory-chip, on which the programming process is stored and from which it can be retrieved?
Is Article 24 of [the] Customs Code to be interpreted as meaning that the separation, purification and crushing of silicon metal blocks and the subsequent sieving, sorting and packaging of the silicon grains resulting from the crushing constitutes origin-conferring processing or working?
If the answer to the first question is in the negative, is Regulation 398/2004 valid?
Is there a requirement under the relevant provisions of the Community legislation concerning ?livestock? aid applications ? and, specifically, under Regulation No 1254/1999 ? to the effect that an application for special premiums for male bovine animals or payments for extensification must be accompanied by a valid legal document attesting to the fact that the aid applicant has the right to use the forage areas to which the application relates?
Must Community law, in particular Article 12(2) and (5) and Article 217(1) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 (customs code) and Article 11 of the 
Commission Regulation No 12/97 (implementing regulation), in conjunction with Article 243 of the Customs Code, be interpreted to mean that a person involved in proceedings concerning customs duties which have been imposed may challenge their imposition by producing binding tariff information issued in another Member State for the same goods, which information was still the subject of a legal dispute at that time, but was eventually revised?
If the answer to Question 1 is in the affirmative: Can the person declaring the goods to customs in his own name and for his own account successfully rely in a case such as this, when making customs declarations for release for free circulation, on binding tariff information whose holder is not that person, but an associated firm on whose instructions that person made the customs declarations?
If the answer to Question 2 is in the negative: Does Community law preclude a person in a case such as this from successfully relying on a national policy decision in which the national authorities raise the expectation that, in respect of the tariff classification of the goods declared, it can rely on tariff information issued to a third party for the same goods?
Is the Common Customs Tariff (CN), in the version of Commission Regulation No 2031/2001 and in the version of Commission Regulation No 1832/2002 to be interpreted as meaning that a product described as a “malt beer base” with an alcoholic strength by volume of approximately 14%, obtained from brewed beer which has been clarified and then subjected to ultrafiltration, by which the concentration of ingredients such as bitter substances and proteins has been reduced, is to be classified under heading 2208?
Is a hotel operator which provides in guest bedrooms televisions and/or radios to which it distributes a broadcast signal a “user” making a “communication to the public” of a phonogram which may be played in a broadcast for the purposes of Article 8(2) of Codified Directive 2006/115/EC …?
If the answer to paragraph (1) is in the affirmative, does Article 8(2) of Directive 2006/115/EC … oblige Member States to provide a right to payment of equitable remuneration from the hotel operator in addition to equitable remuneration from the broadcaster for the playing of the phonogram?
If the answer to paragraph (1) is in the affirmative, does Article 10 of Directive 2006/115/EC … permit Member States to exempt hotel operators from the obligation to pay “single equitable remuneration” on the grounds of “private use” within the meaning of Article 10(1)(a)?
Is a hotel operator which provides in a guest bedroom apparatus (other than a television or radio) and phonograms in physical or digital form which may be played on or heard from such apparatus a “user” making a “communication to the public” of the phonograms within the meaning of Article 8(2) of Directive 2006/115/EC …?
If the answer to paragraph (4) is in the affirmative, does Article 10 of Directive 2006/115/EC … permit Member States to exempt hotel operators from the obligation to pay “a single equitable remuneration” on the grounds of “private use” within the meaning of Article 10(1)(a) of Directive 2006/115/EC?’
Are the rules laid down in the HBG on the compulsory retirement age for civil servants based on an aim in the public interest in accordance with standards of EU law, in particular Directive 2000/78/EC?
What specific requirements should be satisfied by the reasonableness and suitability of a retirement age arrangement within the meaning of the rules laid down in the HBG, implementing Directive 2000/78/EC?
What requirements need to be met as regards the coherence of Hessen’s and possibly Federal German legislation on retirement ages, in application of Directive 2000/78/EC?
‘Are Articles 1(2) and 8(2) and (4) of Directive 91/439/EEC to be interpreted as meaning that a host Member State is entitled to refuse to recognise a driving licence issued by another Member State where entries appearing in the driving licence show that Article 7(1)(b) of that directive has been infringed, if the host Member State has not previously applied to the holder of the licence a measure under Article 8(2) of Directive 91/439/EEC?’
Is Regulation No 1417/2007 valid in so far as it classifies under CN code 3926 90 97 the false nails, and thereby the false nail sets, described in the Annex to the said Regulation?
If the answer to Question 1 is in the negative: Is the CN to be interpreted as requiring that the false nail sets in issue be classified as “manicure or pedicure preparations” under tariff sub-heading 3304 30 00 or as “manicure or pedicure sets and instruments (including nail files)” under tariff sub-heading 8214 20 00?
Do the facts construed in abstracto as a criminal offence committed by Mr Patriciello, a Member of the European Parliament (described in the indictment and in favour of whom the European Parliament has adopted a decision to defend his immunity), categorised as making false accusations under Article 368 of the Penal Code, correspond to the expression of an opinion in the performance of parliamentary duties for the purposes of Article 8 of the Protocol?
Is Article 1(1226) of Law No 296 …, in conjunction with the first paragraph of Article 5 of the … Decree of 17 October 2007 and with Article 2(6) of [Regional] Law No 31 …, compatible with [European Union] law, and in particular with the principles which may be inferred from Directives 2001/77… and 2009/28… and the [Birds and Habitats Directives], in so far as those provisions absolutely prohibit, without distinction, the location of wind turbines not intended for self&#8209;consumption in the SCIs and SPAs comprising the “Natura 2000” ecological network, instead of requiring an appropriate environmental impact assessment to be carried out to analyse the impact of an individual project on the particular site affected?’
Do Articles 23 EC, 43 EC, 49 EC and 56 EC and Article 11(2) and (6) and Article 24 of Directive 2003/54 preclude national legislation which, without the Commission having been notified of it, requires on a permanent basis certain electricity producers which are, in certain circumstances, essential for the purpose of meeting the requirements of the demand for dispatching services, to submit bids on the energy exchange markets according to programmes determined by the system operator in accordance with external rules, and which prevents producers from freely determining the remuneration for such bids by linking the remuneration to criteria which have not been pre-determined in accordance with transparent, non-discriminatory and market-based procedures?
Is the sixth indent of Article 9(2)(e) of [the Sixth Directive] … to be interpreted as meaning that “supply of staff” also includes the supply of self-employed persons not in the employ of the trader providing the service?
Are Articles 17(1), 17(2)(a), 17(3)(a) and 18(1)(a) of [the Sixth Directive] … to be interpreted as meaning that provision must be made in national procedural law to ensure that the taxability and liability to tax of one and the same service are assessed in the same way in relation to the trader providing the service and the trader receiving it, even where the two traders fall within the jurisdiction of different tax authorities?
Only if the answer to Question 2 is in the affirmative, are Articles 17(1), 17(2)(a), 17(3)(a) and 18(1)(a) of [the Sixth Directive] … to be interpreted as meaning that the period within which the recipient of a service may apply for a deduction of the input tax connected with the service received must not expire before a decision on taxability and liability to tax which is binding on the trader providing the service has been adopted?’
Is Article 77(2)(b)(i) of Regulation … No 1408/71 to be interpreted as meaning that family allowances need not be granted by the former State of employment to persons who receive pensions for old age, invalidity or an accident at work or occupational disease under the legislation of more than one Member State (double or multiple pension holders) and whose pension entitlement is based on the legislation of the former State of employment (national pension entitlement) if provision is made in the State of residence for a comparable, higher benefit, which is, however, incompatible with another benefit for which the person concerned, having been given the choice, has opted?
Is Article 78(2)(b)(i) of Regulation … No 1408/71 to be interpreted as meaning that family allowances for orphans of a deceased employed or self-employed person who was subject to the legislation of several Member States and who enjoyed a notional entitlement to an orphan’s pension based on the legislation of the former State of employment (potential national pension entitlement) need not be granted by the former State of employment if provision is made in the State of residence for a comparable, higher benefit, which is, however, incompatible with another benefit for which the person concerned, having been given a choice, has opted?
Does the same apply to a benefit under Article 77 or Article 78 of Regulation … No 1408/71 for which provision is generally made in the children’s State of residence, but for which the person concerned, as someone who is not being given a choice, cannot opt?’
Does and, if so, under what circumstances, national legislation concerning the prohibition of an association for infringement of the principles of international understanding fall within the field coordinated by the Directive, and is it thus precluded by Article 2a of Directive 89/552/ EEC?
Where a Turkish national, having leave to remain in the United Kingdom on condition that he does not engage in any business or profession, enters into self-employment in breach of that condition and then applies to the national authorities for further leave to remain on the basis of the business which he has now established, is he entitled to the benefit of Article 41(1) of the Additional Protocol?
Under Union law, in particular the Agreement with Switzerland on the free movement of persons and Article 72 of Regulation No 1408/71, can a qualification period for family benefit in the form of income-related benefit for childcare be completed in its entirety through employment and insurance in Switzerland?
Under Union law, in particular the Agreement with Switzerland on the free movement of persons and Articles 3(1) and 72 of Regulation No 1408/71, is income earned in Switzerland to be equated with domestic income in the determination of entitlement to family benefit in the form of income-related benefit for childcare?
Is Article 9(2)(b) of Royal Decree 1470/2007, which makes the opportunity to acquire entitlement to single payments from the national reserve subject to the condition that young farmers should have set up their first business under a Rural Development Programme established under Regulation No 1698/2005, compatible with Article 42(3) of Regulation No 1782/2003?
Does Article 4(2) of Directive 69/335 entitle a Member State to reintroduce, as from 1 January 2007, capital duty on a loan taken up by a capital company, if the creditor is entitled to a share in the profits of that company, in the case where that Member State has previously waived the charging of that duty as from the date of its accession to the Union, that is to say, from 1 May 2004?
Is Article 7(1) of Directive 2003/88 to be interpreted as precluding national legislation and/or practices under which entitlement to minimum paid annual leave lapses at the end of the reference period and/or carry-over period even in the case where the worker has been unfit for work over a prolonged period (and that prolonged period of unfitness for work has the result that that worker could have accumulated entitlements to minimum leave for several years if the possibility of carrying over such entitlements had not been limited in time)?
If that question is answered in the negative, must the possibility of carrying over leave entitlement exist for a period of at least 18 months?
‘Does Article 5(1) of [Directive 92/100], now Article 6(1) of [Directive [2006/115], …, preclude a national provision which sets the remuneration at a flat rate of [EUR] 1 per adult per year and of [EUR] 0.5 per minor per year?’
Must the provisions of European Union law concerning copyright and related rights, in particular Article 2(2), (5) and (6) of Directive 92/100, Article 1(5) of Directive 93/83 and Article 2(1) of Directive 93/98, in conjunction with Article 4 of Directive 92/100, Article 2 of Directive 93/83 and Articles 2 and 3 and Article 5(2)(b) of Directive 2001/29, be interpreted as meaning that the principal director of a cinematographic or audiovisual work or other authors of films who are designated by the legislatures of the Member States are directly (originally) entitled in any event, by operation of law, to the exploitation rights in respect of reproduction, satellite broadcasting and other communication to the public through the making available to the public and that the film producer is not entitled thereto directly (originally) and exclusively; are laws of the Member States which allocate the exploitation rights by operation of law directly (originally) and exclusively to the film producer inconsistent with European Union law?
Does European Union law allow the legislatures of the Member States the option, even in respect of rights other than rental and lending rights, of providing for a statutory presumption in favour of a transfer to the film producer of the exploitation rights within the meaning of [Question] 1 to which the principal director of a cinematographic or audiovisual work or other authors of films who are designated by the legislatures of the Member States are entitled and, if so, must the conditions laid down in Article 2(5) and (6) of Directive 92/100, in conjunction with Article 4 of that directive, be satisfied?
Must the original ownership of rights which is enjoyed by the principal director of a cinematographic or audiovisual work or other authors of films who are designated by the legislature of a Member State also be applied to the rights granted by the legislature of a Member State to equitable remuneration, such as ‘blank cassette remuneration’ pursuant to Paragraph 42b of the [UrhG], or to rights to fair compensation within the meaning of Article 5(2)(b) of Directive 2001/29?
Does European Union law allow the legislatures of the Member States the option of providing for a statutory presumption in favour of a transfer to the film producer of the rights to remuneration within the meaning of [Question 2(b)] to which the principal director of a cinematographic or audiovisual work or other authors of films who are designated by the legislatures of the Member States are entitled and, if so, must the conditions laid down in Article 2(5) and (6) of Directive 92/100, in conjunction with Article 4 of that directive, be satisfied?
If a statutory provision of a Member State accords to the principal director of a cinematographic or audiovisual work or other authors of films who are designated by the legislatures of the Member States a right to half of the statutory rights to remuneration, but provides that that right is capable of alteration and not therefore unwaivable, is that provision consistent with the aforementioned provisions of European Union law in the area of copyright and related rights?’
Is Paragraph 3(64) of the EStG compatible with the freedom of movement of workers pursuant to Article 39 EC and/or the freedom of movement of Union citizens pursuant to Article 18 EC, or does it constitute covert discrimination on grounds of nationality, prohibited by Article 12 EC?
Does the provision in the last sentence of Article 88(3) EC, now Article 108(3) TFEU, mean that, in a case such as the present, where the unlawful aid measure was implemented by granting the lender a guarantee which enabled the borrower to obtain a loan from the lender which would not have been available to it under normal market conditions, the national courts, within the framework of their obligation to remedy the consequences of the unlawful aid measure, are obliged, or at any rate authorised, to cancel the guarantee, even if that does not result in the cancellation of the loan granted under the guarantee?
Must Articles 18, 45, 49 and 54 TFEU be interpreted as precluding the legislature of a Member State from adopting or maintaining a rule the purpose of which is to reserve the benefit of taxation at the reduced rate of 7% to non-profit-making associations, friendly societies or national unions of friendly societies, professional unions and international non-profit-making associations, private foundations and public-interest foundations which are established in a Member State in which, at the time of death, the deceased – a resident of Wallonia – actually resided or had her place of work, or in which she had previously actually resided or had her place of work?
Where there is differential VAT treatment as between supplies that are identical from the point of view of the consumer, or as between similar supplies that meet the same needs of the consumer, is that of itself sufficient to establish an infringement of the principle of fiscal neutrality, regardless of any difference in national licencing regimes?
Is a taxpayer whose supplies are, as a matter of national law, subject to VAT (by reason of the exercise by a Member State of its discretion under Article 13B(f) of the Sixth Directive) entitled to claim a repayment of VAT paid on those supplies on the basis of an infringement of the principle of fiscal neutrality arising out of the VAT treatment of other supplies (“comparator supplies”) where as a matter of national law, the comparator supplies were subject to VAT but the taxing authority of the Member State had a practice of treating comparator supplies as exempt from VAT?
In determining whether the principle of fiscal neutrality requires the same tax treatment of the types of machine FOBTs and Part III gaming machines, what level of abstraction should be adopted by the national court in determining whether the products are similar?
If the answer to Question 2 is in the affirmative, what conduct amounts to a relevant practice?
In a situation where a Member State, in the exercise of its discretion under Article 13B(f) of the Sixth VAT Directive, exempted gambling from VAT but subjected a defined class of machines used for gambling to VAT is there in principle a defence of due diligence available to a Member State to a claim that the principle of fiscal neutrality has been infringed by that Member State, and, if so, what factors are relevant in determining whether or not the Member State is entitled to rely on that defence?
If the difference in fiscal treatment results from a consistent practice of the domestic tax authorities based on a generally accepted understanding of the true meaning of domestic legislation, does it make any difference to the existence of a breach of the principle of fiscal neutrality if: the tax authorities subsequently change their practice; a national court subsequently holds that the amended practice reflects the correct meaning of domestic legislation; or the Member State is precluded by domestic and/or European law principles, including legitimate expectation, estoppel, legal certainty and non retroactivity, and/or by limitation periods from collecting the VAT on the supplies previously regarded as exempt?
Must Article 7(1) of Directive 2003/88 be interpreted as precluding national provisions or practices which make entitlement to paid annual leave conditional on a minimum of 10 days’ (or one month’s) actual work during the reference period?
If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, does Article 7 of Directive 2003/88, which imposes a specific obligation on an employer in so far as it creates entitlement to paid leave for a worker who is absent on health grounds for a period of one year or more, require a national court hearing proceedings between individuals to disregard a conflicting national provision which makes entitlement to paid annual leave conditional on at least 10 days’ actual work during the reference year?
Since Article 7 of Directive 2003/88 does not distinguish between workers according to whether their absence from work during the reference period is due to a work-related accident, an occupational disease, an accident on the journey to or from work or a non-occupational disease, are workers entitled, under that directive, to paid leave of the same length whatever the reason for their absence on health grounds, or must that directive be interpreted as not precluding the length of paid leave differing according to the reason for the worker’s absence, if national law provides in certain circumstances for the length of paid annual leave to exceed the minimum of four weeks provided for by the directive?
In the context of Directive 2008/95/EC, is it necessary for the various goods or services covered by a trade mark application to be identified with any, and if so what particular, degree of clarity and precision?
In the context of Directive 2008/95/EC, is it permissible to use the general words of the class headings of the Nice Classification for the purpose of identifying the various goods or services covered by a trade mark application?
In the context of Directive 2008/95/EC, is it necessary or permissible for such use of the general words of the Class Headings of the Nice Classification to be interpreted in accordance with Communication No 4/03?
Is Article 204(1)(a) of the Customs Code to be interpreted as meaning that it also applies to non-fulfilment of those obligations which are to be fulfilled only after discharge of the relevant customs procedure which has been used, so that where goods imported under an inward processing procedure in the form of a system of suspension have been partly re-exported within the time-limit the failure to fulfil the obligation to supply the bill of discharge to the supervising office within 30 days of the expiry of the time-limit for discharging the procedure gives rise to a customs debt in respect of the entire quantity of the imported goods covered by the bill of discharge if the requirements of Article 859(9) of the Implementing Regulation are not fulfilled?
Is an entity, in the persons of future partners, which effects investment expenditure before formal registration of the partnership as an entity governed by commercial law or registration for purposes of value added tax, entitled, following registration of the partnership as an entity governed by commercial law and registration for purposes of value added tax, to exercise, pursuant to Article 9 and Articles 168 and 169 of Directive 2006/112, the right to deduct input tax incurred in connection with investment expenditure which is used for taxable activities carried out within the framework of the partnership?
Does an invoice documenting incurred investment expenditure which was issued to the partners, and not to the partnership, preclude exercise of the right to deduct input tax incurred in connection with investment expenditure as referred to in Question 1?
Does Directive 97/13 and, in particular, Article 6 thereof, permit Member States to charge holders of general authorisations an annual fee which is calculated on the basis of a percentage of gross operating income invoiced in the relevant year, subject to such amount not exceeding two per thousand, and which is applied for the purpose of defraying the costs, including management costs, incurred by the telecommunications regulatory body in the implementation of the scheme of licences and general authorisations, as provided for in Article 71 of Law 11/1998?
Can the determination that a strategic assessment of effects on the environment need not be carried out in the case of documents relating to land planning at local level, in which only one subject of economic activity is mentioned, as laid down in the legislation of the Republic of Lithuania, inter alia in point 3.4 of the Schedule confirmed by Decree No 967, be regarded as a specification of types of plans and programmes within the meaning of Article 3(5) of Directive 2001/42/EC?
Are the provisions of national law applicable in the present case, which provide that, in each specific case in which the potential significance of effects on the environment is not determined, a strategic assessment of the effects on the environment of land planning documents applied to small areas of land at local level, as in the present case, is not to be carried out solely on the basis that mention is made in those documents of one subject of economic activity, compatible with the requirements of Article 3(2)(a), (3) and (5) of Directive 2001/42?
Are the provisions of Directive 2001/42, including Article 11(1) thereof, to be construed as meaning that in circumstances such as those obtaining in the present case, in which an environmental impact assessment was carried out pursuant to Directive 85/337/EEC, the requirements of Directive 2001/42 are not applicable?
Does the scope of application of Article 11(2) of Directive 2001/42 encompass Directive 85/337?
If the answer to Question 4 is in the affirmative, does the fact that an assessment has been carried out pursuant to Directive 85/337 mean that the obligation to carry out an assessment of effects on the environment pursuant to the requirements of Directive 2001/42, in a situation such as that which has arisen in the present case, would be regarded as constituting duplication of assessment within the meaning of Article 11(2) of Directive 2001/42?
If the answer to Question 5 is in the affirmative, does Directive 2001/42, including Article 11(2) thereof, place Member States under an obligation to provide in national law for joint or coordinated procedures governing the assessment to be carried out pursuant to Directive 2001/42 and Directive 85/337 with a view to avoiding duplication of assessment?
Is Article 19(2) of Regulation No 2201/2003 applicable if a court of a Member State first seised by one party to resolve matters of parental responsibility is called upon to grant only provisional measures and a court of another Member State subsequently seised by the other party of an action with the same object is called upon to rule on the substance of the matter, even though the ruling on provisional measures is not capable of recognition in another Member State within the meaning of Article 21 of Regulation No 2201/2003?
Do Article 15 of Directive 2000/43 and Article 17 of Directive 2000/78 preclude national legislation or a judgment of the Curtea Constitu&#539;ional&#259; prohibiting the national judicial authorities from awarding to claimants who have been discriminated against compensation for material and/or non&#8209;material damage which is considered appropriate in cases in which the compensation for the damage caused by discrimination relates to salary rights provided for by law granted to a socio&#8209;professional category other than that to which the claimants belong?
If the answer to Question 1 is in the affirmative: Are the national courts required to await the repeal or amendment of the provisions of national law – and/or a change in the case&#8209;law of the Curtea Constitu&#539;ional&#259; – which are, ex hypothesi, contrary to the provisions of EU law, or are the courts required to apply EU law, as interpreted by the CJEU, directly and immediately to the proceedings pending before them, declining to apply any provision of national law or any judgment of the Curtea Constitu&#539;ional&#259; which is contrary to the provisions of EU law?
Must Articles 3(1) of the First Directive, 2(1) of the Second Directive and 1 and 1a of the Third Directive be interpreted to the effect that they preclude national civil law from providing that if, when two vehicles collide, the event is not attributable to the fault of either driver, and it gives rise to personal injury to the passenger in one of the vehicles (the injured person seeking compensation), the compensation to which the latter is entitled is to be refused or limited, on the ground that that passenger has contributed to the occurrence of the injury, for he was travelling in the vehicle, in the front passenger seat, without fastening his seat-belt as required by national legislation?
Is Article 11 of Regulation No 320/2006 to be interpreted as meaning that the temporary restructuring amount, laid down in Article 11(2), of EUR 113.30 per tonne of quota for sugar and inulin syrup for the marketing year 2008/2009 must in any case be imposed in full, even if such payment would result in a (significant) surplus in the restructuring fund and there appears to be no prospect of any further increase in financing requirements?
In the event that the reply to the first question is in the affirmative, does Article 11 of Regulation No 320/2006 in that case infringe the principle of conferral, because Article 11 could, by means of the temporary restructuring amount, introduce a general tax which is not limited to financing expenditure benefiting the persons called upon to pay the tax?
Does Article 7 of Directive 2003/88 also apply to the employment relationships of public servants?
Does Article 7(1) of Directive 2003/88 also cover entitlements to annual leave where national law provides for such an entitlement of more than four weeks?
Does Article 7(1) of Directive 2003/88 also apply to entitlements to leave of absence granted under national law in addition to annual leave in compensation for work performed on public holidays owing to the irregular distribution of working time?
Can a public servant who has retired base an entitlement to payment in lieu of annual leave directly on Article 7(2) of Directive 2003/88 if he has been prevented from working by sickness and has not therefore been able to take leave in the form of leave of absence from work?
Can such an entitlement to payment in lieu be at least partly precluded by the premature forfeiture of entitlement to leave prescribed in national law?
Does the scale of the entitlement to payment in lieu based on Article 7(2) of Directive 2003/88 extend only to the minimum leave of four weeks guaranteed by Article 7(1) of Directive 2003/88/EC, or does the entitlement to a payment in lieu also extend to the additional leave entitlements for which national law provides? Do those extended leave entitlements also include entitlements to leave of absence arising solely from a particular distribution of working time?
Must Article 1(3)(b) of Directive 2004/17 be interpreted as meaning that it is necessary to treat as a public service concession a contract under which the successful tenderer is granted the right to provide public bus services, in cases where part of the consideration consists in the right to operate the public transport services but where, at the same time, the contracting authority compensates the service provider for losses arising as a result of the provision of services, and in addition the public law provisions governing the provision of the service and the contractual provisions limit the risk associated with operation of the service?
If the first question is answered in the negative, has Article 2d(1)(b) of Directive 92/13 been directly applicable in Latvia since 21 December 2009?
If the second question is answered in the affirmative, must Article 2d(1)(b) of Directive 92/13 be interpreted as being applicable to public contracts entered into before the end of the period prescribed for domestic law to be brought into conformity with Directive 2007/66?
Do Directives 2001/29 and 2004/48, in conjunction with Directives 95/46, 2000/31 and 2002/58, construed in particular in the light of Articles 8 and 10 of the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, permit Member States to authorise a national court, before which substantive proceedings have been brought and on the basis merely of a statutory provision, to order a hosting service provider to introduce, for all its customers, in abstracto and as a preventive measure, at its own cost and for an unlimited period, a system for filtering most of the information which is stored on its servers in order to identify on its servers electronic files containing musical, cinematographic or audio-visual work in respect of which SABAM claims to hold rights, and subsequently to block the exchange of such files?
In interpreting Article 7(1) of Directive 69/335 must a national court take account of the provisions of amending directives, in particular Directives 73/79 and 73/80, even though those directives were no longer in force when the Republic of Poland acceded to the European Union?
If the answer to Question 1 is in the negative, does the exclusion of the assets of a capital company from the amount on which capital duty is charged, as laid down in the first indent of Article 5(3) of Directive 69/335, concern only the assets of a capital company which has had an increase in capital?
Must the host Member State pay due regard to Articles 49 TFEU and 54 TFEU when a company established in another Member State (the Member State of origin) transfers its seat to that host Member State and, at the same time and for this purpose, deletes the entry regarding it in the commercial register in the Member State of origin, and the company’s owners adopt a new instrument of constitution under the laws of the host Member State, and the company applies for registration in the commercial register of the host Member State under the laws of the host Member State?
If the answer to the first question is yes, must Articles 49 TFEU and 54 TFEU be interpreted in such a case as meaning that they preclude legislation or practices of such a (host) Member State which prohibit a company established lawfully in any other Member State (the Member State of origin) from transferring its seat to the host Member State and continuing to operate under the laws of that State?
In the event of international conversion within the Community, when deciding on the company’s application for registration, must the host Member State take into consideration the instrument recording the fact of the transfer of company seat in the commercial register of the Member State of origin?
Is the host Member State entitled to decide on the application for company registration lodged in the host Member State by the company carrying out international conversion within the Community in accordance with the rules of company law of the host Member State as they relate to the conversion of domestic companies, and to require the company to fulfil all the conditions laid down by the company law of the host Member State in respect of domestic conversion, or is the host Member State obliged under Articles 49 TFEU and 54 TFEU to distinguish international conversion within the Community from domestic conversion?
Are the circular contested at first instance and the national rules referred to therein compatible with Community law, in particular, Directive 89/106/EEC?
Do the contested circular and the national rules referred to therein infringe Articles 34 to 37 TFEU?
Under Community rules on workable competition in the sector involving the present dispute, ought the national legislature and administrative authorities to have avoided adopting the legislative measures referred to in the contested circular and in Legislative Decree No 152/2006?
Lastly, is pluralism and competition in the sector in question, which is guaranteed by European law, secured by national rules which introduce and impose the restrictions referred to?
Can the storing and subsequent printing out of a text extract from an article in a daily newspaper, consisting of a search word and the five preceding and five subsequent words, be regarded as acts of reproduction which are protected, see Article 2 of Directive 2001/29?
May the process of production of extracts from newspaper articles in the main proceedings be applied without the authorisation of the copyright holders as it falls within the exception laid down in Article 5(1) of Directive 2001/29, under which certain conditions exempts temporary acts of reproduction from the reproduction right?
Can the scanning by a commercial business of entire newspaper articles, subsequent processing of the reproduction, and the storing and possible printing out of part of the reproduction, consisting of one or more text extracts of 11 words, without the rightholder's consent be regarded as constituting ?certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation? of the newspaper articles and ?not unreasonably prejudicing the


legitimate interests of the rightholder? and therefore justified by Article 5(5) of Directive 2001/29??
Is Article 2(1) of Directive 98/59/EC to be interpreted as meaning that the obligation under that provision to embark on consultations when ?contemplating collective redundancies? of employees and ?in good time? requires consultations to be started when it is established from strategic decisions or changes that have been made relating to the activity that a need for collective redundancies of employees follows?
Is Article 2(1) of Directive 98/59/EC to be interpreted as meaning that the obligation under that provision to start consultations when ?contemplating? collective redundancies and ?in good time? requires consultations to be started already before the employer?s intentions have reached the stage at which the employer is required to identify and supply to the employees the information specified in Article 2(3)(b) of that directive?
Is Article 2(1) in conjunction with Article 2(4) of [Directive 98/59] to be interpreted as meaning that, in a situation in which the employer is controlled by another undertaking, the employer?s obligation to start consultations with the representatives of the employees originates when either the employer or the parent company controlling the employer contemplates action for collective redundancies of employees in the employer?s service?
If the employer is an undertaking controlled within the meaning of Article 2(4) of Directive 98/59 by another undertaking, is Article 2 to be interpreted as meaning that the consultation procedure referred to there must be concluded before the decision on collective redundancies to be implemented in the subsidiary company is taken within the parent company or the group management?
Do the provisions of Directive 2003/6/EC, and especially Article 2 thereof, call for full harmonisation, with the exception of those provisions which explicitly permit the Member States to interpret measures as they wish, or do they, in their entirety, concern a minimum of harmonisation?
Should Article 2(1) of the Directive be interpreted as meaning that the mere fact that a person who possesses inside information and acquires or disposes of, or tries to acquire or dispose of, for his own account or for the account of a third party, financial instruments to which that inside information relates, signifies in itself that he makes use of that inside information?
If the answer to the second question is in the negative, must it then be assumed that application of Article 2 of the Directive presupposes that a deliberate decision has been taken to use inside information?
If in the determination of the proportionate nature of an administrative sanction, as referred to in Article 14 of the Directive, account must be taken of the gains realised, should it be assumed that the publication of information to be designated as inside information has in fact had a significant effect on the price of the financial instrument?
Whether or not the price movement after the publication of information must be significant, what period should be taken into account after the publication of the information for the determination of the scale of the price movement, and what date should be taken as the basis for gauging the financial advantage gained in the determination of the appropriate sanction?
In the light of the determination of the proportionate nature of the sanction, should Article 14 of the Directive be interpreted as meaning that, if a MS has introduced the option of a criminal sanction, combined with an administrative sanction, account must be taken of the option and level of a criminal financial penalty in the consideration of its proportionality?
Is Art. 49 to be interpreted as meaning that the freedom to provide services requires that a service provider be permitted to provide "offshore bookmaking" as well?
Does Art. 49 EC preclude a national monopoly on the operation of sports betting and lotteries which has been put in place on a regional basis for the purpose of combating gambling addiction?
Does Art. 49 EC preclude national rules making licenses to operate such games subject to the discretion of the competent licensing authority?
Does Art. 49 EC preclude national rules prohibiting the brokering of public games of chance on the internet under circumstances such as those at hand?
Do frozen backbones of farmed Atlantic salmon, obtained after filleting the fish, come under CN subheading 0511 91 10 as fish waste or CN subheading 0303 22 00 15  as Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar)?
If the answer to Question 1 is CN subheading 0303 22 00 15: Is the table in Article 1(5) of Regulation 85/2006 void as contrary to the principle of proportionality laid down in Article 5 EC in so far as, according to that table, the minimum import price established for frozen salmon backbones is higher than the minimum import price for whole fish and gutted head-on fish?
Is Regulation 717/2007 invalid, in whole or part, by reason of the inadequacy of Article 95 EC as a legal basis?
Is Article 4 of Regulation 717/2007 (together with Articles 2[2](a) and 6(3) insofar as they refer to the Eurotariff and obligations relating to the Eurotariff) invalid on the grounds that the imposition of a price ceiling in respect of retail roaming charges infringes the principle of proportionality and/or subsidiarity?
Must Article 8(2) of the Directive be interpreted as meaning that the proprietor of a trade mark can invoke the rights conferred by that trade mark against a licensee who contravenes a provision in the licence agreement prohibiting, on grounds of the trade mark?s prestige, sale to discount stores?
Must Article 7(1) of that directive be interpreted as meaning that a licensee who puts goods bearing a trade mark on the market in the [EEA] in disregard of a provision of the licence agreement prohibiting, on grounds of the trade mark?s prestige, sale to discount stores, does so without the consent of the trade mark proprietor?
If not, can the proprietor invoke such a provision to oppose further commercialisation of the goods, on the basis of Article 7(2) of the Directive?
Are Articles 10 and 12 of Directive 92/85 to be interpreted as not precluding the national legislature from making a legal action brought by a pregnant employee who has been dismissed during her pregnancy subject to time-limits fixed in advance?
If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, are the 8- and 15-day periods to be regarded as being too short to allow a pregnant employee who has been dismissed during her pregnancy to take legal proceedings to safeguard her rights?
Is Article 2 of Directive 76/207 to be interpreted as allowing the national legislature from denying a pregnant employee who has been dismissed during her pregnancy the right to bring an action for damages for wrongful dismissal, which is reserved, under national law, to other employees who have been dismissed?
Do the provisions of Article 73d(1)(a) and (3) of the Treaty allow national legislation which precludes the crediting of Spanish inheritance tax against German inheritance tax?
Is Article 73b(1) of the Treaty to be interpreted as meaning that the inheritance tax which another MS levies in respect of the inheritance, by an heir resident in Germany, of the capital claims of a testator last resident in Germany against credit institutions in that other Member State must be credited against German inheritance tax?
In deciding which of the States involved has to avoid double taxation, is the connection to the residence of the creditor more justified than the connection to the registered office of the debtor?
Does the ?polluter pays? principle (first subparagraph of Article 174(2) EC) and the provisions of Directive 2004/35, preclude national legislation which allows the competent authority to impose measures for remedying environmental damage on commercial operators on account of the fact that their installations are located close to a contaminated area, without carrying out any preliminary investigation into the occurrence of the contamination or establishing a causal link between the environmental damage and those operators or indeed intent or negligence on the part of those operators?
Does Community law, and in particular Directive 2004/18, preclude national legislation which allows the competent authority to award directly to a private-sector company the planning and implementation of public works and decontamination works to reinstate a polluted site?
Does Directive 2004/35 permit the competent authority to impose on its own initiative a substantial change in measures for remedying environmental damage which were chosen at the conclusion of a procedure carried out on a consultative basis with the operators concerned and which have been implemented or begun to be put into effect, without that authority having carried out any assessment, before imposing those measures, of the costs and advantages of the changes contemplated from an economic, environmental or health point of view?
Must Directive 2004/35 be interpreted as precluding national legislation which permits the competent authority to make the exercise by operators at whom environmental recovery measures are directed of the right to use their land subject to the condition that they carry out the works required by the authority, even though that land is not affected by those measures because it has already been decontaminated or has never been polluted?
Is Article 49 EC et seq. to be interpreted as precluding a national provision which requires a person who is established in another MS and who is licensed, pursuant to the legal order of that MS, to operate commercial balloon flights (in Germany), to have a company seat or place of residence in Austria in order to be able to operate balloon flights in Austria?
Is Article 49 EC et seq. to be interpreted as precluding a national provision under which the holder of a licence to operate commercial balloon flights who is established in another MS and is recognised under the legal order of that MS is required to obtain a further licence  in another MS, in the case where the conditions applying to that licence prove to be identical in substance, albeit with the additional proviso that the applicant for the licence must have its company seat or his place of residence in national territory?
Are the national provisions at issue incompatible with Article 49 EC if a licence-holder established in Germany is subject to administrative penal proceedings in Austria for operating pursuant to his licence and, as a result, his access to the market is hindered since it is impossible to obtain such a licence without establishing a separate place of business and/or residence, and without re-registering in Austria under Austrian legislation?
May the customs authorities of the importing Member State refuse to grant the preferential treatment provided for under the EC-Israel Association Agreement where the goods at issue originate in the West Bank?
For the purposes of the procedure laid down in Article 32 of the EC-Israel Protocol, are the customs authorities of the importing State bound by the proof of origin that is submitted and by the reply given by the customs authorities of the exporting State?
Must, in order to settle a dispute that has arisen in relation to the verification of invoice declarations, the customs authorities of the importing State, pursuant to Article 33 of the protocol, submit that dispute to the Customs Cooperation Committee before adopting measures unilaterally?
Can Article 12 of Directive 2002/22 be interpreted as allowing the competent legislature of a MS, acting in the capacity of the national regulatory authority, to determine generally and on the basis of the calculation of the net costs of the universal service provider that the provision of universal service may represent an ?unfair burden? for those undertakings designated as universal service providers?
?Is it compatible with the Community principles upholding freedom of competition and freedom to provide services (Articles 49 [EC and] 81 [EC to] 86 [EC]) to impose on pharmacies prohibitions whereby they are not allowed either to decline to take an annual holiday or to remain open whenever they so desire, beyond the maximum limits at present allowed?
Is it compatible with Articles 152 EC and 153 EC to impose on the public pharmacy service, albeit with the aim of protecting the health of consumers, conditions limiting or precluding the possibility of extending the daily, weekly or annual opening times of individual pharmacies?
Is the Italian State legislation which results in periods not worked under ?vertical? part-time arrangements not being taken into account as periods of qualifying contributions for the purpose of acquiring pension rights compatible with Directive 97/81, concerning the principle of non-discrimination?
Are those national provisions compatible with Directive 97/81 which provides that national legislation must facilitate the development of part-time work, and Clauses 4 and 5, which provide that the Member States are to eliminate obstacles of a legal or administrative nature which may limit the opportunities for part-time work?
Can Clause 4 of the Framework Agreement on the principle of non-discrimination also be extended to various kinds of part-time contracts, in view of the fact that, in the case of ?horizontal? part-time work, for an equal number of hours worked and for which remuneration is paid in the calendar year, all the weeks of the calendar year are taken into account under national legislation, whereas they are not in the case of ?vertical? part-time work?
Do Directive 2002/14 preclude implementation of the directive in such a manner that groups of employees are covered by a collective agreement between parties which do not represent the professional group of the persons concerned and where the collective agreement does not cover the professional group of the persons concerned?
Is article 7 of Directive 2002/14 to be interpreted as requiring that more extensive protection against dismissal be conferred on employees? representatives?
Is a national provision such as Regulation 47(7)(b) of the Public Contracts Regulations 2006 to be interpreted as conferring an individual and unconditional right upon the tenderer against the contracting authority such that the time for the bringing of proceedings challenging such a tender exercise and award starts running as from the date when the tenderer knew or ought to have known that the procurement procedure and award infringed EC public procurement law?
Does article 1(1) of Directive 89/665, as amended by Directive 92/50, precludes a national provision which allows a national court to dismiss proceedings seeking to have an infringement of the public procurement rules established or to obtain damages for the infringement of those rules on the basis of the criterion that such proceedings must be brought promptly?
Can a national court apply any discretion as to extending the national limitation period for the bringing of proceedings?
Does Directive 2004/73 comply with Directive 67/548?
If the Directives do not comply should the MS have refrained from transposing into national law the classification of the substance at issue in the main proceedings?
Is Directive 98/44 be interpreted as conferring patent right protection such as those of the case in the main proceedings?
Does Directive 98/44 preclude national patent legislation from offering absolute protection to the patented product as such?
Does Directive 98/44 preclude the holder of a patent issued prior to the adoption of the directive from relying on the absolute protection?
Does the TRIPS agreement affect the interpretation of the Directive (98/44) at issue in the main proceedings?
Is the term ?signature? in the specimen form in Annex A to the Eighth Directive (79/1072) which is to be used to submit an application for refund of [VAT] pursuant to Article 3(a) of the directive, to be given a uniform Community law interpretation?
If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative: Is the term ?signature? to be understood as meaning that the application for a refund must be signed by the taxable person himself or, in the case of a legal person, by its statutory representative, or is the signature of an agent (for example, a representative for tax purposes or an employee of the taxable person) sufficient?
Is Article 46(2) of Regulation 1782/2003 to be interpreted as precluding a contractual arrangement such as that at issue in the main proceedings the object of which is to effect a definitive transfer of payment entitlements whereby the transferee, in his capacity as the person entitled to them, is required to activate the payment entitlements and to pass on to the transferor the full amount, or a part thereof, of the payments made to him on that basis?
Must Regulation 1/2003 be interpreted to mean that national competition authorities derive directly from those provisions an entitlement to submit written observations in appeal proceedings brought against a decision made by them and that they can themselves present arguments in fact and in law, with the result that this entitlement cannot be excluded by a Member State?
Must the Regulation be interpreted to mean that, for the effective application of the competition rules with a view to protecting the general interest, the public enforcement bodies which are designated as the competition authorities are not only entitled but also have a duty to participate in the appeal proceedings against their decisions by stating their position?
Does it fall to the national competition authority which is competent to take the decisions set out in Article 5 of the Regulation to participate in the appeal proceedings? Are the answers given to the first three questions different if one of the components of the national competition authority has judicial status, or if a body belonging to the authority conducts an investigation that leads to the final decision of the judicial component of that authority?
Does Article 49 TFEU (Article 43 EC) preclude national legislation which, in relation to the granting of a tax advantage, such as the self-employed person?s deduction, is potentially discriminatory towards non-resident taxable persons, even though the latter may take advantage of the option to be treated as resident taxable persons provided for in that legislation in order to benefit from that tax advantage?
In the light of Community law (in particular Directive 69/335), are tax authorities obliged, when charging capital duty on an increase in capital, to take into account transactions relating to the same component of capital which were subject to capital duty before the date of Poland?s accession to the European Union? In particular, does the second indent of Article 5(3) of the Directive apply to situations such as that in the main proceedings?
Does Art 49 preclude legislation of a Member State, such as that at issue in the main actions, which prohibits the advertising to residents of that State of gambling organised for the purposes of profit by private operators in other Member States?
Must Art. 49 EC be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State subjecting gambling to a system of exclusive rights, according to which the promotion of gambling organised in another Member State is subject to stricter penalties than the promotion of gambling operated on national territory without a licence?
Is it a requirement, in order for there to be a public works contract under Article 1(2)(b) of Directive 2004/18, that the works be physically carried out for the public contracting authority and bring it an immediate economic benefit?
Is procurement to be regarded as having taken place, in accordance with the second variant of Article 1(2)(b) of the Directive, if the intended works for the public contracting authority fulfil a particular public purpose and the public contracting authority has the legal right under the contract to ensure that the public purpose is achieved and that the necessary works will be available?
Does the concept of a public works contract in accordance with the first and second variants of Article 1(2)(b) of Directive 2004/18 require that the contractor be directly or indirectly obliged to provide the works, which must be legally enforceable?
Does the concept of a public works contract in accordance with the third variant of Article 1(2)(b) of Directive 2004/18 require that the contractor be obliged to carry out works, or that works form the subject-matter of the contract?
Do contracts by which, through the requirements specified by the public contracting authority, it is intended to ensure that the works to be carried out for a particular public purpose be available, and by which the contracting body is given the legal power to ensure the availability of the works for the public purpose, fall within the third variant of Article 1(2)(b) of Directive 2004/18?
Is the concept of ?requirements specified by the contracting authority? in Article 1(2)(b) of Directive 2004/18 fulfilled if the works are to be carried out in accordance with plans examined and approved by the public contracting authority?
Must there be held to be no public works concession under Article 1(3) of Directive 2004/18 if the concessionaire is, or will become, the owner of the land on which the works are to be carried out, or the concession is granted for an indeterminate period?
Does Directive 2004/18 apply if a sale of land by a third party and the award of a public works contract take place at different times and on the conclusion of the land sale the public works contract has not yet been awarded, but at the last-mentioned time there was, on the part of the public authority, the intention to award such a contract?
Are separate but related transactions concerning a sale of land and the award of a public works contract to be regarded from the point of view of the law on the awarding of contracts as a unity?
Is it permitted, for the purposes of Article 1(2) of Regulation 1626/94, for a MS to adopt supplementary measures consisting in the complete prohibition of the use of fishing gear whose use is in principle allowed under the provisions of that regulation?
Is it permitted, for the purposes of the provisions of that regulation, to use in the marine area of a MS fishing gear which is not included among the gear specified as being in principle prohibited in Article 2(3) and Article 3(1) and (1a) of the regulation and whose use was prohibited before the regulation entered into force by a national provision of the MS?
Must Article 13B(g) of the Sixth Directive 77/388 in conjunction with Article 4(3)(a) of the directive be interpreted as meaning that VAT is charged on the supply of a building which has been partly demolished with a view to the replacement of that building with a newly constructed building?
Is it relevant to the answer to the previous question whether it is the vendor or the purchaser of the building who has given the order for demolition and is charged the cost thereof, and thus the supply is subject to VAT only if the vendor has given the order for demolition and is charged the cost thereof?
Is it relevant to the answer to the first question whether it is the vendor or the purchaser of the building who has drawn up the plans for the new building, and thus the supply is subject to VAT only if the vendor has drawn up the plans for the new building?
If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, is VAT then levied on any supply occurring after the date on which the demolition work actually begins or after a later date, especially the date on which the demolition has made substantial progress?
Does the concept of ?fair compensation? in Article 5(2)(b) of Directive 2001/29/EC entail harmonisation, irrespective of the MSs' right to choose the system of collection which they deem appropriate?
Must the system to calculate fair compensation ensure a fair balance between the persons affected, the intellectual property rightholders affected by the private copying exception, to whom the compensation is owed, on the one hand, and the persons directly or indirectly liable to pay the compensation, on the other, and is that balance determined by the reason for the fair compensation, which is to mitigate the harm arising from the private copying exception?
Where a MS opts for a system of charging or levying in respect of digital reproduction equipment, devices and media, in accordance with the aim pursued by Article 5(2)(b) of Directive 2001/29, must that charge necessarily be linked to the presumed use of those equipment and media for making reproductions covered by the private copying exception?
If a Member State adopts a private copying ?levy? system, is the indiscriminate application of that ?levy? to undertakings and professional persons who clearly purchase digital reproduction devices and media for purposes other than private copying compatible with the concept of ?fair compensation??
Might the system adopted by the Spanish State of applying the private copying levy indiscriminately to all digital reproduction equipment, devices and media infringe Directive 2001/29 in so far as there is insufficient correlation between the fair compensation and the limitation of the private copying right justifying it, because to a large extent it is applied to different situations in which the limitation of rights justifying the compensation does not exist?
Is Article 11(1) of Directive 92/85 to be interpreted as meaning that a worker who is transferred to other lower-paid work because of her pregnancy must, on the basis of that provision, be paid as much as she received on average before the transfer?
Is it relevant in that respect what kind of allowances and on what basis the worker was paid in addition to her basic monthly pay?
On a proper construction of Article 18(4) of the Sixth Directive 77/388, is it contrary to that provision for domestic legislation to lay down a limitation period of three years for the exercise of the right to recover sums of VAT overpaid?
When an EU citizen came to another MS, where she was for certain periods a worker but she has not retained her status as a worker, but neither left the host MS during these periods, and her child entered education at a time when she was not a worker but the child remained in education during periods when she was in work in that MS and she is the primary carer of her child, does she only enjoy a right of residence in the host MS if she satisfies the conditions set out in Directive 2004/38, or does she enjoy a right to reside derived from Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68 as interpreted by the ECJ, without being required to satisfy the conditions set out in Directive 2004/38?
If she enjoys a right derived from Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68, must she have access to sufficient resources so as not to become a burden on the social assistance system of the host MS and have comprehensive sickness insurance cover in the host MS?
If she enjoys a right derived from Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68 must the child have first entered education at a time when the she was a worker in order to enjoy a right to reside derived from Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68 or is it sufficient that the EU citizen has been a worker at some time after the child commenced education?
Does any right that the EU citizen has to reside, as the primary carer of a child in education, cease when her child attains the age of 18?
If she only enjoys a right of residence in the host MS if she satisfies the conditions set out in Directive 2004/38, is the position different in circumstances where the child commenced education prior to the date by which Directive 2004/38 was to be implemented by the MS but the mother did not become the primary carer and did claim the right to reside on the basis that she was the primary carer of the child only after the date by which the directive was to be implemented?
Must Articles 4(2) and 8 of Directive 93/13/EEC be construed as meaning that a MS may provide in its legislation, for the benefit of consumers, that the assessment as to whether contractual terms are unfair is to be carried out also in respect of terms which relate to ?the definition of the main subject-matter of the contract? or to ?the adequacy of the price and remuneration, on the one hand, as against the services or goods to be supplied in exchange, on the other?, even where those terms are in plain, intelligible language or in respect of terms which fall outside the scope of such an assessment?
Is an interpretation of Articles 8 and 4(2) of the Directive under which it is possible for a MS to provide for assessment by the courts as to whether contractual terms are unfair compatible with Articles 2 EC, 3(1)(g) EC and 4(1) EC?
Is it compatible with Clause 4.1 of the framework agreement on part-time work that workers employed under a private law contract by a local or regional authority or a public undertaking and who work 30% of normal working time, are treated less favourably than comparable full-time workers with regard to remuneration, classification in salary group, recognition of previous periods of service, entitlement to leave, additional payments and overtime supplements, etc.?
Is the pro rata temporis principle, Clause 4.2 of the framework agreement, to be interpreted as precluding a provision of national law, under which in the event of a change in the working hours of an employee, the amount of leave not yet taken is adjusted proportionally to the new working hours, with the result that the worker who reduces his working hours from full-time to part-time, has his entitlement to leave accumulated while working full-time reduced?
Is a provision of national law under which workers employed for a period not exceeding six months or on a casual basis, are treated less favourably with regard to remuneration, classification in salary group, recognition of previous periods of service, entitlement to leave, additional payments and overtime supplements etc., contrary to Clause 4 of the framework agreement on fixed-term-work?
Is there indirect discrimination on grounds of sex within the meaning of Article 14(1)(c) of Directive 2006/54, if, in the case of employees who take the full two years? parental leave permissible by law, the entitlement to annual leave from the year preceding the birth expires before the end of the parental leave, and the majority of the workers affected are women?
Is the prohibition of direct or indirect discrimination on grounds of age contained in Articles 2 and 6 of Directive 2000/78 to be interpreted as precluding a MS from maintaining a legal situation whereby an employer, upon dismissal of a salaried employee who has been continuously employed in the same undertaking for 12, 15 or 18 years, must, upon termination of the salaried employee?s employment, pay an amount equivalent to one, two or three months? salary respectively, while this allowance is not to be paid where the salaried employee, upon termination of employment, is entitled to receive an old-age pension from a pension scheme to which the employer has contributed?
Is Article 27 of Regulation 918/83 to be interpreted as meaning that the relief referred to in that article may be claimed in respect of consignments made up of goods which are individually of negligible value but are dispatched as a grouped consignment with a combined intrinsic value which exceeds the value threshold in Article 27?
Should Article 27 of Regulation 918/83 be applied on the basis that ?dispatched direct from a third country to a consignee in the Community? also covers a situation in which the goods are in a third country before being dispatched to the consignee but the consignee?s contractual partner is established in the Community?
When applying Article 81(1) EC, which criteria must be applied when assessing whether a concerted practice has as its object the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market?
Is Article 81 EC to be interpreted as meaning that, when a national court applies that provision, the evidence of a causal connection between concerted practice and market conduct must be adduced and appraised in accordance with the rules of national law, provided that those rules do not make the exercise of the rights granted by Community law in practice impossible or excessively difficult?
When applying the concept of concerted practices in Article 81 EC, is there always a presumption of a causal connection between concerted practice and market conduct even if the concerted practice is an isolated event and the undertaking which took part in the practice remains active on the market?
Do Articles 3 and 4 of Directive 80/987 allow workers' outstanding claims relating to pay, when they come to be enforced against the guarantee institution, to be deprived of their initial nature as claims relating to pay and to be reclassified as social security claims merely because the payment of them has been entrusted by the MS to a social security institution?
In view of the social purpose of the directive, is it sufficient for the national legislation to use the employee?s initial claim relating to pay merely as a basis of comparison against which to determine per relationem the benefit to be guaranteed through the intervention of the guarantee institution?
Do the principles inferable from Community legislation, and in particular the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, allow the application to employees? outstanding claims relating to pay, for the period determined in accordance with Article 4 of Directive 80/987, limitation rules that are less favourable than those applied to claims of a similar nature?
Are Articles 12, 18(1) and 149(1), 149(2) 150(2) EC to be interpreted as meaning that those provisions preclude an autonomous community in a MS with responsibility for higher education, which is faced with an influx of students from a neighbouring MS in a number of programmes of study of a medical nature financed principally out of public funds, from adopting measures such as those at issue, when that community relies on valid reasons for claiming that that situation could place an excessive burden on public finances and jeopardise the quality of the education provided?
Would the answer to the first question be different if that community could show that the effect of that situation is that too few students residing in the community in question obtain diplomas for there to be, over a long period, a sufficient number of qualified medical personnel to ensure the quality of the public health system in that community?
Would the answer to the first question be different if that community, having regard to the last part of Article 149(1) EC and Article 13(2)(c) of the ICESCR, chooses to maintain wide and democratic access to quality higher education for the population of that community?
On 1 May 2004, were the national provision, which exclude the right to deduct VAT for the part of the purchase price of goods which comes from a subsidy financed by public funds, compatible with Article 17 of Sixth Council Directive?
If the answer is in the negative, may the applicant rely directly on Article 17 of the Sixth Directive when exercising the right to deduct?
Is the second sentence of the second subparagraph of Article 11(1) of Regulation No 3665/87 to be interpreted as meaning that the expression ?particulars of quantity, weight and destination provided pursuant to Article 47? refers to the particulars in the specific application made pursuant to Article 47(1), with the result that the differentiated part of the refund is requested only at the time of presentation of the application within the meaning of Article 47(1)?
If the reply to the first question is in the affirmative: If the request for payment pursuant to Article 47(1) of Regulation No 3665/87 is already to be submitted in ?the document used for export to enable products to qualify for a refund?, is the abovementioned provision to be interpreted as meaning that the calculation of the refund requested in relation to the differentiated part is to be made using the particulars in the export declaration, with the result that the differentiated part of the refund is requested also with the export declaration?
If the reply to the first question is in the negative: Is the abovementioned provision to be interpreted as meaning that the calculation of the refund requested in relation to the differentiated part is to be made using the documents to be presented in accordance with Article 47 of Regulation No 3665/87, with the result that the differentiated part of the refund is requested only at the time of presentation of the ?documents relating to payment? within the meaning of Article 47(2)?
Are the criteria of legal and economic independence referred to in Article 4(1) of Directive 92/83 for applying the reduced rates of duty to be understood as meaning that economic dependence between otherwise legally independent breweries is to presumed only where the breweries concerned cannot act as competitors in the market uninfluenced by each other, or is the mere de facto possibility of influence on the business activity of the breweries sufficient for the criterion of independence to be met no longer?
Are the principle of equal treatment expressed inter alia in Articles 12 EC, 43 EC and 49 EC and the prohibition in Community law of discrimination on grounds of nationality to be interpreted as meaning that the consequent duties of transparency for public authorities require national law to provide an unsuccessful tenderer with a claim to an order restraining an imminent breach of those duties and/or prohibiting the continuation of such a breach of duty?
If the previous question is answered in the negative: Do those duties of transparency form part of the customary law of the EC, in the sense that they are already applied continually and constantly, equally and generally, and are recognised as a binding rule by those concerned?
Do the duties of transparency require, in the case also of an intended amendment to a service concession contract ? including the substitution of a subcontractor whose identity was emphasised in the tender ? that the negotiations on this point are again opened up to competition with an appropriate degree of advertising, and what would be the criteria for requiring such an opening up?
Are the principles and duties of transparency to be interpreted as meaning that in the case of service concessions, in the event of a breach of duty, a contract concluded as a result of the breach and intended to create or amend a continuing obligation must be terminated?
Are the principles and duties of transparency and Article 86(1) EC, Article 2(1)(b) and (2) of Directive 80/723 and Article 1(9) of Directive 2004/18, to be interpreted as meaning that an undertaking is subject to those duties of transparency, as a public undertaking or contracting authority, if; it was set up by a regional or local authority for the purpose of waste disposal and street cleaning but also operates in the free market, it belongs to that regional or local authority to the extent of a 51% holding, but decisions of shareholders can be taken only by a three-quarters majority, the regional or local authority appoints only a quarter of the members of the supervisory board of the undertaking, including the chairman, and it achieves more than half its turnover from bilateral contracts for waste disposal and street cleaning in the territory of that regional or local authority, which reimburses itself by means of municipal taxes on its residents?
Must Article 11 of Regulation No 1383/2003 be interpreted as precluding the possibility of imposing a penalty on the declarant or owner of goods under national law, where the intellectual property right-holder reaches an agreement, with the declarant or owner of those goods, to abandon them for their destruction, or engages in discussions in respect of the possibility of the goods being abandoned for their destruction, and, in the course of that procedure, the customs authorities receive information that the goods are counterfeit?
Can the principle of freedom of establishment under Articles 43 and 48 EC be interpreted as precluding a legal rule under which a company established in one MS must pay VTL if it employs workers in a branch abroad and meets its tax and social security obligations with regard to such workers in the State where the branch is situated?
If one of the parties to court proceedings is a national of another State than the one in which those proceedings are taking place, does that fact provide a basis for the
cross-border element within the meaning of Article 81 TFEU, which is one of the conditions for the applicability of Council Regulation No 44/2001?
Does Regulation No  44/2001 preclude the use of provisions of national law which enable proceedings to be brought against persons of unknown address?
If Question 2 is answered in the negative: Can the making of submissions by a court-appointed guardian ad litem of the defendant in the case be regarded on its own as submission by the defendant to the jurisdiction of the local court for the purposes of Article 24 of Regulation No 44/2001, even where the subject-matter of the dispute is a claim arising out of a consumer contract and the courts of the Czech Republic would not have jurisdiction under Article 16(2) of that regulation to determine that dispute?
Is Article 82 EC to be interpreted as meaning that selective price reductions on the part of a dominant postal undertaking that has a universal service obligation to a level lower than the postal undertaking’s average total costs, but higher than the provider’s average incremental costs, constitutes an exclusionary abuse, if it is established that the price was not set at that level for the purpose of driving out a competitor?
If the answer to question 1 is that a selective price reduction in the circumstances outlined in that question may, in certain circumstances, constitute an exclusionary abuse, what are the circumstances that the national court must take into account?
Can an agreement on the local jurisdiction of a particular court be regarded as establishing the international jurisdiction of the chosen court for the purposes of Article 17.3 of Regulation No 44/2001, and, if so, does that apply even if the agreement on local jurisdiction is invalid on the ground that it conflicts with Article 6(1) of Directive 93/13?
Did the [Sixth Directive] permit Member States to enact legislation whereby, for transactions between connected parties where the price was patently lower than the open market value, the taxable amount was other than that determined by Article 11A(1)(a) to be generally applicable – namely, the consideration – by extending the scope of the rules on application of goods and services for private use (as was done by Article 79(5) of [Law 37/1992], before its amendment by Law 36/2006 ... ), when the specific procedure provided for in Article 27 of the Sixth Directive to obtain authorisation for derogation from the general rule was not followed, such derogation being obtained by [the Kingdom of] Spain only after Decision 2006/387?
If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative by the Court of Justice … or by the Bundesarbeitsgericht on the basis of the guidelines set out by the Court of Justice in its preliminary ruling: Does the right of collective bargaining give the parties to a collective agreement latitude to eliminate such discrimination by transferring the employees to a new collective pay structure based on activity, performance and professional experience, while preserving their established rights acquired in the old collective system?
Must Question 2(a) in any event be answered in the affirmative if the final allocation of the transferred employees to the steps within a salary group of the new collective pay structure does not depend solely on the age category attained in the old collective system and if the employees who are admitted to a higher step in the new system typically have more professional experience than the employees allocated to a lower step?
If Questions 2(a) and (b) are answered in the negative by the Court of Justice … or by the Bundesarbeitsgericht on the basis of the guidelines set out by the Court of Justice in its preliminary ruling: Is indirect discrimination on grounds of age justified by the fact that it is a legitimate aim to preserve established social rights and because temporarily continuing to treat older and younger employees differently under transitional rules is an appropriate and necessary means of achieving that aim, if that difference of treatment is gradually phased out and the only alternative in practice would be to reduce the pay of older employees?
If Questions 2(a) and (b) are answered in the negative by the Court of Justice … or by the Bundesarbeitsgericht on the basis of the guidelines set out by the Court of Justice in its preliminary ruling, taking into account the right to collective bargaining and the associated autonomy in collective bargaining, must Question 3(a) be answered in the affirmative in any event if parties to a collective agreement agree on such transitional rules?
If Questions 3(a) and (b) are answered in the negative by the Court of Justice … or by the Bundesarbeitsgericht on the basis of the guidelines set out by the Court of Justice in its preliminary ruling: must an infringement of the prohibition in primary law of discrimination on grounds of age which characterises a collective pay system and makes it invalid as a whole, even taking into account the associated additional costs for the employer concerned and the right to collective bargaining of the parties to the collective agreement, always only be eliminated by taking the highest age category as a basis in each case when applying the rules on pay in the collective agreement until new rules that are in conformity with Union law come into force?
If Question 4 is answered in the negative by the Court of Justice … or by the Bundesarbeitsgericht on the basis of the guidelines set out by the Court of Justice in its preliminary ruling: having regard to the right to collective bargaining of the parties to a collective agreement, would it be compatible with the Union law prohibition of discrimination on grounds of age and the requirement for an effective sanction in the event of a breach of that prohibition to set the parties to a collective agreement a manageable deadline (for instance, six months) for retrospectively remedying the invalidity of the pay system they have agreed, and to stipulate that, in the event that no new rules in conformity with Union law are introduced within the deadline, the highest age category will be taken as a basis in each case when applying the collective agreement, and, if so, what temporal margin for the retrospective effect of the new rules that are in conformity with Union law could be allowed to the parties to a collective agreement?’
Does a decision made by a Member State under Article 3(2) of Regulation No 343/2003 whether to examine a claim for asylum which is not its responsibility under the criteria set out in Chapter III of the Regulation fall within the scope of EU law for the purposes of Article 6 TEU and/or Article 51 of the Charter?
Is the duty of a Member State to observe EU fundamental rights (including the rights set out in Articles 1, 4, 18, 19(2) and 47 of the Charter) discharged where that State sends the asylum seeker to the Member State which Article 3(1) of Regulation No 343/2003 designates as the responsible State in accordance with the criteria set out in Chapter III of the regulation?
In particular, does the obligation to observe EU fundamental rights preclude the operation of a conclusive presumption that the responsible State will observe (i) the claimant’s fundamental rights under European Union law; and/ or (ii) the minimum standards imposed by Directives 2003/9, 2004/83 and 2005/85?
Alternatively, is a Member State obliged by European Union law to exercise the power under Article 3(2) of the Regulation to examine and take responsibility for a claim, where transfer to the responsible State would expose the asylum claimant to a risk of violation of his fundamental rights, in particular the rights set out in Articles 1, 4, 18, 19(2) and/or 47 of the Charter, and/or to a risk that the minimum standards set out in Directives 2003/9, 2004/83 and 2005/85 will not be applied to him?
Is the scope of the protection conferred upon a person to whom Regulation No 343/2003 applies by the general principles of European Union law, and, in particular, the rights set out in Articles 1, 18 and 47 of the Charter wider than the protection conferred by Article 3 of the ECHR?
Is it compatible with the rights set out in Article 47 of the Charter for a provision of national law to require a court, for the purpose of determining whether a person may lawfully be removed to another Member State pursuant to Regulation No 343/2003, to treat that Member State as a State from which the person will not be sent to another State in contravention of his rights pursuant to the ECHR or his rights pursuant to the Geneva Convention and the 1967 Protocol?
In so far as the preceding questions arise in respect of the obligations of the United Kingdom, are the answers qualified in any respect so as to take account of the Protocol No 30?
Are [the second paragraph of Article 288 TFEU] and Article 37 of … Regulation No 1/2005 … , as well as Article 3, [second paragraph,] points (f) and (g) [of that regulation], together with point 1.1(f) and point 1.2 of Chapter II [of Annex I thereto], and Article 3, [second paragraph] point (g) [of that regulation], together with Part D of Chapter VII of [that] annex …, to be interpreted as meaning that Member States are precluded from adopting national rules which lay down detailed requirements [concerning the transport by road of pigs] in respect of internal transport height, inspection height and loading density?
Are Article 2(1) and Article 11(4), second sentence, of Directive 2006/126 to be interpreted as meaning that a Member State must refuse to recognise in its territory the validity of a driving licence issued by another Member State to a person outside a period during which that person was prohibited from applying for a new licence, in the case where that person’s driving licence had been withdrawn in the national territory of the first Member State and that person’s normal place of residence at the time of the issue of the driving licence was in the national territory of the issuing Member State?
Regulation No 469/2009 … recognises, amongst the other purposes identified in the recitals, the need for the grant of an SPC by each of the Member States of the Community to holders of national or European patents to be under the same conditions, as indicated in recitals 7 and 8 [in the preamble to that regulation]. In the absence of Community harmonisation of patent law, what is meant in Article 3(a) of … Regulation [No 469/2009] by “the product is protected by a basic patent in force” and what are the criteria for deciding this?
In a case like the present one involving a medicinal product comprising more than one active ingredient, are there further or different criteria for determining whether or not “the product is protected by a basic patent” according to Article 3(a) of … Regulation [No 469/2009] and, if so, what are those further or different criteria?
In a case like the present one involving a multi-disease vaccine, are there further or different criteria for determining whether or not “the product is protected by a basic patent” according to Article 3(a) of … Regulation [No 469/2009] and, if so, what are those further or different criteria?
For the purposes of Article 3(a) [of Regulation No 469/2009], is a multi-disease vaccine comprising multiple antigens “protected by a basic patent” if one antigen of the vaccine is “protected by the basic patent in force”?
For the purposes of Article 3(a) [of Regulation No 469/2009], is a multi-disease vaccine comprising multiple antigens “protected by a basic patent” if all antigens directed against one disease are “protected by the basic patent in force”?
Does … Regulation [No 469/2009] and, in particular, Article 3(b), permit the grant of a [SPC] for a single active ingredient or combination of active ingredients where: (a) a basic patent in force protects the single active ingredient or combination of active ingredients within the meaning of Article 3(a) of the SPC Regulation; and (b) a medicinal product containing the single active ingredient or combination of active ingredients together with one or more other active ingredients is the subject of a valid authorisation granted in accordance with Directive 2001/83/EC or Directive 2001/82/EC which is the first [MA] that places the single active ingredient or combination of active ingredients on the market?’
Must points 3 and 5 of Article 13B(d) of Directive 77/388/CEE (Sixth Directive) be interpreted as meaning that the swift services described in the circumstances of the case, which are used in payment transactions and securities transaction settlements between financial institutions, are exempt from VAT?
Is an anti-dumping regulation, No 1355/2008, adopted by the European Commission … under the [basic Regulation] invalid because the Commission adopted that anti-dumping regulation by reference to a normal value determined on “[an]other reasonable basis” (in this case, on the basis of the prices actually paid or payable for like products in the Community) without conducting further investigations to ascertain a normal value after two companies in a country which the Commission had initially considered to be an analogue country had been contacted in writing but to no effect (one of them not replying at all and the other indicating its willingness to cooperate but failing to respond to the questionnaire which was then sent to it), and parties to the proceedings had drawn the Commission’s attention to another possible analogue country?
Do the rules forming part of European Community law which are designed to bring about free[dom of] movement for workers, in particular the rules set out in Titles I and II of Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 as well as in Articles 39 and 299 of the EC Treaty … preclude an employee, working outside Netherlands territory on a fixed installation on the [continental shelf adjacent to the Netherlands] for an employer established in the Netherlands, from being in a position in which he is not insured under national statutory employee insurance solely on the ground that he is not resident in the Netherlands but in another Member State (in this case, Spain), even if he has Netherlands nationality and can also avail of the option to take out voluntary insurance under essentially the same conditions as those which apply to compulsory insurance?
Must Directive 80/987, in particular Articles 4, 5 and 10 thereof, be interpreted in such a way as to render generally incompatible with it a national rule which obliges employees, in the event of the insolvency of their employer, in order to (fully) validate their right to have their outstanding wage claims met, to register as job-seekers at the latest on the first working day after the day on which the employment relationship ended or should reasonably have ended?
Must Directive 80/987, in particular Articles 4, 5 and 10 thereof, be interpreted in such a way as to render incompatible with it a national rule which also imposes that registration obligation on employees who engaged in activities in their own business or profession during the notice period?
Must Directive 80/987, in particular Articles 4, 5 and 10 thereof, be interpreted in such a way as to render incompatible with it a national rule on the basis of which failure to comply (timeously) with that registration obligation can result in the partial non&#8209;payment of the insolvency benefit, where the level and the duration of the partial non payment measure taken are partly determined by the date of compliance with that obligation?
Does an agreement providing for the airport works at issue in the main proceedings constitute a "project" within the meaning of art 1(2) of Directive 85/337?
Do works to modify the infrastructure of an existing airport already with a runway more than 2100 meters in length correspond to the notion of "project" under Directive 85/337?
Must a Member State take account of the projected increase in the activity of an airport when examining the potential environmental effects of modifications of that airport?
Do the relevant treaty provisions preclude national inheritance legislation and the duties provided for thereby, such as that at issue in the main proceedings?
Does an addressee have the right, under art 8(1) of Regulation 1348/2000, to refuse to accept service where only the annexes to a document to be served are not in the language of the MS addressed or in a  language of the MS of transmission which the addressee understands?
Must an addressee, under art 8(1)(b) Regulation 1348/2000, be deemed to understand the language of a MS of transmission where, in the course of his business, he agreed in a contract with the applicant that correspondence was to be conducted in the language of the MS of transmission?
Can an addressee refuse acceptance of annexes relying on art 8(1) of Regulation no 1348/2000, if he has concluded a contract stating that all correspondence is to be undertaken in the language of the MS of transmission, and the annexes concern that correspondence?
Can a MS apply tax legislation that extends the period laid down in the Sixth directive art 18(4) from 60 to 180 days?
Do the current national provisions constitute special measures to prevent certain types of tax evasion and avoidance within the meaning of art 27(1) of the sixth directive?
Does the term 'profits distributed by the subsidiary', within the meaning of the last sentence of art 4(2) of Directive 90/435/EEC preclude the legislation of a MS from including tax credits in those profits and, if so, does that inclusion fall under art 7(2) of the Directive?
In determination of which protection should be given a trade mark not in itself having any distinctive character or by a designation under art 3(1)(c) of the directive (84/104/EEC) but which has become a trade mark through the process of becoming customary and has been registered, should account be taken of the general interest in ensuring that the availability of given signs is not unduly restricted for other traders?
Does the mere perception of the relevant public of the use of a sign as being nothing more than decoration entail protection of trade mark?
In determination of which protection should be given a trade mark such as that in the main proceedings, is it of any significance whether the trade mark is devoid of distinctive character or contains a designations, within arts 3(1)(b) and art 3(1)(c) of Directive 84/104/EEC respectively?
Does art 13B(a) of the Sixth directive 77/388 extend to activities of a (legal) person which performs activities of an insurance broker, whereby negotiations are carried out in the name of another insurance broker in connection with the bringing about of insurance transactions?
Is Directive 2003/87 valid in the light of the principle of equal treatment, in so far as it makes the allowance trading scheme applicable to installations in the steel sector without including in its scope the aluminium and plastics industries?
Is a national legislation such as the one at issue in the main proceedings, only allowing for parent companies to deduct losses relating to subsidiaries established in other MSs under certain conditions, compatible with art 4 of Directive 90/435?
Does Directive 90/435 have direct effect?
Does art 2(2) of Directive 2001/83 apply to a product in respect of which it has not been established that it is a medicinal product by function, without its being possible to exclude that possibility? If need be, what probability is required for its application?
Might a product be classified as "medicinal" within the meaning of art 1(2)(b)of Directive 2001/83 if, used as intended, is incapable of having certain medicinal effects?
With the new definition of "medicinal product" in Directive 2004/27, is art 1(2)(b) of Directive 2001/83 still to be interpreted as meaning that characteristics of use of the product, extent of distribution, familiarity to consumers and risks that it might entail, are still relevant whether the product is "medicinal"?
Must the refurbishment and improvement of virtually the whole of an urban ring road be made subject to an environmental impact assessment under directive 97/11/EC?
Are studies undertaken before the project at issue in the main proceedings sufficient to satisfy the requirement of an environmental impact assessment as prescribed by Directive 97/11/EC?
Is the sanction provided for by art 11(1) of Regulation no 3665/87 applicable against an exporter who has requested an export refund for goods, where, as a result fraudulent conduct on the part of the exporter's contracting partner, those goods were not exported?
Must art 1(a), 3 and 4 of directive 92/51 be interpreted as meaning that the competent authorities of a host MS are required to recognise a diploma awarded by a competent authority in another MS even though that diploma attests to education and training received, in whole or in part, at an establishment located in the host MS?
Do directives 90/338 and 97/33 preclude a national regulatory authority from being able to require an operator of a network interconnected with a public network to pay to the market-dominant subscriber network operator a charge intended to compensate the latter operator for the deficit incurred as a result of providing the local loop?
Can an individual rely on art 4c of Directive 90/338 and art 12(7) of Directive 97/33 in circumstances such as those of the main proceedings, before the national court?
Does art 31 of the EEA agreement preclude a legislation where a taxpayer subject to unlimited taxation in one MS is able under certain conditions to deduct losses incurred by a permanent establishment situated in another MS which are exempt from income tax pursuant to a double taxation convention, but where this right to deduction is subject to certain limits such as those in the main proceedings?
Does Art 7 of Regulation No 1251/70 also apply to students who came to the MS principally to study and initially worked as employed persons on a limited scale while continuing to study but have meanwhile ceased to work?
Can a student rely on the principle of non-discrimination (as enshrined in the Treaty) in order to obtain a maintenance grant in a MS not being their MS of origin, if they go there to study, even though Directive 93/96, as it appears, precludes such a right?
Is a five year requirement of a prior residence to nationals of other MSs compatible with the principle of non-discrimination in the Treaty, and if so, is it necessary to shorten that period on a case by case basis if there are other factors pointing to integration in society?
Is it contrary to the principle of legal certainty to apply a residence requirement retroactively?
Must art 4(4) of the Sixth Directive be implemented as to cover all situations involving the links set out in that rule, or can a member state choose to what specific situations with such links that the rule shall apply?
Is a temporal restriction such as that at issue in the main proceedings, being an absolute restriction for the applicability of single declaration rule, in breach of the principles of proportionality, prohibition of the abuse of rights, and fiscal neutrality?
Does the national rule at issue, only providing compensation for persons with French nationality or where the accident occurred in France, infringe the general principle of non-discrimination in community law?
Is a footwear such as that at issue in the main proceedings to be classified as footwear with uppers of leather under CN heading 6403 or as footwear with uppers of textile materials under CN heading 6404?
Is Additional Note 1 to Chapter 64 of the CN compatible with Note 4(a) to Chapter 64 of the CN?
Does the freedom of establishment preclude a national legislation such as that in the main proceedings, which only allows for the setting up of private health institutions in case of 'need', as defined in national legislation?
How is the legality of the legislation at issue in the main proceedings, in relation to the freedom of establishment,  affected by the fact that the authorities must take account of care offered by certain outpatient departments?
Is the  national rule at issue in the main proceedings, only allowing for pharmacists to be owner of pharmacies, incompatible with the freedom of establishment?
Having regard to the principle of effectiveness of Community law, is a national authority entitled and obliged under Community law to disapply national provisions as it regards as contrary to Community law even if there is no clear breach of Community law or established by the ECJ that there is any incompatibility?
Is it consistent with Community Law for a national court to prevent a person from participating in proceedings in breach of an arbitration agreement in another Member State?
Is the word ?tethered?, within the meaning of the Directive 91/629 to be interpreted so as to include the act of the defendant?
Is the material, the length or the purpose of the tethering of any significance in that respect?
Can heavy fuel oil,sold as a combustible fuel, be treated as waste within the meaning of the Directive 75/442?
Does a cargo of heavy fuel oil transported by a ship and accidentally spilled into the sea, constitute waste falling in the meaning of the Directive 2006/12?
If the first question is answered in the affirmative and the second in the negative, can the producer of waste be held responsible for pollution when at the time of the accident the fuel was being transported by a third party?
Must a national court before which a civil action is pending request the President to waive immunity for the purposes of pursuing proceedings, even if the Member of Parliament whom the proceedings concern has not waived it?
In the absence of a communication by the European Parliament that it intends to defend the immunities and privileges of the Member concerned, may a National Court rule as to the existence or otherwise of that privilege?
Does the Belgian Law of 14 July 1991 on commercial practices and consumer information and protection constitute a measure having equivalent effect, as prohibited in Articles 28 EC to 30 EC?
Should Article 19(1)(a) of Regulation No 1408/71 be interpreted, in light of the Treaty, as meaning that an employed or self-employed person, or a member of that person’s family,  may not receive any cash benefits or reimbursement provided in the place of residence, if there is provision under the law applicable to the institution of the place of residence for persons insured by that institution to receive only cash benefits, and not benefits in kind?
If there is no such entitlement to benefits in kind, is there, in the light of Article 18 EC, or Articles 39 EC and 49 EC, any entitlement to payment ? subject to prior approval ? by the competent institution of the costs of in-patient care in a care home situated in another Member State, in the amount of the benefits payable in the competent State?
Is arrangements such as those in the main proceedings to be regarded, by reason of their object alone, as being anti-competitive and prohibited by art 81(1)?
Is the list contained in art 24 of directive 1993/37 exhaustive?
Is national provision which establishes an (absolute) incompatibility between the media sector and the public procurement sector compatible with the principles of Community law?
Does art 24 of directive 1993/37 infringe the general principles of the protection of competition and transparency or the principle of subsidiarity?
Are the Belgian rules regarding which mammals that might be imported or traded incompatible with art 30 EC and/or Regulation no 338/97?
Does art 3 of directive 97/36/EC permit Member States to impose on television operators the obligation to earmark a percentage of their operating revenue for the pre-funding of European cinematographic films made for television?
Is it compatible with directive 97/36/EC to reserve a certain percentage of a mandatory fee paid by actors on the national market, for works having an original language which is one of the languages of Spain?
Is a scheme where television operators are required to pay a certain percentage of their revenues, and where a fixed part of that percentage is reserved for the production of movies in the language of the Member State, to be regarded as state aid?
Does art 14(1)(a) of Directive 2003/96 have direct effect?
Is a benefit such as the one at issue in the main proceedings to be regarded as an "unemployment benefit" or as an "invalidity benefit" within the meaning of Regulation 1408/71?
Can a member state make the entitlement of an 'unemployment benefit? within the meaning of Article 4(1)(g) of Regulation No 1408/71, subject to the condition that the recipients must be resident on the national territory of that State?
?Is Directive to be interpreted as meaning that a third party whose health is impaired is entitled to the preparation of an action plan even if he is  otherwise in a position to enforce his right by bringing an action for intervention by the public authority?
If so, is a third party who is affected by such concentrations of particulate matter  entitled to have a detailed action plan drawn up to ensure strict compliance with the emission limit values?
If the answer is no,  can an action plan be limited, on the principle of ?one step at a time?, to measures which, while not guaranteeing compliance with the limit value, nevertheless contribute in the short term to improvements in ambient air quality?
Is the Directive to be interpreted as obliging Member States to establish legal rules whereby any third party has the right to choose the electricity system to which he wishes to be connected?
Does the term of protection granted by Directive 2006/116 under the conditions set out in Article 10(2) thereof apply also in the case of subject-matter that has not at any time been protected in the Member State in which protection is sought?
If Question 1 is to be answered in the affirmative: Do national provisions governing the protection of rightholders who are not Community nationals constitute national provisions within the meaning of Article 10(2) of the Directive?
If Question 1 is to be answered in the affirmative: Does the term of protection granted pursuant to Article 10(2) of the Directive also apply to subject-matter that, on 1 July 1995, fulfilled the criteria set out in Council Directive 92/100, but whose rightholder is not a Community national?
Is it compatible with the objective of agri-environmental support laid down in Regulation 1257/1999 to give continued support only to applicants for whom a decision awarding agri-environmental support has already been made?
Is it compatible with the objective of agri-environmental support laid down in Regulation 1257/1999 to provide support in each budgetary year also to new applicants who are prepared to enter into a commitment?
If the answer to Question 2 is yes, does Regulation 1257/1999 authorize a Member State to determine that support may be applied for only if the applicant has been granted support in the previous year?
If the answer to Question 2 is yes, does Regulation 1257/1999 authorize a Member State if in the context of the programme it becomes clear that there are no longer sufficient budgetary means for granting first-time support, to reduce proportionately the support of all applicants meeting the requirements for agri-environmental support?
Does the term ?person having (the goods) imported for free circulation? in the Regulation 89/97 include the customs agents?
Does regulation 89/97 include the case where goods are imported into the Union at Antwerp and then transported to the Netherlands?
Should the importer hold the authorisation referred to in article 297?
Does the term ?transferee? refer to the customs agent which clears the goods inwards from outside the Community to a Member State of the European Union on behalf of the ultimate importer?
Where a combined power and heating plant consists of a number of units (furnaces), is each unit to be assessed as a separate plant?
Is a plant constructed for waste incarceration but having as its main purpose the production of energy to be classified as an incineration plant?
Is the fact that the earlier mark has a huge reputation for certain specific types of goods or services, the goods or services are dissimilar or dissimilar to a substantial degree to the goods or services of the later mark, earlier mark is unique in respect of any goods or services, and that??the earlier mark would be brought to mind by the average consumer when he or she encounters the later mark used for the services of the later mark, enough to establish a link in the meaning of the directive 89/104?
Is the fact that the earlier mark has a huge reputation for certain specific types of goods or services, enough to establish a link and/or a detriment in the meaning of the directive 89/104?
Is the fact that?the earlier mark is unique in respect of any goods or services enough to establish a link and/or a detriment in the meaning of the directive?
Is the fact that  the earlier mark would be brought to mind by the average consumer when he or she encounters the later mark used for the services of the later mark enough to establish a link and/or a detriment in the meaning of the directive?
If no, what factors is the national court to take into account in deciding whether there is a sufficient link sufficient?
Does the earlier mark have to be unique, in order to satisfy the condition of detriment to distinctive character?
Is a first conflicting use sufficient to establish detriment to distinctive character?
Does the element of detriment to distinctive character of the earlier mark require an effect on the economic behaviour of the consumer?
Does the term "persons" in the context of "persons taking part in sport" include corporate persons and unincorporated associations?
If yes, does the expression "certain services closely linked to sport" permit a member state to limit the exemption only to individuals taking part in sport?
Do reimbursements relating to works such as those carried out by the buyer in the main proceedings, that are covered by a guarantee from the manufacturer, result in post-reduction of customs value under the Customs Code and/or the Implementing Regulation?
Do art 145(2) and (3) of the Implementing Regulation apply to imports in respect of which the customs declarations were accepted before 19 March 2002?
Is Article 145(2) and (3) of [the Implementing Regulation] valid?
Does the block exemption in art 12(2) of Regulation no 1984/83 only cover the situation where the supplier is the initial owner of both the land and the service station?
Does the block exemption in art 5(a) of Regulation no 2790/1999 only cover the situation where the supplier is the initial owner of both the land and the service station?
Can retail price clauses such as those at issue in the main proceedings benefit from the block exemption in recital 8 in the preamble to Regulation No 1984/83 or art 4(a) of Regulation 2790/1999?
Is the Directive 2005/29 to be interpreted as precluding a national rule, such as Article 54 of the 1991 Law, which, subject to certain exceptions, and without taking account of the specific circumstances, lays down a general principle prohibiting the making of combined offers by a vendor to a consumer?
Does Directive 2000/35 preclude national legislation providing that forced execution against a public authority as regards an unchallenged claim cannot be undertaken until after 120 days?
When a time-fixed employment for a foreign teacher changes, after a short interruption, into an indefinite, is it contrary to  the freedom of movement for workers to not count the rights acquired during the first employment?
Is the limitation period in Art 3(1) Regulation 2988/95 applicable to irregularities committed or ceased before the enter into force of that regulation?
Is the limitation period in Art 3(1) Regulation 2988/95 applicable in general to administrative measures such as the recovery of export refunds granted as a result of irregularities?
May Member States make use for the exception in Art3(3) of Regulation 2988/95 in such a way to continue to apply a longer, general time limit, adopted before the entry into force of that Regulation?
Is it in accordance with the right to establishment and the free movement of capital to require tax to be paid on the interest paid by a Belgian company to a non-Belgian company, whilst not requiring such tax if both companies are Belgian?
Is it contrary to art 8(1) of Directive 90/434, to tax a capital gain, calculated as the difference between the initial cost of acquiring the shares and their market value, unless the acquiring company carries over the historical book value of the shares in its own tax balance sheet?
Is the national regulation contrary to the right to establishment or the free movement of capital?
Is the expression "distortions of competition" in Art 4(5) of Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC to be ascertained on a public body by public body basis?
Does "would lead to" in art 4(5) of the Sixth Directive only encompass actual competition, and which level of probability is required for the criterion to be met?
Does "significant" in art (5) of the Sixth Directive mean 'more than trivial or de minimis', 'material' or 'exceptional'?
Is the requirement of "financing by the State"in the first alternative of letter (c) of the second subparagraph of Article 1(9) of [Directive 2004/18] to be interpreted as including a situation where the State prescribes duty to pay contributions to the insurance fund but the sickness insurance funds are linked to a system of solidarity-based financing?
Is the requirement referred to in the second alternative of letter (c) of the second subparagraph of Article 1(9) [of Directive 2004/18] that the body be "subject to management supervisions by those bodies" be interpreted to the effect that State legal supervision is sufficient to satisfy that requirement?
If the answer to question 1a or 1b is yes, are letters (c) and (d) of Article 1(2) of [Directive 2004/18] to be interpreted as meaning that the provision of goods which are individually manufactured, to meet the needs of the particular customer, and on whose use the individual customer is to be advised, are to be classified as supply contracts or as service contracts?
Is only the value of the particular services to be taken into consideration?
If the goods are to be classified as a service, does a "service concession" (within the meaning of Article 1(4) of [Directive 2004/18] ) also include a contract according to which award decisions are taken by third parties?
If the goods are to be classified as a service, does a "service concession" (within the meaning of Article 1(4) of [Directive 2004/18] )also include a contract according to which the contractor is liable to pay remuneration to third parties?
If the goods are to be classified as a service, does a "service concession" (within the meaning of Article 1(4) of [Directive 2004/18] )also include a contract according to which the contractor is not required to provide any kind of services to third party?
Is a Community trade mark protected in the whole Community as a ?trade mark with a reputation? for the purposes of Article 9(1)(c) of [the regulation] if it has a ?reputation? only in one Member State?
If the answer to the first question is in the negative: Is a mark which has a ?reputation? only in one Member State protected in that Member State under Article 9(1)(c) , so that a prohibition limited to that Member State may be issued?
Is the rounding of VAT amounts governed solely by national law?
Does Community law prevent the application of a national rule or practice requiring rounding up of any given VAT amount?
Does Community law require that the taxpayers be allowed to round down any VAT amount which includes a fraction of the smallest unit of currency?
At which level does Community law require rounding off to be applied for the purpose of calculating VAT due?
Is the answer to any of the questions above affected by the principles of equal treatment and fiscal neutrality?
Do Articles 43 EC, 48 EC, 56 EC and 58 EC preclude legislation of a MS which exempts from withholding tax dividends distributed by a subsidiary resident in that MS to a share company or investment fund also resident there, but charges withholding tax on similar dividends paid to a parent company in the form of a SICAV resident in another MS which has a legal form unknown in the law of the former State, does not appear on the list of companies referred to in Article 2(a) of Directive 90/435, and is exempt from income tax under the law of the other MS?
Is the Directive 91/533 to be interpreted as meaning that a collective agreement which is intended to implement the provisions of the directive cannot be applied to an employee who is not a member of an organisation party to that agreement?
Are the words of the second subparagraph of Article 8(2) of the Directive 91/533 to be interpreted as meaning that provisions in a  collective agreement or the obligation of prior notification of the employer cannot be applied to an employee who is not a member of an organisation party to that agreement?
Do the words "temporary contract" and "temporary ... Employment relationship" in the second subparagraph of Article 8(2) refer to short-term employment relationships?
Which criteria should be used to determine whether it is temporary (short-term)?
Is EU law to be interpreted as meaning that, for an undertaking to be regarded as having activities in a Member State, it is necessary for that undertaking to have a branch or a permanent place of business there?
Are the submitted questions admissible?
Must a camcorder be classified in the CN as if it were able to record external digital signals, even if it could not do so when imported, if this function can be activated by enabling software ?
If yes, is the Commission entitled to amend the explanatory notes of the regulation with binding retrospective effect?
Is Article 3(1) of Directive 2000/76/EC to be interpreted as meaning that directive does not apply to the combustion of gaseous waste?
Is a gas plant where gas is generated by means of pyrolysis to be regarded as an incineration plant within the meaning of Article 3(4) of Directive 2000/76/EC even if it has no incineration line?
Is a combustion which is generated in the gas plant and purified after the gasification process to be regarded as an operator within the meaning of Article 3 of Directive 2000/76/EC?
Does it have any bearing that the purified gas replaces the use of fossil fuels?
Does it have any relevance whether the purified gas may be used elsewhere for energy production?
Under what conditions may the purified gas generated in the gas plant be regarded as a product, so that the rules on waste no longer apply?
Do donations of consumer goods to bodies in another MS and which, under the law of that MS are charitable, fall within the scope of the principle of free movement of capital?
If yes, is it incompatible with the principle of free movement of capital for national law to confer a tax benefit on donations to charitable bodies only if the latter are resident in that MS?
If yes, does Directive 77/799 impose an obligation on the tax authorities to obtain assistance from the other MS in order to verify facts which have occurred?
May a municipality, without calling for competition, join a cooperative society, such as that at issue, grouping together exclusively other municipalities in order to transfer to that cooperative society the management of its cable television network, in the knowledge that the cooperative society carries out the essential part of its activities for and with its own members and that decisions regarding those activities are thus taken by representatives of the public authorities?
Can the control thus exercised over the decisions of the cooperative society, via the statutory bodies, by all the members of the cooperative society ? or, in the case of operational sectors or sub-sectors, by some of those members ? be regarded as enabling them to exercise over the cooperative society control similar to that exercised over their own departments?
For that control to be regarded as similar, must it be exercised individually by each member, or is it sufficient that it be exercised by the majority of the members?
Does the principle of freedom of establishment preclude national legislation pursuant to which the grant to companies acquiring tangible assets of an investment premium is conditional upon the goods for which the premium is claimed being used exclusively in a domestic place of business, and which specifies that assets which, when they are hired out for remuneration, are primarily used in other Member States, are not regarded as being used in such a domestic place of business?
Is the contested decision compatible with the EC Treaty?
Is provision in question compatible with Article 31(1) of the directive 2002/22 if a cable network operator is required to provide  access to television programmes on its analogue cable networks even in those areas where end user would in any event be in a position to receive the same programmes terrestrially?
Is a provision compatible with Article 31(1) of the directive 20002/22 if a cable network operator is required to provide  access to television programmes on on its analogue cable networks even in those areas of the Land in which the cable end-user would in any event be in a position to receive the same television programmes terrestrially by means of a terrestrial antenna and a decoder?
Are "television services" within the meaning of Article 31(1) of the directive 2002/22 to be interpreted as including providers of media services or teleshopping?
Is provision compatible with directive 2002/22 if, in the event of a shortage of channels, the national authority has to establish a priority of applicants which results in full utilisation of channels available?
Do the courts of the MS have international jurisdiction under Regulation [No 1346/2000]  in respect of an action to set aside a transaction in the context of insolvency?
If no, does such an action fall within article 1(2)b of Regulation [No 44/2001]?
Is Council Regulation 1347/2001 invalid as a consequence of the invalidity of article 1(1) of Regulation 2081/92 insofar as it permits the registration of geographical indications relating to beer?
Is Council Regulation 1347/2001 invalid as a consequence of the invalidity of article 1(1) of Regulation 2081/92 insofar as it provides for an accelerated registration procedure?
Is Council Regulation 1347/2001 invalid due to its failure to  comply with procedural requirements regarding the indication "Bayerisches Bier"?
Is Council Regulation 1347/2001 invalid due to the fact that the question whether the preconditions had been met for registration was not given due consideration?
Is Council Regulation 1347/2001 invalid due to the fact that the application for registration was not submitted in time by the German Government?
Is Council Regulation 1347/2001 invalid due to failure to satisfy the substantive requirements laid down in  art. 2(2)?
Is Council Regulation 1347/2001 invalid due to the fact that the indication "Bayerisches Bier" is generic?
Is Council Regulation 1347/2001 invalid due to the fact that the registration should have been refused pursuant to article 14(3)?
Is regulation No 1347/2001  to be construed as meaning that recognition of the PGI is to have no adverse effects on the validity or usability of pre-existing marks?
Is it compatible with article 17(2)(a) of the Directive 86/653 to limit the indemnity to which a commercial agent is entitled by the amount of commission lost as a result of termination of the agency contract, even though the benefits which the principal continues to derive have to be given a higher monetary value?
Are benefits accruing to other companies within the group to which the principal belongs also to be taken into consideration for the purposes of the above calculation?
Is the period of the right to a hearing laid down by the MS compatible with the principle of respect for the rights of defence?
May a period of 13 days be considered reasonable for an importer to exercise his rights of defence?
How is the expression "public postal services" in Article 13A(1)(a) of the Sixth Directive to be interpreted?
Is the interpretation affected by the fact that the postal services in a MS have been liberalised, there are no reserved services (within the meaning of Directive 97/67) and there is one designated universal provider?
Does the expression "public postal services" include only the sole designated universal services provider?
In the present circumstances, is the MS required or permitted to exempt all postal services provided by the "public postal services"?
If only some of the services are exempted, by reference to which criteria are those services to be identified?
Does the copy function of a multifunction apparatus of the kind described in these proceedings, designed to operate through a direct connection or a network with one or more computers, but capable, as regards the copying function only, of operating autonomously, constitute a ?specific function other than data processing? within the meaning of Note 5(E) to Chapter 84 of the [CN]?
If yes, does the existence of that specific function, which is expressly acknowledged not to give the product its essential character, mean that classification in Chapter 84, pursuant to Note 5(E), is to be excluded, despite the existence of printing and scanner functions associated with data processing?
If that is the case, and in relation to equipment made up of three materially distinct modules (printer, scanner and computer), should the classification be made on the basis of General Rule 3(b)?
Does the copy function of a multifunction apparatus of the kind described in these proceedings, designed to operate through a direct connection or a network with one or more computers, but capable, as regards the copying function only, of operating autonomously, constitute a ?specific function other than data processing? within the meaning of Note 5(E) to Chapter 84 of the [CN]?
?In the event of an affirmative answer to the first question, does the existence of that specific function mean that classification in Chapter 84, pursuant to Note 5(E), is to be excluded, despite the existence of printing and scanner functions associated with data processing?
Is Regulation No 400/2006 invalid, in particular because it is contrary to the [HS], to the [CN] and to Rules 1 and 3(b) of the General Rules for the Interpretation of the Harmonised System and the Combined Nomenclature?
Is the second subparagraph of Article 17(6) of the Sixth VAT Directive to be interpreted in such a way that it is a condition for the refusal by a Member State of a right to deduct [VAT] on supplies used for the provision of meals to business contacts and staff in a company’s canteen in connection with meetings that there was, prior to the entry into force of the directive, authority under national legislation for the deduction refusal in question and that this authority was applied in practice by the tax authorities in such a way that the right to deduct [VAT] on these supplies was refused?
Does it have any significance that the canteens were not subject to VAT under the rules in force in the MS before the implementation of the directive?
Is an exclusion from the right to deduct retained within the meaning of the directive if during the implementation period, as a result of administrative practice, there was a right to deduct VAT on the expenditure in question?
Is the directive to be interpreted as meaning that the subparagraphs (a) and (b) of Article 6(2) of the Sixth VAT Directive  covers meals offered free of charge to business contacts?
Is the directive to be interpreted as meaning that the subparagraphs (a) and (b) of Article 6(2) of the Sixth VAT Directive covers meals free of charge offered to its staff?
Is point 2 of Article 22 of the Regulation 2001/44 to be interpreted as meaning that proceedings, such as those at issue before the referring court, in the context of which one of the parties alleges that a decision adopted by an organ of a company has infringed rights that it claims under that company?s Articles of Association, concern the validity of the decisions of the organs of a company within the meaning of that provision?
Are sheets to be categorised under the CN heading 1905  if they have not undergone heat treatment?
Is the classification valid?
Must the regulation be construed as meaning that the National Court may not set aside a previous decision on the matter made by the Commission?
If no, does Community law contain any specific provision which guarantees  uniform application of Community law in the case where there is a discrepancy between the views of the Commission and those of the national Court?
Must the regulation be interpreted as meaning that a colour monitor which can display signals both from an automatic data-processing machine and from other sources is excluded from the CN classification under heading 8471 ?
If no, on the basis of which criteria must it be determined whether it is a unit of the sort that is solely or principally used in an automatic data-processing system?
Does the scope of the regulation 754/5004 include the monitor at issue?
Is regulation 754/2004 valid?
Are clause 5 and clause 8(1) and (3) of the Framework Agreement (Directive 1999/70) to be interpreted as meaning that Community law precludes a MS from adopting measures where an equivalent legal measure within the meaning of clause 5(1) of the Agreement already existed under national law before the directive entered into force, and where the measures adopted in order to apply the Agreement reduce the general level of protection afforded to fixed-term workers under national law?
Is the reduction in the protection afforded to fixed-term workers in the case simply of a single fixed-term employment contract, under which the worker is in fact to provide services to meet ?fixed and permanent?, connected to the application of the said Framework Agreement and the above directive and is such a reduction therefore permitted or not permitted from the point of view of Community law?
If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative, where there is an equivalent legal measure under national law which existed before the Directive entered into force, is the adoption of a legal measure  such as that at issue in the main proceedings, an unacceptable reduction in the general level of protection afforded to fixed-term workers within the meaning of clause 8(1) and (3) of the Framework Agreement where the scope of the legal measure in question applying the Agreement extends only to successive fixed-term employment contracts or relationships, while the earlier equivalent legal measure applied to all fixed-term contracts of employment?
If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative, where there is an equivalent legal measure under national law which existed before the Directive entered into force, is the adoption of a legal measure  such as that at issue in the main proceedings, an unacceptable reduction in the general level of protection within the meaning of clause 8(1) and (3) of the Framework Agreement where, for the purpose of protecting fixed-term workers and preventing abuse, the legal measure in question applying the Agreement provides for fixed-term contracts thereafter to be treated as contracts of indefinite duration?
If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative, is the choice made by the Greek legislature, in transposing the above directive into Greek law, first, to exclude the said cases of abuse in which the worker has concluded a single fixed-term contract, and second, not to enact a similar measure establishing legal consequences specific to the case, an unacceptable reduction in the general level of protection under national law within the meaning of clause 8(1) and (3) of the Framework Agreement, bearing in mind?
Is the national court obliged under Community law to disapply national legislation such as Presidential Decree No 164/2004 at issue in the main proceedings if it is contrary to the provisions of the Framework Agreement, and to apply instead an ?equivalent legal measure? such as that provided for under Article 8(3) of Law No 2112/1920?
Must clause 5(1)(a) of the Framework Agreement be interpreted as precluding the application of national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, by the authorities of the MS concerned in such a way that the conclusion of fixed-term employment contracts in the public sector is deemed to be justified by ?objective reasons? within the meaning of that clause solely on the ground that those contracts are founded on legal provisions allowing them to be concluded or renewed in order to meet certain temporary needs when, in fact, those needs are ?fixed and permanent??
Must the Framework Agreement be interpreted as precluding the application of national legislation which, in the public sector, prohibits fixed-term employment contracts that have, in fact, been intended to cover fixed and permanent needs of the employer from being converted to contracts of indefinite duration?
May directive 20006/11 be interpreted as allowing MSs to introduce a declaratory scheme subject to a reference to environmental quality standards that have been adopted under directive?
In determining whether a food within the meaning of Article 1(2) of Regulation 258/97 ?[has] not hitherto been used for human consumption to a significant degree within the Community? may it be considered significant that shortly before the Regulation entered into force on 15 May 1997 the food was imported into a narrowly defined region of Community territory (in the present case: San Marino) and was available in that locality?
For a food not to be considered as novel within the meaning of Article 1(1) and (2) of the Regulation, does it suffice to determine that all of the ingredients used in its production have hitherto been used for human consumption to a significant degree within the Community?
Must Article 1(2)(d) of the Regulation be interpreted narrowly so as to exclude from the category ?foods ... consisting of ... algae? foods containing only such algae as have hitherto been used for human consumption within the Community?
May a food be considered as ?having a history of a safe food use? within the meaning of Article 1(2)(e) of the Regulation if experience regarding its safety only exists in regions outside Europe (in the present case: Japan)?
May a food be considered as ?having a history of a safe food use? because it is produced using ingredients with a safe history in accordance with a production or processing technique currently in use, if no experience exists as to that combination of ingredients and techniques?
Is it incumbent upon an undertaking to initiate the procedure provided for in Article 13 of the Regulation? May, in addition, any indications be deduced from that provision and from Article 1(2) of the Regulation concerning the burden of producing evidence and the substantive burden of proof?
Does Art. 88 EC require that the national court should, on grounds of the prohibition contained in that provision, refuse further grants of State aid to a recipient under the circumstances at hand?
Does the prohibition preclude the application of a provision of national law, if such application is based on the new version of that law during which the decisive declaration of compatibility by the Commission was not yet applicable?
Does the notion of "temporary storage" cover the situation where a producer to mixes together items of waste covered by different codes?
If yes, may "mixed packaging" be used to cover waste consisting of packaging of various materials grouped together?
Does the scope of  Directive 2000/78 extend to national rules which permit employers to dismiss employees over 65 by reason of retirement?
Does the scope of the directive extend to national rules which permit employers to dismiss employees over 65 by reason of retirement where they were introduced after the directive was made?
Were the sections 109 and 156 of the 1996 Act and Regulations 30 and 7 national provisions laying down retirement ages within the meaning of recital 14 of the Directive?
Does the directive permit MSs to introduce legislation providing a different treatment on grounds of age?
Is there any significant difference between the test for justification set out in article 4 and article 6 respectively?
Does Article 13 of the Regulation 1501/95 mean that production of the proof described in the second paragraph thereof results in waiver of the need not only for proof of completion of customs formalities for release for consumption but also for production of the transport documents?
On the basis of the public policy clause in Article 27(1) of the Brussels Convention, may the court of the State requested to enforce a judgment take account of the fact that the court of the State which handed down that judgment denied the unsuccessful party which had entered an appearance the opportunity to present any form of defence following the issue of a debarring order? Or does the interpretation of that provision in conjunction with the principles to be inferred from Article 26 et seq. of the Convention, preclude the national court from finding that civil proceedings in which a party has been prevented from exercising the rights of the defence, on grounds of a debarring order, are contrary to public policy within the meaning of Article 27(1)?
Is it decisive for the interpretation of the term cancellation whether the original flight is abandoned with the result that a delay, regardless how long, does not constitute a cancellation if the air carrier does not actually abandon the planning for the original flight?
If yes, is the answer dependent on the length of the delay?
Must the regulation be interpreted as meaning that technical problems resulting changes in the flight schedule represent extraordinary circumstances which could not have been avoided even if all reasonable measures had been taken?
If a Member State imposes on a company incorporated under the law of that Member State which transfers its place of effective management from that Member State to another Member State a final settlement tax in respect of that transfer, can that company, in the present state of Community law, rely on Article 43 EC (now Article 49 TFEU) against that Member State?
If the first question must be answered in the affirmative: is a final settlement tax such as the one at issue, which is applied, without deferment and without the possibility of taking subsequent decreases in value into consideration, to the capital gains relating to the assets of the company which were transferred from the Member State of origin to the host Member State, as assessed at the time of the transfer of the place of management, contrary to Article 43 EC (now Article 49 TFEU), in the sense that such a final settlement tax cannot be justified by the necessity of allocating powers of taxation between the Member States?
Does the answer to the previous question also depend on the circumstance that the final settlement tax in question relates to a (currency) profit which accrued under the tax jurisdiction of the Netherlands, whereas that profit cannot be reflected in the host Member State under the tax system in force there?’
Is the rule of conflict in Article 6(2)(a) of the Rome Convention, which states that an employment contract is governed by the law of the country in which the employee habitually carries out his work in performance of the contract, to be interpreted as meaning that, in the situation where the employee works in more than one country, but returns systematically to one of them, that country must be regarded as that in which the employee habitually carries out his work?
Does Directive 2006/24, and in particular Articles 3 to 5 and 11 thereof, preclude the application of a national provision which is based on Article 8 of Directive 2004/48 and which permits an internet service provider in civil proceedings, in order to identify a particular subscriber, to be ordered to give a copyright holder or its representative information on the subscriber to whom the internet service provider provided a specific IP address, which address, it is claimed, was used in the infringement?
Is the answer to Question 1 affected by the fact that the Member State has not implemented Directive 2006/24 despite the fact that the period prescribed for implementation has expired?
Are the rules laid down in Article 37 of Regulation No 1013/2006, read in conjunction with Regulation No 1418/2007, to be interpreted as meaning that it is prohibited to ship to Lebanon waste which falls within waste category B1120 of Annex IX to the Basel Convention?
What is the legal nature of the penalty provided for in Article 138 of Regulation No 1973/2004 which consists in refusing a farmer direct payments in the years following the year in which he submitted an incorrect statement as to the size of the area forming the basis for the single area payment?
Must Article 56 TFEU be interpreted as meaning that a restriction on the freedom to provide services exists if the recipient of a service, provided by a service provider established in another Member State, is obliged, under the legislation of the Member State where the service recipient is established and where the service is provided, to withhold tax on the remuneration payable for that service, whereas that withholding obligation does not exist in relation to a service provider who is established in the same Member State as the service recipient?
If the answer to the previous question has the effect that legislation which provides for the imposition of tax by a service recipient hinders the freedom to provide services, can such a hindrance then be justified by the need to ensure that taxes are levied and collected from foreign companies whose stay in the Netherlands is short and which are difficult to monitor?
Does the rule go beyond what is necessary given the opportunities for mutual assistance in the recovery of taxes presented in particular by Directive 76/308/EEC?
In answering the foregoing questions, is it relevant that the tax which is payable on the remuneration in the Member State where the service recipient is established can be set off against tax which is payable on that remuneration in that other Member State?
Must paragraph 3 of Chapter IX of Annex II to the regulation (EC) No 852/2004 be interpreted as meaning that, in circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings, with regard to containers used for self-service retail of bread and bakery products, the fact that a potential purchaser could conceivably have touched the foodstuffs offered for sale by hand or sneezed on them makes it possible, on that basis alone, to hold that those foodstuffs were not protected against any contamination likely to render them unfit for human consumption, injurious to health or contaminated in such a way that it would be unreasonable to expect them to be consumed in that state?
Do Article 10 EC and Articles 2 and 22 of the Sixth Directive preclude legislation of the Italian State, under which the court with jurisdiction in tax matters may not rule on the existence of an alleged tax debt which the tax authorities have sought, in due time, to recover by appealing against an unfavourable decision and which thus in effect provides for the VAT debt at issue to be wholly waived in cases where the courts have ruled at both first and second instance that such a debt does not exist, without the taxable person in favour of whom the waiver has operated having to pay even a fraction of the debt at issue?
Is it compatible with Article 32 of [Protocol 1] if the European Commission essentially takes it upon itself to undertake the subsequent verification of proofs of origin in the exporting country, albeit with the assistance of the authorities of that country, and does it constitute a result of this verification within the meaning of that article if the results of the verification so obtained by the Commission are recorded in a report that is co-signed by a representative of the government of the exporting country?
If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative: can the person liable for the duty in a case such as the action in the main proceedings – in which the exporting country has declared [EUR.1 certificates] issued during a particular period to be invalid because the origin of the goods could not be confirmed by subsequent verification even though it could not be ruled out that some export goods satisfied the origin requirements – rely on the protection of legitimate expectations on the basis of the second and third subparagraphs of Article 220(2)(b) of [the Customs Code] and claim that the [EUR.1] certificates presented in his case may have been correct and were therefore based on a correct account of the facts provided by the exporter?
Are Articles 12(1) and 13(1) of Directive 2009/103 to be interpreted as precluding national provisions the effect of which, as a matter of the relevant national law, is to exclude from the benefit of insurance a victim of a road traffic accident, in the circumstances of the case?
Does the answer to question 1 depend on whether the permission in question (a) was based on actual knowledge that the driver in question was uninsured or (b) was based on a belief that the driver was insured or (c) where the permission in question was granted by the insured person who had not turned his/her mind to the issue?
Are Articles 31 and 32 of [the Regulation], in conjunction with Article 297 TFEU, to be interpreted to require a national court to apply [the Regulation], and in particular Article 15(c) thereof, in a case where the event giving rise to the damage occurred on 29 August 2007?
Is the answer to Question 1 affected by either of the following facts: (i) that the proceedings seeking compensation for damage were commenced on 8 January 2009; (ii) that the national court had not made any determination of the applicable law before 11 January 2009?
Is Article 8(1)(c) of Directive 92/81 to be interpreted as meaning that mineral oils supplied for use in an excavator which is affixed to a vessel but which, because it has its own separate motor and fuel tank, operates independently of the vessel’s propulsion engine, in circumstances such as those of the present case, are exempt from duty?
Are Article 19(1) of Directive 2006/54 …, Article 8(1) of … Directive 2000/43 … and Article 10(1) of … Directive 2000/78 … to be interpreted as meaning that, where a worker shows that he meets the requirements for a post advertised by an employer, he has a right vis-à-vis that employer, if he does not obtain the post, to information as to whether the employer has engaged another applicant and, if so, as to the criteria on the basis of which that appointment has been made?
If the answer to the first question is affirmative: where the employer does not disclose the requested information, does that fact give rise to a presumption that the discrimination alleged by the worker exists?
Should the terms “by means of their own facilities” in Article 5(2)(d) of Directive 2001/29 and “on behalf of and under the responsibility of the broadcasting organisation” in recital 41 in the preamble to that directive be interpreted with reference to national law or to European Union law?
Should it be assumed that the wording of Article 5(2)(d) of Directive 2001/29, as in the Danish, English and French versions of that provision, is to mean “on behalf of and under the responsibility of the broadcasting organisation” or, as in the German version, is to mean “on behalf of or under the responsibility of the broadcasting organisation”?
On the assumption that the terms cited in Question 1 are to be interpreted with reference to European Union law: What criteria should national courts apply to a specific assessment as to whether a recording made by a third party (the “Producer”) for use in a broadcasting organisation’s transmissions was made “by means of their own facilities”, and “on behalf of [and/or] under the responsibility of the broadcasting organisation”, such that the recording is covered by the exception laid down in Article 5(2)(d) of Directive 2001/29?
Should Article 34 TFEU be interpreted as meaning that Spanish national law prohibiting tobacco retailers from importing manufactured tobacco products from other Member States constitutes a quantitative restriction on imports or a measure having equivalent effect as prohibited by the FEU Treaty?
Do the principles of effectiveness, non-discrimination and tax neutrality in relation to VAT preclude national rules or practice in accordance with which the right of the purchaser/client to reimbursement of VAT paid in error is construed, in contrast to the right exercised by the principal debtor (supplier/provider of the service), as a right under the ordinary law to the recovery of sums paid but not due, and time-limits are applied in the case of the purchaser/client which are significantly more generous than those applied to the principal debtor, with the result that the claim of the purchaser/client, brought after the time-limits for the principal debtor have expired, can give rise to an order directing the principal debtor to provide reimbursement, while it is no longer possible for the latter to claim a refund from the tax authority and there is no provision for any bridging instrument, designed to prevent conflicts or disputes, to coordinate the proceedings brought or to be brought before the various courts?
Quite apart from that situation, are the above principles compatible with national practice or case-law under which it is possible for a judgment to direct that the purchaser/client be reimbursed by the supplier/provider of the service, where the latter has not brought a reimbursement claim before another court within the time allowed for that purpose – in reliance on an interpretation, handed down by case-law and subsequently implemented through administrative practice, to the effect that the transaction was subject to VAT?
Is the first sentence of Article 16(1) of Directive 2004/38 to be interpreted as conferring on Union citizens who have resided legally for more than five years in the territory of a Member State on the basis of national law alone, but who did not during that period fulfil the conditions laid down in Article 7(1) of Directive 2004/38, a right of permanent residence in that Member State?
Are periods of residence by Union citizens in the host Member State which took place before the accession of their Member State of origin to the European Union also to be counted towards the period of lawful residence under Article 16(1) of Directive 2004/38?
Where a taxable person (“Trader A”) sells phonecards representing the right to receive telecommunications services from that person, is Article 2(1) of the Sixth Directive to be interpreted so as to mean that Trader A makes two supplies for VAT purposes: one at the time of the initial sale of the phonecard by Trader A to another taxable person (“Trader B”) and one at the time of its redemption (i.e. its use by a person — the “End User” — to make telephone calls)?
If so, how (consistently with EU VAT legislation) is VAT to be applied through the chain of supply where Trader A sells the phonecard to Trader B, Trader B resells the phonecard in Member State B and it is eventually purchased by the End User in Member State B, and the End User then uses the phonecard to make telephone calls?
For a product to be classified as a “biocidal product”, within the meaning of Article 2(1)(a) of Directive 98/8/EC, must that product itself destroy, deter, render harmless, prevent the action of, or otherwise exert a controlling effect on the harmful organism directly by chemical or biological means, or is it sufficient that the product should have an indirect effect on that harmful organism?
If an indirect chemical or biological effect on the harmful organism is sufficient, what is required of the product’s indirect effect on the harmful organism in order to be able to classify such a product as a “biocidal product”, within the meaning of Article 2(1)(a) of the Directive, or is an indirect effect of any nature sufficient to establish a product’s biocidal quality?
Does the unlawfulness of a Community regulation, which cannot in fact or in law be challenged by a trader by means of an individual action to have it set aside, amount for that trader to a case of force majeure which permits the time-limit provided for in Article 236(2) of the Customs Code to be exceeded?
If the first question is to be answered in the negative, do the provisions of the final paragraph of Article 236 of the Customs Code require the customs authorities to repay anti-dumping duties of their own initiative when the unlawfulness of those duties has been found following a challenge to their lawfulness by a Member State of the WTO: from the time of the first communication of the country concerned contesting the lawfulness of the anti-dumping regulation; from the time of the panel report finding the unlawfulness of the anti&#8209;dumping regulation; or from the time of the report of the Appellate Body of the WTO which led the European Community to recognise the unlawfulness of the anti&#8209;dumping regulation?
Must point (a) of the first paragraph of Article 6(2) and Article 13(B)(b) of the Sixth Directive … be interpreted as precluding national legislation which treats as an exempt supply of services, on the basis that it constitutes a leasing or letting of immovable property for the purposes of Article 13B(b), the private use by a director and his family of part of a building constructed or owned under a right in rem in that property by a taxable legal person, where the input tax on that business asset is deductible?
Must Directive 1999/37 or, as the case may be, Articles 34 TFEU and 36 TFEU, be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which provides that the grant of an advantage may only be awarded for demonstration motor vehicles the registration document of which states that it was a ‘demonstration vehicle?
Can the principles and provisions of international law mentioned be relied upon in the context of the present reference for a preliminary ruling, for the purpose of assessing the validity of Directive 2008/101 inasmuch as it includes aviation in the allowance trading scheme under Directive 2003/87?
Is Directive 2008/101 valid in the light of the principles of customary international law mentioned in the Court’s answer to the first question as well as in the light of Articles 7 and 11(1) and (2)(c) of the Open Skies Agreement and of Article 15(3) thereof read in conjunction with Articles 2 and 3(4)?
Does Article 17(2)(b) of the Sixth Directive permit a Member State to make the right to deduct VAT on importation conditional upon the actual payment of that tax by the taxable person, where the taxable person for the purposes of VAT on importation and the holder of the corresponding right to deduction are the same person?
Does Article 8(1) of the Universal Service Directive permit Member States to impose on those undertakings only specific obligations as to the manner in which they are to provide the universal service to end&#8209;users in respect of which they have been designated or if, on the contrary, Member States are entitled to impose on the designated undertakings such obligations as they consider most appropriate for the purpose of guaranteeing the provision of universal service, irrespective of whether those undertakings provide the service themselves?
Does [European Union] law (specifically Article 267 TFEU) require or enable the supreme court of a Member State, of its own motion, to refer a question to the [Court of Justice] for a preliminary ruling even at a stage of proceedings where the constitutional court has annulled a judgment of the supreme court based in particular on the application of the [European Union legal] framework on environmental protection and imposed the obligation to abide by the constitutional court’s legal opinions based on breaches of the procedural and substantive constitutional rights of a person involved in judicial proceedings, irrespective of the [European Union law] dimension of the case concerned, that is, where in those proceedings the constitutional court, as the court of last instance, has not concluded that there is a need to refer a question to the [Court of Justice] for a preliminary ruling and has provisionally excluded the application of the right to an acceptable environment and the protection thereof in the case concerned?
Is it possible to fulfil the basic objective of integrated prevention as defined, in particular, in recitals 8, 9 and 23 in the preamble to and Articles 1 and 15 of Directive [96/61], and, in general, in the [European Union legal] framework on the environment, that is, pollution prevention and control involving the public in order to achieve a high level of environmental protection as a whole, by means of a procedure where, on commencement of an integrated prevention procedure, the public concerned is not guaranteed access to all relevant documents (Article 6 in conjunction with Article 15 of Directive [96/61]), especially the decision on the location of a structure (landfill site), and where, subsequently, at first instance, the missing document is submitted by the applicant on condition that it is not disclosed to other parties to the proceedings in view of the fact that it constitutes trade secrets: can it reasonably be assumed that the location decision (in particular its statement of reasons) will significantly affect the submission of suggestions, observations or the other comments?
Are the objectives of [Directive 85/337] met, especially in terms of the [European Union legal] framework on the environment, specifically the condition referred to in Article 2 that, before consent is given, certain projects will be assessed in the light of their environmental impact, if the original position of the Ministerstvo životného prostredia (Ministry of the Environment) issued in 1999 and terminating a past environmental impact assessment (EIA) procedure is prolonged several years later by a simple decision without a repeat EIA procedure; in other words, can it be said that a decision under [Directive 85/337], once issued, is valid indefinitely?
Does the requirement arising generally under Directive [96/61] (in particular the preamble and Articles 1 and 15a) for Member States to engage in the prevention and control of pollution by providing the public with fair, equitable and timely administrative or judicial proceedings in conjunction with Article 10a of Directive [85/337] and Articles 6 and 9(2) and (4) of the Aarhus Convention apply to the possibility for the public to seek the imposition of an administrative or judicial measure which is preliminary in nature in accordance with national law (for example, an order for the judicial suspension of enforcement of an integrated permit) and allows for the temporary suspension, until a final decision in the case, of the construction of an installation for which a permit has been requested?
Is it possible, by means of a judicial decision meeting the requirements of Directive [96/61] or Directive [85/337] or Article 9(2) and (4) of the Aarhus Convention, in the application of the public right contained therein to fair judicial protection within the meaning of Article 191(1) and (2) [TFEU], concerning European Union policy on the environment, to interfere unlawfully with an operator’s right of property in an installation as guaranteed, for example, in Article 1 of the Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, for example by revoking an applicant’s valid integrated permit for a new installation in judicial proceedings?’
On the assumption that a Member State has lawfully imposed a specific obligation on an undertaking designated under Article 8(1) of the Universal Service Directive without that undertaking’s being required to provide that service directly to end&#8209;users, may such an obligation encompass requirements to maintain a database and make it available to other operators at wholesale level?
Does Article 13(6) of Directive 2000/60/EC … merely set an ultimate temporal limit (22 December 2009) for the drawing up of management plans for water resources or does it lay down, up until that date, a special time&#8209;limit for transposition of the relevant provisions of Articles 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 13 and 15 of that directive?
Is national legislation that permits the diversion of water from a particular river basin to another river basin, without the plans having yet been drawn up for the river basin districts within which the river basins are located, consistent with the Water Framework Directive?
Should the preceding question be answered in the affirmative: For the purpose of Articles 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 13 and 15 of Directive 2000/60, is the transfer of water from a river basin district to a neighbouring river basin district permitted? Should the answer be in the affirmative, can the purpose of that transfer be only to meet water-supply needs or can irrigation and power generation also be served? Is it in any event a requirement, for the purpose of those provisions of that directive, that the administrative authorities have decided, stating reasons and on the basis of the necessary scientific study, that the receiving river basin district cannot meet with its own water resources the needs which it has in respect of water supply, irrigation and so forth?
Does national legislation, enacted within that special time-limit for transposition, that permits the transfer of water from a particular river basin to another river basin, without the plans having yet been drawn up for the river basin districts within which the river basins from and towards which water will be transferred are located, place, without more, the practical effect of that directive at risk, or is it necessary, in order to assess whether the practical effect of the directive is placed at risk, to take account of criteria such as the scale of the interventions provided for and the objectives of the transfer of the water?
Is it for national law to determine whether or not judges as a whole are workers who have an employment contract or employment relationship within the meaning of Clause 2.1 of the Framework Agreement [on part-time work], or is there a Community norm by which this matter must be determined?
Is a legislative provision which is enacted by a national parliament and which approves river basin management plans without the relevant national rules providing for a public consultation stage in the procedure before the national parliament, and without it being apparent from the case-file that the consultation procedure before the administrative authorities that is provided for in Directive 2000/60 was observed, compatible with Articles 13, 14 and 15 of that directive which concern the procedures for informing and consulting the public and for public participation?
If judges as a whole are workers who have an employment contract or employment relationship within the meaning of Clause 2.1 of the Framework Agreement [on part-time work], is it permissible for national law to discriminate (a) between full-time and part-time judges, or (b) between different kinds of part-time judges in the provision of pensions?
For the purpose of … Directive 85/337/EEC …, does an [EIA] which relates to the construction of dams and the transfer of water and which was placed for approval before the national parliament after the annulment by a judicial decision of the measure by which it had previously been approved and in respect of which the publicity procedure had previously been observed, without that procedure being observed anew, meet the requirements of Articles 1, 2, 5, 6, 8 and 9 of that directive regarding informing the public and public participation?
Does a project to divert a river fall within the field of application of Directive 2001/42/EC … where that plan: (a) concerns the construction of dams and the transfer of water from one river basin district to another (from those of western mainland Greece and Epirus to those of Thessaly), (b) falls within the field of application of Directive 2000/60 …, (c) concerns works under … Directive 85/337 …,(d) may have environmental effects on areas covered by … Directive 92/43/EEC ...?
Should the preceding question be answered in the affirmative: for the purpose of Article 13(1) of Directive 2001/42, can acts which concerned the project at issue and which have been annulled with retroactive effect by judicial decisions be considered to be formal preparatory acts which were issued before 21 July 2004 so that there is no obligation to prepare a strategic environmental report?
Should the preceding question be answered in the negative: for the purpose of Article 11(2) of Directive 2001/42, if a plan simultaneously falls within the field of application of that directive and within that of Directives 2000/60 and 85/337 which also require the environmental effects of that scheme to be assessed, are the assessments which have been drawn up on the basis of the provisions of Directives 2000/60 and 85/337 sufficient for observance of the requirements of Directive 2001/42, or will an autonomous strategic environmental report have to be prepared?
For the purpose of Articles 3, 4 and 6 of … Directive 92/43 …, were the areas which were included in the national lists of [SCIs] and, ultimately, were included in the Community list of SCIs covered by the protection afforded by Directive 92/43 before the publication of Commission Decision 2006/613/EC of 19 July 2006 adopting [, pursuant to Council Directive 92/43,] the list of sites of Community importance for the Mediterranean biogeographical region [(OJ 2006 L 259, p. 1)]?
Is it possible, for the purpose of Articles 3, 4 and 6 of Directive 92/43, for the competent national authorities to grant consent authorising the carrying out of a project for the diversion of waters which is not directly connected with or necessary to the conservation of a district included within a special protection area when all the studies that are contained in the file for that project record a complete lack of information or an absence of reliable and updated data regarding the birds in that district?
For the purpose of Articles 3, 4 and 6 of Directive 92/43, can reasons for which a project to divert waters is undertaken that relate principally to irrigation and secondarily to water supply constitute the imperative public interest which that directive requires in order for that scheme to be permitted to be carried out notwithstanding its adverse effects on areas protected by that directive?
In determining the sufficiency of the compensatory measures which are necessary to ensure that the overall coherence of the Natura 2000 network, where that is harmed by a project to divert waters, is protected, for the purpose of Articles 3, 4 and 6 of Directive 92/43 should criteria such as the scale of that diversion and the extent of the works which the diversion entails be taken into account?
For the purpose of Articles 3, 4 and 6 of Directive 92/43, interpreted in the light of the principle of sustainable development as enshrined in Article 6 of the EC Treaty, may the competent national authorities grant consent for the carrying out of a project to divert waters within a Natura 2000 area that is not directly connected with or necessary to the preservation of the coherence of that area, when it is apparent from the [EIA] for that project that the project will result in the conversion of a natural fluvial ecosystem into a man-made fluvial and lacustrine ecosystem?’
Must Articles 6(4) and 13(B)(f), of the Sixth Directive, be interpreted as precluding a tax exemption in respect of services supplied by a commission agent acting in its own name, but on behalf of a principal who organises supply of services referred to in Article 13(B)(f) …?
Is it contrary to the free movement of capital to tax an inheritor for the whole value of an immovable property, where the deceased resided in another MS and the inheritance results in an overendowment which is not taken account of in the taxation?
What method of comparison must be used in a case such as the present to determine there is discrimination as regards the inheritance duty?
Might the inheritance duties in one state be regarded as permitted in relation to the free movement of capital due to tax credits granted by another MS, in which the person died, under rules applicable on the prevention of double taxation?
Does the concept of a holding in the capital of a company of another MS, within the meaning of art 3 of Directive 90/435, include the holding of shares in a right of usufruct ?
Can the legal person at hand in the main proceedings be regarded as an undertaking, within the meaning of arts 82 and 86 of the Nice Treaty?
Is the present national legislation, by which the legal person in the main proceedings is given the power to provide a concurring opinion as to the holding of competitions, without that power being made subject to restrictions, obligations and review, compatible with arts 82 and 86 of the Nice Treaty?
Is the practice of a copyright management organisation, being in a monopoly position and imposing a remuneration model on commercial TV channels, where the remuneration is calculated as a proportion of the channels' revenue, precluded by the community competition rules?
Should there be any other possible calculation methods, more proportionate than the one used at present, does this make the practice of the copyright management organisation amounting to "abusive" within the meaning of community competition law?
Might a remuneration model such as the one at issue in the main proceedings be regarded as contrary to community law on competition if it treats differently public service companies as compared to private companies?
Is there direct discrimination within the meaning of Article 2(2)(a) of Council Directive 2000/43/EC where an employer makes public statements such as those at issue in the main proceedings?
How is the rule of reversal of the burden of proof laid down in art 8(1) of Directive 2000/43 to be applied to a situation in which the existence of a discriminatory recruitment policy is alleged by reference to remarks made publicly by an employer concerning its recruitment policy?
What sanctions may be considered to be appropriate for employment discrimination established on the basis of the employer's public statements
Can the acts being subject of the main proceedings be regarded as "processing of personal data" within art 3(1) of the Directive 95/46/EC?
Might the acts at issue in the main proceedings be regarded as carried out solely for journalistic purposes within art 9 of Directive 95/46/EC?
Is art 17 of Directive 95/46/EC to be interpreted in conjunction with the principles and purpose of the directive as precluding the publication of data collected for journalistic purposes and its onward transfer for commercial purposes?
Does personal data files containing material that has already been published in the media fall outside the scope of Directive 05/46/EC?
Should the applicant be regarded as a "worker" within the Community concept, if he is not called upon to provide any more work-related services than are doctoral students with an employment contract?
In order to respect Regulation 1612/68 art 7, must a person such as the applicant be granted the right to choose between an employment contract and a grant?
What are the consequences in law in event of discrimination against foreign nationals as regards the situation at issue in the main proceedings?
Do arts 17, 18(2) and (3) and 21(1)(b) of the Sixth Directive 77/388 preclude the introduction of a limitation period for the exercise of the right to deduct VAT, in the case of a revers charge procedure?
Do arts 18(1)(d) and 22 of the Sixth Directive preclude a practice whereby declarations are reassessed and VAT recovered which penalises an irregularity in the accounts and tax returns, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, by denying the right to deduct in the case of a revers charge procedure?
Does "capital goods" in art 19(2) of the sixth directive 77/388 include vehicles which a leasing undertaking purchases with a view to leasing them and subsequently selling them?
Can bars of tungsten be processed into scrap falling under two respective subheadings of the CN by being broken up or shattered?
May the Framework Decision 2001/220 be interpreted as meaning that the national court must be guaranteed the possibility of hearing the victim as a witness in criminal proceedings which have been instituted by the victim as a substitute private prosecution?
Must Article 13A(1)(f) of [the Sixth Directive] be construed as meaning that services supplied to their members by independent groups are covered by the exemption in that provision, even if those services are supplied only to one or several of those members?
Must an optical-electrical circuit be regarded as an electrical machine or apparatus within the meaning of heading 8543 of the CN?
Does an optocoupler containing an amplifying circuit, such as that at hand, fall within the heading 8541?
Does the Article 17(6) of the Sixth Directive preclude MSs from repealing completely national provisions concerning restrictions on the deduction of input tax?
If yes, does the Article 17(6) of the Sixth Directive preclude MSs from amending the criteria so as to de facto restrict the scope of deductions of input tax?
Does the Article 17(6) of the Sixth Directive preclude MSs from restricting the deduction of input tax so as to exclude, under certain circumstances the deduction on the purchase of fuel?
Are Community guidelines on aid to employment to be interpreted as meaning that in determining an increase in employment, a comparison must be made between the average AWU for the year preceding the recruitment and the average for the year following the recruitment?
Does the tax provision at hand constitute a restriction on the freedom of establishment?
If yes, can such a restriction be justified by any overriding reason of public interest?
Does the suspension of the application of the acquis communautaire in certain parts of Cyprus by Protocol No 10 preclude a MS court from recognizing and enforcing a judgement given by a court of the Republic of Cyprus, sitting in the Government-controlled area relating to land in the northern area, when such recognition and enforcement , when sought under Regulation No 44/2001?
Does Article 35(1) of the Regulation No 44/2001  entitle or bind a MS court to refuse recognition and enforcement of a judgement given by the courts of another MS concerning land in an area of the latter MS over which the Government of that MS does not exercise effective control? In particular, does such a judgement conflict with Article 22 of the Regulation?
Can a judgement of a MS court, sitting in an area of that MS over which the Government of that State does exercise effective control, in respect of land in that State in an area over which the Government of that State does not exercise effective control, be denied recognition and enforcement under Article 34(1) of the  Regulation on the grounds that as a practical matter the judgement cannot be enforced, although the judgement is enforceable in the Government-controlled area of the MS?
Where a default judgement has been entered against a defendant, the defendant then commenced proceedings in the court of origin to challenge the default judgement but the application was unsuccessful following a full and fair hearing: Can the defendant resist enforcement of the original default judgement under the Regulation at hand, on the grounds that he was not served properly with the document that instituted the proceedings?
In applying the test in Article 34(2) of the Regulation, what factors are relevant to the assessment?
Is Article 86 of Directive 2001/83 to be interpreted as meaning that dissemination by a third party of information about a product is to be understood as constituting advertising, even when he is acting independently and on own initiative?
Is the Commission competent to submit written observations in national proceedings on its own initiative?
Can a member state include in its GAEC standards, requirements relating to the maintenance of visible public rights of way?
Can it give rise to impermissible discrimination for constituent parts of the member state to have different standards of GAEC?
Is the Commission competent, under Article 15(3) of Regulation 1/2003, to submit, on its own initiative, written observations to a national court in proceedings relating to the deductibility from taxable profits of the amount of a fine or a part thereof imposed by the Commission for infringement of Articles 81 EC or 82 EC?
Are the BSE tests at hand tests within the meaning of Article 2(1) of Regulation No 2777/2000 ?
Should Article 2(1) of Regulation No 2777/2000  be seen as an intervention intended to stabilise the beef market rather than a specific veterinary measure?
Should the BSE tests exclusively be financed by the Community?
Are MSs precluded from passing on the costs for BSE tests to the operators?
Are MSs not precluded from charging a fee on account of the costs of the BSE tests?
?Is Article 12(1) of [the directive 89/104 ] to be construed as meaning that a trade mark is put to (genuine) use to distinguish goods and services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings in the case where a non-profit-making association uses the trade mark in announcements for events, on business papers and on advertising material and that trade mark is used by the association?s members when collecting and distributing donations inasmuch as those members wear badges featuring that trade mark??
Are the administrative authorities of a MS entitled to attach funds held in the bank account of an economic operator following a declaration of his insolvency made in another MS?
Does the Brussels Convention allow the administrative authorities of a MS in which secondary insolvency proceedings have not been opened refuse to recognise judgments made by the State of the opening insolvency proceedings?
Must a geographical name in respect of which an application for registration has been rejected or blocked, when applying to be registered as PDO or PGI,  be regarded as generic during the period of rejection?
Are the articles to be interpreted as meaning that the designation of a foodstuff which is evocative of a place and not registered as a PDO or PGI may be legitimately used by producers who use it uninterruptedly and in good faith for a considerable period before the Regulation entered into force?
May a proprietor of a collective trade mark relating to a foodstuff and containing a geographical reference identical to the designation at issue oppose the use of that designation, where those producers have used that name in good faith and uninterruptedly over a period of time considerably pre-dating the registration of that collective mark?
Is  Article 233 of [the Customs Code] to be interpreted as meaning that the seizure of unlawfully introduced goods leads to the extinction of the customs debt only when it takes place before those goods leave the customs office?
Is the limitation of the extinction of customs debts to the situation where the goods are seized at the time of their unlawful introduction contrary to the principle of equal treatment?
Do articles 17 and Article 6 of the Sixth directive infringe the general principle of equal treatment under Community Law?
Does such an infringement also arise as a result of the fact that taxable persons can acquire ownership of residential properties used partially for business purposes but mainly for their own private residential  purposes?
Does national legislation transposing the Sixth Directive infringe Article 87 EC?
Does article 17 of the directive continue to have effect if the national legislature amends a national provision for the exclusion from the right to deduct?
If no, could the effect of an exclusion from the right to deduct be restricted if the national legislature amends one of two overlapping national provisions?
Is article 15 of directive 2004/83 to be interpreted as offering protection only in a situation in which article 3 ECHR also has bearing?
If directive offers supplementary protection, what are the criteria in that case for determining whether a person runs a real risk of serious and individual threat?
Is a part of an undertaking or business only transferred to another employer within the meaning of Article 1(1)(a) and (b) of Directive 2001/23 if, under the new employer, that part of the undertaking or business continues to operate as an organisationally autonomous part of an undertaking or business?
Must subheading 6.6 of Directive 96/61/EC be interpreted as including within its scope quails, partridges and pigeons?
If so, must subheading 6.6. of Directive 96/61/EC be interpreted as authorising a mechanism for calculating authorisation thresholds according to which account may be taken of the amount of nitrogen actually excreted?
Must a designation as such fulfil a specific geographical indication function referring to a particular place or a particular region, or does it suffice that the designation is capable of informing consumers that the product bearing it comes from a particular place or a particular region in the country of origin, in order to be protected under the Community law at hand?
Must the three conditions in question be examined separately and satisfied cumulatively?
Must a consumer survey be carried out for ascertaining perception in the country of origin?
Is protection precluded if the designation has been used as a trademark by only one single undertaking?
Does the fact that a designation has not been notified or its registration applied for either within the six-month period provided for in the Regulations No 918/2004 and No 510/2006  mean that existing national protection becomes void if the designation is a qualified geographical indication?
Does the fact that, in the context of the Act of Accession, the protection of several qualified geographical indications for a foodstuff has been claimed by that Member State in accordance with the Regulation No 510/2006 mean that a national protection for another designation for the same product may no longer be maintained and the Regulation No 510/2006 is exhaustive in its effect tot that extent?
Does regulation 1768/92 preclude the grant of an SCP to the holder of a basic patent for a product which has already been granted to other patent holders?
Does recital 17 of Regulation 1610/96 give rise to a different answer to question 1?
Is it relevant whether the most recent application is submitted within the period prescribed by Article 7(1) of [Regulation No 1768/92] or that prescribed by Article 7(2) of [Regulation No 1768/92]?
Is it relevant whether the period of protection expires at the same time or later than one or more SPCs already granted?
Is it relevant that the regulation 1768/92 does not specify the period within which the competent authority must process the application?
Does the advertisement practice at hand fall under (a) or (b) of Article 5(1) of Directive 89/104?
Does a practice such as that at issue in the main proceedings, i.e.. Not causing any likelihood of confusion, but playing a significant role in the promotion of the trader's product, fall within Arts 5(1)(a) of Directive 89/104? (may unauthorised use be prevented?
Does it amount to "unfair advantage" to, in a comparison list, compare one's products with a product under a well-known trade mark?
Does the expression "presenting goods or services as imitations or replicas" of Article 3a[1](h) of Directive 84/450 cover the case where, without in any way causing confusion or deception, a party merely truthfully says that his product has major characteristic like that of a well-known product which is protected by a trade mark?
Does Article 5(2) of Directive 89/104 mean that a third party who uses a sign similar to a trade mark takes "unfair advantage", where such use gives that party an advantage in the marketing of his goods or services, without giving rise to a likelihood of confusion or causing or risking causing detriment to the mark or to its proprietor?
Does the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) of [the Directive 77/388] require the proportion deductible by a taxable person under Article 17(5) to be determined on an annual basis, fixed as a percentage and rounded up to a figure not exceeding the next unit under circumstances such as those in the case at hand?
Does the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) of [the Directive 77/388] permit Member States to require the proportion deductible by a taxable person under Article 17(5) to be rounded up to a figure other than the next highest whole number?
Does Directive 97/7 preclude a provision providing that, in the case of a revocation by a consumer within the revocation period, a seller may claim compensation for the value of the use of the consumer goods delivered?
Does the use of the trade mark such as that undertaken by the defendant amount to "genuine use", as required by the directive 89/104?
Does the First and the Sixth VAT Directive 77/388 rule out the possibility of imposing an obligation on a person liable to tax on goods and services to pay an additional tax in the event that it is established that the person submitted an amount of tax difference to be repaid in respect of VAT or input tax to be repaid which was greater than the amount due?
Can ?special measures? within the terms of Article 27(1) of [the Sixth VAT Directive] consist in the possibility of imposing on a person liable to tax on goods and services an additional tax liability under the circumstances at hand?
Does the power provided for by the sixth VAT directive encompass the right to introduce the additional tax liability provided for in VAT the law?
In the light of Articles 73 [EC], 87 [EC] and 88 [EC] and of Regulation No 1191/69, may the national authorities impose public service obligations on public passenger transport undertakings?
If the answer is in the affirmative, must the national authorities pay compensation in respect of those obligations?
Must the national authorities, where they are not obliged to hold a tendering procedure for the award of a concession for the operation of a transport network, extend the compensation obligation to all the undertakings which are regarded, under domestic law and within the same area, as offering public passenger transport?
If the answer is in the affirmative, what criterion must apply to the payment of compensation?
In the case of undertakings providing passenger transport by bus which, by virtue of a public concession, carry on their activity on an exclusive basis, is the grant by the State prohibited, where it is not possible to ascertain the additional cost deriving from the performance of public service obligations which, under the terms of the concession, may attract State aid?
Is the State grant prohibited where it is intended to cover the constant operating deficits of such undertakings where the opportunities for other undertakings established in this or in another Member State to provide their transport services may be diminished?
Is the grant by the State, of aid intended to cover the constant operating deficits of such undertakings prohibi0ted with regards to article 73 EC?
Is it necessary that the aid has repercussions on the activity carried on outside the exclusivity are in clearly significant terms in order to conclude that the advantage distorts competition?
Are the rules at hand directly applicable in national courts?
Does the reference to ?bodies? authorised to conclude contracts for the storage of olive oil in Article 12a of Regulation No 136/66 cover a company whose shareholders predominantly comprise producers, oil pressers and olive growers? cooperatives, as well as financial institutions?
Can a company with these characteristics be considered equivalent to producer groups under the Regulation No 952/97?
In the event that the company falls within the description of ?bodies? capable of carrying out storage activities, can the ?approval by the Member State? which such bodies require by virtue of Article 12a of Regulation No 136/66 be obtained as part of an application for an individual exemption made to the national competition authorities?
Does Article 12a of Regulation No 136/66 constitute an absolute requirement that the Commission authorise the private storage of olive oil in each case?
Can the reasoning given by the Court in Case C 137/00 Milk Marque and National Farmers? be extended to agreements which, by their nature and by nature of the sector in question, could affect the Community market in olive oil as a whole?
In the event that the national competition authorities are competent to apply national laws to the aforementioned agreements, can those authorities refuse to allow a company make use of the storage mechanisms for olive oil, even in situations of ?serious disturbance? as contemplated by Article 12a of Regulation No 136/66?
Is the Article 11(2) of Council Directive 87/102 to be interpreted as meaning that there must be an exclusivity clause between the grantor of credit and the supplier in order for the customer to be able terminate the credit agreement?
Is the Article 11(2) of Council Directive 87/102 to be interpreted as meaning that there must be an exclusivity clause between the grantor of credit and the supplier in order for the customer to be able terminate the  and consequently claim reimbursement of the sums already paid?
May a taxable person deduct immediately and in full the VAT due on the acquisition of goods and services used for both business purposes and for other purposes?
If yes, does the application of the directive 77/388 mean that VAT is collected only once during the tax period over which the deduction in respect of those services and goods is enjoyed?
If no, must collection also occur in ensuing periods?
If yes, how is the taxable amount to be determined in respect of goods and services which the taxable person does not write off?
Shall fuel additives such as those at issue, which are not intended for use, offered for sale or used as motor fuel but which are added to motor fuel for purposes other than powering the vehicle in which the fuel is used,  be taxed under article 2(3) of Directive 92/81 ?
If yes, do additives fall within the scope of the exemption under Article 8(1) of Directive 92/81?
Do fuel additives such as those at issue fall to be taxed under second paragraph of Article 2(3) of Directive 2003/96 ?
If yes, are such additives excluded from the scope of Directive 2003/96 ?
Is the duty imposed by the UK precluded by Community law, particularly Directive 92/12 ?
Does regulation No 2201/2003 apply to the enforcement of a single decision, concerning the immediate taking into care of a child and his or her placement outside the home, in its entirety?
Or does the regulation No 2201/2003  apply only to the part of the decision relating to the placement outside the home?
How is the concept of habitual residence to be interpreted in Community law?
Under what circumstances may urgent measures be taken by the MS even if the child is not a habitual resident thereof?
Is a protective measure in Article 20(1) of the regulation No 2201/2003 solely a measure which can be taken under national law, and are the provisions of national law concerning that measure binding when the article is applied?
Must the case, after the taking of the protective measure, be transferred to the court of the Member State with jurisdiction?
If the court of a Member State has no jurisdiction at all, must it dismiss the case as inadmissible or transfer it to the court of the other Member State?
Is a medicinal product to be considered to be a ?reference medicinal product which is or has been authorised under Article 6 of Directive 2001/83 in a Member State? in cases such as the case at hand?
If so, which of the above conditions is/are decisive in this respect?
In circumstances where the competent authority of a reference Member State erroneously refuses an application for a marketing authorisation authorisation, made under Article 10(1) of Directive 2001/83, on the ground that the medicinal product was not a ?reference medicinal product?, what considerations are of relevance to determine whether the breach of Community law is a sufficiently serious breach within the meaning of the judgement in Brasserie du P?cheur and Factortame?
Is Article 51(1)(b) of the Regulation to be interpreted as meaning that an applicant for a Community trade mark is to be regarded as acting in bad faith where he knows, at the time of his application, that a competitor in (at least) one MS is using the same sign, or one so similar as to be capable of being confused with it, for the same or similar goods or services, and he applies for the trade mark in order to be able to prevent that competitor from continuing to use the sign?
If no, Is the applicant to be regarded as acting in bad faith if he applies for the trade mark in order to be able to prevent a competitor from continuing to use the sign, where, he must know that by using an identical or similar sign for the same goods or services, or goods or services which are so similar as to be capable of being confused, the competitor has already acquired a ?valuable right??
If either the first or the second question is answered in the affirmative; Is bad faith excluded if the applicant’s sign has already obtained a reputation with the public and is therefore protected under competition law?’
Does article 28 EC preclude the application of national provisions which oblige only importers of German language books to fix and to publish original retail prices for books imported from other MSs?
If yes, can such a restriction be justified by reference to article 30 EC or Article 151 EC?
Is the national statutory obligation to sell books at fixed price as described in first question compatible with articles 3, 10 and 81 EC?
Is a contract under which the owner of an intellectual property right grants the other party a licence a contract regulating "the provision of services" within the meaning of Article 5(1)(b) of [Regulation No 44/2001]?
Is the service provided at each place where use of the right actually occurs?
If no, is the service provided where the licensor is domiciled or at the licensor's place of central administration?
Does the court which has jurisdiction also have the power to rule on loyalties in another member state or third country?
Is jurisdiction regarding payments of royalties to be determined in accordance with the principles that result from the case-law on article 5 of the Brussels Convention?
Does Article 29 Directive 92/50 preclude MSs from imposing a prohibition to the effect that undertakings linked by a relationship of control may not participate in the same tendering procedure?
How are the terms "permanent transfer" and "temporary transfer" to be interpreted within the meaning of Article 7(2)(a) of Directive 96/9?
Is the size of the databases in the entire commercial product to be used as the criterion regarding "extraction of a substantial part, evaluated quantitatively"?
In interpreting the concept of "extraction of a substantial part, evaluated quantitatively", is the fact that a certain type of data allegedly extracted was obtained by the database maker from a source which is not generally accessible, to be used as a criterion?
Can it be regarded as an indication that extraction has taken place if similarities can be found in the structure, notes, references etc. between the databases?
Is the computer program relevant to determining whether or not an extraction has taken place?
How are the above mentioned concepts to be interpreted in relation to legislative measures, which have been adopted by executive State bodies and are publicly accessible, to their official translations and to case-law?
Must "the location where the release" of GMOs  “will be carried out” which, under Article 19 of … Directive 90/220 …, may not be kept confidential, mean the registered parcel of land or a larger geographical area?
If the location is understood as a registered parcel of land, can an exception relating to the protection of public order or other confidential matters protected by law preclude on the basis of Article 95 [EC] …, or of Directive 2003/4 … or of a general principle of Community law, the disclosure of the registered reference number or numbers of the location of the release??
Is the provision at hand compatible with article 12 in directive 95/46 and the principle of proportionality?
Does the national provision in question infringe the Community law of prohibition on discrimination on the grounds of age?
Can the fact that employers are required to observe only a basic period of notice when terminating the employment of younger employees be justified on the grounds that employers are recognised as having an interest in flexibility as regards staffing?
Must a national court disapply a statutory provision which is explicitly contrary to Community law?
In light of the fact that the registration requirements in Title II of the [REACH] regulation do not apply to polymers by virtue of Article 2(9) of the regulation, does the reference to ?monomer substances? in Article 6(3) mean: 

(a)      reacted monomers;

(b)      unreacted monomers; or 

(c)      both reacted and unreacted monomers?
If the answer to Question 1 is either (a) or (c), is the application of Article 6(3) of the [REACH] regulation to manufacturers or importers of polymers unlawful by reason that the requirements are irrational, discriminatory or disproportionate?
Does Community Law preclude the ascertainment of the amount of an operator's surplus by automatically deducting the average stock for the years preceding 2 May 2004?
If yes, would the answer be different if it were also possible to take into account the growth of the operator's production and other circumstances?
Is it compatible with Community law to regard the entire stock in the operator's possession as at 1 May 2004 as the operator's surplus stock?
Does Community Law preclude the operator himself having to prove that the amount of stock in his possession at stated date is equivalent to his amount of stock transferred or acquired without payment?
If yes, would the answer be different if the administrative body had an obligation to take into account the growth of the operators production after 1 May 2004?
Is it compatible with the objective of Regulation No 1972/2003 and Regulation No 60/2004 to levy the surplus stock charge were the operator is found to have a surplus?
May the provisions in Regulation be interpreted as meaning that in a situation where the operator's storage capacity has increased, this is a basis for reducing the surplus stock?
Does Article 10 of Regulation No 1972/2003 preclude the recovery of a surplus stock charge from an operator in a situation where the tax notice was indeed drawn up while the regulation was applicable?
Is directive 77/388 to be interpreted as meaning that no liability to pay VAT arises in the Member State in which the issuer of the invoice is resident or established if the issuer of that invoice includes on it the VAT in respect of an activity which, according to the common system of [VAT] is deemed to be carried out in another Member State or in a non-member country?
If not: If an invoice has been issued to an addressee who is not entitled to deduct VAT, are the Member States entitled to make the refund of the erroneously invoiced VAT subject to the requirement that the taxable person subsequently issues a corrected invoice to his customer in which there is no mention of any VAT amount?
Does the requirement that the Minister give prior authorisation for any cross-frontier activities of an undertaking constitute a restriction on the free movement of capital?
Can a Member State?s public housing interests be regarded as a public policy interest  or an overriding reason as referred to in Article 56 and 58 EC?
If the answer to question 1 is yes, is that requirement necessary and proportionate?
Can a Member State rely on Article 86(2) EC to justify a restriction on the free movement of capital, if special rights have been granted to the undertakings concerned and those undertakings are entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest?
Can undertakings which also undertake commercial activities in respect of public housing, be regarded as undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest, as referred to in Article 86(2) EC?
If an approved institution can be regarded as an undertaking entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest, can the entrustment of the operation of such services justify the imposition on the approved institution of a restriction on the free movement of capital?
Can the fact that a Member State provides certain undertakings as referred to in Article 86(2) EC with financial resources make it necessary for the territorial scale of their activities to be limited?
Does Directive 69/335 or Article 43, Article 49 or Article 56 of the EC Treaty or any other provision of European Community law prohibit the levying of tax, on the occasion of the issue of shares into a clearance service?
Should Articles 2, 3 and 4 of [Decree 72/2001] and Sections 4, 6 and 7 of the Annex thereto be considered to be in breach of Article 49 TFEU?
Does Article 49 TFEU preclude the legislation of the Autonomous Community of the Principality of Asturias concerning authorisation for the establishment of pharmacies?
Can Directive 77/388 be interpreted as meaning that the letting of an apartment on the one hand and the related cleaning of the common parts on the other hand can be regarded as independent, mutually divisible taxable transactions?
If the answer to the first question is in the negative, do Directive 77/388 leave to the determination of the Member State the application of VAT to payment for cleaning of the common parts of a rented apartment block??
Is it compatible with Community law and to award a contract for the service of collecting, transporting and disposing of solid urban and similar waste to a wholly publicly owned company?
Are Article 1(2), in conjunction with Article 8(2) and (4), of Directive 91/43, and Article 2(1), in conjunction with Article 11(4), of Directive 2006/126 to be interpreted as meaning: that they preclude a Member State (“the host State”) from refusing to recognise, within its territory, a driving licence issued by another Member State (“the issuing State”) in the case where the acquisition of the driving licence in the issuing State was preceded by a refusal to grant a driving licence in the host State on the ground that the physical and mental requirements for the safe driving of a motor vehicle had not been met?
If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative, are Article 1(2), in conjunction with Article 8(2) and (4), of Directive 91/43, and Article 2(1), in conjunction with Article 11(4), of Directive 2006/126 to be interpreted as meaning that they preclude a Member State (“the host State”) from refusing to recognise, within its territory, a driving licence issued by another Member State (“the issuing State”) if is established that there has been a breach of the rule on residence under Article 7(1)(b) of Directive 91/439 … or Article 7(1)(e) of Directive 2006/126 …?
If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative, are Article 1(2), in conjunction with Article 8(2) and (4), of Directive 91/43, and Article 2(1), in conjunction with Article 11(4), of Directive 2006/126 to be interpreted as meaning that they preclude a Member State (“the host State”) from refusing to recognise, within its territory, a driving licence issued by another Member State (“the issuing State”), when the information, about the holder of the license, within the meaning of the case&#8209;law of the Court of Justice, is provided by the issuing State even in the case where that information has not been directly conveyed, but rather has been conveyed only indirectly in the form of a notification based on such information from a third party, in particular the host State’s embassy in the issuing State?
Are Article 1(2), in conjunction with Article 8(2) and (4), of Directive 91/43, and Article 2(1), in conjunction with Article 11(4), of Directive 2006/126 to be interpreted as meaning that they preclude a Member State (“the host State”) from refusing to recognise, within its territory, a driving licence issued by another Member State (“the issuing State”) in the case where, although the formal requirements for the issuing of a driving licence in the issuing State were fulfilled, it is nonetheless clear that the residence was solely for the purpose of acquiring a driving licence and was not for any other purposes protected by European Union law, in particular the fundamental freedoms under the TFEU, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the European Convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms (“Driving licence tourism”)?’
Must EU law, in particular the principle of the prohibition of abuse of rights, Article 4(3) TEU, the freedoms guaranteed by the FEU Treaty, the principle of non-discrimination, the rules on State aid and the obligation to ensure the effective application of European Union law, be interpreted as precluding the application of a provision of national law, in a case such as that in the main proceedings relating to direct taxation?
Is the competent office entitled and obliged of its own motion to regard other documents as equivalent under Article 47(3) of Regulation 3665/87?
Can a request for other documents to be regarded as equivalent under Article 47(3) of Regulation 3665/87 also be made by implication and as a precaution?
Is Article 15 of [Regulation No 1260/2001]  to be interpreted as meaning that, when determining the exportable surplus, account should be taken only of those export quantities of sugar, isoglucose and inulin syrup in respect of which export refunds have actually been paid?
Is Article 6(4) of [Regulation No 314/2002], as amended by [Regulation No 1140/2003], invalid?
Is Article 15 of [Regulation No 1260/2001] to be interpreted as meaning that, when determining both the exportable surplus and the average loss per tonne of sugar, all exports are to be taken into account, even where no export refunds were paid in respect of a portion of those exports in the relevant marketing year?
Is Regulation No 1775/2004 invalid?
Does the Community law at hand preclude a condition such as the first-stage studies condition?
Must Article 5(1) of Directive 89/104 be interpreted as meaning that the adoption, by a third party without authorisation, of a registered word mark, as a company, trade or shop name in connection with the marketing of identical goods, amounts to use of that mark in the course of trade which the proprietor is entitled to stop by reason of his exclusive rights?
Is Article 1 of Regulation 615/98 valid inasmuch as it links the grant of an export refund to compliance with Directive 91/628?
Is Article 5(3) of Regulation No 615/98, according to which export refunds are not to be paid for animals for which the competent authority considers, in the light of all elements at its disposal concerning compliance with Article 1 of Regulation No 615/98, that Directive 91/628 was not complied with, compatible with the principle of proportionality?
Is Article 1(4) of Regulation 2887/2000 to be understood as meaning that the conditions for cost-orientation under Article 3(3) of that regulation lay down minimum requirements in the sense that national law of the MS may not deviate from that standard?
Are imputed interest and cost-accounting depreciation also encompassed by the cost-orientation requirement under Article 3(3) of Regulation 2887/2000?
Is the calculation basis for that interest and depreciation the replacement value of the assets after the depreciation made prior to the time of valuation, or is the calculation basis exclusively the current replacement value, expressed in terms of current daily prices at the time of valuation?
Do the costs used as the calculation basis for imputed interest and cost-accounting depreciation have to be proven by comprehensible documents detailing the costs of the notified operator?
May the costs alternatively be proven by a valuation made on the basis of an analytical cost model?
Is the national regulatory authority entitled, when assessing cost-orientation in the context of its authority under Article 4(1) to (3) of Regulation 2887/2000, to a ?margin of discretion? which is subject only to limited judicial control?
Is that margin also applicable to methods of cost calculation and questions of determining the appropriate amount of imputed interest and appropriate depreciation periods?
Do the cost-orientation requirements at least serve to protect the rights of competitors as beneficiaries, with the consequence that those competitors can claim legal protection against rates for access which are not set on the basis of cost-orientation?
Does the notified operator bear the burden of proof, if, in the supervisory procedure under Article 4 of Regulation No 2887/2000 or in the subsequent judicial proceedings, costs are totally or partially unverifiable?
Is the burden of proof for the cost-orientation also on the notified operator if a beneficiary competitor brings an action against rates approved by a regulatory authority?
For the purposes of Article 3 of Regulation No 1697/79, is classification by the customs authority as ?an act that could give rise to criminal court proceedings? sufficient, or is it instead necessary that that classification should be made by the competent criminal court?
In the latter hypothesis, is it sufficient for the competent criminal justice authority simply to lay a charge, or is it instead necessary that the debtor should be convicted in the relevant criminal proceedings?
Also in the latter hypothesis, are different conclusions to be drawn from the fact that the court acquits the debtor by virtue of the application of the principle in dubio pro reo, or acquits him because it has been proved that the debtor did not commit the offence in question?
If the Public Prosecutors Office or the criminal court itself closes the case because the criminal proceedings are time barred, does such a decision make it impossible to bring the corresponding action to recover the duty not collected?
Did the national telecommunications regulator have the power, by an administrative decision made after the date of the Czech Republics accession to the EC, to impose on a telecommunications company with significant (dominant) market power in the telecommunications market an obligation to conclude a contract for the interconnection of its networks with those of another operator?
Was the national regulatory authority entitled to impose such an obligation solely on the conditions set out in Article 8(2) of the Access Directive 2002/19, or could it act without that prior market analysis carried out in accordance with Article 16 of the Framework Directive 2002/21?
Is the answer to the previous question affected by the facts that the request of a particular operator for the compulsory interconnection of his network with the network of an operator with significant (dominant) market power was lodged with the national regulatory authority before the date of the accession of the Czech Republic to the EC?
To the extent that at the material time the Czech Republic had not adequately implemented the abovementioned directives, is it possible directly to apply the Framework 2002/21 and Access Directives 2002/19,    are those directives unconditional and sufficiently precise to be applied by a court in place of national law?
Are Articles 2 and 3 of Decision 1999/93/EC and Annexes II and III thereto to be interpreted as meaning that it is not possible for doors intended to be fitted with panic bars to be manufactured by operators who do not comply with the requirements of the system of attestation of conformity No 1?
If the answer to the previous question is yes: Are the requirements under Articles 2 and 3 of Decision 1999/93/EC and Annexes II and III thereto legally binding from the date when that decision entered into force in so far as regards the type of attestation of conformity procedure to be complied with by manufacturers of doors intended to be fitted with panic bars?
Are Articles 2 and 3 of Decision 1999/93/EC and Annexes II and III thereto to be regarded as being invalid on the basis that they are contrary to the principle of proportionality in so far as they require all producers to comply with the attestation of conformity procedure No 1 in order to be able to mark doors fitted with panic bars they have themselves manufactured with the CE conformity marking?
Does Directive 2001/83/EC oblige MSs to make anthroposophic medicinal products which are not at the same time homeopathic medicinal products subject to the requirements in respect of authorisation as set out in Chapter 1 of Title III of that directive?
If the answer to the previous question is in the negative: Is the national provision which makes those anthroposophic medicinal products subject to the aforementioned requirements in respect of authorisation an exception to the prohibition under Article 28 EC which is authorised by virtue of Article 30 EC?
Does Article 5(3) of Regulation No 615/98 constitute an exclusion, with the consequence that the burden of proof in respect of the requirements of Article 5(3) of Regulation No 615/98 is on the Principal Customs Office?
In order to conclude under Article 5(3) of Regulation No 615/98 that Directive 91/628 has not been complied with, is it necessary to have proof that there has been an infringement of that directive in the particular case, or does the competent authority discharge its burden of proof if it relies on and provides evidence of circumstances which, viewed as a whole, indicate a material probability that the directive on the protection of animals during transport has not been complied with?
May the competent authority refuse to pay the export refund to the exporter under Article 5(3) of Regulation No 615/98 where there are no indications that the potential infringement of Directive 91/628 has in fact been deleterious to the wellbeing of the animals during transport in relation to the export consignment in question?
Is Regulation 1408/71 to be interpreted as precluding a double taxation convention from providing that income received in the United Kingdom by workers resident in France and covered by social insurance in that State is excluded from the base on which contributions such as the CSG and the CRDS levied in France are assessed?
Is it direct or indirect discrimination contrary to Article 2 of Directive 76/207/EEC, for an employer to refuse to make changes to the date of child-care leave which has been granted to an employee or to interrupt that leave as a result of a new pregnancy of which the employee has become aware before the start of that leave, in accordance with the settled interpretation of national provisions?
May an employer sufficiently justify his conduct which possibly constitutes indirect discrimination, from the point of view of the Directive, on the ground that ordinary rather than serious problems would arise in respect of teachers? Working arrangements, or that the employer would under the national provisions have to compensate the person replacing the teacher on child-care leave for the loss of pay incurred if the teacher on child-care leave were to return to work before the end of their leave?
Can Directive 92/85 be applicable, and, if so, is the employers conduct, as described in the first question, contrary to Articles 8 and 11 of that directive, if, while remaining on child-care leave, the employee has lost her opportunity of enjoying the pay benefits of maternity leave based on her working relationship in the public sector?
Do the provisions of Articles 2(3) and 4(1) of Regulation 881/2002 prohibit property from being conveyed in performance of a sale and purchase agreement to a natural person listed in Annex I to that regulation?
If Question 1 is to be answered in the affirmative: Does Regulation No 881/2002 prohibit the entry in the land register necessary for transferring ownership in the property even when the underlying sale and purchase agreement has been concluded, and the conveyance declared binding, before publication of the restriction on disposal in the Official Journal of the European Communities, and the contractual purchase price to be paid by the natural person listed in Annex I to the regulation, as buyer, has already been deposited in the notarial trust account, or paid to the seller?
Is the rule in the third indent of Article 86(2) of Directive 2001/83 to be interpreted as precluding a national rule prohibiting as prohibited advertising for imports of medicinal products the dispatch of price lists for medicinal products to pharmacists if and to the extent that the medicinal products included on those lists are not approved in the relevant MS but may be imported in isolated cases from other Member States of the EU and other States?
What is the purpose of the rule according to which the title on advertising does not cover trade catalogues and price lists provided they include no product claims, if the scope of application of national provisions on advertising of medicinal products is not thereby exhaustively defined?
Are the taxation arrangements laid down in Article 62 of Legislative Decree No 504/95, the national legislation at issue, compatible with Directive 2003/96?
Do the fundamental principles of Community law governing the award of public contracts, and more specifically Article 30(4) of Directive 93/37, preclude national legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which provides for the automatic exclusion of tenders considered to be abnormally low in relation to the goods, works or services according to a mathematical criterion laid down by that legislation?
Does the obligation of the Member States to take all necessary measures to recover any amounts lost as a result of an irregularity, viewed in the light of the principles of Community law, leave the Member States discretion to refrain from recovery on account of an infringement of a provision where the beneficiary of the subsidy was unaware of that provision and is not at fault for its lack of knowledge of that provision?
May Article 58 of the Act concerning the conditions of accession be interpreted as meaning that a MS may apply against an individual a regulation which at the time of its application has not been properly published in the Official Journal of the European Union in the official language of that MS?
If Question 1 is answered in the negative, is the unenforceability of the regulation concerned against an individual a question of the interpretation or of the validity of Community law within the meaning of Article 234 EC?
Should the Court of Justice conclude that the present reference for a preliminary ruling concerns the validity of a Community act within the meaning of the judgment in Case 314/85 Foto-Frost, is Regulation 2454/93 invalid on the ground of the absence of proper publication in the Official Journal of the European Union in accordance with Article 58 of the Act concerning the conditions of accession ?
Does Article 7(2) of Directive 97/67, which authorises MS to include cross-border mail in the reserved postal services, allow them to establish that reservation only in so far as they are able to prove that, without it, the economic equilibrium of the universal service provider is at risk?
Does Article 216 of the Customs Code apply to inward processing operations with prior exportation?
If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative; Can an undertaking in a situation such as Agrovers benefit from a remission of duties under Article 220(2)(b) of the CCC on the basis of a possible error on the part of the customs authorities?
Does the national provision, which entitles certain consumers to claim from undertakings in the courts prizes ostensibly won by them where the undertakings send them prize notifications worded so as to give the impression that they have won a particular prize, constitute, in circumstances where the claiming of that prize was not made conditional upon actually ordering goods and where no goods were actually ordered but the recipient of the communication is nevertheless seeking to claim the prize, a contractual, or equivalent, claim under Article 15(1)(c) of Regulation No 44/2001?
Does a claim falling under Article 15(1)(c) of Regulation No 44/2001 arise if the claim for payment of the prize was not made conditional upon ordering goods but the recipient of the communication has actually placed an order for goods?
Are Articles 6 and 16(3) of Directive 96/97 to be interpreted as precluding national provision which requires the payment of a sum by way of fees for administrative assistance and supervision?
Is it in conflict, or incompatible, with the completion of the internal market and the principles laid down in Articles 3(c) EC and 4 EC, for payment to be required of a sum by way of fees for administrative assistance and supervision?
May requiring payment of a sum by way of fees for administrative assistance and supervision be regarded as abuse within the meaning of Article 82 EC?
Must Article 56 EC, in conjunction with Article 58(1) EC, be interpreted as precluding a rule in a MS under which a concession to be granted to a fiscal investment enterprise on account of taxation at source deducted in another MS from dividends received by the fiscal investment enterprise is restricted to the amount which a natural person resident in the Netherlands could have had credited on the basis of a tax treaty concluded with the other MS?
Must Article 56 EC, in conjunction with Article 58(1) EC, be interpreted as precluding a rule in a MS under which a concession to be granted to a fiscal investment enterprise on account of taxation at source deducted in another MS from dividends received by the fiscal investment enterprise is restricted where and to the extent to which the shareholders of the fiscal investment enterprise are not natural persons resident in the Netherlands or bodies subject to Netherlands corporation tax?
Does direct investment in Article 57(1) EC also include the holding of a block of shares in a company if the holder of the shares holds them only as an investment and the size of the block does not put the holder in a position to exercise a decisive influence over the management or control of the company?
Under Article 56 EC, is any restriction of the movement of capital connected with the levying of tax that would be impermissible if it related to cross-border movement of capital within the EC similarly impermissible in the case of the same movement of capital to and from third countries?
Must Article 56 EC be interpreted as meaning that a restriction by a MS of a tax concession granted to a fiscal investment enterprise with regard to taxation at source of a dividend received from a third country, that restriction being based on the fact that not all shareholders of the fiscal investment enterprise have their place of residence in the MS concerned, is incompatible with that article?
Is the answer to the above questions affected by whether the tax deducted in another country from the dividend received from that country is higher than the tax on the payment of that dividend to foreign shareholders in the MS of establishment of the fiscal investment enterprise?
Is the answer to the above questions affected by whether the shareholders of the fiscal investment enterprise who have their place of residence outside the MS of establishment of the fiscal investment enterprise are resident or established in a country with which the abovementioned MS has a treaty providing for reciprocal credit of taxation of dividends at source?
Is the answer to the above questions affected by whether the shareholders of the fiscal investment enterprise who have their place of residence outside the MS of establishment of the fiscal investment enterprise are resident or established in another country of the EC?
Is broadcasts or parts of broadcasts in which the television broadcaster offers viewers the opportunity to participate in the broadcasters prize games by means of immediately dialling premium rate telephone numbers, and thus in return for payment, to be interpreted as being "teleshopping" within the meaning of Article 1(f) or "television advertising" within the meaning of Article 1(c) of Directive 89/552?
Do Articles 3 and 4 of Directive 89/48 preclude legislation of a MS which makes the performance, on its territory, of activities by a service provider established in another MS subject to obtaining an authorisation the grant of which is conditional upon success in an aptitude test in law?
If the answer to the previous question is in the negative, does it then follow that that directive and the national provisions adopted to implement it are contrary to Article 49 EC inasmuch as that directive and the national provisions adopted to implement it protect the market for estate agency activity in respect of immovable property situate in Belgium, in a manner which is objectionable, artificial and lacking objective justification, against cooperation agreements entered into by independent estate agents established in different MS?
Is the last sentence of Article 88(3) EC to be interpreted as meaning that the national court is bound to order the recovery of aid implemented contrary to that provision, where the Commission has adopted a final decision declaring that aid to be compatible with the common market, within the meaning of Article 87 EC?
Must the periods during which the aid in question was declared by the Commission to be compatible with the rules of the common market, before those decisions were annulled by the CFI, be taken into account for the purpose of calculating the sums to be repaid?
Must Articles 25 EC and 90 EC be construed as precluding a statutory rule under which domestic purchasers of electricity are required during a transitional period to pay to their net operator a price surcharge on the amounts of electricity transmitted to them?
Does the rule mentioned in the first question satisfy the requirements of Article 87(1) EC?
Is Article 1 of Regulation No 615/98 to be understood as meaning that point 48(7)(b) of the annex to Directive 91/628 applies analogously in the case of transport by sea on a regular and direct link between a geographical point of the Community and a geographical point in a third country by means of vehicles loaded on to vessels without unloading of the animals?
If question one is answered in the affirmative, is point 48(7)(b) of the annex to Directive 91/628 to be understood as meaning that, in the case of transport of bovine animals, the journey time by sea does not comply with the rule in point 48(4)(d) if, after 14 hours of travel, the animals are not given a rest period of at least one hour?
If question one is answered in the negative, is the then applicable provision in point 48(7)(a) of the annex to Directive 91/628 to be understood as meaning that the journey time by sea on a regular and direct link between a geographical point of the Community and a geographical point in a third country by means of vehicles loaded on to vessels without unloading of the animals is immaterial provided that the animals are regularly fed and watered, does a further period of 29 hours of transport by road begin immediately after unloading the lorry at the port of destination?
Is the first indent of Article 5A point 2(d)(ii) of Directive 91/628 to be understood as meaning that the staff in charge of the transport are required to state in the route plan the times at which the animals transported were fed and watered during the ferry journey and that a pre-typed statement indicating that during the ferry journey, animals are fed and watered in the evenings and mornings, at midday, and in the evenings and mornings does not meet the requirements of Directive 91/628?
Should a camcorder, which at the time of importation is unable to record video signals from an external source, be classified under subheading 8525 40 99 of the CN if its video port can subsequently be reconfigured as a video input by means of activating certain switches even though the manufacturer and the seller have neither mentioned nor support this possibility?
Is a court of second instance which has to give a decision on an appeal against a decision of a commercial court in proceedings to amend a registration of a company entitled to make a reference for a preliminary ruling under Article 234 EC, where neither the action before the commercial court nor the appeal procedure is inter partes?
Is the answer to the previous question is in the affirmative, must that court be regarded as a court against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy, which has an obligation, under Article 234 EC, to submit questions on the interpretation of Community law to the ECJ?
Does a national measure which confers a right to bring an appeal against an order making a reference for a preliminary ruling limit or could limit the power of the national courts to refer questions for a preliminary ruling in a way that is incompatible with community law?
May Articles 43 EC and 48 EC be interpreted as meaning that, in accordance with those articles, national rules or practices which prevent a Hungarian company from transferring its seat to another MS are incompatible with Community law?
Does a care insurance scheme, which has been established by an autonomous Community of a federal MS, which applies to persons who are resident in the part of the territory of that federal State for which that autonomous Community is competent, which provides for reimbursement of the costs incurred for non-medical assistance and service to persons with serious, long-term reduced autonomy and which is financed by members annual contributions and by a grant paid out of the budget for expenditure of the autonomous Community concerned, constitute a scheme falling within the scope ratione materiae of Regulation 1408/71?
Must Regulation 1408/71 and Articles 18 EC, 39 EC and 43 EC, be interpreted as precluding an autonomous Community of a federal MS from adopting provisions which, in the exercise of its powers, allow only persons residing in the territory for which that autonomous Community is competent and, in relation to citizens of the EU, persons employed in the territory and who are resident in another MS to be insured under and covered by a social security scheme within the meaning of that regulation, to the exclusion of persons, whatever their nationality, who reside in a part of the territory of the federal State for which another autonomous Community is competent?
Must Articles 18 EC, 39 EC and 43 EC be interpreted as not permitting the scope of such a system to be limited to persons who are resident in the territorial components of a federal MS which are covered by that system?
Must Community law be interpreted as precluding legislation of a MS that allows public authorities to entrust, without regard to the rules governing the award of public service contracts, the provision of both reserved and non-reserved postal services to a public limited company whose capital is wholly state-owned and which is, in that State, the provider of the universal postal service?
Do Articles 10 EC, 12 EC, 23 EC, 25 EC, 49 EC or 90 EC preclude a national tax provision which makes the deposit of waste at a waste disposal site subject to a tax, and provides for exemption from that tax but only in respect of the deposit of waste which originates from suspected contaminated sites located in Austria?
Is Article 41(1) of the Additional Protocol to be interpreted in such a way that it constitutes a restriction on freedom to provide services if a Turkish national who works in international transport for a Turkish undertaking as a driver of a lorry registered in Germany has to be in possession of a Schengen visa to enter Germany under German legislation and Article 1(1) of Regulation 539/2001 even though on the date on which the Additional Protocol entered into force he was permitted to enter Germany without a visa?
If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, should Article 41(1) of the Additional Protocol be interpreted as meaning that the Turkish nationals mentioned in (1) do not require a visa to enter Germany?
Does the Italian authorities? failure to comply with the time-limits of 11 months and 3 months, imposed for the benefit of the principal by the first and second paragraphs of Article 379 of the implementing regulation respectively or the principles established by the Court of Justice, preclude the recovery of customs duties?
In circumstances such as those under consideration, is it contrary to the principle of proportionality for a customs clearance agent to be held liable for all of the consequences of an incorrect Community transit operation?
In circumstances such as those set out in Question 1, is the question of whether the customs authorities have jurisdiction to be determined according to the criteria laid down by the second or third indent of Article 215(1) of the Customs Code?
Does Directive 79/7 preclude a MS, when it adopts rules intended to allow a category of persons of a particular sex, originally discriminated against, to become eligible for the pension scheme applicable to the category of persons of the opposite sex, from making such membership conditional on payment, in a single sum and together with interest?
Is a Member State obliged to adapt its legislation following a judgment given by the Court on an order for reference from which it is apparent that that legislation is incompatible with Community law?
Are Article 56 EC and Article 12(1)(c) of Directive 69/335/EEC to be interpreted as precluding the charging of capital transfer tax where securities are transferred, as described in the order for reference, as a contribution to a capital company which gives new shares of its own in return?
If a tenderer has failed within the time-limit set by national law to challenge a decision incorrectly placing a public tender outside the scope of Community protection, does Directive 89/665 prevent the tenderer from being denied the right conferred by that directive to a review of any further decisions in the tender process?
What details should appear on the tender notice so as to enable the conclusion to be drawn that the contract value has been wrongly estimated to fall below the threshold for the protection granted by Directive 89/665?
In the light of the judgment in Joined Cases C-317/01 and C-369/01, is Article 13 of Decision No 1/80 to be construed as meaning that a Turkish national, who has complied with the rules for first admission and residence in the country and from 14 December 2000 to 2 October 2002 was legally employed by various employers, but failed to request in due time the extension of the period of validity of his residence permit, can rely on that provision?
Is the word restriction in Article 13 of Decision No 1/80 to be understood to include the requirement upon a Turkish national, to whom Decision No 1/80 applies, to pay administrative charges in connection with the processing of an application for the extension of the period of validity of a residence permit, failing which payment his application will not be considered?
Must Article 13 of Decision No 1/80, read in conjunction with Article 59 of the Additional Protocol to the EEC-Turkey Association Agreement, be interpreted as meaning that the amount of the administrative charges for Turkish nationals who fall within the scope of Decision No 1/80, payable in connection with the processing of an application for the grant or extension of a residence permit, may not exceed the amount of the charge that can be levied on nationals of the EC?
Does the principle of the free movement of goods and the prohibition of measures having equivalent effect within the meaning of Article 28 EC preclude a national provision prohibiting the sale by mail order of image storage media that are not labelled as having been examined in that MS as to their suitability for young persons?
If so: Is such a prohibition justified under Article 30 EC, having regard to Directive 2000/31 even if the image storage medium has been examined as to its suitability for young persons by another MS and is labelled accordingly?
Must the rules referred to at the end of Article 86(1) EC be interpreted as precluding an obligation imposed on undertakings which distribute television programmes by cable to broadcast certain pre-determined programmes, if that obligation is to be regarded as conferring on the programmes authors a special right within the meaning of Article 86 EC?
Must Article 49 EC be interpreted as meaning that a prohibited restriction of the freedom to provide services exists from the time a measure taken by a MS is liable to impede directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, the provision of services from another MS to recipients of those services in the first MS, which will be the case where, on account of that measure, the service provider finds itself in an unfavourable position when negotiating for access to those networks?
If the effective centre of management of a company is transferred from a MS which has abolished capital duty to another MS which charges capital duty, is that company precluded from being classified as a capital company for the purposes of charging capital duty within the meaning of Article 4(1)(g) and Article 4(3)(b) of Directive 69/335?
Does Article 7(2) of Directive 69/335 prohibit the MS to which a capital company transfers the effective centre of management, on the occasion of the transfer of the effective centre of management, from charging capital duty on the transactions described in Article 4(1)(a) and (g) of Directive 69/335 if the transactions took place at the time when the capital company had its effective centre of management in a MS which had waived the charging of capital duty by repealing the relevant national legal basis for that duty?
Is a national provision, which requires the importer of cosmetic product to communicate to the health authority information about the business and the products, compatible with Article 28 EC and Article 7 of Directive 76/768?
Are the first paragraph of Article 27 of Directive 2002/21/EC and Article 16(1)(a) of Directive 2002/22/EC to be understood as meaning that a statutory requirement provided for under earlier national law for the authorisation of charges for the supply of voice telephony services to end-users by an undertaking with a dominant position in that market, and hence an administrative measure confirming that requirement, should be temporarily maintained?
Does Community law preclude such extensive continuation?
Is a compulsory occupational pension scheme a scheme similar to state schemes as referred to in Article 3(3) of Directive 2000/78?
Are benefits paid by a compulsory occupational pension institution to survivors in the form of widow?s/widower?s pensions to be construed as pay within the meaning of Article 3(1)(c) of Directive 2000/78?
Does Article 1 in conjunction with Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2000/78 preclude regulations governing a supplementary pension scheme under which a registered partner does not after the death of his partner receive survivors benefits equivalent to those available to spouses?
If the preceding questions are answered in the affirmative: Is discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation permissible by virtue of Recital 22 in the preamble to Directive 2000/78?
Would entitlement to the survivors benefits be restricted to periods from 17 May 1990 in the light of the case-law in Barber cited above?
In deciding a case before it, are the Rights Commissioners and the Labour Court required by any principle of Community law, in particular the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, to apply a directly effective provision of Directive 1999/70, even though those tribunals have not been given express jurisdiction to do so under the domestic law and individuals can pursue alternative claims before an ordinary court arising out of a failure by their employer to apply the Directive and seeking damages for loss suffered by them arising from the MSs failure to transpose the Directive on time?
If the answer to Question 1 is in the affirmative: Is Clause 4(1) of the framework agreement unconditional and sufficiently precise in its terms as to be capable of being relied upon by individuals before their national courts?
If the answer to Question 1 is in the affirmative: Is Clause 5(1) of the framework agreement unconditional and sufficiently precise in its terms as to be capable of being relied upon by individuals before their national courts?
Having regard to the answers to Question 1 and Question 3, does Clause 5(1) of the framework agreement preclude a MS, acting in its capacity as an employer, from renewing a fixed-term contract of employment for up to eight years in the period after the said Directive should have been transposed and before the transposing legislation was enacted in domestic law?
If the answer to Question 1, 2 or 3 is in the negative, are the Rights Commissioner and the Labour Court required by any provision of Community law, and in particular the obligation of consistent interpretation, to interpret provisions of domestic law enacted for the purpose of transposing Directive 1999/70 as having retrospective effect to the date on which the said Directive should have been transposed?
If the answer to Question l or Question 4 is in the affirmative, do the employment conditions to which Clause 4 of the framework agreement refers include conditions of an employment contract relating to remuneration and pensions?
Does Community law, specifically Directive 2000/31, Directive 2001/29, Directive 2004/48 and Articles 17(2) and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union permit MSs to limit to the context of a criminal investigation or to safeguard public security and national defence, thus excluding civil proceedings, the duty of operators of electronic communications networks and services, providers of access to telecommunications networks and providers of data storage services to retain and make available connection and traffic data generated by the communications established during the supply of an information society service?
Does point 48.7(a) of the annex to Directive 91/628/EEC define the basic conditions for transport of animals by sea so that, transports on so called roll-on/roll-off ferries are included?
If the answer to the previous question is in the affirmative, are the journey times by road before and after transport by sea interconnected, where animals are being transported on so called roll-on/roll-off ferries?
Does point 48.7(b) of the annex to Directive 91/628/EEC include a special provision for so-called roll-on/roll-off ferries, so that a new maximum journey time does commence after arrival of the ferry at the port of destination only if not the journey time at sea is such that the voyage has exceeded the general scheme of points 48.2 to 48.4 of the annex to that Directive?
Is Article 7(2) of Regulation No 3950/92 to be interpreted as meaning that, on expiry of rural leases on a milk-production holding or a milk-production area, the attached reference quantities can revert to the lessor even if that lessor is not, or is not about to become, a producer himself, in so far as he transfers the reference quantity as soon as possible through a State sales office to a third party who has that status?
Must Community law be interpreted as applying to an exclusive supply contract for petroleum products having the characteristics of that at issue in the main proceedings, first, in the event that that contract is regarded as having been concluded between two independent undertakings, and, second, in the event that that contract is to be regarded as a genuine agency contract?
Is an exclusive supply agreement, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, capable of benefiting from a block exemption such as provided for in Community law, subject to its compliance with the conditions laid down by that law and, in particular, the maximum duration of the agreement and the granting of commercial and financial advantages?
Must Community law be interpreted as precluding the application of the block exemption to an exclusive supply contract by reason of the fact that that contract provides for the fixing of the retail price by the supplier?
Does the automatic nullity provided for by Community law affect the contract at issue in the main proceedings in its entirety or only those clauses which are incompatible with the Community law at hand?
What, in accordance with Article 81 EC and with the general principles of Community law, is the criterion to be adopted in determining the undertaking on which a penalty is to be imposed for contravention of the rules in the sphere of competition when the last part of the penalised actions was carried out by an undertaking having succeeded the original undertaking in the economic sphere concerned, and when the original body, while still in existence, no longer operates in the economic sector affected by the penalty?
Does it fall to the national authority responsible for the application of antitrust rules, when determining the person to be penalised, to assess at its own discretion whether circumstances exist which warrant the attribution to the economic successor of responsibility for contraventions of the competition rules committed by the legal person which it has succeeded, even when that latter has not ceased to exist at the date of the decision, so that the effectiveness of the competition rules is not compromised by alterations made to the legal form of the undertakings?
Must point 3(a) of part 4 of Annex X to the Act of Accession be interpreted as meaning that Hungary has been granted a temporary derogation which allows it to maintain the HIPA, or that by granting the possibility to maintain reductions in the HIPA, the Act of Accession also recognises that Hungary has the provisional right to maintain a tax on economic activities?
On a correct interpretation of Article 33 of the Sixth Directive, does that provision preclude the maintenance of a tax such as the HIPA?
Is there withholding tax within the meaning of Article 5(1) of Directive 90/435 in the case in which national law provides that, where profits are distributed by a subsidiary to its parent company, income and asset increases of the capital company are to be taxed which, under national law, would not be taxed if they remained with the subsidiary and were not distributed to the parent company?
If the previous question is to be answered in the negative: Is it compatible with Articles 52, 73b and 73d of the Treaty for a national rule to provide for divergent set-off arrangements for the distribution of profits by a capital company using portions of its own capital, resulting in consequent tax liability even in cases in which the capital company demonstrates that it has distributed dividends to non-resident shareholders, even though, under national law, such non-resident shareholders, unlike resident shareholders, are not entitled to set off against their own tax the corporation tax thus determined?
Is Article 47(2)(b) and (c) of Regulation 1493/1999 in conjunction with the fifth indent of point (B)(1)(b) and point (B)(3) of Annex VII to that regulation and Article 23 of Regulation 753/2002 to be interpreted as meaning that a particular which refers to the production or ageing method or the quality of the wine is permitted only as a regulated ?optional particular? and not as an ?other particular? in accordance with point (B)(3) of Annex VII to Regulation 1493/1999?
Is Article 24(2)(a) of Regulation 753/2002 to be interpreted as meaning that imitation or evocation exists only if it is in the same language as that of the protected traditional term?
Is Article 24(2) of Regulation 753/2002 to be interpreted as meaning that the traditional terms listed in Annex III are protected only with regard to wines from the same producer Member State as the protected traditional term?
Must Community law be interpreted as precluding refusal to apply to businesses which consolidate postal items from various senders the special tariffs which the national universal postal service provider grants to business customers for the deposit of minimum quantities of pre-sorted mail at its sorting offices?
Is it contrary to Article 52 and Article 58 EC for Germany, as the State of origin, to treat a currency loss of a German controlling company resulting from the repatriation of so-called start-up capital granted to an Italian establishment as being part of that establishment?s profits and to exclude that loss, on the basis of the exemption under Articles 3(1), 3(3) and 11.1(c) of the  Double Taxation Convention between Germany and Italy from the basis of assessment for German tax?
If the previous question is answered in the affirmative: Is it contrary to Article 52 and Article 58 EC if the currency loss mentioned above is to be included in the basis for assessment of the German tax but may be deducted as operating expenditure only in so far as no tax-free profits are obtained from the Italian establishment?
Does the fact that a Turkish national was granted permission to enter the territory of a Member State as an au pair deprive that national of the status of worker and prevents him from being regarded as duly registered as belonging to the labour force? of that Member State within the meaning of Article 6(1) of Decision No 1/80, with the result that he cannot rely on that provision for the purposes of obtaining renewed permission to work and a corollary right of residence?
Does the fact that a Turkish national was granted permission to enter the territory of a Member State as a student deprive that national of the status of worker  and prevents him from being regarded as duly registered as belonging to the labour force of that Member State within the meaning of Article 6(1) of Decision No 1/80, with the result that he cannot rely on that provision for the purposes of obtaining renewed permission to work and a corollary right of residence?
Is the national legislation which requires an operator, formerly the holder of an exclusive right to provide public telecommunications services and then the holder of a general authorisation, to pay a pecuniary charge corresponding to the amount previously demanded for the exclusive right consistent with Articles 11, 22 and 25 of Directive 97/13?
In the context of the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of disability, does Directive 2000/78 only protect from direct discrimination and harassment persons who are themselves disabled?
If the answer to the previous is in the negative, does Directive 2000/78 protect employees who, though they are not themselves disabled, are treated less favourably or harassed on the ground of their association with a person who is disabled?
Where an employer treats an employee less favourably than he treats or would treat other employees, and it is established that the ground for the treatment of the employee is that the employee has a disabled son for whom the employee cares, is that treatment direct discrimination in breach of the principle of equal treatment established by Directive 2000/78?
Where an employer harasses an employee, and it is established that the ground for the treatment of the employee is that the employee has a disabled son for whom the employee cares, is that harassment a breach of the principle of equal treatment established by Directive 2000/78?
Is a national rule that payment by bank transfer preventing the occurrence of late payment by a debtor or putting an end to late payment on his part does not depend on the time when the amount is credited to the creditors account but on the time when the debtor gives a transfer order that is covered by sufficient funds or a sufficient credit limit and is accepted by the bank compatible with Article 3(1)(c)(ii) of Directive 2000/35?
Are Articles 4 and 5 of Directive 2005/35, in the light of Regulations 9 and 11(b) of Annex I, and Regulations 5 and 6(b) of Annex II, to Marpol 73/78 and in the light of the provisions of UNCLOS which define the conditions under which coastal States may exercise certain of their rights in the various marine zones, invalid?
Does the use of the phrase serious negligence in Article 4 of the Directive infringe the principle of legal certainty, and if so, is Article 4 invalid to that extent?
Where, under Article 28(2)(a) of the Sixth Directive a MS has maintained in its domestic VAT legislation an exemption with refund of input tax in respect of certain specified supplies, does a trader making such supplies have a directly enforceable Community-law right to be taxed at a zero rate?
Where, under Article 28(2)(a) of the Sixth Directive a MS has maintained in its domestic VAT legislation an exemption with refund of input tax in respect of certain specified supplies but has mistakenly interpreted its domestic legislation with the consequence that certain supplies benefiting from exemption with refund of input tax under its domestic legislation have been subject to tax at the standard rate, do the general principles of Community law, including fiscal neutrality, apply so as to give a trader who made such supplies a right to recover the sums mistakenly charged in respect of them?
If the answer to some of the previous questions is in the affirmative, do the Community-law principles of equal treatment and fiscal neutrality in principle apply with the result that they would be infringed if the trader in question is not repaid the entire amount mistakenly charged on the supplies made by him on the ground that domestic legislation provides that overpaid tax cannot be repaid to the extent that repayment would lead to unjust enrichment of the trader, but this provision does not apply in the case of claims by ?repayment traders??
Is the answer to the previous question affected by whether or not there is evidence that the difference of treatment between traders making claims for the repayment of overpaid output tax and traders making claims for additional amounts by way of input tax deduction has, or has not, caused any financial loss or disadvantage to the former?
If the Community-law principles of equal treatment and fiscal neutrality would be considered as infringed, does Community law require or permit a court to remedy the difference of treatment by upholding a trader?s claim to a repayment of overpaid tax in such a way as to enrich him unjustly or require or permit a court to grant some other remedy?
Is Regulation No 1223/2002 valid?
Does Directive 89/48/EEC apply to an Italian national who obtained a three-year degree in engineering in Italy, obtained recognition of the Italian qualification as being equivalent to the corresponding Spanish qualification, obtained registration in the Spanish register of engineers but never pursued that profession in Spain and applied, on the basis of the Spanish recognition of equivalence, for registration in the register of engineers in Italy?
If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, is a domestic provision that does not permit recognition in Italy of a qualification of a MS which in turn is exclusively the result of recognition of a previous Italian qualification compatible with Directive 89/48/EEC?
Must the concept of force majeure giving rise to losses to products under duty suspension arrangements, within the meaning of Article 14(1) of Directive 92/12 be interpreted as meaning unforeseeable and unavoidable circumstances extraneous to the authorised warehousekeeper who seeks to rely on those circumstances, or is it sufficient that the authorised warehousekeeper could not have avoided those circumstances?
Can losses of part of products which have escaped from a pipeline due to their liquid nature and to the characteristics of the ground on which they spilled, which hindered their recovery and led to the levying of duty on them, be regarded as inherent in the nature of the products within the meaning of Article 14(1) of Directive 92/12?
Is Article 1(2), in conjunction with Articles 7(1)(a) and 8(2) and (4) of, and Annex III to, Directive 91/439, to be interpreted as meaning that there is an obligation imposed on the MS of residence to recognise a driving licence which, after his driving licence was withdrawn in his MS of residence, on the ground of unfitness to drive, the holder obtained fraudulently, by deliberately deceiving the competent driving licence authorities of the issuing MS, without proving that he had become fit to drive again, or as a result of collusion with employees of the authorities of the issuing MS?
On a proper construction of Articles 1(2) and 8(2) and (4) of Directive 91/439, after a driving licence has been withdrawn by the administrative authorities of the MS of residence, may that State temporarily suspend, or prohibit the use of, a driving licence issued by another MS while that issuing State considers whether to revoke that driving licence fraudulently obtained?
Where a worker is resident outside the European Community on the date on which he reaches pensionable age, should Article 48 of Regulation No 1408/71 be applied in the same way as in a case where the worker concerned is resident in the territory of the Community?
Where it appears in the first condition of indent (c) of the second subparagraph of Article 1(9) of Directive 2004/18, is the term ?financed?by the State? to be interpreted as including indirect financing of certain bodies through the payment of fees by persons who possess broadcasting receivers?
Is the first condition of indent (c) of the second subparagraph of Article 1(9) of Directive 2004/18 to be interpreted as requiring that ?financing by the State? must involve a direct public influence on the awarding of contracts by the body financed by the State?
Is indent (c) of the second subparagraph of Article 1(9) of Directive 2004/18, in the light of Article 16(b) of that directive, to be interpreted as meaning that the only services excluded from its scope are those services specified in the latter provision?
Do documents within the meaning of Article 2(3) of Regulation No 1049/2001 include acts which are required to be published in the Official Journal of the European Union pursuant to Article 254 EC?
Do regulations or parts thereof have binding force if, contrary to the requirement of Article 254(2) EC, they are not published in the Official Journal of the European Union?
Does it amount to an unjustified restriction on the freedom to provide services under the EC Treaty if a public contracting authority is required by statute to award contracts for building services only to undertakings which, when lodging a tender, undertake in writing to pay their employees, when performing those services, at least the remuneration prescribed by the collective agreement in force at the place where those services are performed?
Is the national legislation which provides for the extension of the length of the transitional period at the end of which occurs the early cessation of a concession for the distribution of natural gas, originally granted without any previous tender procedure, compatible with Articles 43 EC, 49 EC and 86(1) EC and the principles of equal treatment, non-discrimination and transparency?
Is the  national legislation which automatically extends the length of the transitional period at the end of which occurs the early cessation of a concession for the distribution of natural gas, originally granted without any previous tender procedure,  compatible with the fourth, eighth, 10th and 18th recitals in the preamble to Directive 2003/55/EC, and with Article 23(1) thereof, Article 10 EC and the principles of reasonableness and proportionality?
Is Article 7(1) of Directive 2003/88 to be understood as meaning that workers must in any event receive minimum annual paid leave of four weeks and that leave not taken by a worker because of illness during the leave year must be authorised at a later date, so that national legal provisions and/or national practice cannot stipulate that an entitlement to paid annual leave is extinguished if workers become incapacitated for work during the leave year before leave is authorised?
Is Article 7(2) of Directive 2003/88 to be understood as meaning that at the end of the employment relationship workers have, in any event, a claim to financial compensation in respect of leave accrued, but not taken, so that national legislation and/or national practice cannot stipulate that workers will not receive an allowance in lieu of leave if, up to the end of the leave year or the relevant carry-over period, they are incapacitated for work?
Is Article 7 of Directive 2003/88 to be understood as meaning that the entitlement to annual leave or an allowance in lieu requires the worker actually to have worked during the leave year?
In light of the prohibition on discrimination set out in Article 12 EC and having regard to the right to the freedom of movement for every citizen of the Union laid down by Article 18 EC, is the national provision on the conflict of laws compatible with those provisions, in so far as it provides that the law relating to names is governed by nationality alone?
Does Article 4(1) of Directive 2004/18, or the analogous Article 26(2) of Directive 92/50, preclude a national legislation, which excludes persons not having the status of companies with share capital to participate in tendering procedures?
Do those provisions have immediate binding effect and take precedence over any possibly conflicting domestic provisions laid down by MSs?
Are the national provisions in question compatible with the Community principles set out in Article 39, 43, 48 and 81 EC and therefore, in the event of a conflict being identified, must the abovementioned national provisions be disapplied as conflicting with Community provisions that have direct binding effect and take precedence over domestic provisions?
Are national provisions, which provide, respectively, that any establishment or undertaking which carries out the operations specified in Annex II A to Directive 75/442 must obtain a permit from the competent authority referred to in Article 6 of that directive and, that the plans referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 7 of Directive 2006/12 may, for example, cover the natural or legal persons empowered to carry out waste management compatible with Article 9(1) of Directive 75/442 or the analogous Article 7(2) of Directive 2006/12?
Is it incompatible with Article 52 in conjunction with Article 58 of the Treaty of Rome (EEC) that, when unlisted shares in a company are valued, an interest in a national partnership is assigned a lower value than an interest in a partnership established in another MS?
Must Article 4(1) of Directive 2002/37/EC be interpreted as meaning that that provision requires MSs to terminate the authorisation of a plant protection product containing ethofumesate before 1 September 2003 on the ground that the authorisation holder does not have, or have access to, a dossier satisfying the conditions set out in Annex II to Directive 91/414/EEC?
Are the rules for determining non-preferential origin contained in Annex 11 to Regulation No 2454/93 for the colour televisions (CTV) produced in Turkey falling within combined nomenclature ex 8528 invalid, by virtue of an incompatibility with the provisions of Article 24 of the Community Customs Code?
If the answer to the previous question is in the negative, does the non-preferential origin of a separate part, such as a chassis, incorporated in a finished CTV, have to be determined separately?
If the answer to the previous question is in the affirmative, on which basis is that non-preferential origin to be determined?
If a part of a CTV, such as a chassis, has obtained local origin under Article 24 of the Community Customs Code on the basis of a physical processing or working test, is it then still necessary to determine a value for such part in order to apply to the CTV the specific origin rule for CTVs contained in Annex 11 to Regulation No 2454/93?
In the event that the rules agreed for the EC Negotiating Position before the WTO can be applied when applying Annex 11, is it necessary for a part of a CTV, such as a chassis, to have its own actual ex-works price?
When determining an equivalent value, is it appropriate to apply Articles 29 and 30 of the Community Customs Code, any of Articles 141 to 153 of Regulation 2454/93 or any of the Interpretative Notes on Customs Value set out in Annex 23 to Regulation No 2454/93?
What form of evidence of value or cost is needed?
In what circumstances may recourse be had to a computed or constructed cost of a part of a CTV in assessing its non-preferential origin?
What type of costs may be taken into account in calculating a computed or constructed cost of a part?
Is it appropriate to apply average values over a period of time in determining the duty liability of a specific product at a specific point in time?
Is it appropriate to use different methodologies for calculating costs or values when comparing the cost or value of a part with the cost or value of a completed, exported product?
Do the provisions of Article 44(2) of Decision No 1/95, read together with Article 47 of the Additional Protocol to the EEC-Turkey Association Agreement require the Community to have made an application for a recommendation and a notification to the EEC-Turkey Council of Association prior to making the anti-dumping duties imposed by Regulation 2584/98 also applicable to products imported from Turkey and which were in free circulation?
Does Article 46 of Decision No 1/95 require that the Community inform the Customs Union Joint Committee that it intends to apply these measures also to imports from Turkey, before it can make imports from Turkey of CTVs originating in China or Korea and in free circulation, subject to the application of the new anti-dumping duties imposed by Regulation 2584/98?
Do Articles 44 to 47 of Decision No 1/95 require that traders be informed, or otherwise be made aware, of information given pursuant to Article 46 of Decision No 1/95 or a notification made pursuant to Article 47(2) of the Additional Protocol to the EEC-Turkey Association Agreement?
In the event that an application, notification or information is required: What form must any such measure of application, notification and information pursuant to Article 44 and 46 of Decision No 1/95, read together with Article 47 of the Additional Protocol to the EEC-Turkey Association Agreement take?
Do the steps taken by the European Commission in the present case sufficiently comply with the required form of application, notification or information?
Are Articles 44, 46 and 47 of Decision No 1/95 and Article 47 of the Additional Protocol to the EEC-Turkey Association Agreement directly applicable or of direct effect in national courts?
Should Directive 92/12 be interpreted as meaning that a MS which has collected excise duty for tobacco products by means of issuing tax markings is obliged to reimburse the recipient of the tax markings for the sum paid for them if the tobacco products furnished with those tax markings in another MS departs from the duty suspension arrangement irregularly?
Is the Commissions decision of 12 July 2000 valid as regards only the transitional provision?
Must Directive 2004/17 be interpreted as meaning that a contracting entity which pursues one of the sectoral activities referred to in Article 3 of that directive also falls within the scope of that directive in relation to an activity pursued in parallel under competitive conditions?
Must an undertaking be characterised as a body governed by public law within the meaning of Directive 2004/17 or Directive 2004/18 if it provides district heating in a given area without any real competition?
Must an activity pursued under competitive conditions by a company which also pursues activities of a non industrial or non commercial nature be included within the scope of Directive 2004/17 or Directive 2004/18 if, through effective precautions such as separate balance sheets and accounts, cross financing of the activities pursued under competitive conditions can be excluded?
Are the provisions of Article 3(2) and the first subparagraph of Article 3(3) of Directive 1999/44/EC to be interpreted as precluding national legislation which provides that, where consumer goods are brought into conformity with the contract by means of delivery of replacement goods, the seller may require compensation from the consumer for use of the goods originally delivered, which were not in conformity with the contract?
Is a milk-quota sales point which transfers delivery reference quantities to milk producers for consideration an agricultural intervention agency within the meaning of the third subparagraph of Article 4(5) of and Annex D(7) to the Sixth Directive, or a staff shop within the meaning of the third subparagraph of Article 4(5) of and Annex D(12) to the Sixth Directive?
When assessing whether the treatment of a milk-quota sales point of a body governed by public law as a non-taxable person would lead to ?significant distortions of competition? within the meaning of the second subparagraph of Article 4(5) of the Sixth Directive, is the relevant geographic market the transfer area defined by the MS?
When assessing whether the treatment of a public milk-quota sales point as a non-taxable person would lead to such ?significant distortions of competition? is only the normal case of transfers independently of the land to be taken into consideration, or are other types of transfers independently of the land also to be included?
May the first paragraph of Article 4 and Article 5(1) of Directive 85/577/EEC be interpreted as meaning that the national legislature is not precluded from placing a time-limit on the right of cancellation given by Article 5 of the Directive, despite the consumer having been given defective notice, so that it expires one month after both parties have performed their obligations under the agreement in full?
Should Directive 85/577/EEC be interpreted as meaning that the right of cancellation cannot be forfeited by the consumer if he has not been given notice in accordance with the first paragraph of Article 4 of the Directive?
Is it compatible with Articles 43 EC and 56 EC for a German company with income from industrial or commercial activities to be precluded, when calculating its income, from deducting losses from a permanent establishment in another MS on the ground that, according to double taxation convention, the corresponding income from such a permanent establishment is not subject to taxation in Germany?
Is the second sentence of Article 2(2) of Regulation 2988/95 to be interpreted as meaning that the provisions laid down by Articles 66 and 67 of Regulation 796/2004 apply retroactively to an application for ?livestock? aid falling within the scope ratione temporis of Regulation 3887/92, which gave rise to an exclusion from the benefit of aid under Article 10c of the latter regulation?
Is the Sixth Directive to be interpreted as meaning that there can be a finding of an abusive practice when the accrual of a tax advantage is the principal aim of the transaction or the transactions in question, or if such a finding can only be made if the accrual of that tax advantage constitutes the sole aim pursued, to the exclusion of other economic objectives?
For the purposes of VAT, may there be considered to be an abuse of rights, where contracts for leasing arrangements, financing, insurance and intermediation contracts are concluded separately with the effect that only the consideration paid in respect of the grant of the right to use the goods is subject to VAT, whereas a single contract of leasing in accordance with the practice and interpretation of national case-law would include the financing and would therefore make the whole of the consideration subject to VAT?
Does the primary law of the European Communities contain a prohibition of discrimination on grounds of age, protection under which must be guaranteed by the MS even if the allegedly discriminatory treatment is unconnected to Community law?
If the previous question is answered in the negative, does such a connection to Community law arise from Article 13 EC or ? even before the time-limit for transposition has expired ? from Directive 2000/78?
Is any prohibition of discrimination on grounds of age also applicable between private employers on the one hand and their employees or pensioners and their survivors on the other hand?
Does a provision of an occupational pension scheme, which provides that a survivor?s pension will not be granted to a surviving spouse in the event that the survivor is more than 15 years younger than the deceased former employee, fall within the scope of the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of age?
If the previous question is answered in the affirmative, can such a provision be justified by the fact that the employer has an interest in limiting the risks arising from the occupational pension scheme?
If the previous question is answered in the negative, does the possible prohibition of discrimination on grounds of age have unlimited retroactive effect as regards the law relating to occupational pension schemes?
Must Article 87(1) EC be construed as meaning that, by providing for a rate of tax lower than the basic rate set in national legislation and for deductions from the amount of tax payable which do not exist in State tax legislation, provisions in the field of taxation adopted by the Juntas Generales del Territorio Hist?rico de Vizcaya, which take effect in the jurisdiction of that infra-State autonomous body, must be regarded as selective and as covered by the definition of State aid enshrined in Article 87(1) EC and, accordingly, must be notified to the Commission pursuant to Article 88(3) EC?
Is it compatible with Article 56 EC, on the free movement of capital, that the profits from a sale of shares in a foreign limited company in 2001 were subject to tax if the seller held, either directly or indirectly, a share of at least 1% of the company?s capital within the previous five years, whereas the profits from the sale of shares in a national limited company subject to unlimited corporation tax in 2001 were, in otherwise comparable circumstances, subject to tax only in the case of a substantial shareholding of at least 10%?
Is the national provision compatible with Article 20(1) of Directive 2003/54/EC inasmuch as a so-called ?operation network? is exempted from the general provisions on system access even where such system access would not impose an unreasonable burden?
Does an national provision, which limits the incidence of the tax to 50% of capital gains realised by persons residing in that MS, infringe Articles 12, 18, 39, 43 and 56 EC by excluding from that limitation capital gains realised by a person residing in another MS?
Do Article 5(1)(o) and Article 6(1)(b)(iii) of Directive 64/433 and Article 5(1), Article 7 and Article 8 of Directive 89/662 place producers and distributors of pigmeat in a legal position which can give rise to a claim seeking to establish State liability under Community law in the event of errors of transposition or application?
May the producers and distributors of pigmeat rely on an infringement of Article 30 of the EC Treaty in order to substantiate a claim seeking to establish State liability under Community law where the transposition and application of the abovementioned directives are contrary to Community law?
Does Community law require the limitation period for a claim seeking to establish State liability under Community law to be interrupted in the light of Treaty infringement proceedings under Article 226 EC or at any rate to be suspended pending the end of those proceedings where there is no effective domestic legal remedy to compel the Member State to transpose a directive?
Does the limitation period for a claim which seeks to establish State liability under Community law and is based on the inadequate transposition of a directive and an accompanying import ban commence only with the full transposition of the directive?
Given that the MS may not frame the conditions for reparation of loss and damage in respect of claims seeking to establish State liability under Community law less favourably than those relating to similar domestic actions, are there, generally, objections to a national rule under which an obligation to pay compensation does not arise if the injured party has wilfully or negligently failed to avert the damage by utilising a legal remedy?
Is Regulation No 1873/2003 partially void on account of a breach of higher-ranking Community law, Articles 1(1) and 3 of Regulation No 2377/90 in conjunction with Article 4(1) of Directive 96/22, in so far as application of an injection solution as a pharmaceutical form is excluded by virtue of the note marked (*) against the listing of progesterone in Annex II to Regulation No 2377/90?
Where a MS (the concerned MS) receives an application pursuant to Article 28 of Directive 2001/83 for mutual recognition of a marketing authorisation of a medicinal product granted by another MS (the reference MS) and such marketing authorisation was granted by the reference MS on the grounds that the product is essentially similar to another medicinal product which has already been authorised within the EU, is it compatible with Directive 2001/83 for the concerned MS to refuse to accept and review the application and not proceed to recognise the marketing authorisation granted by the reference MS on the grounds that in its opinion the product is not essentially similar to the other product, or is the concerned MS obliged to recognise the marketing authorisation granted by the reference MS within 90 days of receipt of the application?
If the concerned MS is obliged to recognise the marketing authorisation, and the concerned MS rejects the application and thereby fails to recognise the marketing authorisation, does that failure by the concerned MS amount to a sufficiently serious breach of Community law within the meaning of the second condition in the judgment in Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 (Factortame) ?
Where the failure of the concerned MS to recognise the marketing authorisation granted by the reference MS is based on a general policy adopted by the concerned MS that different salts of the same active moiety cannot, as a matter of law, be considered essentially similar, does the failure by the concerned MS to recognise the marketing authorisation amount to a sufficiently serious breach of Community law within the meaning of the second condition in the judgment in Joined Cases C-46/93 and 48/93 (Factortame) ?
Are the terms ?awarding? in Article 3(1) of Directive 92/50 and ?awarded? in Articles 8 and 9 of that directive to be interpreted as encompassing circumstances in which a contracting authority intends to obtain services in the future from a service provider established as a limited liability company where those services were previously supplied by a different service provider who is the sole shareholder in the future service provider and has control of the future service provider?
Are the terms ?awarding? in Article 3(1) of Directive 92/50 and ?awarded? in Articles 8 and 9 of that directive to be interpreted as encompassing circumstances in which a contracting authority, during the period of validity of a contract concluded for an indefinite period, agrees with the service providers amendments to the charges for specified services under the contract and reformulates an index-linking clause, where these amendments result in different charges and are made upon the changeover to the euro?
Are the terms ?awarding? in Article 3(1) of Directive 92/50 and ?awarded? in Articles 8 and 9 of that directive to be interpreted as encompassing circumstances in which a contracting authority, during the period of validity of a contract concluded for an indefinite period, agrees with the service providers to amend the contract, first, renewing for a period of three years a waiver of the right to terminate the contract by notice, and second, also laying down a higher rebate than before for certain volume-related charges within a specified area of supply?
If any of the pervious situation are to be regarded as an award: Is Article 11(3)(b) of Directive 92/50, or are any other provisions of Community law, to be interpreted as permitting a contracting authority to obtain services by awarding a single contract in a negotiated procedure without prior publication of a contract notice, where parts of the services are covered by exclusive rights as referred to in Article 11(3)(b) of Directive 92/50/EEC?
If the answer to the previous question is in the affirmative: Can an undertaking which does not have any right to deal with data that is subject to an exclusive right possessed by an undertaking which has a dominant position in the market establish that in that respect it has the capacity to provide a comprehensive service to a contracting authority, by relying on Article 82 EC and an obligation derived from that provision on the market-dominant undertaking to provide the data on reasonable conditions?
If any of the previous described situations is to be regarded as an award and the contracting authority was required to publish a contract notice (negative answer to question 4): Is ?harmed? in Article 1(3) of Directive 89/665 and in Article 2(1)(c) of that directive to be interpreted as meaning that an undertaking is harmed simply where he has been deprived of the opportunity to participate in a procurement procedure because the contracting authority did not, prior to making the award, publish a contract notice, on the basis of which the undertaking could have tendered for the contract to be awarded, could have submitted an offer or could have had the claim that exclusive rights were involved reviewed by the competent procurement review body?
Are the Community law principle of equivalence and the Community law requirement for effective legal protection, or the principle of effectiveness, to be interpreted, having regard to any other relevant provisions of Community law, as conferring an individual and unconditional right on an undertaking against a MS such that it has at least six months from the time when it could have known that a contract award infringed procurement law to bring legal proceedings before the competent national authority to seek damages?
Must Community law be interpreted as meaning  that a national authority with competence for export refunds is empowered to decide that a transport of animals has not been carried out in accordance with Directive 91/628 in the main proceedings?
Is the power of that authority subject to certain limits?
Should the competent authority of the Member State of export take into account, for the purpose of determining whether Community legislation on animal welfare during transport have been complied with, the available surface area of the vessel based on the standards in force in that Member State or that mentioned upon the grant of authorisation based on the standards in force in the State in which the vessel is registered?
Is Community law to be interpreted as meaning that there was a failure to comply with Community animal welfare legislation in Article 33(9) of Regulation No 1254/1999  only in respect of the number of animals by which the permitted cargo was exceeded, or must it be found that that legislation was not complied with in respect of all the live animals transported?
Does Community law require national courts to examine, of their own motion, where such an examination would result in denial of the principle of national law that an individual bringing an action must not be placed in a less favourable position than if he had not brought that action?
Must Community law be interpreted as meaning that it includes granting to the public the right to use reproductions of a work protected by copyright without that grant of use entailing a transfer of ownership and exhibiting those reproductions to the public without actually granting a right to use them?
Can the protection accorded to the free movement of goods preclude exercise of the distribution right if the items presented are not under copyright protection in the Member State in which they were manufactured and placed on the market?
Is the rule of special jurisdiction (Regulation 44/2001) applicable to the action brought by an employee against two companies established in different Member States which he considers to have been his joint employers?
Where the refusal of an undertaking holding a dominant position to meet fully the orders sent to it by pharmaceuticals wholesalers is due to its intention to limit their export activity and, thereby, the harm caused to it by parallel trade, does the refusal constitute an abuse within the meaning of Article 82 EC?
Is the rounding of VAT amounts governed solely by national law, or is it a matter for Community law?
Does it follow from the First and Sixth VAT Directives that the MSs are required to permit rounding down per article, even if different supplies are included in one invoice and/or one tax return?
Are the provisions in Directive 91/628 to be interpreted as meaning that a MS is entitled to introduce national transitional rules under which more strict requirements for height during transport operations over eight hours of pigs are imposed?
Are the provisions in Directive 91/628 to be interpreted as meaning that a MS is entitled to introduce national rules under which, in the case of transport operations of over eight hours? duration, there must be at least 0.50 m2 per 100 kg of pig?
Having regard to the general principle of equality and non-discrimination, is there no objective justification for the difference in treatment created by the national legislation, consequently, must compensation for dismissal payable to an employee pursuant to extra-judicial conciliation be included in the ambit of Directive 80/987?
Is it incompatible with Article 43 or 49 EC for national legislation to prohibit the broadcasting on national television networks of advertisements for medical and surgical treatments carried out in private health care establishments duly authorised for that purpose?
By adopting a code of conduct which imposes limits on the advertising of professional health care services and by construing the legislation in force concerning the advertising of medical services in a manner which considerably restricts the right of doctors to advertise their own activities, both measures being binding on all doctors, have the National Federation of Associations of Doctors, Surgeons and Dentists restricted competition beyond what is permitted under the relevant national legislation and in breach of Article 81(1) EC?
Is a worker, who undergoes in vitro fertilisation, a ?pregnant worker? within the meaning of the first part of Article 2(a) of Directive 92/85 if, at the time at which she was given notice of dismissal, the woman?s ova had already been fertilised with the sperm cells of her partner and ?in vitro? embryos thus existed, but they had not yet been implanted within her?
Is the general processing of personal data of foreign citizens of the Union in a central register of foreign nationals compatible with Article 12(1) EC, in conjunction with Articles 17 EC and 18(1) EC?
Is such processing compatible with the prohibition of restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a MS in the territory of another MS, first paragraph of Article 43 EC?
Is such treatment compatible with the requirement of necessity under Article 7(e) of Directive 95/46?
Must Articles 39 EC and 56 EC be interpreted as precluding, either individually or jointly, a situation in which a taxpayer who, in his MS of residence, has negative income from a dwelling owned and occupied by him, and obtains all of his positive income, specifically work-related income, in a MS other than that in which he resides, is not permitted by that other MS to deduct the negative income from his taxable work-related income, even though the MS of employment does allow its own residents to make such a deduction?
Where a trader, in an advertisement for his own goods or services, uses a registered trade mark owned by a competitor for the purpose of comparing the characteristics of goods or services marketed by him with the characteristics of the goods or services marketed by the competitor under that mark in such a way that it does not cause confusion or otherwise jeopardise the essential function of the trade mark as an indication of origin, does his use fall within Article 5(1) of Directive 89/104?
Where a trader uses, in a comparative advertisement, the registered trade mark of a competitor, in order to comply with Article 3a(1) of Directive 84/450 must that use be ?indispensable? and if so what are the criteria by which indispensability is to be judged?
If there is a requirement of indispensability, does the requirement preclude any use of a sign which is not identical to the registered trade mark but is closely similar to it?
Does the prohibition of discrimination in Article 10(1) of Decision No 1/80 preclude a MS from refusing to allow a Turkish worker who was duly registered as belonging to the labour force of the MS and had a right of unlimited duration in relation to employment on the date of expiry of the national residence permit originally granted to him, to continue to reside there for the duration of his employment, when the worker is employed as a seasonal worker?
Does a change in the legal form of national law governing permission to work that takes place after the expiry date of the original residence permit have any effect on the prohibition on refusal of further residence consequent on Article 10(1) of Decision No 1/80?
Whenever tender procedures governed by Directive 93/36/EEC for the supply of medical devices under Directive 93/42/EEC are conducted under the lowest-price system, is the contracting authority as the purchaser of the relevant goods able to reject a tender for medical devices which bear the CE marking and have been the subject of a quality check by the competent certification body, as technically unacceptable at the stage of the technical assessment, by reason of protection of public health?
Is the contracting authority as the purchaser of the relevant goods able directly to consider medical devices which bear the CE marking unsuitable for the form of use for which they are intended, or must the safeguard clauses first be applied, which enable the relevant competent authority to take measures either in accordance with the procedure in Article 8 or under Article 18 of Directive 93/42/EEC?
In the event that the abovementioned safeguard clauses must first be applied, is the contracting authority obliged to await the outcome of the procedure initiated either under Article 8 or under Article 18 of Directive 93/42/EEC and is it bound by that outcome?
Is the requirement that the level of remuneration for the planting of harvested material within the meaning of Article 5(2) of Regulation 1768/95 be ?sensibly lower? than the amount charged for the licensed production of propagating material of the same variety in the same area satisfied also if the remuneration is calculated at a flat rate of 80% of that amount?
Does Article 5(4) and (5) of Regulation 1768/95 contain a commitment in value terms with respect to the level of remuneration for the planting of harvested material in the event of statutory assessment?
If so, does that commitment, as the expression of a general idea, also apply to plantings of harvested material occurring before Regulation 2605/98 entered into force?
Does the guideline function of an agreement between organisations of holders of plant variety rights and farmers within the meaning of Article 5(4) of Regulation 1768/95 include the possibility of the calculation parameters of that agreement being applied also where, at the time of the calculation of the statutory remuneration, not all of the parameters lying within the sphere of the planter of the harvested material and required for calculation based on the agreement are known to the holder and he is not entitled to be notified of the relevant facts by the farmer?
If so, does such an agreement, if it is to perform a guiding function along these lines, presuppose compliance with the requirements laid down in Article 5(4) of Regulation 1768/95 also where it was concluded before the latter regulation entered into force?
Does Article 5(5) of Regulation 1768/95 set an upper limit on the remuneration under contractual and/or statutory remuneration arrangements?
Can an agreement between professional organisations be used as a guideline within the meaning of Article 5(4) of Regulation 1768/95 if it exceeds the rate of remuneration of 50% of the amount defined in Article 5(5) of that regulation?
Are the words ?without adversely affecting the essential interests of Community producers of similar goods? in Article 133(e) of the Customs Code to be interpreted as meaning that only the market for the finished product must be considered or must the economic situation with regard to the raw materials for processing under customs control also be investigated?
In relation to the assessment of the ?processing activities to be created or maintained? under Article 502(3) of Regulation 2454/93, is there a specific number of jobs which must, as a minimum, be made possible by the activities?
Can the ECJ examine the validity of a conclusion of the Customs Code Committee in preliminary ruling proceedings?
If so, is the conclusion in this case valid with respect to both the reasons and the economic arguments adduced?
If the ECJ cannot examine the validity of a conclusion, are the words ?[t]he Committee?s conclusion shall be taken into account by the customs authorities? in Article 504(4) of Regulation 2454/93 to be interpreted as being binding for the national customs authorities and/or the national courts?
Is Article 41(1) of the Additional Protocol to the EEC-Turkey Association Agreement to be interpreted as prohibiting a MS from introducing new restrictions, as from the date on which that Protocol entered into force in that MS, on the conditions of and procedure for entry to its territory for a Turkish national seeking to establish himself in business in that MS?
Where the use by an employer of the criterion of length of service as a determinant of pay has a disparate impact as between relevant male and female employees, does Article 141 EC require the employer to provide special justification for recourse to that criterion?
Would the answer to the preceding question be different if the employer applies the criterion of length of service on an individual basis to employees so that an assessment is made as to the extent to which greater length of service justifies a greater level of pay?
Is there any relevant distinction to be drawn between the use of the criterion of length of service in the case of part-time workers and the use of that criterion in the case of full-time workers?
Are the national provisions concerning the affixing of the SIAE marking compatible with Article 3 EC, Articles 23 EC to 27 EC, Articles 1, 8, 10 and 11 of Directive 98/34 and Directives 92/100 and 2001/29?
Must Article 11(1) and Article 13(1) of Directive 85/511 be interpreted as meaning that legal consequences, such as direct effect, must be attached to the fact that the presence of foot-and-mouth disease is found by a laboratory listed in Annex B to Directive 85/511, but which has been subject to changes that have not been registered in that Annex?
Must Annex B to Directive 85/511 be interpreted, having regard to Articles 11 and 13 thereof, as meaning that the mention in Annex B to Directive 85/511 of ?Centraal Diergeneeskundig Instituut, Lelystad? can or must refer also to ID-Lelystad BV?
Must Directive 85/511 be interpreted as providing that the national administrative authority authorised to adopt decisions is bound by the outcome of an examination by a laboratory which is listed in Annex B to Directive 85/511?
Are the national authorities bound unconditionally by the result of a foot-and-mouth disease examination carried out by a laboratory?
Must Articles 2 and 5 of the Eighth Directive be interpreted as meaning that VAT, which is not due and invoiced in error to the beneficiary of the services, then paid to the tax authorities of the MS of the place where the services were supplied, is refundable?
May the recipient of a service be considered, generally speaking, to be the person liable for payment of VAT for the purposes of the tax authorities of the Member State where the services are supplied?
Does the common system of VAT and the principles of neutrality, effectiveness and non-discrimination preclude national legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which does not entitle the recipient of services to reimbursement of VAT by the tax authorities where that tax was not due, but was nevertheless paid by that recipient to the tax authorities of the Member State where the services were supplied?
Do the principles of equivalence and non-discrimination preclude national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which entitles the recipient of services to bring an action only against the supplier, although there exists a situation where, in the case of undue payment, both the person charged with collecting the tax and the person liable for payment of that tax are entitled to bring an action against those authorities?
Does EU law prevent the imposition, for the purpose of teachers' training, of a requirement of employment in a Swedish school?
Is Article 21 of Regulation 1254/1999 to be interpreted as meaning that any irregularity in complying with Regulation 1760/2000 in respect of an animal results in the complete exclusion of a slaughter premium for that animal?
If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative: Are the effects of Article 21 of Regulation 1254/1999 so disproportionate so as to render that provision invalid?
Are Articles 44 and 45 of Regulation 2419/2001 applicable to irregularities in complying with Regulation 1760/2000?
If Question 3 is answered in the affirmative: Does the correct application of Article 45 of Regulation 2419/2001 in conjunction with Article 44 mean that the exclusion of a slaughter premium is not applicable to an omission relating to the notification of information to the keeper of the computerised database if the information provided is factually entirely accurate?
Is Article 11 of Regulation 3887/92 and/or Article 22 of Regulation 1760/2000 and/or Article 47(2) of Regulation 2419/2001 to be interpreted as meaning that a MS is authorised to exclude the Community right to a slaughter premium or apply reductions to it by means of a national sanction to ensure compliance with the provisions of the Regulation?
If Question 5 is to be answered wholly or partially in the affirmative: Do the exceptions from Community reductions and exclusions laid down at Community level, in particular Articles 44 and 45 of Regulation 2419/2001, apply by analogy to national reductions and exclusions?
Does the use of a trade mark registered also for ?toys? constitute use as a trade mark for the purposes of Article 5(l)(a) of the Trade Mark Directive if the manufacturer of a toy model car copies a real car in a reduced scale, including the trade mark of the proprietor of the trade mark as applied to the real car, and markets it?
If the answer to Question in 1 is in the affirmative: Is the type of use of the trade mark described in Question 1 an indication of the kind or quality of the model car within the meaning of Article 6(1)(?) of the directive?
If the answer is in the affirmative: In cases of this type what are the decisive criteria to be applied in assessing whether the use of the trade mark corresponds to honest practices in industrial or commercial matters?
Is the manufacturer of a model car acting in accordance with honest practices in industrial or commercial matters if he applies to the packaging, and to an accessory required in order to use the toy, a mark recognisable to the trade as its own trade mark together with its company name and the address of its seat?
Does Article 33(1) of Regulation 1408/71 preclude, when the basis for calculating sickness insurance contributions applied in the MS of residence of the recipient of pensions paid by the institutions of that MS is determined, the inclusion in that basis, in addition to the pensions paid in the country of residence, pensions paid by the institutions of another MS, provided that the sickness insurance contributions do not exceed the amount of pensions awarded by the State of residence?
Must the national provisions transposing the Directive govern all the situations subject to the system of protection laid down by that directive, in particular the condition in Article 9(1)(c) thereof that any hunting derogations must be restricted to ?small numbers? of birds?
Should the national provisions transposing the Directive refer to a criterion which is or can be determined and on the basis of which the small number of birds that may be hunted can be established?
Does the national provision in Article 19 bis of Law No 157/92, by requiring the obligatory but non-binding opinion of the INFS to determine that criterion without providing for a process for reaching agreement between the regions on the binding determination of the distribution for each species of the numerical limits of hunting derogations set at national level as small numbers, constitute a proper application of Article 9 of the Directive?
Is the procedure for verifying the compatibility with Community provisions of the hunting derogations authorised by the Italian regions under Article 19 bis of Law No 157/92, requiring fixed periods of time, which are also necessary for the adoption and publication of the measure, during which the brief period of hunting derogations itself may expire, suitable for ensuring effective application of the Directive?
?How is the term ?full cost? in Article 11(A)(1)(c) of the Directive to be interpreted: Must that amount be established by reference to the national rules applicable to depreciation for wear and tear of the building or on the basis of the length of the period for adjustment of deductions concerning VAT as laid down by national law in accordance with Article 20 of the Sixth Directive?
Do Articles 18(1) EC, 39 EC, 43 EC and 49 EC preclude legislation of a MS which enables taxpayers to claim school fees paid to certain private schools established in national territory as special expenses giving a right to reduction of income tax, but generally excludes that possibility in relation to school fees paid to a private school established in another MS?
Is Article 13B(f) of the Sixth Directive to be interpreted as meaning that the provision of call centre services to a telephone bookmaking organiser, which entails the staff of the supplier of those services accepting bets on behalf of the organiser, constitute a betting transaction within the meaning of that provision and may, therefore, qualify for the exemption from VAT laid down by that provision?
Does the penalty provided for in Article 13(4) of Regulation 97/95 apply where a contract described as a ?cultivation contract?, and accepted as such by a competent national authority under Article 4(2) of that regulation, was not concluded with a potato producer but with a trader obtaining potatoes directly or indirectly from potato producers?
Is imposition of the penalty provided for in Article 13(4) of Regulation 97/95 conditional on the starch-producing undertaking exceeding its sub-quota?
Does the system of penalties provided for in Article 13(4) of Regulation 97/95, by contradistinction to Article 13(3) of that regulation, satisfy Community law standards of certainty?
Is Article 13(4) of Regulation 97/95 valid from the point of view of the principle of proportionality referred to in Article 2(1) of Regulation 2988/95, in so far as Article 13(4) permits the imposition of penalties on starch-producing undertakings which have taken delivery of potatoes not covered by a cultivation contract, although they have not exceeded their sub-quota?
Is an irregularity liable to a penalty under Article 13(4) of Regulation 97/95 caused by negligence within the meaning of Article 5(1) of Regulation 2988/95 even if the authority has approved the premium in full knowledge of the facts?
Does Article 64 of the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement have any effect on the right to remain?
If Question (1) is answered in the affirmative: Can it be inferred from the prohibition of discrimination laid down in Article 64 of the Agreement that the legal position in relation to the right to remain precludes making that right subject to a time-limit in the case of a Tunisian citizen who holds a work permit of indefinite duration, is actually in employment and, on the date of the decision under the law on aliens, already has a right to remain for a specified period?
If Question (2) is answered in the affirmative: Can the legal position relating to the right to remain and construed in the light of Article 64 of the  Agreement, be determined by reference to a date subsequent to the decision under the law on aliens making the right to remain subject to a time-limit?
If Question (3) is answered in the affirmative: Is it necessary to comply with the principles developed in relation to Article 39(3) EC when applying the proviso in respect of grounds relating to the protection of a legitimate national interest?
Is Article 11(A)(2)(a) and Article 11(A)(3)(c) of the Sixth Directive to be interpreted as meaning that a registration duty for motor vehicles must be included in the taxable amount for VAT, where a purchase agreement is entered into for the supply of a new motor vehicle for use for carrying passengers, where the motor vehicle is supplied by the dealer to the consumer already registered and for an overall price which includes both the price paid to the dealer and also the registration duty?
May a MS arrange its tax system in such a way that the registration duty is regarded as an expense which the dealer pays on behalf of the final purchaser, so that it is the final purchaser who is directly liable to pay the duty?
With regard to compensating products which are considered to have been released for free circulation, must the customs debt be determined on the basis of the taxation elements referred to in Article 122(c) of the Community Customs Code even where the person concerned has made no prior and express request in that regard?
Is it necessary to grant a subsequent application ? after notification of the amount by way of duty arising from the customs debt ? for (re)calculation of the amount of customs debt on the basis of the taxation elements referred to in Article 122(c) of the Community Customs Code which is made in connection with an application for repayment pursuant to Article 236 of the Community Customs Code?
Does EU law preclude legislation providing that exemption from income tax in respect of dividends may be granted only if the distributing company is established wihtin the EEA or in a Member State's taxation convention state?
Do the provisions of the Treaty on free movement of capital preclude the legislation of a MS which provides that exemption from income tax in respect of dividends distributed in the form of shares in a subsidiary may be granted only if the distributing company is established in a State within the EEA or in a State with which a taxation convention providing for the exchange of information has been concluded by the MS imposing the tax?
Do the provisions of Article 13A(1)(b) and (2) of the Sixth Directive allow for the tax exemption for medical laboratory tests ordered by general practitioners to be made subject to the conditions specified in those provisions, even where medical care by such practitioners is exempt from taxation in any event?
Must Article 3(3) of Directive 89/104 be interpreted as meaning that in order to acquire distinctive character as a result of use, it is necessary that the sign be regarded as a trade mark, before the date of application, by the relevant public throughout the Benelux territory or, are the conditions in that provision satisfied if the sign is regarded as a trade mark by the relevant section of the public in a substantial part of the Benelux territory?
When assessing distinctive character acquired through use, within the meaning of Article 3(3) of Directive 89/104, of a sign ? consisting of one or more words of an official language in the territory of a MS ? is it necessary to take into account the language regions within that territory?
For registration as a mark, is it sufficient if that the sign be regarded as a trade mark by the relevant section of the public in a substantial part of the language region of the MS in which that language is an official language?
In the light of the principle of the primacy of immediately applicable Community law, in the form in this case of Decision 90/555 and Note No 5259, requiring the recovery of aid, is it legally possible and compulsory for the national administrative authority to recover aid from a private recipient even though a final civil judgment has been delivered confirming the unconditional obligation to pay the aid in question?
Or, in view of the generally accepted principle that decisions on the recovery of aid are governed by Community law but the implementation thereof and the associated recovery procedure is governed by national law (See Cases 205/82 to 215/82), is the recovery procedure rendered legally impossible by virtue of a specific judicial decision that has become res judicata, thereby being conclusive as between the private individual and the administration?
Does Article 7 of the directive preclude a national provision which, during a contract of employment, permits days of annual leave within the meaning of the directive, which are not taken in the course of a given year, to be replaced by an allowance in lieu in the course of a subsequent year?
Is the first indent of Article 5(3) of Regulation 1475/95 to be interpreted as meaning that it requires a supplier which terminates a distribution agreement pursuant to that provision, first, to set out formal reasons for the decision to terminate, and, secondly, to draw up a reorganisation plan prior to that decision being taken?
What substantive conditions must be satisfied in order for the first indent of Article 5(3) of Regulation 1475/95 to apply?
Who bears the burden of proving that the conditions for the supplier being able to terminate the agreement on one year?s notice under Article 5(3) of Regulation 1475/95 are satisfied?
Could the entry into force of Regulation 1400/2002, of itself, be sufficient to render the reorganisation of the distribution network of a supplier necessary within the meaning of the first indent of Article 5(3) of Regulation 1475/1995?
Is, pursuant to Article 17(2)(a) of the Directive, objection to the redispatch of a consignment that does not satisfy the import conditions founded on the failure to meet Community requirements or, is it founded on the requirements that apply in the third country to which the consignment is likely to be redispatched?
Must Article 17(2)(a) of the Directive, read in conjunction with Article 22(2) of that directive and Article 5 of the Regulation, be interpreted as meaning that, in all cases in which any one of the checks provided for in the Directive indicates that a consignment of animal products is likely to constitute a danger to animal or human health, that provision imperatively requires the destruction of such products?
Must Article 22 of the Directive, read in conjunction with Article 5 of the Regulation, be interpreted as meaning that the mere fact that residues of a substance listed in Annex [IV] to the Regulation are found in a consignment mean that the consignment in question is likely to constitute a danger to animal or human health so as to preclude its redispatch?
Is Section 6(2) of Annex XIII to the Act of Accession to be interpreted as meaning that it enables the Republic of Austria to maintain, on a transitional basis, its legislation containing an exemption from excise duty for cigarettes imported in travellers? personal luggage limited to 25 units, since that exemption was already in force prior to the accession of the Republic of Slovenia?
Are Articles 23 EC, 25 EC and 26 EC to be interpreted as meaning that they prohibit national legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, under which the exemption from excise duty for cigarettes imported in travellers? personal luggage is limited to 25 units on entry to the Republic of Austria from certain other Member States, in particular the Republic of Slovenia?
Is Directive 94/25 or, as the case may be, Articles 28 EC and 30 EC to be interpreted as meaning that they preclude national regulations, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, which prohibit the use of personal watercraft on waters other than designated waterways?
Must the national court, in order to determine the scope of protection of a trade mark which has been lawfully acquired on the basis of its distinctive character, in accordance with Article 5(1) of Directive 89/104, take into account the perception of the public concerned either at the time when use was commenced of the sign which infringes the trade mark concerned, at any other time thereafter or at the time the national court delivers its ruling?
Is, as a general rule, the national court entitled to order cessation of the use of the sign in question where it has been found that that sign constituted an infringement of the protected mark at the time when it began to be used?
Is it appropriate to order cessation of the use of the sign in question if the trade mark has lost its distinctive character, wholly or in part, after that sign has begun to be used and that loss is due, wholly or in part, to an act or omission of the proprietor of that mark?
Is a tax authority entitled to refuse to allow an intra-Community supply, which undoubtedly occurred, to be exempt from tax solely on the ground that the taxable person did not produce the prescribed accounting evidence in good time?
Does the answer to the question depend on whether the taxable person initially knowingly concealed the fact that an intra-Community supply had occurred or not?
Does Directive 92/51 or Directive 89/48 apply to the activity of director of voluntary sales of chattels by public auction?
Can the host MS avail itself of the derogation from the third subparagraph of Article 4(1)(b) of Directive 92/51 or the third subparagraph of Article 4(1) of Directive 89/48?
What is to be understood by ?the same acts? within the meaning of Article 54 of the CISA and can the circumstances in the main proceeding be considered as "same acts"?
Is a person?s trial disposed of, for the purposes of Article 54 of the CISA, if the charge brought against that person has been declared not to have been legally and satisfactorily proved and that person has been acquitted on that charge by way of a judgment?
Must Article 9(2) of Directive 93/83/EEC be interpreted as meaning that, where a collecting society is deemed to be mandated to manage the rights of a copyright owner or holder of related rights who has not transferred the management of his rights to a collecting society, that society does not have the power to exercise that rightholder?s right to grant or refuse authorisation to a cable operator for cable retransmission, since it is mandated only to manage the pecuniary aspects of that rightholder?s rights?
Does Article 43 EC preclude national legislation which imposes a liability to tax on dividends paid by resident subsidiaries to their parent company when that company is established in another Member State, whilst resident parent companies are almost fully exempt from that tax?
Where a double taxation convention between France and another MS authorises a withholding tax such as that referred to in Question 1, and provides for the possibility to impute it onto the tax due in this other MS, should this treaty be taken into account in assessing the compatibility of the measure with Article 43 EC?
If the applicable DTC should indeed be taken into account, does the possibility that a non-French-resident parent company may not in fact be able to carry out the imputation provided for by the treaty mean that the measure should be considered contrary to Article 43 EC?
Is the shipment of meat-and-bone meal, whether or not free of special risk material, subject, in so far as it involves waste, to the notification obligation under Regulation No 259/93?
Is the shipment of meat-and-bone meal, whether or not free of special risk material, excluded from the application of Regulation No 259/93 in accordance with Article 1(2)(d) of that regulation?
Is the shipment of meat-and-bone meal which is free of special risk material illegal under Article 26(1)(a) and (b) of Regulation No 259/93, in the absence of notification to and the consent of the authorities concerned, on the ground that it involves waste within the meaning of Regulation No 259/93?
Is the shipment of meat-and-bone meal which contains special risk material illegal under Article 26(1)(a) and (b) of Regulation No 259/93, in the absence of notification to and the consent of the authorities concerned, on the ground that it involves waste within the meaning of Regulation No 259/93?
Is Article 28c(A)(a) of the Sixth Directive, in conjunction with Directive 77/799 and Regulation 218/92, to be interpreted as meaning that the MS of the dispatch or transport of the goods must request the MS of arrival of those goods to provide information and must take the results of that request into account when examining the evidence of the dispatch or transport of the goods?
Does Community law, in particular Article 18 EC, preclude national legislation under which the grant of a benefit for civilian war victims is refused solely on the ground that the person concerned, who holds the nationality of the relevant MS, was resident in the territory of another MS at the time when the application was submitted?
Is the CN in the version of Annex I to Regulation 1789/2003 to be interpreted as meaning that pizza cheese (mozzarella) that was stored after its manufacture for one to two weeks at 2 to 4?C is to be classified under subheading 0406 10 CN?
In the absence of Community rules, may the examination of whether cheese is fresh within the meaning of subheading 0406 10 CN be carried out on the basis of organoleptic features?
Is the second paragraph of Article 3 of the Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Communities, which provides that the governments of the MS are to take the appropriate measures to remit or refund the amount of indirect taxes or sales taxes, to be interpreted as meaning that a proportional duty levied in respect of decisions of courts and tribunals, given in all matters, ordering payment of money or liquidation of securities, falls within its scope?
Is the third paragraph of Article 3 of the Protocol, which provides that no exemption is to be granted in respect of a mere charge for a public utility service, to be interpreted as meaning that the charge made at the outcome of proceedings to the losing party ordered to pay a specified amount constitutes merely a charge for a public utility service?
In refusing to take the pay earned by the plaintiff in Belgium into account when calculating the amount of the allowance for asbestos workers granted to him because that pay did not give rise to the payment of social security contributions in accordance with the French legislation, did the defendant take a wrongful decision constituting an impediment to freedom of movement as laid down in Article 39 EC or an infringement of Article 15 of Regulation 574/72?
Are the rules of Community law protecting freedom of movement for persons and workers, particularly Articles 18 and 39 EC and Articles 3 and 7 of Regulation 1612/68, infringed by an interpretation of the national provision to the effect that employment subject to compulsory social security contributions means only employment that comes within the scope of application of the national law?
Is it possible and necessary to interpret that provision in conformity with European law so as to avoid the type of infringement described in the previous question?
Are the rules of Community law protecting freedom to provide services and competition, particularly Articles 49, 50 and 87 EC, in conjunction with Articles 81, 85 and 86 EC, or other rules of Community law, infringed by an interpretation of the national provision to the effect that employment subject to compulsory social security contributions means only employment that comes within the scope of application of the national law?
Is it possible and necessary to interpret that provision in conformity with European law so as to avoid the type of infringement described in the previous question?
Is a German national who, while continuing his service as a post office official in Germany, moved his permanent residence from Germany to Austria in 1990 and has since then carried on his occupation as a frontier worker to be regarded as a migrant worker within the meaning of Regulation 1612/68 for periods between January 1994 and September 1998?
Does it constitute indirect discrimination within the meaning of Article 7(2) of the Regulation if the non-working spouse of the person mentioned in Question 1, who lives in Austria and is an Austrian national, was excluded from receiving German child-raising allowance in the period in question because she did not have either her permanent or ordinary residence in Germany?
Do exclusive fuel distribution contracts with characteristics such as those at issue in the main proceedings, fall within the scope of Article 81 EC and Regulation 1984/83?
Does the agreement at issue in the main proceedings constitute a public works contract within the meaning of Article 1(a) of the Directive?
Can a procurement procedure under Directive 93/37 be dispensed with where, under national law, the agreement in question may only be concluded with certain legal persons in the first place and those persons would themselves have to carry out procurement procedures if they were to award any follow-up contracts?
Does Article 2 of Directive 85/433 merely impose an obligation on Member States to recognise diplomas, certificates and other formal qualifications in respect of activities in pharmacies which have been in operation for at least three years?
Does Community law require the courts to conduct an examination of their own motion, that is to say, an examination of grounds which are outside the terms of the dispute, by reference to criteria based on Directive 85/511?
Must Annex B to Directive 85/511 be interpreted, having regard to Articles 11 and 13 thereof, as meaning that the reference in Annex B to ?Centraal Diergeneeskundig Instituut, Lelystad? can or must refer also to [ID-Lelystad]?
Must Directive 85/511 be interpreted as providing that the national administrative authority authorised to adopt decisions is bound by the outcome of an examination by a laboratory which is listed in Annex B to Directive 85/51?
Must the first sentence of Article 17(7) of the Sixth Directive be interpreted as precluding from being treated as ?consultation of the VAT Committee?, for the purposes of Article 29 of that directive, the notification by a MS of the adoption of a rule of national law which limits the right to deduct VAT in respect of the use and maintenance of the goods referred to in Article 17(2), the VAT Committee limiting itself to taking note of such notification?
Must the first sentence of Article 17(7) of the Sixth Directive be interpreted as meaning that it authorises a Member State to exclude the goods referred to in Article 17(2) of that directive from the system of deducting VAT without prior consultation of the VAT Committee, and without limitation in time?
May the national tax authorities rely as against a taxable person on a provision derogating from the principle of the right to deduct VAT which was not established in accordance with Article 17(7) of the Sixth Directive?
Do Articles 43 EC and 56 EC, having regard to Article 58 EC and Directive 90/435/EEC, preclude the system established by national legislation on intra-group financial transfers, which makes the deductibility of intra-group financial transfers subject to the condition that the transferor and the transferee be national companies?
May Article 81(1) EC be interpreted as meaning that agreements between financial institutions for the exchange of information on customer solvency and default may be regarded as compatible with the common market?
May Article 81(3) EC be interpreted as meaning that a MS, acting through its competition authorities, may authorise agreements on the exchange of information between financial institutions through the establishment of a credit information register on their customers, on the ground that its establishment benefits the consumers and users of those financial services?
Does a supply of goods or services which, when made within a MS, is exempted by reason of Article 13A(1)(e) of the Sixth Directive and does not give rise to the right to deduct input tax pursuant to Article 17 of the directive, fall within the ambit of Article 15(1) and (2) or (3) of the directive as worded prior to 1 January 1993 or Article 28cA(a), applicable as of 1 January 1993, and thus within the ambit of Article 17(3)(b) of the directive giving rise to the right to deduct input tax when the goods or services are supplied by an operator established in a MS of the Community to an operator established in another MS?
What protection regime is required under Article 3(1) and the sixth recital of Directive 92/43 in the light of the second paragraph of Article 10 EC, as a result of the judgment in C-117/03 in respect of sites which could be designated sites of Community importance, particularly those with priority natural habitat types or priority species, before they appear in the list of sites of Community importance adopted by the Commission?
Is a national protection scheme for those sites sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Community law under Article 3(1) and the sixth recital of Directive 92/43 in the light of the second paragraph of Article 10 EC?
Is Article 10(1) of  Directive 89/104/EEC to be interpreted as meaning that the ?date of the completion of the registration procedure? means the start of the period of protection?
Is Article 12(1) of Directive 89/104/EEC to be interpreted as meaning that there are proper reasons for non-use of a mark if the implementation of the corporate strategy being pursued by the trade mark proprietor is delayed for reasons outside the control of the undertaking?
In Turbon International it was held that Annex I to Regulation 2658/87 as amended by Regulation 1734/96 had to be interpreted as meaning that an ink cartridge such as that at issue in the main proceedings, is to be classified under subheading 3215 90 80 of the CN. Contrary to that ruling, should not the ink cartridge described above in fact be classified as a part or accessory of a printer under CN heading 8473 because the mechanical and electronic functioning of the printer is dependent upon the presence of a cartridge of that kind?
Does the fact that specific goods are counted as a single supply, including both items within and outside the scope of exemption from VAT refund, prevent the Member State from levying VAT at standard rate on these items?
Does waste water constitute 'waste' within the meaning of Directive 75/442 where it escapes from a sewerage network maintained by a statutory undertaker pursuant to the legislation which transposes Directive 91/271?
Is waste water which escapes from a sewerage network 'waste' falling outside the scope of Directive 75/442 by virtue of Article 2(1)(b)(iv) and, in particular, by virtue of Directive 91/271 or the Water Industry Act 1991, or those two legal instruments read together?
Does waste water which escapes from a sewerage network come within Article 2(2) of Directive 75/442 and is excluded from the scope of the Directive, in particular, by virtue of Directive 91/271?
Can cable scrap be classified as ?electronic scrap? within the terms of heading GC 020 of the green list?
Can a combination of green list materials, which is not as such mentioned in the green list, be regarded as a green list material and may that combination of materials be transported for purposes of recovery without the notification procedure being applicable?
Is it necessary in this connection that the waste material be offered or transported separately?
Is Community law to be interpreted as meaning that the supplementary allowance at issue, listed in Annex IIa to Regulation No 1408/71, is of a special and non-contributory character, thereby excluding, pursuant to Articles 10a and 95b of Regulation No 1408/71, its award to a non-resident who did not satisfy the age condition on 1 June 1992?
Does a production unit which is not independent from the company come within the concept of "establishment" for the purposes of the application of Directive 98/59?
Is the presentation of the new packaging to be measured against the principle of minimum intervention or only against whether it is such as to damage the reputation of the trade mark and its proprietor?
Are Article 7 of Directive 89/104 and the case-law of the Court to be interpreted as meaning that the parallel importer fulfils his duty of notification only if he informs the proprietor of the trade mark also of the State of export and the precise reasoning for the repackaging?
Is a sum paid as a deposit by a client to a hotelier, where the client exercises the cancellation option available to him and that sum is retained by the hotelier, to be regarded as consideration for the supply of a reservation service, which is subject to VAT, or as fixed compensation for cancellation, which is not subject to VAT?
Is Article 8 of the Directive to be interpreted as requiring Member States to ensure, by whatever means necessary, that employees? accrued rights under supplementary company or inter-company final salary pension schemes are fully funded by Member States in the event that the employees? private employer becomes insolvent and the assets of their schemes are insufficient to fund those benefits?
If the answer to Question 1 is ?no?, are the requirements of Article 8 sufficiently implemented by legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings?
If Article 8 of the Directive has not been properly transposed into domestic law, does the Member State concerned incur liability by the mere fact of that infringement of Community law, or is its liability contingent on a finding of manifest and grave disregard by that State for the limits set on its discretion?
Does, in proceedings for the withdrawal and recovery of differentiated refunds which have been definitively paid on the basis of Regulation 3665/87, a finding that those refunds have been wrongly paid mean that evidence of abuse on the part of the exporter must be furnished?
If question 1 is answered in the negative, what criteria apply to enable it to be established when the re-exportation of goods necessarily leads to the conclusion that definitively paid variable refunds were wrongly paid?
What criteria apply to enable it to be established if there has been a continuous or repeated irregularity as referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 3(1) of Regulation (EC, Euratom) 2988/95?
Does a registered trade mark grant its proprietor the right to prohibit the transit of goods with the sign?
If the answer is in the affirmative: May a particular assessment be based on the fact that the sign enjoys no protection in the country of destination?
If the answer to (1) is in the affirmative and irrespective of the answer to (2): Is a distinction to be drawn according to whether the article whose destination is a Member State comes from a Member State, an associated State or a third country?
Is it relevant in this regard whether the article has been produced in the country of origin lawfully or not, in infringement of a right to a sign existing there held by the trade-mark proprietor?
Is the phrase ?? unless [the defendant] failed to commence proceedings to challenge the judgment when it was possible for him to do so? in Article 34(2) of Regulation 44/2001 to be interpreted as meaning that the ?possibility? of such a challenge is in any event dependent on the due service on the defendant in accordance with the applicable law on service of an office copy of an appealable default judgment delivered in a MS?
If Question 1 is answered in the negative: Would the service of an office copy of the order on the application for a declaration of enforceability in Austria of the default judgment from the Netherlands and for an execution order following the foreign order for execution declared enforceable necessarily already have put the defendant on notice, not only of the existence of that judgment, but also of the availability of a legal remedy under the legal order of the State in which the judgment was delivered, so that it would be aware as a result of the possibility of challenging the judgment in accordance with Article 34(2) of the Regulation?
Does the benefit paid under the Wajong constitute a special non-contributory benefit subject to the provisions of Article 4(2a) in conjunction with Article 10a of Regulation 1408/71, from which it would follow that payment could validly be made to depend on a condition of residence?
If the answer to Question 1 is in the affirmative, can a worker rely on Article 39 EC, as implemented by Article 7 of Regulation 1612/68, against the Member State of which he is a national when he has worked only in that Member State but is resident in the territory of another Member State?
If the answers to Questions 1 and 2 are in the affirmative, must Article 39 EC, as implemented by Article 7(2) of Regulation 1612/68, be understood as meaning that a legislative provision which makes the grant or continuation of a benefit conditional on the person concerned being resident in the territory of the Member State whose legislation is at issue, is always compatible therewith where that legislation provides for a special non-contributory benefit, within the meaning of Article 4(2a) of Regulation No 1408/71, which is listed in Annex IIa to that regulation?
If the answers to Questions 1 and 2 are in the affirmative and the answer to Question 3 is in the negative, must Community law (in particular Article 7(2) of Regulation 1612/68 and Article 39 EC, and also Articles 12 EC and 18 EC) be understood as meaning that sufficient justification can be found in the nature of the Wajong to invoke the residence condition against a citizen of the Union, who is in full-time employment in the Netherlands and in that regard is subject solely to Dutch legislation?
Is it a criminal prosecution of ?the same acts? within the meaning of Article 54 of the CISA if a defendant has been convicted by an Italian court of importing contraband foreign tobacco into Italy and of being in possession of it there, as well as of failing to pay duty at the border on importing the tobacco, and is subsequently convicted by a German court ? in connection with his earlier receipt of the same goods in Greece ? of being party to evasion in relation to the technically Greek import duty that arose when the goods were previously imported by third parties?
Has a penalty ?been enforced? or is it ?actually in the process of being enforced? within the meaning of Article 54 of the CISA if the defendant was given a custodial sentence, the enforcement of which was suspended in accordance with the law of the State in which judgment was given?
Has a penalty ?been enforced? or is it ?actually in the process of being enforced? within the meaning of Article 54 of the CISA if the defendant was for a short time taken into police custody and/or held on remand pending trial, and that detention would count towards any subsequent enforcement of the penalty of imprisonment under the law of the State in which judgment was given?
Is the interpretation of the notion of enforcement for the purposes of Article 54 of the CISA affected by the Framework Decision?
Does the first paragraph of Article 90 EC allow MSs to maintain in force a duty on used motor vehicles from other MSs, when that duty is wholly independent of the value of the vehicle and the amount is determined solely on the basis of the technical characteristics of the vehicle and its environmental classification?
If a third-country national is regarded by a host MS as a member of the family of a worker, within the meaning of Article 10 of Regulation 1612/68 and if the validity of the residence permit granted by that MS has not yet expired, does this mean that the MS of which the worker is a national may not, for that very reason, deny the third-country national the right of entry and residence on the return of the worker?
Is that MS itself permitted, where that third-country national arrives in its territory, to determine on the basis of national law whether that person satisfies the conditions for entry and residence, or must that MS first determine whether the third-country national still derives rights from Community law as a member of the worker?s family?
Does it make any difference to the answers to the two preceding questions if, prior to his stay in the host MS, the third-country national had no right of residence, under national law, in the MS of which the worker is a national?
Does a third-country national who is a member of the family of the worker who has returned from the host MS to the MS of which he is a national in order to seek employment there have a right of residence in the latter MS?
Does that right also exist if the worker does not carry on any effective and genuine activities in the MS of which he is a national and cannot, or can no longer, be regarded as seeking employment, in the context of Directive 90/364, in view of the fact that the worker is in receipt of welfare benefit by virtue of his nationality?
What significance for the answers to the previous questions is to be attached to the fact that the third-country national is a member of the family of a citizen of the Union who has exercised his right under Article 18 of the Treaty establishing the European Community and who has returned to the MS of which he is a national?
Do actions for compensation which are brought by natural persons against a Contracting State as being liable under civil law for acts or omissions of its armed forces fall within the scope ratione materiae of the Brussels Convention in accordance with Article 1 thereof where those acts or omissions occurred during a military occupation of the plaintiffs? State of domicile following a war of aggression on the part of the defendant, are manifestly contrary to the law of war and may also be considered to be crimes against humanity?
Is it compatible with the system of the Brussels Convention for the defendant State to put forward a plea of immunity, with the result that the very application of the Convention is neutralised, in particular in respect of acts and omissions of the defendant?s armed forces which occurred before the Convention entered into force?
Does Article 86(1) EC permit a MS to grant ex lege to a public undertaking a legal status which allows it to execute public works without being subject to the general rules on the award of public contracts by tender, where there are no special circumstances of urgency or public interest, both below and above the financial threshold laid down by the European Directives in this regard?
Is such a legal regime compatible with the provisions of Directives 93/36/EEC and 93/37/EEC?
Are the statements contained in the judgment in C-349/97  applicable in any event to Tragsa and its subsidiaries, in the light of the rest of the case-law of the Court regarding public procurement and in view of the fact that the Administration entrusts to Tragsa a large number of works which are not subject to the rules governing free competition, and that this situation might cause considerable distortion of the relevant market?
Is it contrary to the provisions of Article 52 and Articles 73b to 73d of the EC Treaty for the national legislation to exempt from double taxation the designated passive income of a foreign establishment of a party with unlimited liability to tax in Germany, which would be liable to tax as controlled-foreign-corporation income if the establishment were a foreign corporation?
Is the time taken to load and unload part of ?travel? within the meaning of point 48(4)(d) of the Annex to Directive 91/628?
Is the Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA compatible with Article 34(2)(b) of the EU Treaty, under which framework decisions may be adopted only for the purpose of approximation of the laws and regulations of the MS?
Is Article 2(2) of the Framework Decision compatible with Article 6(2) of the EU Treaty and, more specifically, with the principle of legality in criminal proceedings guaranteed by that provision and with the principle of equality and non-discrimination?
Does Article 1(2) of Directive 2001/97 infringe the right to a fair trial which is guaranteed by Article 6 of the ECHR and, as a consequence, Article 6(2) EU, in so far as the new Article 2a(5) in Directive 91/308/EEC requires the inclusion of members of independent legal professions, not excluding the profession of lawyer in the scope of that directive?
Does the installation in hotel rooms of television sets to which a satellite or terrestrial television signal is sent by cable constitute an act of communication to the public which is covered by the harmonisation of national laws protecting copyright provided for in Article 3 of Directive 2001/29?
Does the private nature of hotel rooms preclude the communication of a work to those rooms by means of television sets from constituting communication to the public within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29?
For the purposes of protecting copyright in relation to acts of communication to the public provided for in Directive 2001/29, can a communication that is effected through a television set inside a hotel bedroom be regarded as public because successive viewers have access to the work?
Where Directive 1999/70/EC provides that fixed-term workers are not to be treated in a less favourable manner than comparable permanent workers, does this also refer to financial conditions?
Is the fact that the national legislation provides that fixed-term workers are not entitled to the length-of-service allowance granted to permanent workers an adequate objective ground?
Are the agreements concluded between the staff union representatives and the administration adequate objective grounds for not granting the length-of-service allowance to temporary staff?
Does Article 25 EC, which prohibits customs duties on imports and exports and charges having equivalent effect between MS, prohibit a MS from applying its national law under which excise duty is charged on the acquisition of any vehicle, irrespective of its place of origin before its initial registration in that MS?
Does the first paragraph of Article 90 EC allow a MS to impose excise duty on second-hand vehicles imported from other MS without charging such duty on the sale of second-hand vehicles already registered in that MS, where the excise duty has been imposed, under national law, on all vehicles not registered in that MS?
Do Article 28 EC and Article 3(3) of Directive 92/12 prohibit a MS from maintaining in force national legislation, under which persons effecting intra-Community acquisition of passenger cars not registered in that MS in accordance with the provisions relating to road traffic are required, after importing them into that MS to submit a simplified declaration to the head of the relevant customs office within five days of the intra-Community acquisition?
Must Directive 2000/13/EC be interpreted as meaning, in respect of pre-packaged foodstuffs under Article 1 thereof, that the obligations provided for therein, and in particular those in Articles 2, 3 and 12, are imposed only on the producer of the pre-packaged food product?
Must Articles 2, 3 and 12 of Directive 2000/13/EC be interpreted as precluding the possibility that a mere distributor, located within a MS, of a foodstuff pre-packaged by a trader in another MS, may be held liable for an infringement discovered by a public authority involving an inaccurate statement of value stated on the label by the producer of the foodstuff, and may thus be penalised, even if that distributor simply markets the foodstuff in the form in which it is delivered by the producer of the food product itself?
Is Directive 89/105 to be interpreted as precluding rules of a MS which, following the exclusion of non-prescription medicinal products from the range of benefits provided by the national health system, empower an authority under that system to adopt rules derogating from that exclusion in respect of certain medicines without making provision for a procedure under Article 6(1), second sentence, and 6(2) of Directive 89/105?
Is Directive 89/105 to be interpreted as granting the manufacturers of the medicinal products a subjective right vis-?-vis the public authorities, in particular a right to a decision, containing a statement of reasons and information as to the available avenues of appeal, on the inclusion of one of their medicinal products on a list of the type mentioned above?
Is Article 2(d) of Directive 90/434/EEC to be interpreted as meaning that there is no ?exchange of shares? within the meaning of that directive where the persons involved in the exchange of shares, at the same time as agreeing to exchange the shares in a non-legally binding manner, declare it to be their common intention to vote, at the first general meeting of the acquiring company after the exchange, in favour of distributing a profit in excess of 10% of the nominal value of the security transferred by way of the exchange of shares and such a profit is in fact distributed?
Do such actions constitute abuse within the meaning of Article 11(1)(a) of Directive 90/434?
Is it compatible with Article 59 of the Additional Protocol to the EEC-Turkey Association Agreement for a Turkish national who, as a child, joined his parents who were employed as workers in a MS, and lived with them as a family, not to lose his right of residence derived from the right under the second indent of the first paragraph of Article 7 of Decision No 1/80 to free access to any paid employment ? apart from in cases under Article 14 of Decision No 1/80 or where he leaves the host Member State without legitimate reason for a significant period of time ? also where he has attained the age of 21 and no longer lives with or is maintained by his parents?
Notwithstanding the loss of his legal status under the second indent of the first paragraph of Article 7 of Decision No 1/80, does that Turkish national enjoy special protection against expulsion under Article 14 of Decision No 1/80 where, after having ceased to live with his parents as a family, he was employed from time to time but has not acquired in his own right the legal status conferred by Article 6(1) of Decision No 1/80 by virtue of being a worker and for a number of years has worked exclusively on a self-employed basis?
Is there an infringement of Article 52 of the Treaty when a resident taxpayer is refused joint assessment to income tax with his spouse who lives in another MS, from whom he is not separated, on the ground that that spouse received both more than 10% of the joint income and more than DEM 24 000, when that income is tax-free under the national law of that MS?
Does the Directive allow heating oil, acquired in another Member State b a private individual for his own use and transported to the Member State of consumption, to be subject to excise duty in that Member State, whatever the means of transport used?
If yes, is Art. 9(3) of the Directive compatible with the fundamental principles of free movement of goods and proportionality?
If the answer to question 1 is no, does the thransport by a private individual of heating oil constitute an atypical mode of transport?
Does Article 7(4) of the directive allow a Member state to demand that a private indivual, transporting heating oil for his own use by an atypical mode of transport, lodge a guarantee for payment and carries proof thereof during transport?
Is it compatible with Article 39 EC, Articles 3(1) and 23(3) of Regulation 1408/71, and Article 7(2) of Regulation 1612/68 for a married migrant worker employed in Germany, whose spouse resides in another MS, to receive sick pay always linked to net remuneration established on the basis of the wage tax class stated on his wage tax card without account being taken of a subsequent retroactive amendment, which is favourable to him, of the tax classification relating to his marital status?
Is it compatible with EU law for trade unions to attempt, by means of a blockade, to force a foreign provider of services to sign a collective agreement in the host country in respect of terms and conditions of employment, such as the collective agreement for the building sector, if the situation in the host country is characterised by the fact that the legislation to implement that directive has no express provision concerning the application of terms and conditions of employment in collective agreements?
Where there is a prohibition in a Member State against trade unions undertaking collective action with the aim of having a collective agreement between other parties set aside or amended, do Articles 49 EC and 50 EC preclude that prohibition from being subject to the condition that such action must relate to terms and conditions of employment to which the national law applies directly?
Is Article 1 of the Third Directive to be interpreted as meaning that it precludes national legislation whereby compulsory motor insurance for civil liability does not cover liability in respect of personal injuries to persons travelling in a part of a motor vehicle which has not been designed and constructed with seating accommodation for passengers?
If the answer to Question 1 is in the positive, does Article 1 of the Third Directive confer rights on individuals that may be relied upon directly before the national courts?
Are the provisions of Order No 2000-916 that concern the conversion of the tax applied to the production of flour, meal and groats of common wheat from FRF 100 to EUR 16 in conformity with the Community regulations in relation to the introduction of the euro?
Are the words ?special investment funds? in Article 13B(d)(6) of the Sixth Directive capable of including closed-ended investment funds, such as ITCs?
If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, does the phrase ?as defined by Member States? in Article 13B(d)(6) allow Member States to select certain of the ?special investment funds? within their jurisdiction to benefit from the exemption of the supply of management services and exclude others from the exemption?
If the answer to the second question is that Member States can select which ?special investment funds? benefit from the exemption, how do the principles of fiscal neutrality, equal treatment and the prevention of distortion of competition affect the exercise of that discretion?
Does Article 13B(d)(6) have direct effect?
Must Article 7(1) of Directive 69/335 be interpreted to mean that the mandatory exemption stipulated there relates only to transactions which fall within Article 4(2) and Article 8 of that directive, and to the extent that those transactions were exempted or taxed at a reduced rate less than or equal to 0.50% at the date of 1 July 1984?
In the case of a State such as the Portuguese Republic, which acceded to the European Communities with effect from 1 January 1986, must Articles 7(1) and 10 of Directive 69/335 be interpreted as prohibiting the introduction, after 1 January 1986 of a stamp duty on a transaction increasing share capital falling within the scope of that directive which, on 1 July 1984, was exempt from that duty under national law?
Must the notion of ?same acts? within the meaning of Article 54 of the CISA be construed as covering different acts consisting, in particular, first, in holding in one Contracting State the proceeds of drug trafficking and, second, in the exchanging at exchange bureaux in another Contracting State of sums of money having the same origin, where the national court before which the second criminal proceedings are brought finds that those acts are linked together by the same criminal intention?
If Question 1 is answered affirmatively:

Must the expression ?may not be prosecuted ? for the same acts? in Article 54 of the CISA be interpreted as meaning that a defendant can no longer be prosecuted for the offence of money-laundering in Belgium once he has been duly convicted in the Netherlands of other offences committed with the same intention, regardless of any other offences committed during the same period but which became known or in respect of which prosecutions were brought in Belgium only after the date of the definitive foreign judgment?
Do Article 43 EC and Article 56 EC preclude a Member State from laying down as a condition for acquiring an agricultural property the requirement that the acquirer take up fixed residence on that property?
Does it matter, as regards the answer to Question 1, that the property cannot constitute a self-sustaining unit and that the property?s residential building is situated in an urban zone?
Do the provisions of Directive 2001/83/EC, concerning a reference to statements of third parties who lack professional knowledge of the subject and advertising with a prize draw, set not only a minimum standard for the prohibition on advertising of a medicinal product to the general public, but also a definitive maximum standard?
If the answer to Question 1 is in the affirmative: Is there an improper or misleading reference to a ?claim of recovery? within the meaning of Article 90(j) of the directive, where the advertiser reports the result of a survey of third parties who lack professional knowledge of the subject with a positive overall evaluation of the medicinal product advertised, without attributing the evaluation to individual fields of application?
In the absence of an express prohibition in the directive on the advertising of medicinal products by means of prize draws, is the latter permitted or prohibited by Article 87(3) of that directive?
Are the above questions to be answered analogously in respect of Directive 92/28/EEC?
Is the exemption in the national legislation contrary to the provisions on the free movement of capital, Articles 56 EC to 58 EC, given that the exemption is applicable only to dividend payments to shareholders liable to corporation tax in the Netherlands or to foreign shareholders with a permanent establishment in the Netherlands, with the shares forming part of the assets of that permanent establishment?
Does the answer to the previous question depend on whether the State of residence of a foreign shareholder/company to which the exemption in the national legislation does not apply grants that shareholder/company full credit for Netherlands dividend tax?
Does Article 10 of the ECHR, as referred to in Article 6 of the EU Treaty, guarantee pluralism in the broadcasting sector, thus requiring the MS to secure pluralism and competition in the sector based on an antitrust system which, in step with technological development, secures network access and a multiplicity of operators?
Do the provisions of the Treaty which secure freedom to provide services and competition require the principles governing that matter to be capable of ensuring equal non-discriminatory treatment, as well as transparency, proportionality and respect for the rights of individuals; and are those provisions and principles of the Treaty infringed by the national legislation in question?
With effect from 25 July 2003, does Article 17 of Directive 2002/20 render that directive directly effective in the internal legal order and oblige a MS which has granted broadcasting rights to bring them into line with Community rules?
Does Article 9 of Directive 2002/21 and Article 5 of Directive  2002/20 and Article 4 of Directive 2002/77, providing for transparent and non-discriminatory public procedures conducted on the basis of objective, transparent, non-discriminatory and proportionate criteria, preclude a system providing for general authorisation under national law?
Is the derogation in the second subparagraph of Article 5(2) of Directive 2002/21, and in Article 4 of Directive 2002/77, available to be relied on by the MS solely in order to protect pluralism of information and to guarantee the protection of cultural or linguistic diversity?
In order to benefit from the derogation under Article 5 of Directive 2002/20, does the MS have to indicate the objectives actually pursued by the national derogatory rules?
May that derogation be applied, in addition to the case of the concessionary of the public broadcasting service, in favour also of private operators who have been unsuccessful in competitive procedures and to the detriment of undertakings who may have duly been granted rights following a competitive procedure?
Under Community rules on workable competition in the broadcasting sector, ought the national legislature to have avoided extending the old transitory analogue system on the advent of the terrestrial digital system?
Is the pluralism of sources of information and of competition in the broadcasting sector, which is guaranteed by European law, secured by the national rules in question?
Does the definition of comparative advertising in Directive 84/450 cover advertisements in which the advertiser refers only to a type of product, so that in those circumstances such advertisements must be regarded as referring to all undertakings which offer that type of product, and each of them can claim to have been identified?
On a comparison of Article 2(2a) with Article 3a(1)(b) of  Directive 84/450, should any undertaking which can be identified in the advertising be regarded as a competitor within the meaning of Article 2(2a), whatever the goods or services it offers?
In order to establish if there is a competitive relationship, is it only necessary to consider the current state of the market and consumer habits in the Community or is it also necessary to consider how those habits might evolve?
Must any investigation be confined to that part of the Community territory in which the advertising is disseminated?
Is it necessary to consider the competitive relationship in relation to the types of products being compared and the way in which those types of products are generally perceived, or is it necessary to take into account the particular characteristics of the product which the advertiser intends to promote in the advertising concerned and the image it intends to give it?
Are the criteria by which a competitive relationship within the meaning of Article 2(2a) can be established identical to the criteria for verifying whether the comparison satisfies the condition referred to in Article 3a(1)(b)?
Does it follow from a comparison of Article 2(2a) with Article 3a of Directive 84/450 that no comparative advertising is permitted enabling a type of product to be identified where no competitor or goods offered by a competitor can be identified from that reference?
Does it follow from a comparison of Article 2(2a) with Article 3a of Directive 84/450 that the question whether the comparison is permitted must be considered only in the light of national legislation, which could lead to a lower level of protection for consumers or undertakings offering the type of product being compared with the product offered by the advertiser?
If it should be concluded that there has been comparative advertising within the meaning of Article 2(2a), must it be inferred from Article 3a(1)(f) of Directive 84/450 that no comparison is permitted which, in respect of products without designation of origin, relates to products with designation of origin?
Does Article 3(1) of Regulation 857/84 preclude a national rule laid down in implementation of that provision which is framed in such a way that producers who have incurred investment obligations, regardless of whether or not that occurred under a development plan, may obtain a special reference quantity only if they incurred those investment obligations after 1 September 1981 but before 1 March 1984?
Is Article 3(1) of Directive 2002/14 to be interpreted as precluding national legislation which excludes, even temporarily, a specific category of workers from the calculation of staff numbers within the meaning of that provision?
Is Article 1(1)(a) of Directive 98/59 to be interpreted as precluding national legislation which excludes, even temporarily, a specific category of workers from the calculation of staff numbers set out in that provision?
Is Article 5(1)(b) of Regulation 44/2001 to be interpreted as meaning that a seller of goods domiciled in one MS who has delivered the goods to the purchaser, domiciled in another MS, at various places within that other MS, can be sued by the purchaser regarding a claim under the contract relating to all the part deliveries, at the plaintiff?s choice, before the court of one of those places?
What interpretation should be given to the term ?Community waters? in the first subparagraph of Article 8(1)(c) of Directive 92/81 in contrast to the term ?inland waterways? for the purposes of Article 8(2)(b) of Directive 92/81?
Should the operation of a suction and holding vessel (so-called ?hopper dredger?) in Community waters always be regarded as navigation within the meaning of the first subparagraph of Article 8(1)(c) of Directive 92/81?
Must Article 6(1) of Directive 83/183 be interpreted as meaning that an employee in the public service, the armed forces, the public security forces or the harbour police corps of a MS, who stays for at least 185 days a year in another MS with the members of his family in order to carry out an official task of a definite duration in that latter State, has, for the duration of that task, his normal residence, within the meaning of Article 6(1), in that other MS?
Are the provisions of Annex VI, Part C, point 1, to Regulation 1408/71 compatible with the freedom of movement for persons, and Article 42 EC, in that they make it possible to include, for the purposes of the payment of old-age benefits, contribution periods completed between 1937 and 1945 on the parts of the territory where the social security legislation of the German Reich was applicable, but which are outside the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, subject to the condition that the recipient reside in that MS?
Is Regulation 1599/1999 invalid, since the determination by the Council of the European Union concerning the existence of injury to the Community industry and of the causal link between that injury and the subsidised imports of stainless steel wires is vitiated by manifest error?
Does the fact that dumpers are, in view of their distinctive characteristics, also designed for use on paved, public roads preclude their classification under subheading 8704 10 of the CN?
Does the principle of equal treatment, which prohibits any discrimination whatsoever on the grounds of age in Article 13 EC and Article 2(1) of Directive 2000/78, preclude a national law pursuant to which compulsory retirement clauses contained in collective agreements are lawful, such as that at issue in the main proceedings?
In the event that the reply to the first question is in the affirmative: Does the principle of equal treatment, which prohibits any discrimination whatsoever on the grounds of age in Article 13 EC and Article 2(1) of Directive 2000/78, require a national court not to apply to this case the first paragraph of the single transitional provision?
Is Article 3(6) of Regulation 1400/2002 to be interpreted as precluding an express termination clause in a motor vehicle concession agreement which is intended to benefit from the exemption provided for in Article 2(1) of that regulation?
Are Articles 4 and 16 of the Framework Directive to be interpreted as meaning that the term ?parties affected?  includes undertakings operating as competitors on the relevant market in respect of which specific obligations are not imposed, maintained or amended in market analysis proceedings?
In the event that Question 1 is answered in the affirmative: Does Article 4 of the Directive preclude a national provision which provides that only the undertaking in respect of which specific obligations are imposed, amended or withdrawn has the status of a party to market analysis proceedings?
Is Article 55 of Presidential Decree No 917/86, under which Community grants are taken into account for the purpose of determining taxable income, compatible with the second subparagraph of Article 21(3) of Regulation 2082/93?
If there is a finding of incompatibility, will it apply solely to funds granted and payable by Community bodies or will it also apply to funds that are described in the SPD (Single Programming Document) as being payable by national bodies?
Is a refund within the meaning of Article 11(3), subparagraph 1, first sentence, of Regulation 3665/87 unduly paid and thus to be reimbursed, where the beneficiary presents the documents supporting payment only in the course of the procedure for recovery and after the expiry of the time-limits set out in Articles 47(2) and 48(2)(a) of the Regulation?
Are Articles 11 and 14 of Directive 87/102 to be interpreted as meaning that the right to pursue remedies, provided for in Article 11(2) of the Directive, which the consumer enjoys against the grantor of credit, may not be made subject to the condition that the prior offer of credit must indicate the goods or services being financed?
Must Directive 87/102 be interpreted as allowing the national courts to apply of their own motion the provisions transposing Article 11(2) thereof into national law, particularly in view of the fact that the aim of the Directive is broader than consumer protection alone, extending also to the organisation of the market?
In the light of Article 21 of Directive 2001/34, can a national legislature lay down, for cases where the information recorded in listing particulars proves to be inaccurate or misleading, administrative penalties imposable upon the issuer of the securities being admitted to listing on a stock exchange and, indiscriminately, upon the members of its board of directors, regardless of whether the board members have been identified as responsible in the abovementioned sense?
Does the Court of Justice have jurisdiction to interpret Article 33 of the TRIPs Agreement?
If the first question is answered in the affirmative, must national courts apply that article, on their own initiative or at the request of one of the parties, in proceedings pending before them?
Must the principle of effective judicial protection of an individual?s rights under Community law  be interpreted as requiring it to be possible in the legal order of a MS to bring a free-standing action for an examination as to whether national provisions are compatible with Article 49 EC if other legal remedies permit the question of compatibility to be determined as a preliminary issue?
Does the principle of effective judicial protection of an individual?s rights under Community law require it to be possible in the legal order of a MS to obtain interim relief suspending the application of national measures until the competent court has given a ruling on whether those measures are compatible with Community law?
If the answer to Question 2 is in the affirmative: Does it follow from Community law that, where the compatibility of national provisions with Community law is being challenged, in its  examination of an application for interim protection, a national court must apply national provisions governing the conditions for interim protection, or must it apply Community law criteria?
Is Directive 94/25 to be interpreted as precluding national regulations which prohibit the use of jet-skis on waters other than designated waterways?
Are Articles 28 EC and 30 EC to be interpreted as precluding national regulations which prohibit the use of jet-skis on waters other than designated waterways?
Does the failure to notify the Commission of the adoption of the new jet-ski prohibition pursuant to Directive 98/34 preclude national provisions such as those set out above?
Is Article 13A(1)(i) of the Sixth Directive to be interpreted as meaning that the provision of education includes the making available, for consideration, of a teacher to an educational institution so that he may temporarily provide teaching services there within the area of responsibility of that educational institution?
Can the concept of ?services closely related to education? be interpreted as including the service described in the previous question?
Are the answers to the above questions affected by the fact that the body which makes the teacher available is itself also an educational institution?
In the context of the right of deduction granted in Article 17(2) of the Sixth Directive, must it be held that there is a direct and immediate link between specific services obtained by a taxable person and taxable transactions yet to be performed by that same taxable person in a case where those services have been obtained with a view to establishing a monetary claim that forms part of his assets but which arose in a period preceding that in which he became a taxable person for VAT purposes?
Where a trade union takes collective action against a private undertaking so as to require that undertaking to enter into a collective bargaining agreement with a trade union in a particular MS which has the effect of making it pointless for that undertaking to re-flag a vessel in another MS, does that action fall outside the scope of Article 43 EC by virtue of the EC?s social policy and by analogy with the Court?s reasoning in C-67/96?
Does Article 43 EC have horizontal direct effect so as to confer rights on a private undertaking which may be relied on against another private party and, in particular, a trade union in respect of collective action by that union?
Does the collective action at issue in the main proceedings constitute a restriction within the meaning of Article 43 EC?
If the collective action constitutes a restriction within the meaning of Article 43 EC, may such a restriction be justified?
Could a natural or legal person such as Roquette, in factual and legal circumstances such as those of the main proceedings, undoubtedly have brought an admissible action, on the basis of Article 230 EC, to annul the Regulations' provisions referred to in the question?
Are the contested provisions valid in as far as they set maximum basic quantities of isoglucose production for metropolitan France without taking account of the isoglucose produced in that MS between 1 November 1978 and 30 April 1979 as an intermediate product used in the final manufacture of other products intended for sale?
Does connection of the water distribution network to a property owner?s installation by a water supply undertaking for a separately calculated fee come under the heading of ?the supply of water?/?water supplies? within the meaning of the Sixth Directive?
Must Article 49 EC be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State, such as the legislation at issue in the main proceedings, which excludes reimbursement of the cost of treatment provided in a private hospital in another Member State except in the case of treatment provided to children under 14 years of age? If so, can such legislation be considered as justified?
Is tuition for school or university given by a private teacher to be exempt from tax under Article 13A(l)(j) of the Sixth Directive only where the private teacher provides his tuition services directly to the pupils as recipients of those services or is it sufficient for the private teacher to provide his tuition services to a school or university as recipient of those services?
Is Annex 11 to Regulation 2454/93 invalid on grounds of being contrary to Article 24 of the Community Customs Code in that it has the result that a television receiver manufactured in Poland in the circumstances described in the proceedings is held to be of Korean origin?
Do Articles 43 et seq. and 56 et seq. of the EC Treaty preclude national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which exempts companies established in France from the disputed tax, while, in respect of companies established in another MS, making that exemption subject either to the existence of a convention on administrative assistance for the purposes of combating tax evasion or to the existence of a requirement imposed by a treaty containing a clause prohibiting discrimination on grounds of nationality?
Does a tax such as the tax at issue constitute a tax on capital within the meaning of Article 1 of Directive 77/799 concerning mutual assistance by the competent authorities of the Member States in the field of direct and indirect taxation?
Do the obligations imposed on Member States by Directive 77/799, in the area of mutual assistance in tax matters, preclude the application, by the Member States, of the obligations which derive from the bilateral Convention of 1 April 1958?
Do Articles 43 et seq. and 56 et seq. of the EC Treaty oblige a MS which has concluded with another country a convention containing a clause prohibiting discrimination in the field of taxation, to accord a legal person having its effective centre of management in the territory of another MS the same benefits as those provided for by that clause, when that legal person owns one or several properties in the territory of the first MS and the second MS is not linked to the first by an equivalent clause?
Is there negotiation within the meaning of Article 13B(d)(1) of the Sixth Directive, under circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings, where a taxable person obtains credit for clients and from which it receives a commission for the negotiation of a product, even if, in the process, it analyses the financial situation of the clients and their personal and financial needs?
Does the concept of negotiation for the purposes of Article 13B(d)(1) of the Sixth Directive presuppose a contractual link between the provider of the service of negotiation of credit and one of the parties to the credit agreement and, secondly, if there is no such contractual link, is a direct contact required between that service provider and both parties to the credit agreement in order for the exemption provided for in Article 13B(d)(1) to be granted?
Is the second sentence of the second subparagraph of Article 5(3)(b), in conjunction with Article 5(3)(d) and in conjunction with Annex III, section 4, of Directive 75/106/EEC, to be construed as meaning that products in bottle packaging with a volume of 0.071 litre, which are lawfully manufactured and/or marketed in Great Britain or Ireland, may also be marketed in all the other EC Member States?
If Question 1 should be answered in the negative: Is the second sentence of the second subparagraph of Article 5(3)(b), in conjunction with Article 5(3)(d) and in conjunction with Annex III, section 4, of Directive 75/106/EEC, compatible with the principle of free movement of goods under Articles 28 EC and 30 EC?
Is there a transfer of a business or part of a business, for the purposes of Article 1 of Directive 2001/23/EC in a situation such as that in the main action, in which there is a transfer of employees between two temporary employment businesses?
Can legal persons also be victims within the meaning of Framework Decision 2001/220, and in particular, Articles 2 and 9 thereof?
Is there any indication (and, if so, what indication) provided by Article 7 of Directive 2003/88 and Clause 3 of the Agreement annexed to Directive 2000/79 concerning the European Agreement on the Organisation of Working Time of Mobile Workers in Civil Aviation, with regard to the remuneration to which an airline pilot is entitled during their annual leave?
Must Article 81 EC (now Article 101 TFEU) and Regulation No 1/2003 be interpreted to mean that that legislation must be applied (in proceedings brought after 1 May 2004) to the whole period of operation of a cartel, which commenced in the Czech Republic before that state’s entry to the European Union (that is, before 1 May 2004) and continued and ended after the Czech Republic’s entry to the European Union?
What is meant by the term “human embryos” in Article 6(2)(c) of Directive 98/44/EC: Does it include, a) all stages of the development of human life, beginning with the fertilisation of the ovum, or must further requirements, such as the attainment of a certain stage of development, be satisfied; b) unfertilised human ova into which a cell nucleus from a mature human cell has been transplanted or unfertilised human ova whose division and further development have been stimulated by parthenogenesis; c) stem cells obtained from human embryos at the blastocyst stage?
Must Article 1(2) of Directive 91/250 must be interpreted as meaning that the functionality of a computer program and the programming language and the format of data files used in a computer program in order to exploit certain of its functions constitute a form of expression of that program and may, as such, be protected by copyright in computer programs for the purposes of that directive?
Must Article 5(3) of Directive 91/250 be interpreted as meaning that a person who has obtained a copy of a computer program under a licence is entitled, without the authorisation of the owner of the copyright in that program, to observe, study or test the functioning of that program in order to determine the ideas and principles which underlie any element of the program, in the case where that person carries out acts covered by that licence with a purpose that goes beyond the framework established by the licence?
Must Article 2(a) of Directive 2001/29 be interpreted as meaning that the reproduction, in a computer program or a user manual for that program, of certain elements described in the user manual for another computer program protected by copyright constitutes an infringement of that right in the latter manual?
Must Article 11(6) of Regulation No 1/2003 in conjunction with Article 3(1) thereof and recital 17 in the preamble thereto, point 51 of the Commission Notice, the principle ne bis in idem under the EU Charter and the general principles of European law be interpreted as meaning that if the Commission brings proceedings after 1 May 2004 for infringement of Article 81 EC and makes a decision in that case: a) the competition authorities of the Member States are automatically relieved of their competence to deal with that conduct from that time onwards and b) the competition authorities of the Member States are relieved of their competence to apply to that conduct the provisions of domestic law containing parallel legislation to Article 81 EC?
Does the expression “uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes” include any commercial exploitation within the meaning of Article 6(1) of Directive 98/44/EC, especially use for the purposes of scientific research?
Is an invention is unpatentable under pursuant to Article 6(2)(c) of Directive 98/44/EC, even though its purpose is not the use of human embryos, where it concerns a product whose production necessitates the prior destruction of human embryos or a process for which requires a base material obtained by destruction of human embryos?
Must the definition of working time in the directive 93/104 be considered to apply exclusively to the Community thresholds established by the directive or must it be considered to have a general scope, applying also to the thresholds laid down in national legal systems?
Could a strictly proportional system of equivalence, which consists in taking into account the total number of hours of presence but applying a weighting mechanism to them which reflects the lower intensity of work done during periods of inactivity, be regarded as compatible with the objectives of Directive 93/104?
Does the obligation of mutual assistance imposed on the customs authorities of the Member State of import by Article 31(2) of the Protocol require them to take into account decisions of the Hungarian courts concerning the validity of the investigations carried out by the authorities of the State of export into the correctness of the EUR.1 export certificate?
If the answer to the above question is affirmative, are the abovementioned provisions of Community law to be construed as not permitting the adoption of administrative acts imposing additional duties, taxes and penalties by the national authorities of the State of import after notification by the Hungarian authorities of the outcome of the investigation conducted by them?
In that connection are the above questions affected by the fact that neither the Greek nor the Hungarian authorities sought convocation of the association committee mentioned in Article 33 of the Protocol for it to rule on the matter?
In the light of Article 42 EC can Article 46(2)(b) of Regulation No 1408/71 be interpreted as meaning that the basis of calculation of the Italian pro rata pension must always be the notional pension, brought up to the statutory minimum, even if the income limits laid down by Italian law for bringing the pension up to the minimum have been exceeded?
Are the provisions mentioned in Article 244(c)B of the Code general des impots and in Article 49(g)H of Annex III to the said code, in so far as they restrict the benefit of the tax credit for research to research activities performed in France, contrary to the provisions of Article 49 EC?
If the answer to that question is in the affirmative, is the condition that the research activities be performed in France laid down by those tax provisions partaking of the principle of coherence of corporation tax and thus allowing restriction of the requirements of Article 49 EC?
Does Community law, having regard in particular to Directive 98/37 and Articles 28 EC and 30 EC, preclude national legislation which may impose obligations on the importer of a machine bearing the CE marking in relation to the characteristics of the machine which concern safety?
Does Community law preclude national legislation under which obligations of action or supervision in relation to the safety of the machine are imposed on the importer of a machine bearing the CE marking?
Does Community law preclude a Member State from imposing criminal penalties to ensure compliance with the obligations laid down by Directive 98/37
Are Articles 2(1) and 5(1) of the Sixth Directive, in conjunction with Article 6(1) thereof, to be interpreted as meaning that the acquisition of software on terms such as those at issue in this dispute ? whereby separate payment is stipulated in respect of the basic software, recorded on a carrier, developed and put on the market by the supplier, on the one hand, and the subsequent customisation thereof to meet the purchaser?s requirements, on the other ? must be regarded as a single supply?
If the answer to the above question is in the affirmative, are these provisions to be interpreted as meaning that this supply must be regarded as a service (of which the supply of the goods, namely the carriers, forms part)?
If the answer to that question is in the affirmative, is Article 9 of the Sixth Directive to be interpreted as meaning that this service is supplied at the place referred to in Article 9(1)?
Does the term ?batch? in Article 4(3) of Regulation 1046/2001 have the same meaning as the term ?load? in point 1 of Annex II to that regulation or must the term ?batch? be taken to mean all the animals which are delivered for rendering by a holding on one day or pursuant to one decision to purchase?
Does Directive 69/335, in circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings, preclude the charging of a proportional registration duty of 1% of the value of the transaction in the case of a ?reverse? merger, namely a merger by means of acquisition where all of the shares in the acquiring company are held by the company acquired?
Are Article 1 of Directive 1999/70/EC and Clauses 1(b) and 5 of the framework agreement to be interpreted as precluding national provisions which differentiate between employment contracts signed with the public authorities and contracts with employers in the private sector by excluding the former from the protection afforded by establishing an employment relationship of indefinite duration in the event of an infringement of binding rules on successive fixed-term contracts?
Are stops made by a ship in ports of non-member countries, at which passengers may disembark from the vessel only for a short period, but at which they may not begin or end their journey, ?stops in a third territory? within the meaning of Article 8(1)(c) of the Sixth Directive?
Must, under Article 20(3) of the Sixth Directive, in circumstances such as those of the main proceedings, immovable capital goods be regarded, until the expiry of the period of adjustment, as if they had been applied for business activities which are presumed to be fully taxable or fully exempt, or whether they are to be regarded as if they had been applied to business activities which are partly taxable and partly exempt in the proportion of the respective values of the two transactions to which those goods were subject?
Are third-party proceedings between insurers, based on alleged multiple insurance or co-insurance rather than on a re-insurance agreement, covered as matters relating to insurance by the provisions of Section 3 of Title II of the Brussels Convention?
Is Article 6(2) applicable when determining jurisdiction in the event of third-party proceedings between insurers and, if so, is such application contingent on there being a connection between the various claims within the meaning of Article 22 of the Convention or, at the very least, on evidence that there is sufficient connection between such claims to demonstrate that the choice of forum does not amount to an abuse?
Is the term ?television broadcasting? within the meaning of Article?1(a) of Directive?89/552/EEC to be interpreted as not covering an ?information society service? within the meaning of Article?1(2) of Directive?98/34/EC, but as covering services such as those set out in the indicative list of services not covered by Article?1(2) of Directive?98/34/EC?
How should a distinction be drawn between the term ?television broadcasting? within the meaning of Article?1(a) of Directive?89/552/EEC and the term ?communication services providing items of information ? on individual demand? also set out therein?
On the basis of which criteria must it be determined whether a service such as that at issue constitutes a television broadcasting service or an information society service?
In this regard is priority to be given to the standpoint of the subscriber or rather to that of the service provider?
Is the kind of services with which the service concerned is in competition relevant in this regard?
Is it relevant that classification of a service such as that at issue as an ?information society service? to which Directive 89/552/EEC does not apply might undermine the effectiveness of that directive?
Do Articles 10 EC, 81 EC and 82 EC preclude a MS from adopting a legislative measure which approves, on the basis of a draft produced by a professional body of lawyers, a scale fixing a minimum fee for members of the legal profession from which there can generally be no derogation in respect of either services reserved to those members or those such as out-of-court services which may also be provided by any other economic operator not subject to that scale?
Does Article 49 EC preclude legislation containing an absolute prohibition of derogation, by agreement, from the minimum fees set by a scale, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, for services which are (a) court services and (b) reserved to lawyers?
In light of the prohibition on discrimination set out in Article 12 EC and having regard to the right to the freedom of movement for every citizen of the Union laid down by Article 18 EC, is the provision on the conflict of laws contained in Article 10 of the EGBGB valid, in so far as it provides that the right to bear a name is governed by nationality alone?
Does Regulation 2092/1991, supplemented by Regulation 1804/1999, regard, in all Member States, the terms ?biologico? and ?ecologico? and their derivatives ?bio? and ?eco? as indications which suggest to the purchaser that the product or its ingredients have been obtained in accordance with the rules on organic production?
Does Regulation 2092/1991, supplemented by Regulation 1804/1999 necessarily reserve, in all Member States, the terms ?biologico? and ?ecologico? and their derivatives ?bio? and ?eco? for products which have been obtained in accordance with the rules laid down in respect of organic production in that regulation?
Does Article 2 of Regulation 2092/1991, supplemented by Regulation 1804/1999, reserve, in Spanish, only the term ?ecologico? and its derivative ?eco? for products which have been obtained in accordance with the rules laid down in respect of organic production in the regulation, so that it may not be contrary to European law to use the term ?biologico? and its derivative ?bio? in Spain for non-organic products, if, through use, that term and its derivative have become a generic term and derivative?
Is Article 5(1)(b) of the directive  89/104 to be interpreted as meaning that where the goods or services are identical there may be a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public where the contested sign is composed by juxtaposing the company name of another and a registered mark which has normal distinctiveness and which, although it does not determine by itself the overall impression conveyed by the composite sign, has an independent distinctive role therein?
Do the terms ?processing, conversion or shaping? in the first paragraph of Article 75 EA also encompass the enrichment of uranium?
Is Article 196(b) EA to be interpreted as meaning that an undertaking having its seat outside the territories of the Member States pursues ?all or any of its activities?, within the meaning of that provision, in those territories if it maintains with an undertaking having its seat in those territories a commercial relationship either for the supply of raw material for the production of enriched uranium and the procurement of enriched uranium or for the storage of enriched uranium?
For the purposes of Article 75(c) EA, must the material supplied for processing, conversion or shaping be identical to the material subsequently returned or is it sufficient for the processed material to be commensurate in terms of quantity and quality with the material supplied? Is the application of Article 75(c) EA precluded where the undertaking carrying out the process acquires title to the raw material on delivery and therefore has to transfer title to the enriched uranium back to the other contracting party on completion of the process?
Is the application of Article 75 EA precluded if the undertakings concerned do not fulfil their duty to notify the Agency under the second paragraph of Article 75 EA, or can breach of the duty to notify the Agency be remedied by the undertakings concerned subsequently fulfilling their duty to notify or by the Agency subsequently becoming cognisant in some other way?
Is an agreement or contract within the meaning of Article 73 EA invalid if the contracting parties do not obtain the prior consent of the Commission required thereunder? If so, can the invalidity of the transaction be remedied by the persons or undertakings concerned subsequently obtaining such consent or by the institutions of the Community failing to take action after becoming cognisant in some other way?
Is the disposal of materials within the meaning of Article 57(1) EA prohibited if the producer does not fulfil his obligation to make an offer to the Agency under the second sentence of Article 57(2) EA? Can breach of the duty to offer materials to the Agency be remedied by the producer subsequently or by the Agency subsequently becoming cognisant in some other way and not exercising its right of option?
Does the concept of ?production? in Article 86 EA also encompass the enrichment of uranium?
Are uranium and light-enriched uranium ?source materials? within the meaning of the last phrase of Article 197(1) EA?
Can a civil-law title under Paragraph 903 of the German Civil Code be acquired and transferred in respect of materials that have become property of the Community under the first sentence of Article 86 EA?
Does an undertaking pursue any of its activities in the territories of the Member States of the Euratom Community within the meaning of Article 196(b) EA if it acquires or disposes of enriched uranium stored there?
Does Article 73 EA also apply mutatis mutandis to agreements concerning enriched uranium stored within the territory of the Community where all of the parties are nationals of third States?
On a true interpretation of Article 11 of the Directive 85/374, when a product is supplied pursuant to a contract of sale by a French manufacturer to its wholly-owned English subsidiary, and then by the English company to another entity; when is the product put into circulation?
Where proceedings asserting rights conferred on the claimant in respect of an allegedly defective product are instituted against one company (A) in the mistaken belief that A was the producer of the product when in fact the producer of the product was not A but another company (B), is it permissible for a MS to confer a discretionary power on its courts to treat such proceedings as ?proceedings against the producer? within the meaning of Article 11 of the Directive 85/374?
Does Article 11 of the Directive 85/374, correctly interpreted, permit a MS to confer a discretionary power on a court to allow B to be substituted for A as a defendant in circumstances where the period of 10 years referred to in Article 11 has expired; the relevant proceedings were instituted against A before the 10-year period expired; and no proceedings were instituted against B before the expiry of the 10 year period in respect of the product which caused the damage alleged by the claimant?
Does Article 1 of Directive 89/665 preclude a national provision, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which requires the members of a consortium without legal personality, which, as such, has participated in a procedure for the award of a public contract and has not been awarded that contract, to act together, in their capacity as associates or in their own names, in order to bring an action against the decision awarding the contract?
Would the answer to Question 1 be different where the members of the consortium brought an action together, but the application of one of its members is inadmissible?
Does Article 1 of Directive 89/665 preclude a national provision, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which is interpreted as prohibiting a member of such a consortium from bringing an action individually, either in its capacity as an associate or in its own name, against the decision awarding the contract?
Is Article 7 of directive 93/104/EC consistent with provisions of national law which allow pay for annual leave to be included in a worker?s hourly remuneration and paid as part of remuneration for working time but not paid in respect of a period of leave actually taken by the worker?
Does Article 7(2) of directive 93/104/EC preclude the national tribunal from giving credit to an employer for such payments when it seeks to give to the applicant an effective remedy according to powers contained in national regulations?
May the export to a third country of goods which are defined as cheese intended for processing in that country and fall under subheading 0406 90 11 of the combined nomenclature be granted an export refund under Regulations 3445/89 and 1706/89?
Where national rules such as those at issue in the main proceedings apply, must Article 48 of the Treaty be interpreted as meaning that the working period during which a worker was affiliated to the Joint Sickness Insurance Scheme of the European Communities must be taken into account?
May the person who must present the goods to customs be deemed to be the person required to fulfil the obligations arising from temporary storage of the goods (final indent of Article 203(3) of the Customs Code), and must present the goods to the customs authorities so long as they have not been unloaded from the means of transport carrying them at the time when they are brought into the Community and until they have been assigned a customs-approved treatment or use?
May the person required to fulfil the obligations arising from temporary storage of the goods be deemed to be the person who, after release of the goods, holds them in order to move them or store them, in consequence of which, under Article 51(2) and 53(2) of the Community Customs Code, he is deemed to be the holder of the goods and is therefore required to re-present the goods whenever the customs authorities so require?
May the persons referred to in Questions 1 and 2 consequently be deemed to be joint and several customs debtors, it being understood that the persons mentioned in the first and second questions are different persons?
If the third question is answered affirmatively, does the person mentioned in the first question remain the debtor until the goods are assigned a customs-approved treatment or use, regardless of the fact that after goods are unloaded from the means of transport by which they entered the Community they were stored with or removed by the person mentioned in the second question?
If the third question is answered in the negative must the person mentioned in the first question be regarded as remaining a customs debtor until the goods are received by the person mentioned in the second question and does the person mentioned in the second question become a debtor only from the time when he arranges the storage and removal of the goods?
Are the provisions of Articles 3, 4(1)(a) and (b) and (2) and 6(1) to (4) of the Directive  89/48 unconditional and sufficiently precise so that, between the date of expiry of the period prescribed for transposing it and the date of its belated transposition into the national law, an individual was entitled, on the basis of a diploma acquired in another MS and falling within the scope of the above provisions, to rely on those provisions before an administrative body of that MS in order to obtain from that body authorisation to take up and pursue a regulated profession in the host MS?
If Question 1 is answered in the negative:  could an administrative body, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, taking into account Articles 48 and 52 of the Treaty, make authorisation to take up and pursue the above profession, applied by the holder of a diploma acquired in another MS, dependent on prior recognition of the academic equivalence of the diploma held, and on subsequent successful participation in the examinations provided for in the national legislation?
Is Clause 8(3) of the Framework Agreement to be interpreted, when transposed into domestic law, as prohibiting a reduction of protection following from the lowering of the age limit from 60 to 58?
Is Clause 5(1) of the Framework Agreement to be interpreted as precluding a provision of national law which ? like the provision at issue in this case ? does not contain any of the three restrictions set out in paragraph 1 of that clause?
Is Article 6 of Directive 2000/78 to be interpreted as precluding a provision of national law which, like the provision at issue in this case, authorises the conclusion of fixed-term employment contracts, without any objective reason, with workers aged 52 and over, contrary to the principle requiring justification on objective grounds?
If one of those three questions is answered in the affirmative: must the national court refuse to apply the provision of domestic law which is contrary to Community law and apply the general principle of internal law, under which fixed terms of employment are permissible only if they are justified on objective grounds?
Must the Directives 70/458 and 92/33 be interpreted in such a way that it is only possible to include varieties of shallots which reproduce without seeds in the common catalogue?
Is the decision (2002/581) at hand invalid in the light of the Community law at hand, inasmuch as the Commission considers the tax reduction to be incompatible with the common market?
Is Article 4 of the decision at hand invalid?
Do Articles 10, 39, 43 and 49 EC preclude a MS from adopting a measure requiring a worker who is resident within its territory to register his vehicle there even when that vehicle belongs to his employer, a company established in another MS and to which that worker is linked by an employment contract but in which at the same time he occupies a position of shareholder, director, day-to-day manager or similar?
Are Articles 3, 4(1), and 15(b) of Directive 2002/46/EC invalid by reason of the inadequacy of Article 95 EC as a legal basis?
Are Articles 3, 4(1), and 15(b) of Directive 2002/46/EC invalid by reason of infringement of Articles 28 EC and 30 EC and/or Articles 1(2) and 24(2)(a) of Regulation 3285/94?
Are Articles 3, 4(1), and 15(b) of Directive 2002/46/EC invalid by reason of infringement of the principle of subsidiarity?
Are Articles 3, 4(1), and 15(b) of Directive 2002/46/EC invalid by reason of infringement of the principle of proportionality?
Are Articles 3, 4(1), and 15(b) of Directive 2002/46/EC invalid by reason of infringement of the principle of equal treatment?
Are Articles 3, 4(1), and 15(b) of Directive 2002/46/EC invalid by reason of infringement of Article 6(2) EU, read in the light of Article 8 and Article 1 of the First Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights?
Are Articles 3, 4(1), and 15(b) of Directive 2002/46/EC invalid by reason of infringement of the duty to give reasons?
Does national legislation, which subjects the sale of ?bake-off? products to the same requirements as those applicable to the complete manufacturing and marketing procedure for traditional bread and bakery products, constitutes a measure having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction that is contrary to Art. 28 EC?
Does the exemption for ?management of special investment funds as defined by Member States?, contained in Article 13B(d)(6) of the Sixth VAT Directive, mean that the MSs have the power to define the activities comprising the ?management? of the special investment funds?
If the term ?management? in Article 13B(d)(6) of the Sixth VAT Directive is to be given an independent Community law meaning, are charges made by a depositary or trustee for the services it provides pursuant to Articles 7 and 14 of Directive 85/611, exempt supplies of ?management of special investment funds? under Article 13B(d)(6) of the Sixth VAT Directive?
If the term ?management? is to be given an independent Community law meaning, does the exemption for the ?management of special investment funds? in Article 13B(d)(6) of the Sixth VAT Directive apply to services performed by a third-party manager in respect of the administrative management of the funds?
In order to verify its compatibility with Community law; Must a national provision, such as that in the first subparagraph of Paragraph 2 of Chapter 4 of the Alkohollagen, be assessed in the light of Article 31 EC on state monopolies of a commercial character or in the light of Article 28 EC?
Is the disputed ban on private imports of alcoholic beverages compatible with Article 31 EC?
Is Article 28 EC to be interpreted as meaning that it, in principle, prohibits the ban on imports at issue in the main proceedings, despite the obligation of Systembolaget to obtain, upon request, alcoholic beverages which it does not hold in stock or, can it be considered as justified and proportionate, under Article 30 EC, in order to protect the health and life of humans?
In view of the principles of non-discrimination and effectiveness, must Directive 1999/70/EC be interpreted as meaning that it precludes national provisions which in fact contain an absolute prohibition from the outset on the establishment of employment relationships of indefinite duration resulting from abuse relating to the use of fixed-term contracts and relationships?
If the answer to the previous question is in the affirmative, in view of the expiry of the time-limit for its implementation, must Directive 1999/70 and the applicable principles of Community law be considered to confer on individuals an actual right, which may be exercised immediately, to recognition of the existence of an employment relationship of indefinite duration?
If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative and the second question in the negative, in view of the expiry of the time-limit for its implementation, must Directive 1999/70 and the applicable principles of Community law be considered to confer on individuals a right to reparation for any loss or damage caused by the failure of the MS to adopt appropriate measures to prevent abuse relating to the use of fixed-term contracts and/or relationships with employers in the public sector?
Does the criterion of use ?on the high seas? referred to in the Article 15 of Directive 77/388/EEC, relate only to vessels which carry passengers for reward or does it also refer to vessels used for the purpose of commercial, industrial or fishing activities?
Does the exemption provided for in Article 15 of Directive 77/388/EEC cover only the supply of services for the direct needs of sea-going vessels and of their cargo and which are intended for the shipowner himself, or does this exemption also cover such supplies of services to a third party?
Can the conduct of the national tax authority authorizing a taxable person not to pass on the VAT to the other party to a contract, even if that conduct is unlawful, give rise to a legitimate expectation on the part of the taxable person that would preclude subsequent payment of the tax?
Is Article 20 of the Sixth Directive to be interpreted as meaning that the adjustment of deductions in accordance with that article is mandatory for MSs in the case of capital goods unless it follows otherwise from Article 20(5)?
Is Article 20 of the Sixth Directive to be interpreted as meaning that the adjustment of deductions in accordance with that article is applicable even where the capital goods were first used in non-taxable activity, in which case an initial deduction could not have been made at all, and only later in taxable activity during the adjustment period?
May the second subparagraph of Article 13(C) of the Sixth Directive be interpreted as meaning that a MS may restrict the right to deduct for acquisitions relating to immovable property investments?
May the second subparagraph of Article 17(6) of the Sixth Directive be interpreted as meaning that a MS may restrict the right to deduct for acquisitions relating to immovable property investments?
Is a requirement in national legislation that a parent must have been resident and covered by health insurance in the MS in question for at least 240 days prior to the child?s birth in order to be entitled to parental benefit in accordance with the parent?s sickness benefit compatible with the EC Treaty, Regulation 1612/68 and Directive 96/34?
If question (1) is answered in the affirmative: Does Community law require that, in the determination of whether the worker fulfils the qualification period for insurance under national law, there must be cumulation with a period during which the worker was covered by the Joint Sickness insurance scheme pursuant to the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities?
Is the two-month time-limit in Article 3(4) of Directive 90/313 a directory time-limit or is it a mandatory time-limit with which an authority must comply?
If the two-month time-limit is mandatory and on expiry of that time-limit the authority to which a request for information was addressed has not made a decision, what is the ?decision? referred to at the end of Article 4 of directive 90/313 against which a judicial or administrative review may be sought ?in accordance with the relevant national legal system??
Do Articles 3(4) and 4 of Directive 90/313 prohibit a ?relevant national legal system? from interpreting a failure to respond within the two-month period referred to in Article 3(4) of the directive on the part of the authority to which a request for information is referred as a implicit refusal of that request?
Where a broadcasting company transmitting from the territory of one MS uses, in order to extend the transmission of its programmes to a part of its national audience, a transmitter situated nearby on the territory of another MS, does the legislation of the latter State govern the single equitable remuneration which is required by Article 8(2) of Directive 92/100 and Article 4 of Directive 93/83?
If so, is the original broadcasting company entitled to deduct the sums paid from the remuneration claimed from it in respect of all the transmissions received within national territory?
Are the fees charged in respect of the drawing-up of a notarial document attesting to the disposal of company shares covered by Article 4(3) of Directive 69/335?
Are the national provisions compatible with Articles 10(c) and 12(1)(e) of Directive 69/335 inasmuch as they provide for fees in an unlimited amount for documents drawn up in respect of the disposal of shares, which are fixed exclusively by reference to the value of the shares being disposed of, without being subject to any limit whatsoever and irrespective of the value of the service provided?
Do Articles 43 EC, 49 EC and 56 EC preclude national tax legislation which provides in specified circumstances for the imposition of a charge upon a company resident in that MS in respect of the profits of a subsidiary company resident in another MS and subject to a lower level of taxation?
Does the special scheme for travel agents set out in Article 26 of Directive 77/388/EEC also apply to transactions entered into by an undertaking which organises ?High School? and ?College? Programmes involving periods of three to 10 months spent in a foreign country, which are offered to participants by the undertaking in its own name and which are provided using services performed by other taxable persons?
Should Article 10(1) of Regulation 1538/91 be interpreted as meaning that on labelling within the meaning of Article 1(3)(a) of Directive 79/112/EEC the wording ?reared under controlled conditions? indicates a type of farming within the meaning of Article 10(1) of Regulation 1538/91?
Does the national provision infringe, conflict with or in any event create conditions of unequal treatment as between men and women prohibited by Article 141 EC and Directive 76/207 in so far as it grants the advantage of taxation of voluntary redundancy incentives and of sums paid in connection with the cessation of employment relationships at a rate reduced to one half (50%) for workers who have passed the age of 50 years in the case of women and the age of 55 years in the case of men?
Are Articles 2(1) and 9(1) of the Sixth Directive to be interpreted as meaning that a fixed establishment, which is not a legal entity distinct from the company of which it forms part, established in another MS and to which the company supplies services, must be treated as a taxable person by reason of the costs imputed to it in respect of those supplies?
Can the passing on of the costs of such services to the branch concerned be regarded as consideration for the services supplied for the purposes of Article 2 of the Sixth Directive?
If the supply of services between the parent company and the branch are regarded in principle as being exempt from VAT because the recipient is not independent and consequently a legal relationship between the two entities cannot be said to exist, is a national administrative practice which considers that the supply is taxable in such a case contrary to the right of establishment laid down in Article 43 EC where the parent company is established in another MS?
When must a national court ? as far as possible ? interpret its domestic law in conformity with a directive which was transposed belatedly into national law?
Does clause 5(1)(a) of the Framework Agreement mean that, in addition to reasons connected with the nature, type or characteristics of the work performed or other similar reasons, the fact solely and simply that the conclusion of a fixed-term contract is required by a provision of statute or secondary legislation may constitute an objective reason for continually renewing or concluding successive fixed-term employment contracts?
Is a national provision, which specifically lays down that successive contracts are contracts concluded between the same employer and worker under the same or similar terms of employment, the contracts not being separated by a period of time longer than 20 days, compatible with clause 5(1) and (2) of the Framework Agreement?
Is the prohibition in national law on the conversion of successive fixed-term employment contracts into a contract of indefinite duration, where those contracts are said to have been concluded for a fixed term to cover the exceptional or seasonal needs of the employer but are aimed at covering its fixed and permanent needs, compatible with the principle of effectiveness of Community law and the purpose of clause 5(1) and (2) in conjunction with clause 1 of the Framework Agreement?
Should Article 56 EC be interpreted as precluding national legislation by which, in the case of a land purchase transaction that does not require the authorisation of the land transfer authority, failure by the acquirer to submit a declaration by the due date, results in the retrospective invalidity of the transaction?
Must the expression ?where this is not possible? in Article 2(g)(ii) of Regulation 259/93 be understood as meaning that an approved collection undertaking cannot automatically be the notifier of exports of waste for recycling?
May the criterion to determine whether an approved collection undertaking can be the notifier of exports of waste for recycling be that the waste producer is unknown or that there are so many waste producers, the individual contribution of each of which is so modest, that it would be unreasonable for each individually to be required to notify the exportation of the waste?
Does Article 7(2) of Regulation 259/93 and Article 7(4)(a), first and second indents in particular, provide a possibility for the competent authorities of the country of dispatch to raise an objection against a specific request for authorisation to export waste for the purpose of recycling if there is no information from the notifier that the recipient plant?s treatment of the waste in question will, from an environmental point of view, be of the same standard as is required under national rules in the country of dispatch?
Must the first indent of Article 6(5) of Regulation 259/93 be construed as meaning that the requirement as to information on the composition of the waste may be regarded as satisfied if the notifier indicates that the waste in question is of only one specific kind?
Must Article 7(1) and (2) of Regulation 259/93 be construed as meaning that the period in Article 7(2) begins to run when the competent authority of destination has sent the acknowledgement, irrespective of the fact that the competent authority of dispatch does not consider that it has received all of the information set out in Article 6(5)?
Does the fact of having exceeded the 30-day period for reply have the effect in law that the authority cannot raise further objections or request further information?
Must a group of bodies, namely banking foundations such as those at issue in the main proceedings, be considered to be subject to the Community rules on competition ? even where they are assigned objects of social benefit?
Consequently, are those entities, under the rules contained in Law No 218/90 and Legislative Decree No 356/90, as subsequently amended, as well as the reform contained in Law No 461/98 and Legislative Decree No 153/99, subject to Articles 87 EC and 88 EC, in relation to a preferential tax regime which applies to them?
If Question 2 above is answered in the affirmative, does or does not the system of relief from direct tax on dividends received, which is at issue in this case, constitute State aid, within the meaning of Article 87 EC?
If Question 2 above is answered in the affirmative, is Decision 2003/146, in which the rules on State aid were held to be inapplicable to the foundations of banking origin, valid, having regard to the issues of lawfulness and the lack and/or inadequacy of reasoning?
Does according more favourable tax treatment to the distribution of the profits of the ? exclusively national ? assignee banks, controlled by the foundations, and received by the latter, or of those undertakings in which holdings were acquired using the proceeds from the disposal of holdings in assignee banks, constitute discrimination and does it infringe  Articles 12 EC, 43 et seq. EC and Article 56 et seq. EC?
Must subparagraphs (e) and (f) of the first paragraph of Article 29 Directive 92/50 be interpreted as precluding a national provision which refers to the position of service providers who are ?not in compliance? with social security or tax obligations?
At what time must the service provider provide evidence that he has complied with those obligations?
Must a service provider who is late with payment of its social security contributions or taxes, has been authorised by the competent authorities to make payment of those contributions or taxes in instalments, or has brought administrative or judicial proceedings to contest the existence or amount of its social security or tax obligations, be regarded as not having fulfilled his social security or tax obligations for the purposes of subparagraphs (e) and (f) of the first paragraph of Article 29 of the Directive 92/50?
Is it compatible with Article 1(1) of Directive 85/577/EEC for the rights of consumers, in particular their right of cancellation, to be made subject not only to the existence of a doorstep-selling situation in Article 1(1), but also to additional criteria for responsibility, such as a trader?s deliberate use of a third party in the conclusion of the agreement or a trader?s negligence in respect of the third party?s conduct in connection with the doorstep selling?
Is it compatible with Article 5(2) of the Directive for a mortgage borrower, who not only concluded the loan agreement in a doorstep-selling situation but also arranged, in that situation, for the loan to be paid into an account which, in practice, is no longer at his disposal, to have to pay back the loan to the lender if the agreement is cancelled?
Is it compatible with Article 5(2) of the Directive for the mortgage borrower, if he is required to pay back the loan following cancellation, to have to do so not on the instalment repayment dates laid down in the agreement but immediately in a one-off sum?
Is it compatible with Article 5(2) of the Directive for the mortgage borrower, if he is also required to pay back the loan following cancellation, to have to pay interest on it at the normal market rate?
In the context of an assessment whether there is a transfer of a business within the meaning of Article 1 of Directive 2001/23, does a finding that there was a transfer of the assets from the original contractor to the new contractor presuppose their transfer for independent commercial use by the transferee?
Does the principle of cooperation arising from Article 10 EC impose an obligation on a national court to review and set aside a final judicial decision if that decision should infringe Community law?
Does a misleading promise of financial benefit that induces the conclusion of a contract, demonstrate a connection with the intended conclusion of a consumer contract sufficiently close for jurisdiction over consumer contracts under Article 15(1)(c) of Regulation 44/2001 to be afforded to consequent claims?
If the answer to Question 2(a) should be in the negative: Is jurisdiction over consumer contracts afforded to claims arising out of a pre-contractual obligation and does a misleading promise of financial benefit demonstrate a sufficiently close connection with the pre-contractual obligation for jurisdiction over consumer contracts also to be afforded thereto?
Do national provisions, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, constitute State aid that is incompatible with Article 87 EC and also unlawful, not having been notified in accordance with Article 88(3) EC?
Is Article 33 of Law No 273/2002 contrary to Articles 43 EC, 44 EC, 48 EC, 49 EC et seq. on freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services?
Is the first sentence of Article 8(1)(a) of the Sixth Directive to be interpreted as meaning that the place where dispatch or transport begins is relevant even when several undertakings enter into arrangements for the supply of the same goods and those arrangements are implemented by way of a single movement of goods?
If the answer to the previous question is in the affirmative, is the place at which the second supply begins the actual place of departure of the goods or the place where the first supply finishes?
Are successive supplies to be treated as exempted intra-Community supplies when several undertakings enter into arrangements for the supply of the same goods and those arrangements are implemented by way of a single movement of goods?
Is the identity of the party having the right of disposal of the goods during their movement a relevant factor in answering the previous questions?
Must the term ?legally owed? in Article 236 of the Community Customs Code (the CCC) be understood as referring exclusively to the question whether the conditions for a customs debt to be incurred, as set out in Chapter 2 of Title VII of the CCC, are fulfilled? (excluded: or can legal indebtedness arise only if there are no grounds, including grounds under the national provisions in force as specified in Article 4(23) of the CCC, for challenging the communication that duties are owed)?
If the possibility of remission under Article 13 of Regulation  1430/79 is not applicable to charges on C sugar, are Regulation 1785/81 and Regulation 2670/81 wholly or partly invalid in view of the absence of the possibility of repaying or remitting charges on C sugar on equitable grounds?
If so, does the legal liability to the charge on C sugar no longer apply?
Is a trade mark of such a nature as to deceive the public and thus prohibited from registration under Article 3(1)(g) of Directive 89/104 in circumstances such as those in the main proceedings?
Is a registered trade mark liable to mislead the public in consequence of the use made of it by the proprietor or with his consent and so liable to revocation under Article 12(2)(b) of Directive 89/104 in circumstances such as those in the main proceedings?
Must Directive 69/335/EEC be interpreted as meaning that all operations referred to in Article 10(c) of the directive fall within the prohibition thereby enacted, irrespective of the conditions in Article 4?
When applying the directive, may a distinction be made between fees for the provision of services by the State and taxes, with the result that ?fees? can be assimilated to taxes on the transfer of ownership?
If the answer to the previous question is in the affirmative, should the last sentence of Article 12(2) of the directive be interpreted as meaning that an exception arises from the fact that the national legislation makes no provision for a fee for rectifying the land register in succession cases where the application for registration is made within two years following the death?
In an appeal against a decision imposing a sanction on the basis of the first subparagraph of Article 11(1) of Regulation 3665/87, are national authorities and courts entitled to examine whether an exporter requested a refund in excess of that applicable if the reimbursement decision under the first subparagraph of Article 11(3) of the Regulation became final before the decision imposing the sanction was issued?
Does Article 13B(c) in conjunction with Articles 2(1) and 11A(1)(a) of the Sixth Directive mean that the VAT exemption which it provides for the supply of goods on the acquisition of which value added tax did not become deductible by virtue of Article 17(6) of that directive, precludes national legislation imposing VAT on transactions by which a taxable person resells, after having used goods for business purposes, the acquisition of which from taxpayers who could not declare VAT on them did not, for that reason, give rise to a right to deduct?
Can a taxable person who, in the normal course of his activities, resells cars which he purchased second-hand with a view to using them in his sale and leaseback business, be considered to be a ?taxable dealer? within the meaning of Article 26a of the Sixth Directive?
Is the third subparagraph of Article 4(5) of, in conjunction with No 1 of Annex D to the Sixth Directive, to be interpreted as meaning that the allocation of rights to use frequencies for mobile telecommunications systems in accordance with the  UMTS/IMT-2000, GSM/DCS-1800 and TETRA standards by a Member State in return for a frequency use payment is a telecommunications activity?
Is the second subparagraph of Article 4(5) of the Sixth Directive to be interpreted as meaning that it would lead to significant distortions of competition if a MS, when allocating frequency use rights for mobile telecommunications systems in return for frequency use payments, does not subject those payments to turnover tax but private bidders for those frequencies must subject that activity to that tax?
Does the first subparagraph of Article 4(5) of the Directive mean that an activity of a MS which allocates frequency use rights for mobile telecommunications systems to mobile telecommunications operators in such a way that a highest bid for the frequency use payment is first ascertained in an auction procedure and the frequencies are then allocated to the highest bidder does not take place in the exercise of public authority, so that the State is considered a taxable person in respect of that activity?
Does the allocation by way of an auction by a Member State of rights, such as the frequency use rights at issue in the main proceedings, constitute an ?economic activity? within the meaning of Article 4(2) of the Sixth Directive?
Is the Sixth Directive to be interpreted as meaning that the frequency use payments determined for the allocation of frequency use rights for mobile telecommunications systems are gross payments (which already include VAT) or net payments (to which VAT may still be added)?
Is the third subparagraph of Article 4(5) of the Sixth Directive, in conjunction with No 1 of Annex D thereof, to be interpreted as meaning that the allocation of rights to use frequencies for mobile telecommunications systems by a MS in return for a frequency use payment is a telecommunications activity?
Is the second subparagraph of Article 4(5) of the Sixth Directive to be interpreted as meaning that it would lead to significant distortions of competition if a MS, when allocating frequency use rights in return for the sums at hand in the main proceedings, does not subject those payments to turnover tax and private bidders for those frequencies must subject that activity to that tax?
Is the first subparagraph of Article 4(5) of the Sixth Directive to be interpreted as meaning that an activity of a MS which allocates frequency use rights to operators in such a way that a highest bid for the frequency use payment is first ascertained in an auction procedure and the frequencies are then allocated to the highest bidder does not take place in the exercise of public authority, so that the MS is considered a taxable person in respect of that activity?
Is Article 4(2) of the Sixth Directive to be interpreted as meaning that the allocation of frequency use rights for mobile telecommunications systems by a MS, as described in the previous question, is to be regarded as an economic activity, so that the MS is considered a taxable person in respect of that activity?
Is the Sixth Directive to be interpreted as meaning that the frequency use payments determined for the allocation of frequency use rights for mobile telecommunications systems are gross payments (which already include VAT) or net payments (to which VAT may still be added)?
Must Articles 49 EC and 50 EC be interpreted as precluding national legislation under which a procedure of retention of tax at source is applied to payments made to providers of services not resident in the MS in which the services are provided, while payments made to providers of services resident in that MS are not subject to such a retention?
Must Article 49 EC be interpreted as being applicable if the recipient of services, who relies on that article in order to benefit from the freedom to provide services within the Community, is a national of a MS and established within the Community, and his contracting partner, the provider of services, is established in another State of the Community but is a national of a non-member country?
Must Articles 49 EC and 50 EC be interpreted as precluding national legislation which does not allow a recipient of services who is the debtor of the payment made to a non-resident provider of services to deduct, when making the retention of tax at source, the business expenses of that service provider which are economically connected with his activities in the MS in which the services are provided?
Must Articles 49 EC and 50 EC be interpreted as not precluding national legislation under which only the business expenses directly linked to activities in the MS in which the service is provided, which the service provider established in another MS has reported to the payment debtor, are deducted in the procedure for retention at source, and any further business expenses can be taken into account in a subsequent refund procedure?
Must Articles 49 EC and 50 EC be interpreted as precluding a rule stating that the tax exemption granted under the Germany-Netherlands Convention to a non-resident provider of services who has carried on activity in Germany can be taken into account by the payment debtor in the procedure for retention of tax at source, or in a subsequent procedure for exemption or refund, or, in the circumstances referred to in paragraph 21 above, in proceedings for liability brought against him, only if a certificate of exemption is issued by the competent tax authority?
Are Articles 56 EC and 58 EC to be interpreted as precluding tax legislation under which, on a distribution of dividends by a capital company, a shareholder who is fully taxable in a MS is entitled to a tax credit, calculated by reference to the corporation tax rate on the distributed profits, if the dividend-paying company is established in that same MS but not if it is established in another MS?
Does Part Two of the Treaty apply to persons who possess the nationality of a MS and who are resident or living in a territory belonging to the OCTs referred to in Article 299(3) EC?
If the answer to the previous question is no: are the MSs free, in the light of the second sentence of Article 17(1) EC, to confer their nationality on persons who are resident or living in the OCTs referred to in Article 299(3) EC?
Must Article 19(2) EC be construed as meaning that even in the case where the persons concerned are resident or living in the OCTs, the status of citizen of the Union automatically confers the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament?
Do Articles 17 EC and 19(2) EC, read together and considered in the light of Article 3 of Protocol No 1 to the  ECHR, preclude persons who are not citizens of the Union from having the right to vote and to stand as candidates in elections to the European Parliament?
Does Community law impose requirements as to the nature of the legal redress to be provided in the case where the national courts conclude that persons resident or living in the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba and having Netherlands nationality were improperly refused registration for the elections of 10 June 2004?
May Article 6(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC, which provides that MS are to lay down that unfair terms used in a contract concluded with a consumer by a seller or supplier are not to be binding on the consumer, be interpreted as meaning that it precludes a national provision which provides that unfair terms do not cease to bind the consumer ipso jure, but do so only where an express declaration to that effect is made?
Does Article 6(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC preclude national legislation which lays down that, when there is an unfair term, the remainder of the contract is still binding only if the parties would have concluded it without that term?
From the point of view of the application of Community law, is it relevant that the main dispute arose before the accession of Hungary to the EU?
Where computers equipped with operating systems by the seller are imported, must the value of the software made available to the seller by the buyer free of charge be added to the transaction value of the computers pursuant to Article 32(1)(b) of the Community Customs Code where the value of the software is not included in the transaction value?
Is the fact that there is a suspicion that a product is subject to a ban under Community law which prohibits the export of a product sufficient of itself to exclude the existence of sound and fair marketable quality within the meaning of the first sentence of Article 13 of Regulation 3665/87?
Is confirmation of sound and fair marketable quality given in a national application for payment information for the purposes of the second subparagraph of Article 11(1) in conjunction with Article 3 of Regulation 3665/87?
Is Article 35(2) of Regulation 2535/2001 contrary to higher-ranking Community law, in particular Article 28 EC and the second subparagraph of Article 34(2) EC and Article 26(2) of Regulation 1255/1999, and is it therefore invalid?
Is Article 25(1) of Regulation 2535/2001 contrary to higher-ranking Community law, in particular the second subparagraph of Article 34(2) EC, the second subparagraph of Article 29(2) of Regulation 1255/1999, Article 28 EC and the first paragraph of Article 82 EC, and is it therefore invalid?
Are Articles 25(1) and 35(2) of Regulation 2535/2001 contrary to Article XVII(1)(a) of GATT and Article 1(3) of the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, and are they therefore invalid?
Can Article 8 of Directive 91/414 be applied by the national court after the period referred to in Article 23 thereof has expired?
Can Article 16 of Directive 98/8 be applied by a national court after the period referred to in Article 34 thereof has expired?
Must Article 16 of Directive 98/8 be interpreted as having the same meaning as Article 8(2) of Directive 91/414?
Must Article 16(1) of Directive 98/8 be interpreted as a standstill obligation?
Must Article 8(2) of Directive 91/414 be interpreted as meaning that where a MS authorises the placing on the market in its territory of plant protection products containing active substances not listed in Annex I to that directive that were already on the market two years after the date of notification of that directive, regard must also be had to the provisions of Article 4 thereof?
Must Article 8(2) of Directive 91/414 also be interpreted as meaning that where a MS authorises the placing on the market in its territory of plant protection products containing active substances not listed in Annex I to that directive that were already on the market two years after the date of notification of that directive, regard must also be had to the provisions of Article 8(3) thereof?
Must Article 8(3) of Directive 91/414 be interpreted as meaning that ?a review? must also be construed as including an examination whereby regard is to be had to the effects of an active substance concerned on human and animal health and on the environment?
Must Article 8(3) of Directive 91/414 be interpreted as meaning that it contains only rules relating to the provision of data before a review, or, must it be construed as meaning that the requirements set out therein are also relevant to the way in which a review must be organised and carried out?
Must Article 36 of Directive 92/50 and Article 34 of Directive 93/38 be interpreted as meaning that Community law precludes a jury from attaching specific weight to the subheadings of an award criterion which are defined in advance, by dividing among those subheadings the points awarded for that criterion by the contracting authority when the contract documents or the contract notice were prepared?
Does the ECJ consider the national legislation in question to be compatible with the principles enshrined in Article 43 EC and 49 EC concerning the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide cross-border services?
Is a national provision which provides that a telecommunications  company, although licensed to provide public services, must pay an additional fee for the allocation of the telecommunications network to the parent company, compatible with the basic principles laid down in Directive 97/13?
Is a national provision which calculates the second and additional fee charged for the activity carried out for the parent company on the basis of what was paid in the past by the parent company under the previous system of exclusive rights consistent with Community law and the interpretation by the ECJ in its judgment in cases C-292/01 and C-293/01?
Is the direct award of a contract for the supply of fuel for heating appliances in buildings owned by or within the competence of the Municipality to a joint stock company whose capital is held entirely by another joint stock company, of which the awarding Municipality is the major shareholder, compatible with Directive 93/36?
Must the requirement that the undertaking to which the supply contract is awarded directly carry out the essential part of its activities with the controlling authority be ascertained by applying Article 13 of Directive 93/38?
Can it be concluded that the requirement referred to in the previous question has been satisfied where that undertaking derives the majority of its turnover from the controlling public authority or in the territory of that authority?
Where a petition is presented to a court for the winding up of an insolvent company and that court makes an order appointing a provisional liquidator with powers to take possession of the assets of the company, manage its affairs, open a bank account and appoint a solicitor all with the effect in law of depriving the directors of the company of power to act, does that order combined with the presentation of the petition constitute a judgment opening insolvency proceedings for the purposes of Article 16 Regulation 1346/2000?
If the answer to the previous question is in the negative, does the presentation of a petition to the High Court for the compulsory winding up of a company by the court constitute the opening of insolvency proceedings for the purposes of that regulation by virtue of the national legal provision deeming the winding up of the company to commence at the date of the presentation of the petition?
Does Article 3 of Regulation 1346/2000, in combination with Article 16, have the effect that a court in a Member State other than that in which the registered office of the company is situated and other than where the company conducts the administration of its interests on a regular basis in a manner ascertainable by third parties, but where insolvency proceedings are first opened, has jurisdiction to open main insolvency proceedings?
In determining the ?centre of main interests? when the registered offices of a parent company and its subsidiary are in two different MS, is (a) the fact that the subsidiary conducts the administration of its interests on a regular basis in a manner ascertainable by third parties and in complete and regular respect for its own corporate identity in the MS where its registered office is situated or (b) the fact that the parent company is in a position, by virtue of its shareholding and power to appoint directors, to control and does in fact control the policy of the subsidiary, a governing factor?
Where it is manifestly contrary to the public policy of a MS to permit a judicial or administrative decision to have legal effect in relation to persons or bodies whose right to fair procedures and a fair hearing has not been respected in reaching such a decision, is that MS bound, by virtue of Article 17 of Regulation 1346/2000, to give recognition to a decision of the courts of another MS purporting to open insolvency proceedings?
Is the expression ?proceedings which have as their object rights in rem in immovable property? in Article 16(1)(a) of the Brussels Convention to be interpreted as including an action for an injunction, prohibiting emissions from a property located in a neighbouring State - which is not a MS - affecting land owned by the claimant?
Is Article 6 of Regulation 261/2004 invalid on grounds that it is inconsistent with the Montreal Convention, and in particular Articles 19, 22 and 29 thereof, and whether this affects the validity of the Regulation as a whole?
Was the amendment of Article 5 of Regulation 261/2004 during consideration of the draft text by the Conciliation Committee done in a manner that is inconsistent with the procedural requirements provided for in Article 251 EC and, if so, whether Article 5 of the Regulation is invalid?
Are Articles 5 and 6 of Regulation 261/2004 invalid on grounds that they are inconsistent with the principle of legal certainty, and if so whether this invalidity affects the validity of the Regulation as a whole?
Are Articles 5 and 6 of Regulation 261/2004 invalid on grounds that they are not supported by any or any adequate reasoning, and if so whether this invalidity affects the validity of the Regulation as a whole?
Are Articles 5 and 6 of Regulation 261/2004 invalid on grounds that they are inconsistent with the principle of proportionality required of any Community measure, and if so, does this invalidity affect the validity of the Regulation as a whole?
Are Articles 5 and 6 of Regulation 261/2004 invalid on grounds that they discriminate, in particular, against the members of the second Claimant organisation in a manner that is arbitrary or not objectively justified?
Is Article 7 of the Regulation void or invalid on grounds that the imposition of a fixed liability in the event of flight cancellation for reasons that are not covered by the extraordinary circumstances defence is discriminatory, fails to meet the standards of proportionality required of any Community measure, or is not based on any adequate reasoning?
In circumstances where a national court has granted permission to bring a claim in that court which raises questions as to the validity of provisions of a Community instrument and which it considers is arguable and not unfounded, are there any principles of Community law in connection with any test or threshold which the national court should apply when deciding under the second paragraph of Article 234 EC whether to refer those questions of validity to the Court?
In circumstances such as those which arise in the main proceedings, do Article 43 EC in conjunction with Article 48 and Articles 56 et seq. EC preclude legislation of a MS which restricts the right of a parent company which is resident in that State to deduct for tax purposes losses incurred by that company in respect of write-downs to the book value of its shareholdings in subsidiaries established in other Member States?
Where a parallel importer markets in one MS a pharmaceutical product imported from another MS in its original internal packaging but with a new exterior carton printed in the language of the MS of importation: Does the importer bear the burden of proving that the new packaging complies with each of the conditions set out in Joined Cases C-427/93, C-429/93 and C-436/93 BMS [1996] ECR I-3457?
Where a parallel importer markets in one MS a pharmaceutical product imported from another MS in its original internal packaging but with a new exterior carton printed in the language of the MS of importation: Does the first condition set out in Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS) as interpreted in Case C-379/97 Upjohn and C-143/00 Boehringer Ingelheim and Others, namely that it must be shown that it is necessary to repackage the product in order to avoid that effective market access is hindered, apply merely to the fact of reboxing?
Where a parallel importer markets in one MS a pharmaceutical product imported from another MS in its original internal packaging but with a new exterior carton printed in the language of the MS of importation: Is the fourth condition set out in BMS, namely that the presentation of the repackaged product is not such as to be liable to damage the reputation of the trade mark or its owner, only infringed if the packaging is defective, of poor quality or untidy?
Where a parallel importer markets in one MS a pharmaceutical product imported from another MS in its original internal packaging but with a new exterior carton printed in the language of the MS of importation: Must "de-branding" and "co-branding" necessarily be regarded as damaging to the reputation of the trade mark?
Where a parallel importer markets in one MS a pharmaceutical product imported from another MS in its original internal packaging but with a new exterior carton printed in the language of the MS of importation: If the answer to Question l(d) is that it is a question of fact for the national court to assess, on whom does the burden of proof lie?
Where a parallel importer markets in one MS a pharmaceutical product imported from another MS in its original packaging to which the parallel importer has applied an additional external label printed in the language of the MS of importation (an ?overstickered? product): Do the five conditions set out in BMS apply at all?
Where a parallel importer markets in one MS a pharmaceutical product imported from another MS in its original packaging to which the parallel importer has applied an additional external label printed in the language of the MS of importation (an ?overstickered? product): If the answer to Question 2(a) is yes, does the importer bear the burden of proving that the overstickered packaging complies with each of the BMS conditions?
Where a parallel importer markets in one MS a pharmaceutical product imported from another MS in its original packaging to which the parallel importer has applied an additional external label printed in the language of the MS of importation (an ?overstickered? product): if the answer to Question 2(a) is yes, does the first condition set out in BMS, namely that it must be shown that it is necessary to repackage the product in order to avoid that effective market access is hindered, apply merely to the fact of overstickering?
Where a parallel importer markets in one MS a pharmaceutical product imported from another MS in its original packaging to which the parallel importer has applied an additional external label printed in the language of the MS of importation: If the answer to Question 2(a) is yes, is the fourth condition set out in BMS, namely that the presentation of the repackaged product is not such as to be liable to damage the reputation of the trade mark or its owner, only infringed if the packaging is defective, of poor quality or untidy?
Where a parallel importer markets in one MS a pharmaceutical product imported from another MS in its original packaging to which the parallel importer has applied an additional external label printed in the language of the MS of importation: Is it damaging to the reputation of a trade mark for this purpose if either (i) the additional label is positioned so as to obscure one of the proprietor?s trade marks or (ii) the additional label fails to state that the trade mark in question is owned by the proprietor or (iii) the name of the parallel importer is printed in capital letters?
Where a parallel importer has failed to give notice in respect of a repackaged product as required by the fifth condition of BMS and accordingly has infringed the proprietor?s trade mark(s) for that reason only: Is every subsequent act of importation of that product an infringement or does the importer only infringe until such time as the proprietor has become aware of the product and the applicable notice period has expired?
Where a parallel importer has failed to give notice in respect of a repackaged product as required by the fifth condition of BMS, and accordingly has infringed the proprietor?s trade mark(s) for that reason only: Is the proprietor entitled to claim financial remedies by reason of the importer?s acts of infringement on the same basis as if the goods had been spurious?
Where a parallel importer has failed to give notice in respect of a repackaged product as required by the fifth condition of BMS, and accordingly has infringed the proprietor?s trade mark(s) for that reason only: Is the granting of financial remedies to the proprietor in respect of such acts of infringement by the importer subject to the principle of proportionality?
Where a parallel importer has failed to give notice in respect of a repackaged product as required by the fifth condition of BMS, and accordingly has infringed the proprietor?s trade mark(s) for that reason only: If not, upon what basis should such compensation be assessed given that the products in question were placed on the market within the EEA by the proprietor or with his consent?
Are any or all of Regulation 2398/97, Regulation 1644/2001, Regulation 160/2002 or Regulation 696/2002 valid in the light of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, as subsequently interpreted by the recommendations and decisions of the DSB and also in the light of the basic regulation?
Must a national customs authority repay all or part of the anti-dumping duties which it has collected pursuant to Regulation 2398/97; and if so, to whom and under what conditions should repayment be made?
For the purposes of establishing whether a product in respect of which an export refund is sought is of sound and fair marketable quality, does Regulation 1538/91 introducing detailed rules for implementing Regulation 1906/90 on certain marketing standards for poultry apply?
In the event that the reply to Question 1 is in the affirmative: Does Article 70 of Regulation 2913/92 apply where it is necessary to determine whether a product in respect of which an export refund is sought is of sound and fair marketable quality?
Does the legal fiction relating to uniform quality in the first subparagraph of Article 70(1) of the Customs Code also apply if the size of the sample taken is insufficient having regard to Article 7 of Regulation 1538/91 and, consequently, it is not possible to establish whether the tolerance margins laid down therein have been exceeded or not?
In the event that the replies to Questions 2(a) and (b) are also in the affirmative:

What is the effect of the legal fiction relating to uniform quality where several samples are taken from export consignments that were declared as a single unit and examination of part of those samples reveals that they are of sound and fair marketable quality, while examination of another part reveals that they are not?
Must Article 3a(1)(a) of Directive 84/450/EEC be construed as meaning that the comparison of the general price level of advertisers with that of competitors is impermissible inasmuch as this creates in any event the impression that the advertiser is cheaper over its entire range of products, whereas the comparison made relates only to a limited sample of products?
Must Article 3a(1)(b) of Directive 84/450/EEC be construed as meaning that comparative advertising is allowed only if the comparison relates to individual goods or services that meet the same needs or are intended for the same purpose, to the exclusion of product selections, even if those selections meet the same needs or are intended for the same purpose?
Must Article 3a(1)(c) of Directive 84/450/EEC be construed as meaning that comparative advertising in which a comparison of the prices of products, or of the general price level, of competitors is made will be objective only if it lists the products and prices being compared?
Must Article 3a(1)(c) of Directive 84/450/EEC be construed as meaning that a feature in comparative advertising will satisfy the requirement of verifiability in that article only if that feature can be verified as to its accuracy by those to whom the advertising is addressed, or is it sufficient if the feature can be verified by third parties to whom the advertising is not addressed?
Must Article 3a(1)(c) of Directive 84/450/EEC be construed as meaning that the price of products and the general price level of competitors are in themselves verifiable features?
Does the prohibition on putting measures into effect under Article 88(3) EC preclude the application of a national legal provision which must be classified as aid within the meaning of Article 87 EC, but which was not notified to the Commission prior to the national entry into force of the rules, even where the Commission has found the measure to be compatible with the common market under Article 87(3) EC for a period in the past and the application for reimbursement relates to taxes payable for that period?
If so, in such a case does the prohibition on putting measures into effect require a rebate even in cases where the applications were made by service businesses after the adoption of the Commission?s decision for assessment periods prior to that date?
Is the term ?economic activity? for the purposes of Article 4(1) and (2) of the Sixth Directive to be interpreted as including the issuing of third-generation mobile telecommunications licences by the Secretary of State by auction of rights to use telecommunications equipment in defined parts of the electromagnetic spectrum?
Was the Secretary of State, in conducting the activity, acting as a ?public authority? within the meaning of Article 4(5) of the Sixth Directive?
Can the activity be in part an economic activity and in part not, and/or partly carried out by a body governed by public law acting as a public authority and partly not, with the result that the activity would be partly chargeable to VAT under the Sixth Directive and partly not?
How likely and how close in time to the carrying out of an activity such as the activity does a ?significant distortion of competition? within the meaning of the second subparagraph of Article 4(5) of the Sixth Directive have to be in order for the person carrying out that activity to be required by that subparagraph to be considered a taxable person in respect of that activity?
Does the word ?telecommunications? in Annex D to the Sixth Directive include the issuing of third-generation mobile telecommunications licences?
Where a MS chooses to implement Article 4(1) and (5) of the Sixth Directive by legislation conferring on a Government department a statutory power to make directions specifying which goods or services supplied by Government departments are to be treated as taxable supplies and that Government department makes directions specifying that certain supplies are taxable: is the principle set out in Case C-106/89 relevant to the interpretation of the domestic legislation and of those directions?
Having regard to the nature of the National Health Service and its position under national law, is Article 49 EC, read in the light of cases C-157/99, C-385/99 and C-56/01, to be interpreted as meaning that in principle, persons ordinarily resident in the UK enjoy an entitlement in EU law to receive hospital treatment in other MS at the expense of the NHS?
Is there any distinction between a State-funded national health service and insurance funds, in particular having regard to the fact that the State-funded national health service has no fund out of which payment must be made?
Is the NHS obliged to authorise and pay for such treatment in another MS, notwithstanding that it is not obliged to authorise and pay for such treatment to be carried out privately by a United Kingdom service provider?
Is it relevant if the patient secures the treatment independently of the relevant NHS body, and without prior authorisation or notification?
In answering the previous questions, is it material whether hospital treatment provided by the NHS is itself the provision of services within Article 49 EC?
Are Articles 48 EC, 49 EC and 50 EC to be interpreted as meaning that in principle the provision of hospital treatment by NHS bodies constitutes the provision of services within Article 49 EC?
If Article 49 EC applies to the NHS, are there objective justifications for it or the Secretary of State to rely on for refusing prior authorisation for hospital treatment in another MS relating to the existence of a waiting list and economic and organisational considerations?
In determining whether treatment is available ?without undue delay? for the purposes of Article 49 EC, to what extent is it necessary or permissible to have regard in particular to the following:

(a)      waiting times;

(b)      the clinical priority accorded to the treatment by the relevant NHS body;

(c)      the management of the provision of hospital care in accordance with priorities aimed at giving best effect to finite resources;

(d)      the fact that treatment under the NHS is provided free at the point of delivery;

(e)      the individual medical condition of the patient, and the history and probable course of the disease in respect of which that patient seeks treatment?
On the proper interpretation of Article 22(1)(c) of Regulation No 1408/71 and in particular the words ?within the time normally necessary for obtaining the treatment in question? are the applicable criteria identical with those applicable in determining questions of ?undue delay? for the purposes of Article 49 EC?
In circumstances where a MS is obliged in EU law to fund the hospital treatment in other MSs of persons ordinarily resident in the first MS, is the cost of such treatment to be calculated under Article 22 of Regulation No 1408/71 by reference to the legislation of the MS where the treatment is provided or under Article 49 EC by reference to the legislation of the MS of residence?
Is the obligation limited to the actual cost of providing the same or equivalent treatment in the first MS?
Does it include an obligation to meet travel and accommodation costs?
Is there an obligation on MSs, under Article 49 EC and Article 22 of Regulation No 1408/71, to fund hospital treatment in other MSs that is compatible with the MSs? responsibility for the organisation and delivery of health services and medical care, as recognised under Article 152(5) EC?
Do Articles 43 EC and 56 EC preclude a rule of a MS which, on a payment of dividends by a resident company, grants a full tax credit to the ultimate shareholders receiving the dividends who are resident in that MS or in another State with which the first MS has concluded a DTC providing for such a tax credit, but does not grant a full or partial tax credit to companies receiving such dividends which are resident in certain other MSs?
Is it contrary to Article 43 or 56 EC for MS A to give effect to a provision in a DTC conferring an entitlement to a partial tax credit in respect of relevant dividends on a parent company resident in MS B, but not to confer such an entitlement on a parent company resident in MS C, where there is no provision for a partial tax credit in the DTC between MS A and MS C?
Is it contrary to Article 43 or 56 EC for MS A, in giving effect to its DTCs, to grant no partial tax credit to companies resident in MS B if they are controlled by a resident in MS C, but to confer entitlement to a partial tax credit in respect of relevant dividends on companies resident in MS B if they are controlled by a resident in MS B?
If the answer to any of the previous questions is in the affirmative, how are the remedies to be paid by the MS to be calculated?
To whom should such payment be made?
Does the claim for compensation need to fulfil the conditions set out in the judgment in joined cases C-46/93 and 48/93?
In order to recover, is it necessary for the company making the claim to establish that it, or its parent, would have claimed a tax credit if it had known that under Community law it was entitled to do so?
Does it make any difference when determining the amount of the compensation that in accordance with the ruling of the Court of Justice in joined cases C-397/98 and 410/98 the relevant subsidiary in MS A may have been reimbursed or may be entitled in principle to reimbursement of, or in respect of, advance corporation tax in relation to the dividend paid to the relevant parent company in MS B or MS C?
Is it appropriate for the ECJ to provide in the present cases further guidance when it comes to determining whether there is a sufficiently serious breach within the meaning of the judgment in joined cases 46/93 and 48/93?
Does Article 21(3) of the Sixth Directive permit MSs to provide that any person may be made jointly and severally liable for payment of tax with any person who is made so liable by Article 21(1) or 21(2), subject only to the general principles of Community law, namely that such a measure must be objectively justifiable, rational, proportionate and legally certain?
Does Article 22(8) of the Sixth Directive permit MSs to provide that any person may be made so liable or to provide that one person may be required to provide security for tax due from another subject only to the aforesaid general principles?
Are MS precluded by the Sixth Directive from providing for joint and several liability of taxpayers or from requiring one taxpayer to provide security for tax due from another in order to prevent abuse of the VAT system and protect revenues properly due under that system, if such measures comply with the aforesaid general principles?
Is it contrary to Article 52, 59 and 73b EC, in conjunction with Article 58 and 66 of the EC Treaty for a charitable foundation established under private law in another MS, with limited liability to tax on its rental income in Germany, unlike a charitable foundation established in Germany, with unlimited liability to tax and receiving similar income, not to be entitled to exemption from corporation tax?
Where stock-market transactions agreed on in advance which result in the increase or artificial inflation of the price of the securities transferred are carried out between persons or groups of persons having one of the characteristics set out in Article 2(1) of Directive 89/592, are the persons carrying out those transactions to be regarded as persons possessing inside information within the meaning of Articles 1 and 2 of that directive, so that their actions fall within the prohibition, laid down by Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the directive, on taking advantage of inside information?
Is Article 11(1) of Directive 97/13/EC to be interpreted as precluding the imposition of a licence fee calculated to anticipate the amount of a national regulatory authority?s general administrative costs over a period of 30 years, to be charged in advance?
If the answer to Question 1 is in the affirmative: Are Article 10 EC and Article 11 of the Directive 97/13 to be interpreted as meaning that a fee assessment that determines fees within the meaning of Question 1 and which has not been contested, although such a possibility is afforded under national law, must be set aside where that is permissible under national law but not mandatory?
Must exemption from a provincial tax on motive force granted solely in respect of motors used in natural gas stations, to the exclusion of motors used for other industrial gases, be regarded as State aid within the meaning of Article 87 of the consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Community?
If the answer to Question 1 is ?yes?, must the national court, before which an action is brought by a taxpayer who has not enjoyed exemption from the provincial tax on motive force, order the public authority which levied that tax to repay it to that taxpayer if it finds that it is not possible for the public authority which levied that tax to claim it from the taxpayer who enjoyed exemption from the tax on motive force?
Must a tax on motive force levied on motors used for transporting industrial gas through very high pressure pipes, be regarded as a charge having equivalent effect prohibited by Article 25 EC et seq.  if it is apparent that it is levied by a province on the transport of industrial gas outside its territorial limits, when in the same conditions the transport of natural gas is exempt from such a tax?
Must a tax on motive force levied on motors used for transporting industrial gas through very high pressure pipes, which requires the use of compression stations, be regarded as internal taxation, prohibited by Article 90 EC et seq. if it is apparent that the transport of natural gas is exempt from that tax?
If the answer to the questions above is ?yes?, is a taxpayer who has paid the tax on motive force justified in seeking the reimbursement of that tax from 16 July 1992, the date on which the Legros judgment was given?
Do services supplied by persons referred to in Article 13A(1)(b) of the Sixth Directive comprising the grant of use of a telephone and a television to patients and the provision of food and a bed to persons accompanying patients come under activities closely related to hospital and medical care, within the meaning of that provision?
Does Articles 17 and 18 EC, under which citizens of the European Union have the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, preclude a provision of national law which makes entitlement to an allowance such as that at issue in the main proceedings conditional on actual residence in the MS concerned, given that that allowance is granted to unemployed persons aged over 50 who are exempt from the requirement to register as job-seekers?
Are the first subparagraphs of Article 28a(3) and Article 28c(A)(a) of the Sixth Directive, having regard to the term ?dispatched?, to be interpreted as meaning that the intra-Community acquisition of goods takes place and the exemption of the intra-Community supply of goods becomes applicable only when the right to dispose of the goods as owner has been transferred to the purchaser and the supplier establishes that those goods have been dispatched or transported to another MS and that, as a result of that dispatch or that transport, they have physically left the territory of the MS of supply?
Is the first subparagraph of Article 28c(A)(a) of the Sixth Directive to be interpreted as precluding the competent authorities of the MS of supply from requiring a supplier, who acted in good faith and submitted evidence establishing, at first sight, his right to the exemption of an intra-Community supply of goods, to subsequently account for VAT on those goods where that evidence is found to be false, without however, the supplier?s involvement in the tax evasion being established?
Can the fact that the purchaser made a declaration concerning intra-Community acquisition, such as that in question in the main proceedings, to the tax authorities in the MS of destination be regarded as conclusive proof for the purposes of the exemption from VAT of an intra-Community supply?
Is a national provision, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, that sets no limit on the freedom of a public authority to choose between the different methods of awarding a contract for the provision of a public service and, in particular, between an award as a result of a public and open tendering procedure and direct award to a company wholly controlled by the authority, compatible with Community law and, in particular, with Articles 43 EC, 49 EC and 86 EC?
Does it follow from Article 871 of Regulation 2454/93 that if the national customs authorities express, albeit temporarily, doubts concerning the fulfilment of the conditions required for waiving post-clearance recovery of a duty which has been eluded, that they are under an obligation to refer the case to the Commission?
Does Directive 79/7 prohibit the refusal of a retirement pension to a male-to-female transsexual until she reaches the age of 65 and who would have been entitled to such a pension at the age of 60 had she been held to be a woman as a matter of national law?
If the Court finds that Directive 79/7 precludes the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings, must the temporal effects of such a judgment be limited?
Is there a ?combination of active ingredients of a medicinal product? within the meaning of Regulation 1768/92 where a combination of substances comprises two components of which one component is a known substance with a therapeutic effect for a specific indication and the other component renders possible a pharmaceutical form of the medicinal product that brings about a changed efficacy of the medicinal product for this indication?
Is Article 28 EC to be interpreted as precluding legislation of a MS under which undenatured ethyl alcohol of an alcoholic strength of more than 80% may be imported only by a person who has obtained a licence to do so?
If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative; Is the licensing system to be regarded as permitted under Article 30 EC?
Must the ne bis in idem principle, enshrined in Article 54 of the CISA, be applied to criminal proceedings brought in a Contracting State for acts for which a person has already been convicted in another Contracting State even though the CISA was not yet in force in that State at the time when that person was convicted?
Must Article 54 of the CISA, read with Article 71 thereof, be construed as meaning that offences of possession for the purposes of export and import in respect of the same narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances of any kind, and which are prosecuted as exports and imports respectively in different countries which have signed the CISA, are deemed to be ?the same acts? for the purposes of Article 54?
Does Article 30(2) of Directive 2002/22/EC, which provides that national regulatory authorities are to ensure that pricing for interconnection related to the provision of number portability is cost oriented, refer only to costs related to traffic to the ported number, or does it also refer to tariffs of costs incurred by operators in executing requests for number porting?
Does Article 30(2) of Directive 2002/22/EC preclude ex ante rules governing the costs for the provision of portability?
Must Article 4(1) of Directive 2002/21/EC be interpreted as meaning that the authority designated to hear and determine appeals must be able to have at its disposal all the information necessary for the merits of the case to be duly taken into account, including the confidential information on the basis of which the national regulatory authority adopted the decision which is the subject-matter of the appeal?
Where the recipient of a supply of goods is a taxable person who has entered into a contract in good faith without knowledge of a fraud committed by the seller, does the principle of fiscal neutrality in respect of [VAT] mean that the fact that the contract of sale is incurably void ? by reason of a rule of domestic civil law on the ground that the basis of the contract is unlawful by reason of a matter which is attributable to the seller ? cannot cause that taxable person to lose the right to deduct that tax?
Is the answer different where the contract is incurably void for fraudulent evasion of [VAT] itself?
Is the answer different where the unlawful basis of the contract of sale which renders it incurably void under domestic law is a fraudulent evasion of [VAT] known to both parties to the contract?
Does the exemption from VAT laid down by Article 13A(1)(c) of the Sixth Directive apply to treatments carried out, respectively, by a physiotherapist and by a psychotherapist outside the context of the exercise of the medical and paramedical professions as defined by the legislation of the Member State concerned?
Is it contrary to Article 43 or 56 EC for a MS to keep in force and apply measures which exempt from corporation tax dividends received by a company resident in that MS from other resident companies and which subject dividends received by the resident company from companies resident in other MS to corporation tax, after giving double taxation relief?
Is it contrary to Article 43 or 56 EC or Article 4(1) or 6 of Directive 90/435 for the MS to keep in force and apply measures which provide for the resident company to pay dividends to its shareholders without being liable to pay ACT to the extent that it has received dividends from companies resident in that MS and do not provide for the resident company to pay dividends to its shareholders without being liable to pay ACT to the extent that it has received dividends from non-resident companies?
Is it contrary to Article 43 or 56 EC or Article 4(1) or 6 of Directive 90/435 for the MS to keep in force and apply measures which provide for the ACT liability to be set against the liability of the dividend-paying company, and that of other companies in the group resident in that MS, to corporation tax in that MS upon their profits, but which do not provide for any form of set off of the ACT liability or some equivalent relief in respect of profits earned by companies in the group which are not residents in that MS and/or provide that any double tax relief which a company resident in that MS enjoys reduces the liability to corporation tax against which the ACT liability can be set?
Do Articles 43 EC and 56 EC, together with Articles 4(1) and 6 of Directive 90/435, preclude national legislation which, while allowing resident companies receiving foreign-sourced dividends to elect to recover ACT accounted for on a subsequent distribution to their own shareholders, first, obliges those companies to pay the ACT and to reclaim it subsequently and secondly, does not provide any tax credit to their shareholders, whereas those shareholders would have received such a tax credit if the resident companies had made a distribution based on nationally-sourced dividends?
Having regard to the fact that the national measures referred to in Questions 1 and 2 were adopted before 31 December 1993, are the measures referred to in Question 4, which were adopted after that date but which amend those national measures, to the extent to which they also constitute restrictions on capital movements prohibited in principle by Article 56 EC, authorised as restrictions which existed on 31 December 1993, for the purposes of Article 57(1) EC?
In the event that the national measures referred to in the preceding questions are incompatible with Community law, should claims such as those brought by the claimants in the main proceedings in order to remedy that incompatibility be classified as claims for the repayment of sums unduly levied or benefits unduly claimed or, conversely, as claims for compensation for damage suffered and therefore necessary to satisfy the conditions laid down in the Brasserie du P?cheur and Factortame judgment?
Is there a sufficiently serious breach within the meaning of the judgment in Brasserie du P?cheur and Factortame?
Can an undertaking having its registered office in a country outside the EU, rely on the freedom of movement of capital under Article 56 EC in respect of the commercial grant of credit to residents of a MS, or are the preparation, provision and performance of such financial services covered solely by the freedom to provide services under Article 49 et seq. EC?
Does the fact that an undertaking chooses to have its registered office in a third country exclusively in order to grant credit to persons resident in MS represent an abuse of rights because the undertaking does not require authorisation for that commercial activity in the third country?
Do rules which make the commercial grant of credit by an undertaking having its registered office in a country outside the EU to residents within the EU subject to authorisation being obtained beforehand from an authority of the MS in which the borrower is domiciled interfere with the free movement of capital under Article 56 EC?
Is the requirement of prior authorisation for the grant of credit by an undertaking having its registered office in a third country to residents of a MS justified by Article 58(1)(b) EC?
Is an authorisation requirement permissible per se also justified under Article 58(1)(b) EC where the grant of the authorisation is subject to the condition that the undertaking should have its central administration or at least a branch in the MS concerned?
Does ?voyage which follows or precedes the cabotage voyage? in Article 3(3) of Regulation 3577/92 mean only a voyage which is ?functionally and commercially autonomous, that is to say, with cargo on board destined for or coming from a foreign port?, as stated in the measures at issue, or does it also include a voyage without cargo on board?
Must Article 56 EC be interpreted as precluding a national provision, under which the articles of association of a company limited by shares may confer on the State or a public body with a shareholding in that company the power to directly appoint directors which, alone or in conjunction with a national provision, grants that State or body the right to participate in the election on the basis of lists of the directors it has not appointed directly, is such as to enable that State or body to obtain a power of control which is disproportionate to its shareholding in that company?
Must Article 22(1)(c) and (2) and Article 36 of Regulation 1408/71 be interpreted as meaning that the authorisation, granted by the competent institution, to go to the territory of another MS to receive there the appropriate medical treatment also confers on the individual concerned the right to be reimbursed, by the institution which granted the authorisation, for the costs of travel to, and accommodation and/or subsistence on, the territory of the MS in question?
In the event that the reply to the first question is in the affirmative: is there a provision or rule of Community law in accordance with which the costs to be refunded, and their amount, must be set?
Do Articles 10 EC and 249 EC and Article 22 of Regulation No 1408/71, preclude national legislation under which provision is made for entitlement to benefits additional to those provided for in Article 22 of Regulation No 1408/71 in the situation covered by paragraph (1)(a) of that article, but not in that covered by paragraph (1)(c) thereof?
Are Article 12 EC, Article 49 EC, and Articles 81, 82 and 87 EC to be interpreted as precluding rules of a MS, which abolish the right of individuals entitled to benefits under the Spanish public social security scheme to obtain reimbursement of the costs of medical treatment provided by medical establishments and practitioners established in Spanish territory and not affiliated to the Spanish social security system?
Is a finding by the courts of one Member State that prosecution of an offence is time-barred binding on the courts of the other Member States?
Does the acquittal of a defendant on account of the fact that prosecution of the offence is time-barred benefit, by extension, persons being prosecuted in another Member State where the facts are identical?
If the criminal courts of one MS declare that the extra-Community nature of goods has not been established for the purposes of an offence of smuggling and acquit the defendant, may the courts of another MS broaden the investigation in order to prove that the introduction of goods without payment of customs duties was from a non-member State?
Where a criminal court in a Member State has declared either that it is not established that goods have been unlawfully introduced into the Community or that prosecution of the offence of smuggling is time-barred: Can the goods be regarded as being in free circulation in the rest of the Community?
Does the marketing of goods in another Member State, after their importation into the Member State where the accused was acquitted because the prosecution was time-barred, form part of the same acts or constitute conduct independent of importation into the latter Member State?
Is it contrary to Article 52, in conjunction with Article 58 EC and to Article 73b EC if financing costs, incurred by a corporation, which have a direct economic link to profits, not subject to tax in Germany, derived from a holding in a capital company established in another MS may be deducted as operating expenditure only in so far as no profits from that holding are distributed on a tax-free basis?
Is Article 4(2) of Directive 2001/29 invalid?
Does Article 4(2) of Directive 2001/29 preclude a Member State from retaining international exhaustion in its legislation?
Are Articles 1 to 12 of Regulation 1019/20021 to be construed as meaning that those provisions also lay down rules governing the presentation of unpackaged olive oils and olive-pomace oils to final consumers?
Is the first paragraph of Article 2 of Regulation 1019/2002 to be construed as containing a prohibition on the presentation of unpackaged olive oils and olive-pomace oils to final consumers?
Is the first paragraph of Article 2 of Regulation 1019/2002 to be construed restrictively as meaning that, while it does contain a prohibition on the presentation of unpackaged olive oils and olive-pomace oils to the final consumer, that prohibition does not apply to the sale of unpackaged olive oils and olive-pomace oils effected according to the ?bag in the box? method?
Must the payment made by a customer for the supply of specified services, such as examination, consultation or aftercare required for contact lenses, be added to the total payment, which include contact lenses, cleaning solutions and soaking cases, in order to constitute together the transaction value within the meaning of Article 29 of the Customs Code?
If the answer to Question 1 is 'No', may the amount of the payment for the specified goods nonetheless be calculated under Article 29 or is it necessary to make such calculation under Article 30 of the Customs Code?
Are the principles laid down in the CCP (Case C-349/96) judgment relevant for determining the elements of the transaction to be taken into account for the purposes of applying Article 29 of the Customs Code?
Must Article 7(2) of Directive 95/59 be interpreted as meaning that cigarettes without tobacco which do not contain substances having a medical effect but which are presented and marketed as an aid to giving up smoking are ?used exclusively for medical purposes? within the meaning of the second subparagraph of that provision?
Is Article 7(1) [first sentence] and (3) of Regulation 536/93 to be interpreted as conferring on a MS discretion  to lay down a rule imposing on producers of milk products established in its territory an obligation to keep records which is more extensive than the obligation under Article 7(1)(f)?
If the answer to Question 1 is in the affirmative, must it then be held that a rule requiring the producer to account to the administration for the quantity of butter produced and for its use, even where the butter has been destroyed or used as feeding stuff, is within the Member State?s discretion?
Must Article 3(1) of the Directive 98/50 be interpreted as meaning that, where an undertaking is transferred and a contract of employment refers to a collective agreement to which the transferor is a party but not the transferee, the transferee is not bound by collective agreements subsequent to the one in force at the time of that transfer?
If Question 1 is to be answered in the negative: Is it compatible with Article 3(1) of Directive 98/50 if the transferee of the business ? who is not subject to a collective agreement ? is bound by collective wage agreements which have entered into force after the transfer of the business only so long as the transferor of the business is so bound?
Do separately imported screwdriver ends with square drive for slotted-head, cross-head, TX (internal Torx) and hexagon socket head screws, of the type described in the order, fall within heading 8204?
Do separately imported parts of the square system described in the order, which are not in direct contact with the fastener (nut, screw) during use, fall within heading 8204?
Do separately imported square-system torque meter wrenches of the type described in the order fall within heading 8204?
Is Article 13(1), first sentence, (c), in conjunction with Annex VII(2)(a) and the third indent of Annex VII(1)(a) of Regulation 999/2001 as amended by Article 3(1) of and Annex II to Regulation 1326/2001 invalid because the measure infringes the principle of proportionality?
Should Article 9 of Directive 98/5 be interpreted as precluding appeal proceedings as provided for under the Law of 10 August 1991, as amended by the Law of 13 November 2002?
Does Community law allow a host Member State to make the right of a lawyer to practise on a permanent basis in that Member State under his home-country professional title subject to a test of his proficiency in the languages of that Member State?
Must Article 56(1) EC be interpreted as prohibiting a restriction resulting from a provision in the income tax legislation of a MS which subjects dividends from resident companies and dividends from companies resident in another MS to the same uniform tax rate, without in the latter case providing for the imputation of tax levied at source in that other MS?
Is a charge, such as the charge in dispute, levied on an operator in a MS for landing shrimp with a fishing vessel registered in that MS consistent with Community law and, in particular, with Articles 25 EC and 90 EC, if the charge is also payable on shrimp landed by such an operator elsewhere in the Community?
Is the answer to this Question 1 affected by any of the following circumstances: where the shrimp are caught, whether, after being landed elsewhere in the Community, the shrimp are transported to the MS in which the fishing vessel is registered and whether, after the shrimp have been landed elsewhere in the Community, payment for sieving and peeling is made in that place also?
Do Articles 18 and 39 EC preclude national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, according to which the tax on a retirement pension paid in the Member State concerned to a person residing in another Member State exceeds, in certain cases, the tax which would be charged if that person resided in the first Member State?
Is Directive 90/365 to be interpreted as precluding national legislation such as that described in Question 1 above?
Is it contrary to Articles 43 EC, 49 EC or 56 EC for a MS to keep in force and apply provisions which impose restrictions upon the ability of a company resident in that MS to deduct for tax purposes interest on a loan finance granted by a parent company resident in another MS in circumstances where the borrowing company would not be subject to such restrictions if the parent company had been resident in the State of the borrowing company?
Would the answer to Question 1 be different if the loan finance to the UK-resident subsidiary was provided not directly by its parent company, but by an intermediate lending company also part of the same group, and if such a lending company and/or parent company were resident not in another Member State but in a third country?
In the event that any of the matters referred to in Questions 1 or 2 are contrary to Articles 43 EC, 49 EC or 56 EC, then in circumstances where the borrowing company, or other companies in the borrowing company?s group make claims such as those listed in Question 5 of the order for reference: What are such claims to be regarded as for the purposes of Community law?
In determining the loss or damage for which reparation may be granted, is it open to the national court to have regard to the question of whether injured persons showed reasonable diligence in order to avoid or limit their loss, in particular by availing themselves of legal remedies which could have established that the national provisions did not (by reason of the application of double taxation conventions) have the effect of imposing the restrictions set out in Question 1?
Must Community law be interpreted as meaning that a pharmaceutical laboratory liable to pay a contribution such as that under the national law at issue in the main proceedings is, in order to obtain its repayment, entitled to plead that the fact that wholesale distributors are not liable for that contribution constitutes State aid?
Is compliance with the principle of effectiveness ensured where, in order to be able to obtain reimbursement in accordance with the applicable national law on the burden of proof, it is for the economic operator seeking reimbursement to establish that the absence of liability of wholesale distributors amounts to an overcompensation of the latter, inasmuch as at least one of the so-called ?Altmark? conditions is not met, and thus, as such, constitutes an economic advantage referred to in Article 87(1) EC?
Can the exhaustive provisions contained in Annex 19, in conjunction with Article 81, of Royal Decree No 1247/2008 of 18 July 2008, relating to the granting of official recognition of labels of quality, be considered to be excessive and disproportionate to the objective pursued and to involve an unjustified restriction which renders the recognition of the equivalence of certificates more difficult and to be an obstacle to or a restriction of the marketing of national or imported products contrary to Articles 34 TFEU and 36 TFEU?
In proceedings for infringement of the exclusive right conferred by a registered Community design, does the right to prevent the use thereof by third parties provided for in Article 19(1) of [the] Regulation … extend to any third party who uses another design that does not produce on informed users a different overall impression or, on the contrary, is a third party who uses a later Community design registered in his name excluded until such time as that design is declared invalid?
Is the answer to the first question unconnected with the intention of the third party or does it depend on his conduct, a decisive point being whether the third party applied for and registered the later Community design after receiving an extra-judicial demand from the holder of the earlier Community design calling on him to cease marketing the product on the ground that it infringes rights deriving from that earlier design?
Does the absorption of losses of a company by its sole member, a public authority whose representative was instructed by the competent body to grant an annual member’s contribution to cover losses in the amount provisionally specified in that regard prior to the beginning of the financial year in the budget estimate or business plan adopted by the company, increase the assets of that company within the meaning of Article 4(2)(b) of Directive 69/335/EEC …?
Does [Article 21(3) of the Sixth Directive] in conjunction with [the Article 16(1)B(e) and the second subparagraph of Article 16(1) of that directive], authorise the Member States to provide that a warehouse-keeper other than a customs warehouse-keeper is jointly and severally liable, unconditionally, for the tax which is owing on a supply of goods made for valuable consideration by the owner of the goods who is liable for the tax on those goods, even where the warehouse-keeper acts in good faith or where no fault or negligence can be imputed to him?
Does the reference to health in a claim within the meaning of the first sentence of Article 4(3) of Regulation No 1924/2006, read in conjunction with Article 2(2)(5) or Article 10(3) thereof, require there to be a beneficial nutritional or physiological effect aimed at a sustained improvement of physical condition, or is a temporary effect, limited in particular to the time taken by the intake and digestion of the food, sufficient?
If the assertion of a temporary beneficial effect may in itself be a reference to health: in order for it to be assumed that such an effect is due to the absence or reduced content of a substance within the meaning of Article 5(1)(a) and recital 15 in the preamble to the Regulation, is it sufficient merely to assert in the claim that an effect generally derived from foods of this kind and frequently perceived as being adverse is limited in a particular case?
If the answer to Question 2 is in the affirmative: is it compatible with the first subparagraph of Article 6(1) of the Treaty on European Union, read in conjunction with Article 15(1) (freedom to choose an occupation) and Article 16 (freedom to conduct a business) of the Charter, for a producer or marketer of wine to be prohibited, without exception, from making in its advertising a health claim of the kind at issue, even if that claim is correct?
Where a GMO constituting feed was placed on the market prior to the publication of Regulation No 1829/2003 and the authorisation is maintained in force pursuant to Article 20 of that regulation, must the product at issue be regarded, before a decision has been taken on the application for a new authorisation which must be submitted pursuant to the regulation, as among the products to which the provisions of Article 12 of Directive 2001/18 refer and, in that event, is the GMO subject, with respect to the emergency measures which may be adopted after the issue of authorisation to place it on the market, only to Article 34 of Regulation No 1829/2003 or, on the contrary, may such measures be adopted by a Member State on the basis of Article 23 of Directive 2001/18 and the national provisions transposing it?
On the assumption that emergency measures may be adopted only within the framework of Article 34 of Regulation No 1829/2003, may the authorities of a Member State adopt, and under what circumstances, measures such as those under the order of 5 December 2007 (first action for annulment) and the order of 7 February 2008 (10 other actions), as amended by the order of 13 February 2008, on grounds of the containment of risk as referred to in Article 53 of Regulation No 178/2002 or by way of the interim protective measures which may be adopted by a Member State on the basis of Article 54 of the same regulation?
What degree of requirement, taking into account in particular the precautionary principle, is imposed, respectively, by Article 23 of the directive, under which the adoption of emergency measures such as a suspension of the use or provisional prohibition against use of the product is subject to the condition that the Member State must have “detailed grounds for considering that a GMO ... constitutes a risk to ... the environment” and by Article 34 of the regulation, under which the adoption of such a measure is subject to the condition that it be “evident” that the product is “likely to constitute a serious risk to ... the environment”, in terms of identifying the risk, evaluating its probability and assessing the nature of its effects?
Having regard to the provisions of Article 13 thereof, does Directive 85/374 permit the implementation of a system of liability based on the special situation of patients in public healthcare establishments, in so far as it recognises, inter alia, that they have the right to obtain from such establishments, even when those establishments are not at fault, compensation for damage caused by the failure of products and equipment which they use, without prejudice to the possibility for the establishment to bring third-party proceedings against the producer?
Does Directive 85/374 limit the ability of the Member States to define the liability of persons who use defective equipment or products while providing services and, in so doing, cause damage to the recipient of those services?
Does the right to compensation provided for in Article 7 of Regulation No 261/2004 constitute a claim for non-compensatory damages within the meaning of the second sentence of Article 29 of the Montreal Convention?
What is the relationship between, on the one hand, the right to compensation based on Article 7 of Regulation No 261/2004 which a passenger has, according to the judgment in Sturgeon and Others, if he reaches his final destination three hours or more after the scheduled arrival time and, on the other hand, the right to compensation in respect of delay provided for in Article 19 of the Montreal Convention, regard being had to the exclusion of non&#8209;compensatory damages under the second sentence of Article 29 of the Montreal Convention?
How may the interpretative criterion underlying the Court of Justice’s judgment in Sturgeon and Others, which allows the right to compensation under Article 7 of Regulation No 261/2004 to be extended to cover cases of delay, be reconciled with the interpretative criterion which the Court of Justice applied to that regulation in its judgment in Case C&#8209;344/04 IATA and ELFAA?
Are Articles 5 to 7 of Regulation No 261/2004 to be interpreted as requiring the compensation provided for in Article 7 of that regulation to be paid to passengers whose flights are subject to delay within the meaning of Article 6 of that regulation, and if so in what circumstances?
If question 1 is answered in the negative, are Articles 5 to 7 of Regulation No 261/2004 invalid, in whole or in part, for breach of the principle of equal treatment?
If question 1 is answered in the affirmative, are Articles 5 to 7 of Regulation No 261/2004 invalid, in whole or in part, for inconsistency with the Montreal Convention; breach of the principle of proportionality; and/or breach of the principle of legal certainty?
If question 1 is answered in the affirmative and question 3 in the negative, what if any limits are to be placed upon the temporal effects of the Court’s ruling in this case?
If question 1 is answered in the negative, what if any effect is to be given to the decision of Sturgeon and Others between 19 November 2009, the date of its delivery, and the date of the Court’s ruling in this case?
Must the reasonable compensation which a farmer must pay to the holder of a Community plant variety right in accordance with Article 94(1) of Regulation No 2100/94, because he has used propagating material of a protected variety obtained through planting and has not fulfilled the obligations laid down in Article 14(3) of Regulation No 2100/94 and Article 8 of Regulation No 1768/95, be calculated on the basis of the average amount of the fee charged for the licensed production of a corresponding quantity of propagating material of protected varieties of the plant species concerned in the same area, or must the (lower) remuneration which would be payable in the event of authorised planting under the fourth indent of Article 14(3) of Regulation No 2100/94 and Article 5 of Regulation No 1768/95 be taken as a basis for the calculation instead?
In the event that only the remuneration for authorised planting must be taken as a basis for the calculation: In the circumstances described above, may the holder, in the event of a single intentional or negligent infringement, calculate the damage for which he must be compensated in accordance with Article 94(2) of Regulation No 2100/94 as a lump sum based on the fee for the grant of a licence for the production of propagating material?
Is it permitted or even required, when assessing the reasonable compensation due under Article 94(1) of Regulation No 2100/94 or the further compensation due under Article 94(2) of that regulation, for the special monitoring costs of an organisation which protects the rights of numerous holders to be taken into account in such a way that double the compensation usually agreed, or double the remuneration due under the fourth indent of Article 14(3) of Regulation No 2100/94, is awarded?
Must the definition of bioethanol in Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2003/30 be interpreted as meaning that it encompasses a product such as that at issue in the main proceedings?
Is Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2003/30 to be interpreted as meaning that the product in question can be classified as bioethanol only where it is actually used as biofuel, or is it sufficient that it is intended for use as biofuel and/or is actually suitable for use as biofuel?
Must EU law be interpreted as meaning that a product such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which potentially meets the definition of bioethanol in Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2003/30 is, as regards the applicable excise duty, subject to the provisions of Directive 92/83 or those of Directive 2003/96?
May hydrocarbons which are spilled unintentionally and cause soil and groundwater contamination be considered to be waste within the meaning of Article 1(a) of Directive 75/442?
May the petroleum undertaking which supplies the service station be considered to be the producer or holder of such waste within the meaning of Article 1(b) and (c) of Directive 75/442?
Is Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention to be interpreted as meaning that that rule concerns all proceedings concerned with the registration or validity of a patent, irrespective of whether the question is raised by way of an action or a plea in objection?
Is it contrary to Article 5(1) and (2) of Directive 1999/31, read in the light of Article 176 EC, for measures of domestic law to impose more stringent requirements than those laid down by the Directive with regard to the landfilling of waste?
Are measures of national law such as those at issue in the main proceedings compatible with the Community law principle of proportionality?
Are SICAVs (open-ended investment companies) which have as their sole object the collective investment in transferable securities of capital raised from the public in accordance with Directive 85/611 taxable persons within the meaning of Article 4 of the Sixth Directive?
When determining what types of services provided to SICAVs may benefit from the exemption under Article 13B(d)(6) of the Sixth Directive: Is it necessary in that context to distinguish between services which comprise the giving of assistance and management advice, on the one hand, and management services in the strict sense, on the other?
Are goods to be regarded as having been put on the market by virtue of the fact that the proprietor of the trade mark has imported them into the common market and paid import duty on them, with the intention that they be sold there or has offered them for sale in the trade mark proprietor?s own shops or those of a related company within the common market but a sale of the goods has not taken place?
If goods have been put on the market under one of the above alternatives and exhaustion of the trade mark rights thereby occurs, can a trade mark proprietor interrupt exhaustion by returning the goods to a warehouse?
Are goods to be regarded as having been put on the market by virtue of the fact that they have been sold by the trade mark proprietor to another company in the internal market, if, upon the sale, the trade mark proprietor imposed a restriction on the buyer under which he was not entitled to resell the goods in the common market?
Is the answer to the previous question affected if the trade mark proprietor, upon selling the consignment to which the goods belonged, gave the buyer permission to resell a small part of the goods in the common market but did not specify the individual goods to which that permission applied?
Can Article 86(2) EC be invoked to justify continuing to grant a company which was formerly entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest and which entered into certain commitments in connection with such operation a special right to enable it to honour those commitments after the particular task assigned to it has been completed?
If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative: Is a rule which provides for the preferential allocation for a period of ten years of half to a quarter of the cross-border transmission capacity for electricity to the undertaking concerned nevertheless invalid because it is not proportionate in relation to the ? public ? interest served thereby and affects trade to such an extent as would be contrary to the interests of the Community?
Does the prohibition of discrimination laid down in Article 7(5) of Directive 96/92 preclude national measures such as those at issue in the main proceedings?
Is a tariff, such as the per-minute price at which defendant (a mobile telephone operator) invoices its customers telephone calls, a monetary amount to be paid or accounted for within the meaning of the first sentence of Article 5 of Regulation 1103/97?
Must Regulation 1103/97, in particular the first sentence of Article 5 of the regulation, be taken to preclude the rounding to the nearest cent of amounts other than those which must be paid or accounted for?
Do Articles 28 EC, 39 EC or 49 EC preclude a national regime, such as that laid down by the Law on itinerant activities, which makes an offence of the itinerant sale in Belgium, without prior authorisation, of subscriptions to periodicals?
Do Article 3(2) of Directive 92/50, Article 5(7) of Directive 93/36, Article 6(6) of Directive 93/37, and Articles 2(1)(b) and 3(1)(b) of Directive 97/52, in conjunction with the principle of proportionality, freedom of trade and industry and respect for the right to property (as guaranteed by the ECHR) preclude a rule, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which states that any person who has been instructed to carry out research in connection with public works, supplies or services is not allowed to participate in a public contract for those works where that person is not permitted to prove that, in the circumstances of the case, the experience which he has acquired was not capable of distorting competition?
Would the answer to Question 1 be different if those directives, considered in conjunction with that principle, freedom and right, were interpreted as referring only to private undertakings or to undertakings which have provided services for valuable consideration?
May Directive 92/13, and in particular Articles 1 and 2 thereof, be interpreted as meaning that a contracting entity may refuse, up to the end of the procedure for the examination of tenders, to allow an undertaking connected to any person who has been instructed to carry out research or studies in connection with supplies or services to participate in the procedure or to submit a tender, even though, when questioned on that point by the awarding authority, the undertaking states that it has not thereby obtained an unfair advantage capable of distorting the normal conditions of competition?
Does Directive 69/335 preclude the imposition of a levy as described above on securities institutions in respect of their gross profit from securities-related transactions?
Given the provisions of, in particular, Articles 15 and 16 of Directive 73/239 and Articles 17 and 18 of Directive 79/267, may the national legislature provide that, where an insurance company is the subject of insolvency proceedings, is put into liquidation or is otherwise in a state of insolvency, salary claims are satisfied from the assets which are included in its technical provisions in preference to insurance claims?
Is the grant of a supplementary protection certificate in a MS on the basis of a medicinal product for human use authorised in that MS precluded by a marketing authorisation for that product as a veterinary medicinal product granted in another MS before the date specified in Article 19(1) of the Regulation 1768/92?
Does Art. 4(1) and (3) of Directive 77/388 mean that a legal person is entitled to deduct VAT under circumstances such as those at hand?
Does the question whether the legal person seeks to utilize the commercial lease have any bearing on the answer to question 1?
Can an application for a marketing authorisation for a medicinal Product C validly be made under the first paragraph of Article 10(1)(a)(iii) of Directive 2001/83, where the application seeks to demonstrate that Product C is essentially similar to another product, Product B, in circumstances such as those at hand (i.e. where three criteria are met)?
Is the Etropi Antagonismou a court or a tribunal within the meaning of Art. 234?
Are the national rules at issue in the main proceedings concerning the imposition of the marble tax in the Commune di Carrara, compatible with Articles 23, 81, 85 and 86 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, in the version in force following amendment by the Treaty of Amsterdam?
Is it compatible with Article 4.8(a)(iii) of Directive 65/65  for a product to be authorised under the abridged application procedure when a salt of the active substance in the product is changed from the one used in the reference product?
Can the abridged application procedure be used when an applicant, on its own initiative or at the request of national health authorities, submits additional documentation in the form of certain pharmacological or toxicological tests or clinical trials with a view to demonstrating that the product is ?essentially similar to? the reference product?
May a Member State derive from Community law the power to decide to kill animals which are suspected of being infected or contaminated with the foot-and-mouth virus?
Does Directive 85/511/EEC, as amended by Directive 90/423/EEC, afford the Member States scope to (order or) take supplementary national measures to control foot-and-mouth disease?
What limits does Community law place on a Member State with regard to taking supplementary national measures other than those provided for in Directive 85/511/EEC, as amended by Directive 90/423/EEC?
Does an application for a witness to be heard before the proceedings on the substance are initiated, with the aim of enabling the applicant to decide whether to bring a case, fall within the scope of application of the Brussels Convention?
If so, can the provision in that case constitute a measure within the meaning of Article 24 of the Brussels Convention?
On a proper interpretation of Articles 2, 3 and 8(4) of the Framework Decision, must a national court be able to authorize young children, who, as in this case, claim to have been victims of maltreatment, to give their testimony in accordance with arrangements ensuring them an appropriate level of protection, outside the public trial and before it is held?
Is ?relevant information? in Article 6(3) of Directive 98/10/EC to be interpreted as meaning only the numbers together with the name, address and postcode of the person to whom the number has been issued and any entry as to whether the number is used (exclusively) as a fax line published by the organisations concerned?
Which elements of the costs of compiling, updating and providing relevant information on subscribers may be included in the price of the supply of the data in the context of Article 6(3) of Directive 98/18?
Can a jurisdiction clause conforming with Article 12(3) of the Brussels Convention, in a contract of insurance concluded between a policy-holder and an insurer,  be enforced against a beneficiary under that contract who did not expressly subscribe to that clause and is domiciled in a Contracting State other than that of the policy-holder and the insurer?
Is Article 4(5) of Directive 92/43 to be interpreted as meaning that the measures under Article 6 thereof are only mandatory for the Member States after final approval at Community level of the list of sites under Article 21?
Must the term "milk for the manufacture of milk-based products" in Article 2(2) of Directive 92/46/EEC be interpreted as meaning that it includes milk constituents of a product which also contains other non-milk constituents and where the milk constituent cannot be separated from the non-milk constituents?
If the answer to the previous question is affirmative: Must Article 22 of Directive 92/46/EEC be interpreted as meaning that in the case of imports from non-Member States, that Directive is applicable only to the milk constituent of a product and thus not to the product of which it is a constituent?
Does the concept of "milk-based products" in Article 2(4) of Directive 92/46/EEC concern only finished products or also semi-finished products?
In the event that Article 2(4) of Directive 92/46/EEC also covers semi-finished products, according to which criteria must it be determined whether milk or a milk product forms an essential part of a product?
Can an administrative measure which imposes on certain undertakings using the electricity transmission system an increased charge for access to and use of that system intended to finance general revenue charges of the electricity system be regarded as a State aid for the purposes of Article 87 et seq of the EC Treaty?
Must the principles established in Directive 96/92 and in particular Articles 7 and 8 thereof be interpreted as precluding the possibility for a MS to adopt a measure imposing on certain undertakings, for a transitional period, an increased charge in order to offset the overvaluation of hydroelectric and geothermal energy occasioned?
Must Article 2(2)(b) of Regulation No 1139/98 be interpreted in such a way that the exemption from labelling for which it provides also applies to foodstuffs intended for the particular nutritional use of infants and young children?
Do Article 49 or 82 EC, both read in conjunction with Article 86 EC preclude the entrusting to a public undertaking of the management of a tax and duties on a market which forms a substantial part of the common market and on which the public undertaking holds a dominant position?
Do Article 82 and 86 EC or Article 87 and 88 EC preclude the payment to that undertaking of the revenue from the tax and duties in question, inasmuch as it constitutes unlawful State aid (not notified), incompatible with the common market??
Are Articles 8 and 9 of Directive 64/221 to be interpreted as precluding legislation of a MS pursuant to which, firstly, a decision ordering expulsion from the territory of that State made against a national of another MS can be the subject, at the time of the examination of the legal proceedings brought against such a decision, only of an assessment of its legality and, secondly, such appeals have no suspensory effect?
Are the guarantees of judicial protection provided by Articles 8 and 9 of Directive 64/221 to be applied to Turkish nationals who enjoy legal status as defined by Article 6 or Article 7 of Decision No 1/80?
Is the competent institution issuing Forms E-111 and E-112, thereby authorising an affiliated person to undergo medical treatment in another MS, bound by the decisions of the medical services of that MS as to the diagnosis of the ailment and the therapeutical measures to be taken, where these measures include urgent, life-saving surgery being carried out in a country not belonging to the EU and without the competent body in the MS of origin being enabled to require the worker concerned to return, so that it can carry out its own medical examination and suggest other appropriate methods of treatment?
Does the principle of equal treatment laid down in Article 3(1) in conjunction with Article 22(1)(i) of Regulation No 1408/71 imply that the competent institution is required to assume the costs of medical health care provided by a non-MS to a worker authorised to receive treatment in another MS?
Do the provisions on jurisdiction contained in other conventions take precedence over the general provisions on jurisdiction in the Brussels Convention even where a defendant fails to submit pleas as to the merits of the case in the proceedings before that court?
Is it contrary to Article 43 and 56 EC that nationals of a MS, who are assessable to tax in Germany on their total income and who are in receipt of income from employment in Germany, cannot claim rental income losses incurred in another MS, either for the purposes of determining their taxable income in Germany or in the computation which determines their rate of income tax in that MS?
Must Article 76 of Regulation 1408/71 be interpreted as applying only where a migrant worker is entitled to family benefits under the legislation of the MS of employment and under the legislation of the MS in which the members of his family are resident?
Which MS is competent, on the basis of priority, under Article 10 of Regulation No 574/72 for the grant of family benefits where a frontier worker?s spouse is employed in the MS of residence?
May the MS of employment refuse to pay the full family benefit where the MS of residence is competent, on the basis of priority, but refuses to pay the benefit?
In a legal system where there are both notaries who are self-employed and notaries who are employed as civil servants and the civil servant must remit a fixed portion of the charges to the State, which is his employer and which uses those proceeds to fund its activities, are the charges of the notary employed as a civil servant for the notarisation of a legal transaction covered to be regarded as tax for the purposes of Directive 69/335?
If the State waives its claim to the portion of the charges due to it in respect of that legal transaction, thereby ceasing to enforce the legal provision requiring a portion of the charges to be remitted to the State, do the charges cease to constitute a tax for the purposes of Directive 69/335?
Is Article 39 of the EC Treaty to be interpreted as precluding a MSs legislation which provides that natural persons who are not regarded as resident in the country for tax purposes but who receive income from employment in the country are subject to a tax at source of such a nature that a basic allowance or other allowance or deduction for personal circumstances is not granted?
Must a car which is made available to a natural person by his employer and is used by him for both business and private purposes be regarded as personal property within the meaning of Article 1(2)(c) of Regulation No 918/83?
Must Article 3(a) of Regulation 918/83, requiring property to have been in the possession of the person concerned at least six months before the date on which he gave up his normal place of residence in the country of origin, be interpreted as meaning that the person concerned who has had property made available to him, even free of charge, in the context of his employment by the owner of the property in question, and during the whole period had the right to buy the car, is to be deemed to have been in possession of the property?
Does a national rule, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, providing that in the case of supplies made by doctors the changeover from taxable to exempt status for the purposes of value added tax does not, in relation to goods that continue to be used in the business, entail the reduction of input tax already deducted that is prescribed by Article 20 of the Sixth Directive 77/388, constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 87 EC?
Does Community law and the principles laid down in the Kobler judgment preclude national legislation which, firstly, excludes all State liability for damage caused to individuals by an infringement of Community law committed by a national court adjudicating at last instance, where that infringement is the result of an interpretation of provisions of law or of an assessment of the facts and evidence carried out by that court, and, secondly,  limits such liability solely to cases of intentional fault and serious misconduct on the part of the court?
Is Directive 98/59/EC to be interpreted to the effect that "redundancy" is to be construed as meaning the notice of dismissal as the first act in bringing the employment relationship to and end or does it mean the termination of the employment relationship upon expiry of the period of notice?
Does directive 98/59 require that both the consultation procedure under Article 2 of the directive and the notification procedure under Articles 3 and 4 thereof must have been concluded before the notices of dismissal are announced?
Does the operation of a sick-leave scheme which treats employees suffering from pregnancy-related and pathological illness in an identical fashion fall within the scope of Directive 76/207?
If yes, is it contrary to Directive 76/207 for an employer to offset, against an employees total entitlement to benefit, a period of absence from work due to incapacity caused by a pregnancy related illness?
If yes, does Directive 76/207 require an employer to have in place special arrangements to cover absence from work due to incapacity caused by pregnancy-related illness?
Does the operation of a sick-leave scheme which treats employees suffering from pregnancy-related and pathological illness in an identical fashion fall within the scope of article 141 EC and directive 75/117?
If yes, is it contrary to Article 141 EC and Directive 75/117 for an employer to reduce a woman’s pay after she has been absent from work for a designated period where the absence is caused by incapacity due to a pregnancy-related illness arising during pregnancy in circumstances in which a non-pregnant woman or a man absent from work for the same period as a result of incapacity due to purely pathological illness would suffer the same reduction?
Is the date of the granting of a marketing authorisation in Switzerland, which is automatically recognised in Liechtenstein, to be considered as the first authorisation to place a medicinal product on the market for the purpose of calculating the duration of a supplementary protection certificate as provided in Article 13 of Regulation 1768/92 (as amended by the EEA Agreement)?
Is a competent authority within the EEA obliged to rectify any existing supplementary protection certificates, the duration of which has been erroneously calculated?
Is the date of the granting of a marketing authorisation in Switzerland, which is automatically recognised in Liechtenstein, to be considered as the first authorisation to place a medicinal product on the market, for the purpose of calculating the duration of a supplementary protection certificate as provided for in Article 13 of Regulation No 1768/92?
?Is a competent authority within the EEA obliged to rectify any existing supplementary protection certificates, the duration of which has been erroneously calculated?
Does assistance with maintenance costs for students attending university courses, such assistance being given by way of either (a) subsidised loans or (b) grants, fall outside the scope of the application of the EC Treaty for the purposes of Article 12 EC and the prohibition on discrimination on grounds of nationality?
If either part of question 1 is answered in the negative, what criteria should the national court apply in determining whether the conditions governing eligibility for such assistance are based on objectively justifiable considerations not dependent on nationality?
If either part of question 1 is answered in the negative, whether Article 12 EC may be relied upon to claim entitlement to assistance with maintenance costs from a date prior to the date of the judgment of the Court of Justice in the present case and, if [not], whether an exception should be made for those who initiated legal proceedings before that date?
Are Articles 28 EC to 30 EC, applied compatibly with general principles of Community law, to be interpreted as precluding national legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings?
Is Article 8 of Directive 2001/37/EC invalid in whole or in part by reason of Community law?
If the answer to the previous question is in the affirmative, under the circumstances given in the question (a-d), are the principles of Community law as referred to in the previous question to be interpreted as also prohibiting the national measure in question?
Are the products at hand in the main proceedings to be classified as "foodstuffs", and does Lactobact omni FOS constitute a novel food within the meaning of Regulation 258/97? (questions 1(a) and 1(d))
Is the method of ingesting a product significant for its classification as a medicinal product or as foodstuff?
Is the Directive 2000/46 to be applied instead of Regulation 178/2002 to the extent they regulate the same area?
Does only the Community law specific to medicinal products apply to products that satisfies equally well the conditions for classification as a foodstuff and the conditions for classification as a medicinal product?
What does "pharmacological effect" mean?
Must a product which is lawfully marketed in one Member State as a foodstuff be capable of being imported by the grant of marketing authorisation in another Member State where that product is considered to be a medicinal product? How can a marketing authorisation be implemented?
What importance must be attributed to the concept of upper safe levels in connection with the classification of a product as a medicinal product or as a foodstuff within the meaning of the Community provisions?
Is the absence of a nutritional need in the population of a Member State sufficient to justify that the State prohibits the marketing of a foodstuff or a food supplement lawfully manufactured or placed on the market in another Member State?
Is the fact that the discretion which the authorities of a Member State enjoy when establishing an absence of nutritional need is subject to only limited review by the courts compatible with Community law?
How is Article 1(2) of Regulation No 258/97 to be interpreted?
May a national court refer questions on the classification of products to the European Food Safety Authority and, if so, what is the binding force of such an opinion?
Must article 6(3) of the Athens Protocol (Protocol for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution from Land-based Sources 1980) be held to have direct effect?
Are the discharges at hand prohibited by the Athens Protocol (1980) without an authorisation issued by the competent authorities of the Member States?
Does the third paragraph of Article 4(2) of Directive 73/148/EEC  mean that the right of residence granted a person who claims to be a national of another Member State has to be recognised by the authorities of the Member State in which that person invokes his right of residence only from such time as he has presented his valid identity card or passport?
If the answer to the previous question is yes, does Community law provide grounds for making an exception thereto so that the authorities of a Member State must still afford to that person the opportunity to present his valid identity card or passport?
Is it contrary to Community law for nationals of a MS to be required in another MS to present a valid passport or identity card in order to prove their nationality, when the latter MS does not impose a general duty on its own nationals to provide evidence of identity?
If the answer to Question 2 is in the affirmative, does Community law lay down any requirements in regard to the period within which that Member State must afford the opportunity for the person concerned to present a valid identity card or passport before it imposes an administrative penalty?
Does an administrative penalty in the form of an order, namely the imposition of a detention order with a view to deportation under the national law at hand, before the period referred to in previous question has elapsed constitute a penalty which impinges disproportionately on freedom to provide services?
If the answer to Question 1 is in the negative, is freedom to provide services as recognized in Community law impeded where a detention order with a view to deportation under national law is, in the interest of public policy, imposed on a person claiming to be a national of another Member State and a tourist for as long as he does not demonstrate his right of residence by presenting a valid identity card or passport, even where there is no obvious present and serious danger to public policy?
If the answer to question 6 is in the affirmative, is the period within which that Member State afforded an opportunity to present a valid identity card or passport material relevant for the purposes of establishing whether or not the impediment is justified?
If the answer to question 6 is in the affirmative, is it relevant, for the purposes of establishing whether that impediment is justified, whether or not the Member State subsequently pays compensation in respect of the period during which the person was detained as is customary in that Member State in the case of unlawful detention as an illegal alien?
Where a MS itself lays down no general duty to provide evidence of identity, does Community law preclude, in particular in light of the prohibition on discrimination, a Member State from imposing, in connection with the internal control of aliens, a measure such as detention as an illegal alien with a view to deportation under national law, in respect of a person who claims to be a tourist for as long as that person does not present an identity card or passport?
So long as a national of a MS does not himself invoke the right of residence vis-?-vis the Member State in whose territory he is residing, does Community law preclude that MS from not regarding that person as a national protected by a right of residence under Community law?
Is the term ?recipient of services? in the context of freedom to provide services to be construed as meaning that, even where a person stays in another MS for a long period, is arrested there for an offence, is unable to give a fixed abode and, furthermore, has no money, residence in another MS itself provides sufficient grounds for assuming that tourist and services associated with short-term residence are received?
Do transactions of the kind at issue in the main proceedings constitute supplies of goods or of services and an economic activity within the meaning of Article 2(1), Article 4(1) and (2), Article 5(1) and Article 6(1) of the Sixth Directive where they are carried out with the sole object of obtaining a tax advantage, without any other economic aim?
Does Article 13(2)(f) of Regulation 1408/71 preclude legislation of a MS under which a person who has ceased all occupational activity in its territory remains insured under that legislation only if they continues to reside there, whilst that person remains compulsorily insured in respect of certain other branches of social security irrespective of their place of residence?
Is it material to the reply to the first question that under the legislation of that MS the person has the option of being voluntarily insured in respect of a number of branches of social security, without such voluntary insurance being conditional on their remaining resident in that MS?
If the answer to  the first question is negative, is Article 39 EC to be interpreted as meaning that the replacement of compulsory insurance with voluntary insurance is incompatible with that article where cessation of compulsory insurance is brought about by the introduction of a residence requirement?
When applying Article 6(1)(c) of Directive 89/104/EEC, what are the applicable criteria when determining if a product is to be regarded as a spare product or accessory?
Is the permissibility of the use of a third partys trade mark to be assessed differently, depending on whether the product is like a spare part or accessory?
What criteria must be used in interpreting the requirement that use by a third party of a trade mark of which he is not the owner must be necessary in order to indicate the intended purpose of a product, within the meaning of Article 6(1)(c) of Directive 89/104?
What factors should be taken into account when assessing use in accordance with honest commercial practice?
Does it affect the permissibility of the use of a third partys trade mark that the economic operator who refers to the third partys trade mark also markets, in addition to a spare part or accessory, a product of his own with which that spare part or accessory is intended to be used with?
Are the third indent of Article 6(1) and Article 6(2) of Decision No 1/80 to be interpreted as meaning that a Turkish worker who has been legally employed by various employers in maritime shipping forming part of the duly-registered labour force of a MS for more than 15 years and who has satisfied the requirements of the first indent of Article 6(1) of Decision No 1/80 during that time is entitled to a residence permit where his employment in maritime shipping has undergone interruptions of between 1 and 70 days between individual employment relationships on 17 occasions?
Is entitlement to a residence permit under the third indent of Article 6(1) of Decision No 1/80 conditional on the Turkish worker already satisfying the requirements of the second indent of Article 6(1) of Decision No 1/80?
Do Articles 43, 49 and 81 EC preclude provision for the direct award, that is to say without an invitation to tender, of the management of the public gas-distribution service to a company in which a municipality has a holding, whenever that holding is such as to preclude any direct control over the management itself, and must it therefore be declared that the essential preconditions for "in-house" management are not met?
Is it contrary to the prohibition on discrimination on nationality, the freedom of movement of services or the freedom of establishment to, in a public tendering, have requirements such as those in the main proceedings?
Do Article 56(1) EC and Article 58(1)(a) EC preclude a legal provision of a Member State which denies the availability of income tax relief to natural persons for the acquisition of shares representing cash contributions in capital companies established in other Member States?
Must the time-limit of 90 days, which may be extended for another 90 days, as mentioned in the first subparagraph of Article 6(1) of Directive 89/105/EEC, be regarded as a mere indicative time-limit or as a mandatory time-limit?
If the time-limit is mandatory, must exceeding it be deemed to constitute inclusion in the abovementioned list?
Does Article 52 and Article 58 of the Treaty preclude a national law such as the one in dispute in the main proceedings which, in the case of a branch of a company which has its seat in another Member State, lays down a tax rate on the profits of that branch which is higher than that on the profits of a subsidiary of such a company where that subsidiary distributes its profits in full to its parent company ?
If the place of business tax rates infringes Article 52 and Article 58 of the EC treaty, is it necessary to reduce it to 30% for the financial year in dispute in order to cure the infringement?
Do national provisions such as those in the amended Law on Lotteries constitute a technical regulation within the meaning of Article 1(9) of Directive 83/189 in that they entail a prohibition on the organisation of games of chance using certain automatic gaming machines?
Can redefining in national legislation a service connected with the design of a product, in particular of operating certain gaming machines, as the 1996 law did, constitute a technical regulation which must be notified under Directive 83/189, if the new definition affects the use of the product?
What is the significance for the purpose of the obligation to notify laid down by Directive 83/189 of the following factors: 1) The replacement of a licence requirement by a prohibition in national law, 2) the greater or lesser value of the product/service or 3) The effect of a new national legal prohibition?
Does subparagraph (a) of the first paragraph of Article 13(C) of the Sixth Directive (77/388)permit a MS, which has exercised the power to allow taxpayers a right of option for taxation in cases of letting and leasing of immovable property, to make full deduction of the input VAT conditional upon non-retroactive approval of the tax authorities first being obtained?
Does Directive 76/769 permit a Member State to lay down additional conditions for the placing on the market and use of a biocidal product, the active substance of which is included in Annex I thereto?
Is a national system of deductions and supplements based on the quality of raw milk delivered to the dairy, such as that at issue, consistent with Regulation (EEC) No 804/68 on the common organisation of the market in milk and milk products and in particular with the prohibition of "equalisation between the prices" in Article 24(2) ?
Is a national system of supplements based on the quality of raw milk delivered to the dairy, consistent with the prohibition of aid in the Regulation 804/68?
Is a national system of supplements based on the quality of raw milk delivered to the dairy, to be regarded providing State aid within the meaning of Article 93(3) of the EC Treaty?
Does the Directive mean that transactions by which one company simultaneously grants associated companies a licence to occupy a single property for payment constitute the "letting of immovable property"?
Is Article 4(2b) of Regulation No 1408/71 in conjunction with Annex II, Section III, to be interpreted as meaning that care allowance at hand is excluded from the scope of Regulation 1408/71 as a special non-contributory benefit?
Can a person in the situation such as that in the main proceedings claim payment of care allowance under the SPGG (sickness benefit in cash in accordance with Article 19 Regulation No 1408/71) irrespective of the fact that his main residence is in Germany, if he satisfies the other conditions of the receipt of the benefit?
Can a benefit such as that at hand, as a social advantage within the meaning of art 7(2) of Reg 1612/68, be made subject to the condition that the recipient has his main residence in the Province at hand?
Is the fact that citizens of the union such as in the case at hand are not entitled to social advantage within the meaning of art 7(2) of Reg 1612/68, compatible with Community law, in particular with the principles of citizenship of the union and non-discrimination under Articles 12 EC and 17 EC?
Is identification of "the decision of the competent authority which entitles the developer to proceed with the project" (Article 1(2) of Directive 85/337/EEC) exclusively a matter for the national court applying national law?
Does directive 85/337 require an Environmental Impact Assessment  to be carried out if the project may have significant effects on the environment?
May national law preclude a competent authority from requiring that an  Environmental Impact Assessment  be carried out at a later stage of the planning process?
In what, if any, circumstances is it open to a tour operator, which has completed its VAT return for a financial year, to recalculate its VAT liability considering C-308/96?
Is it possible in the circumstances of the present case to identify that part of the in-house service relating to flights sold as part of a holiday package by taking either A) or B) in the financial year in question?
Are national provisions contrary to Articles 2, 3, 17, 18, 39, 40, 42 and 283 EC and Article 7 of Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 in that these national provisions do not allow a citizen of the EU to compare the pension benefits which he would obtain under various schemes?
Are national provisions contrary to Articles 2, 3, 17, 18, 39, 40, 42 and 283 EC and Article 7 of Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 in that these mislead or may mislead a member of the EU?
Are national provisions contrary to Articles 2, 3, 17, 18, 39, 40, 42 and 283 EC and Article 7 of Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 as these national provisions do not allow years of services as an official of the EU to be taken into account for the purposes of the grant of an early pension?
Must the time-limit of 90 days which may be extended for another 90 days, referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 6(1) of Directive 89/105/EEC, be considered to be a strict time-limit precluding, upon expiry, the adoption of any decision, even where an initial decision adopted in good time has been annulled?
Does Article 12 EC and Articles 39 EC to 42 EC and Article 45 of  Regulation No 1408/71 preclude a national provision such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which does not allow the competent authorities of a Member State to take into consideration, for the purposes of acquiring the right to a retirement pension under the national scheme, certain periods of insurance completed on the territory of that State by an unemployed worker during which contributions to old-age insurance were paid by the unemployment benefit agency, such periods being taken into consideration solely for the calculation of the amount of that pension?
In order to determine for the purposes of the application of Art 48(1) of Reg 1408/71 whether the duration of the periods of insurance completed under the legislation applied by the institution of a Member State amounts to one year, must that institution take into account not only the periods of insurance necessary for acquiring the right to a pension but also those which affect only the calculation of the amount of the benefits?
Must Article 3(1) and Article 2(4) of the Directive 76/207 be interpreted as meaning that they preclude a national provision which reserves the exemption from the age limit for obtaining access to public-sector employment to widows who have not remarried who are obliged to work, excluding widowers who have not remarried who are in the same situation?
In a situation where an applicant has used a sign which consists of a feature which has a function and which forms part of the appearance of a new kind of article, and the applicant has, until the date of application, had a de facto monopoly in such articles: Is it sufficient, in order for the sign to have acquired a distinctive character within the meaning of Article 3(3) of the Directive, that a significant proportion of the relevant public has by the date of application for registration come to associate the relevant goods bearing the sign with the applicant?
If that is not sufficient, in order for the sign to have acquired a distinctive character, is it necessary for the person who has used the sign to have promoted it as a trade mark?
Must Article 11(2) of Directive 97/13 be interpreted as precluding national legislation which provides that a new operator on the telecommunications market is required to pay a charge for the allocation of telephone numbers, even though a undertaking having a dominant position on the same market took over free of charge the very large stock of numbers which were available to its predecessor, and national law precludes retrospective payment of such a charge in respect of that stock?
Is the acquisition of bonds denominated in national currency for a term of one year from their issue, dealt in and quoted on a stock exchange, issued by a bank established in a MS and belonging to that State, an ?acquisition ? of domestic securities dealt in on a stock exchange? within the meaning of List B, Item IV A of Annex I to the First Directive (31960L0921)?
Does the use, for the purposes of acquiring bonds such as those referred to in the first question, of a balance on current or deposit account with a credit institution fall within the meaning of List D, Item IX of Annex I to the First Directive (31960L0921)?
Does the term "contracts for the provision of transport services" in Article 3(2) of Directive 97/7/EC include contracts for the provision of car hire services?
Is Commission Decision 97/612/EC of 16 April 1997 on aid granted by the Region of Sardinia, Italy, in the agricultural sector invalid?
Did the EC-Hungary Association Agreement 1993 provide an appropriate legal basis for the adoption of Decision 93/724 by which the Community concluded the EC-Hungary Agreement on wines 1993?
In view of Opinion 1/94 of the Court, should the Agreement between the EC and the Republic of Hungary on the reciprocal protection and control of wine names, which specifies the protection of geographical names which have intellectual and commercial property significance, be declared invalid and of no effect because the agreement itself has not been ratified by the individual Member States of the EC?
In the event that the Community Agreement of 1993 is to be regarded as lawful and applicable in its entirety, should the prohibition of the use in Italy after 2007 of the name Tocai, be regarded as invalid and of no effect because it is inconsistent with the rules governing geographical homonyms established in the agreement itself?
Is the Joint Declaration on homonyms (1993) a clear misrepresentation of reality, invalidating, under Article 48 of the Vienna Convention, that agreement in so far as it prohibits the use of the name Tocai in Italy after 31 March 2007?
In the light of Article 59 of the Vienna Convention, do the provisions of the TRIPs Agreement (42) governing homonyms in vine names apply in place of those of the Agreement on wine names where there is inconsistency between the two, given that the parties to both agreements are the same and that the TRIPs Agreement entered into force after conclusion of the Agreement on wine names?
Are Articles 22 to 24 of the TRIPs Agreement to be interpreted as meaning that, in the case of homonymity between a geographical indication and a name including the name of a vine variety, each of the names may continue to be used in the future provided that it has been used in the past by the respective producers either in good faith or for at least 10 years prior to 15 April 1994 and that it clearly identifies the country, region or area of origin of the protected wine in such a way as not to mislead the consumer?
Does the right to property in the ECHR and the Charter include intellectual property in designations of origin of wines and its exercise and, if so, does protection of the latter preclude the operators concerned from being deprived of the possibility of using the word Tocai for the presentation of certain Italian quality wines psr at the end of a transitional period expiring on 31 March 2007, as arises from the exchange of letters on Tocai annexed to the EC-Hungary Agreement on wines but not from the body of that agreement?
In the event that it is held that the EC-Hungary Agreement on wines and/or the exchange of letters on Tocai are unlawful to the extent described in the preceding questions; Are the provisions of Article 19(2) of Regulation 753/2002, which abolish the use of the name Tocai friulano after 31 March 2007, invalid or in any event of no effect?
Does Article 3(2)(a) of Directive 85/577 also apply to contracts for the purchase of immovable property which must be regarded as merely a component of a credit-financed capital investment scheme and where the contract negotiations conducted up to the conclusion of the contract were held in a doorstep-selling situation, both as regards the contract for the purchase of the immovable property and the loan agreement serving solely to finance that purchase?
In the case of a single financial transaction consisting of a contract for the purchase of immovable property and a secured credit agreement for financing the purchase of the property, does Article 95(3) EC and Directive 85/577 preclude a national measure which provides that exercise of the right of cancellation under Article 5 of Directive 85/577 entails the cancellation of the credit agreement only, and not that of the purchase contract?
Does a national rule on the legal effects of the cancelling of a loan agreement, to the effect that the cancelling consumer must pay back the loan proceeds to the financing bank even though according to the scheme drawn up for the capital investment the loan serves solely to finance the immovable property and is paid directly to the vendor of the immovable property, fulfil the protective purpose of the rule on cancellation laid down in Article 5(2) of the Directive 85/577?
Where legal effect of cancellation under national law results in the consumer being required, after declaring cancellation, immediately to pay back the loan proceeds, plus interest thereon at the normal market rate; Is such an effect contrary to the requirement of a high level of protection in the field of consumer protection of Article 95(3) EC and to the principle of the effectiveness of consumer protection enshrined in the Directive 85/577/EEC?
May the distinctive character of a mark referred to in  Article 3(3) of  Directive 89/104 and Article 7(3) of Regulation 40/94 be acquired following or in consequence of the use of  that mark as part of or in conjunction with another mark?
Under the common system of VAT, and in the light of the First Directive and the Sixth Directive, is the entitlement of a trader to credit for a payment in respect of VAT under a transaction to be judged only by reference to the particular transaction to which the trader was a party including the traders purposes in entering into it?
Does the exclusion from the VAT regime of transactions entered into by an innocent party, but which form links in a carousel fraud by others, infringe the general principles of proportionality, equal treatment or legal certainty?
Is Article 1(d) of Regulation 1432/92 to be interpreted as meaning that the commercial carriage of persons to or from the territory covered by the embargo involving so-called "split" transport was permitted or prohibited?
Was there an obligation under Article 10 EC or Article 297 EC or other provisions of Community law to consult other Member States and/or the Commission before taking national measures based on the unlawfulness of split transport?
Does the first sentence of Article 9 of Decision No 1/80 have direct effect in the territory of the Member States?
If the first question should be answered in the affirmative: Do Turkish children still qualify as ?residing legally with their parents? if they establish and maintain their own main residence in the place of their university education and have registered only a secondary residence at their parents? address?
If the second question should be answered in the affirmative: Does the first sentence of Article 9 of Decision No 1/80 confer on the beneficiaries of that provision entitlement not only to equal access to educational facilities but also equal access to State benefits granted by the MS?
If both the second and third questions should be answered in the affirmative: Does that also apply to a university education for the protected group of persons in their country of origin, Turkey?
Does Community law, and in particular Article 56 EC et seq., preclude national legislation such as that referred to in the main proceedings, under which a domestic taxpayer is always entitled to deduction of a tax allowance in respect of wealth tax, whereas a non-resident taxpayer has no such entitlement in the case where the assets in question are situated predominantly in the taxpayer?s State of residence (in which no wealth tax is levied)?
If not, does it make a difference in this case that the Netherlands has, under a bilateral treaty, granted to residents of Belgium, who in all other respects are in comparable circumstances, entitlement to the tax allowance (no wealth tax being levied in Belgium either)?
If either of the previous two questions is answered in the affirmative, does Community law preclude a legal costs scheme such as that at issue, under which, in principle, only a limited contribution is made towards legal costs where a citizen is successful in proceedings brought before the national courts for breach of Community law by a Member State?
Must the first and second subparagraphs of Article 11(1) of the Regulation be interpreted - including in the light of the principle of proportionality - as meaning that false information relating to individual items listed in the export declaration is sufficient to give rise to a punitive reduction in the export refund, even though the exporter expressly stated in connection with the separate application for payment which must be submitted under national law that if would not be applying for an export refund in respect of the relevant items in the export declaration?
Is the Explanatory Note to the Combined Nomenclature relating to subheadings 4202 12 11 and 4202 12 19 contrary to the tariff in question?
Is Directive 85/374 to be interpreted as precluding a national rule under which the supplier is answerable without restriction for the no-fault liability which the Directive establishes and imposes on the producer?
Does Directive 85/374 preclude a national rule under which the supplier is answerable without restriction for the fault-based liability of the producer where damage is caused by a defective product?
Do the provisions of Community law relating to restrictions on the placing on the market of dangerous substances or preparations, in particular the provisions of Directive 76/769 and Directive 94/60, prohibit the placing on the market for sale to the public of siccatives containing lead compounds classified as toxic for reproductive purposes?
May the proprietor of a trade mark oppose the (direct or indirect) introduction without his consent of goods from third countries, bearing a trade mark within the meaning of Directive 89/104 and/or of Regulation 40/94, into the territory of a MS in the context of transit or transit trade as referred to below?
Does ?using a sign in the course of trade? within the meaning of Article 5(1) in conjunction with Article 5(3)(b) and (c) of Directive 89/104 and Article 9(1) in conjunction with Article 9(2)(b) and (c) of Regulation 40/94 cover the storing in a customs office or warehouse within the territory of a MS, of original branded goods which have not been imported into the EEA by the trade mark proprietor or with his consent, which come from outside the EEA and which have the customs status of non-Community goods?
Does it make any difference to the answers to Questions (1) and (2) whether or not, at the time of entering the abovementioned territory, the final destination of those goods is specified, or that no (purchase) agreement has or has yet been concluded with a customer in a third country in respect of those goods?
In the context of answering Questions (1), (2) and (3), is it relevant whether there are any additional circumstances? Which ones?
Must the term ?offering? in the provisions referred to in Question (1) be construed as also meaning the offering (for sale) of original branded goods which are stored in a customs office or warehouse within the territory of a MS, which have not been introduced into the EEA by the trade mark proprietor or with his consent, which come from outside the EEA and which have the status of non-Community goods, in the circumstances set out above in Questions (3) and (4)?
With which of the parties does the burden of proof rest as regards the acts mentioned above under (1), (2) and (5)?
Does Article 13 of Regulation 3665/87 mean that meat which is fit for human consumption cannot be deemed to be of fair marketable quality and eligible for an export refund when its marketing for human consumption within the Community is restricted?
Does the concept of "fair marketable quality" in Article 13 of Regulation 3665/87 require that the product to be exported be of average quality, and does  it therefore disqualify from the grant of an export refund a product of inferior quality?
Is the freedom of establishment to interpreted as meaning that it is precluded to refuse registration of the merger between a foreign European company with a German company in the German register of companies on the ground that national law provides only for transformation of legal entities established in Germany?
Must Articles 2, 5(6) and 6(2)(b) of the Sixth Directive be interpreted as precluding a national rule whereby transactions in respect of which an actual consideration is paid are regarded as an application of goods or services for private use, even where that consideration is less than the cost price of the goods or services supplied?
Must Articles 6(2) and 17(2) and (6) of the Sixth Directive (77/388) be interpreted as precluding national legislation, adopted before the Sixth Directive came into force, which does not make it possible for a taxable person to allocate capital goods used in part for business purposes and in part for purposes other than those, and which does not authorise immediate deduction in full of the VAT due on the acquisition of those goods and does not provide that their use for purposes other than those of the business is treated as a supply of services for consideration?
Must Article 8(1) of the Regulation 1348/2000 be construed as meaning that, in the event of refusal by an addressee to accept a document on the ground of failure to comply with the language requirement laid down in Article 8(1), it is possible for the sender to rectify that failure?
If the answer to Question 1 is in the negative: must refusal to accept the document be deemed to have the effect in law of rendering the service inoperative in its entirety?
If the answer to Question 1 is in the affirmative: (a) Within what period of time and in what manner must the translation be brought to the attention of the addressee?
(b) Does national procedural law apply in respect of the possibility of rectifying the failure?
Must Articles 14 and 15 of Directive 2001/83 be interpreted as meaning that they preclude a national provision which does not permit use of the special simplified registration procedure for a medicinal product composed of several known homeopathic substances if its use as a homeopathic medicine is not generally known?
Is the legislation at hand in the main proceedings, that treats losses and gains distributed by subsidiaries in other Member States less favourable than such losses and gains distributed by domestic subsidiaries, contrary to the freedom of establishment?
Is the legislation in the previous question contrary to the freedom establishment under the condition that the State of the subsidiary under certain circumstances allows relief for some or all of the losses incurred by the subsidiary against taxable profits in that State, or takes into account whether the company has made use of other possibilities to offset in that state?
Do Articles 4 EC, 10 EC, 82 EC, 86 EC and 98 EC preclude national legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings which reserves the right to pursue certain tax advice and assistance activities exclusively to CAF?
Do Articles 43 EC, 48 EC and 49 EC preclude national legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings which reserves the right to pursue certain tax advice and assistance activities exclusively to CAF?
Must Article 87 EC be interpreted as meaning that a national measure such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which provides for payment to be made to CAF from State funds in respect of the activities referred to in Articles 34(4) and 37(2) of that legislative decree, constitutes State aid?
Must the supply of services consisting of enabling the public to use, for consideration, slot gaming machines installed in amusement arcades established in the territory of a Member State be regarded as constituting entertainment or similar activities within the meaning of the first indent of Article 9(2)(c) of Directive 77/388, so that the place where those services are supplied is the place where they are physically carried out?
Must article 152 EC be interpreted as being the correct legal basis for the adoption of measures, contained in Directive 2002/2/EC, on labelling of vegetable feedingstuffs?
Insofar as it imposes an obligation to indicate the precise feed materials contained in compound feedingstuffs, which applies even to vegetable-based feedingstuffs, is directive 2002/2/EC  justified on the basis of the precautionary principle in the absence of risk assessment?
Is directive 2002/2/EC  justified in the light of the principle of proportionality?
Insofar as it fails to respect the principle of proportionality, does directive 2002/2/EC  conflict with the fundamental rights of property of MS citizens?
Must directive 2002/2/EC  be interpreted as meaning that its application is subject to the adoption of a positive list of feed materials?
Is directive 2002/2/EC  to be regarded as unlawful on the grounds of infringement of the principle of equal treatment?
Does the award of the management of the public pay car parks constitute a public service contract within the meaning of the Directive 92/50, or, a public service concession?
Does Community law preclude a public authority from awarding, without putting it out to competition as is in regional law, such a public service concession as is at hand?
In becoming listed on a stock market and in issuing shares in that connection to new shareholders in return for the issue price, does a public limited company make a supply for consideration within the meaning of Article 2(1) of the Sixth Directive (77/388)?
If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative: Are Article 2(1) and Article 17 of the sixth Directive to be interpreted as meaning that all services obtained in connection with a listing on the stock market are to be attributed to an exempt supply and that for that reason there is no right to a deduction of input tax?
If Question 1 is answered in the negative: is there a right under Article 17(1) and (2) of the Sixth Directive to deduct input tax on the ground that the services in respect of which a deduction of input tax is claimed (advertising, agent?s fees, and legal and technical advice) are used for the purposes of the undertaking?s taxable transactions?
Does Article 10(c) of Directive 69/335 also encompass charges for the notarially attested transfer of shares in a private limited company?
Does it make any difference if the State waives its claim minus a sum merely amounting to 15% to recoup expenditure, to the notary in the civil service himself, where the notary is integrated in the State administration?
Is a digital recording machine, such as that at issue, to be regarded as performing a specific function other than data processing within the meaning of the Regulation 2658/87?
Could the bona fide buying commission be dutiable as part of the price actually paid or payable for the goods under Article 29 of the Customs Code?
In such circumstances are the customs authorities obliged under the Customs Code, and in particular Article 78(3) thereof, to accept the amendment to the price paid or payable for the imported goods and thereby reduced customs value?
Is the importer therefore entitled under the Customs Code, and in particular Article 236 thereof, to a refund of the duty paid on the buying commission?
Must the principle ne bis in idem, enshrined in Article 54 of the CISA, be applied to a decision of the judicial authorities of one Member State, closing the case on the sole ground that criminal proceedings have been started in another Member State against the same defendant and for the same acts, without any determination whatsoever as to the merits of the case?
Is there a measure having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions within the meaning of Article 28 EC, or a measure which should be abstained from under the second paragraph of Article 10 EC, if an expert official belonging to the State?s health and safety at work organisation who does not have decision-making power, after a market supervision case has been raised but before the decision in the case, expresses his opinion publicly, in such a way that his statements, on the hazard to health and even to life of the machinery manufactured and marketed by a specified manufacturer which is the subject of the market supervision case may give the machinery negative publicity and affect its marketing?
Is Directive 98/37/EC  to be interpreted as meaning that a vehicle lift is contrary to the essential safety requirements it lays down if it is not constructed in accordance with standard SFS-EN 1493, in such a way that in designing the structure account is not taken of the placing of the vehicle on the lifting arms in either driving direction and the load calculations of each lifting arm are not done for the least favourable loading situation?
If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative, are the officials actions  disproportionate having regard to the legitimate aim based on the protection of human health and life and hence contrary to the EC Treaty?
If the question of proportionality in Question 3(a) is for the national court to decide, is the main weight to be attached to the possible non-compliance with the European or national safety requirements or to the circumstances of the publication of the non-compliance with the requirements?
May the actions of an official described in Question 1 be justified in the conditions described in Question 3(a) on the basis of freedom of speech within the meaning of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, even if they are contrary to Articles 28 EC and 30 EC or to Article 10 EC?
If the actions of an official described in Question 1 are contrary to Articles 28 EC and 30 EC or to Article 10 EC, is the breach so manifest and serious that, if the other conditions of liability are satisfied, the State is obliged under EC law to compensate the damage which may have been incurred by the undertaking marketing the machinery?
Can Article 10 EC and in particular its second paragraph create rights for individuals in the circumstances described in Question 1?
Can an official himself, in addition to the State, be similarly liable under EC law, in the circumstances mentioned in Question 1, for compensation for his actions, if they are contrary to EC law?
Is the obtaining of compensation based on EC law impossible in practice or excessively difficult if, in accordance with national provisions, compensation for economic damage other than damage to persons and things may be obtained only if the damage has been caused by a criminal offence or in the exercise of public authority or if in other cases there are especially serious grounds for the awarding of damages?
If compensation is awarded under national law because of a breach of requirements or omission concerning the free movement of goods, does EC law require that the compensation to be awarded is an effective and deterrent sanction, and is it incompatible with the requirements of EC law concerning liability that under national law an official who has committed an infringement or omission is liable for reasonable but not necessarily full compensation and is not liable at all for compensation if he is culpable of only slight negligence, or that an official and the State which is liable for the officials fault or omission may be ordered to pay compensation for economic damage other than damage to persons or things only if the damage has been caused by a criminal offence or in the exercise of public authority or if in other cases there are especially serious grounds for the awarding of compensation?
If any of the limitations of liability mentioned in Question 6(a) is incompatible with EC law, is the limitation of compensation under national law to be disapplied with respect to the official in question even though the official?s liability would be more severe or more extensive than under national law?
Where a taxable person has concluded an agreement with an insurance company such as the agreement at hand, are the activities to be categorised as " related services performed by insurance brokers and insurance agents" within the meaning of Article 13B of Directive 77/388?
Does Article 33 of the Sixth Directive (77/388) preclude the maintenance of a charge with the characteristics of the tax at issue in the main proceedings?
Is Article 3(1) of Directive 77/187 to be interpreted as meaning that there is a particular point in time at which the transfer of the undertaking or part thereof is deemed to have been completed and the transfer of rights and obligations pursuant to Article 3(1) is effected?
How is the particular point in time in question to be identified?
How are the words "on the date of a transfer" in Article 3(1) of Directive 77/187 to be interpreted?
Is the municipal tax at hand an excise duty within the meaning of Article 3(2) of Directive 92/12 or one of the taxes referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 3(3)?
Does the expression subject to the same proviso of the second subparagraph of Article 3(3) of Directive 92/12 only refer to the conditions laid down in the first subparagraph?
Does Article 4(2)(b) of Directive 69/335 permit capital duty to be levied on a company in respect of a direct informal capital contribution made by the parent of that company to a subsidiary of that company?
Does the freedom of establishment as laid down in Article 52 of the EC Treaty, in conjunction with Article 58 of the EC Treaty, prohibit the tax authorities of a Member State from pursuing a policy whereby no capital duty is levied on a company in respect of a direct informal capital contribution made by the parent of that company to a subsidiary of that company?
Is it permissible to resort to other language versions of the Sixth Directive to elucidate the meaning of the word "charitable" in Article 13A(1)(g) and (h)?
If Article 13A(1)(g) and (h) of Directive 77/388 is to be interpreted as applying to an organisation that has a social character but which also systematically aims to make profit, such as Kingscrest Ltd?
Is Article 13A(1)(g) and (h) of Directive 77/388 to be interpreted as meaning that they confer on MS a discretion to recognise for the purposes of those provisions an organisation which is registered under the Care Standards Act 2000 but which is not governed by public law and does not have the status of a charity under domestic law?
Must the question of state liability in cases such as the one at hand be answered by reference to national law or Community law?
If reference is to be made to Community law, are there circumstances in which Community law can entail a state obligation or liability?
If yes, which rules of community law are applicable?
Must Article 1(2) of Decision 94/381/EC, read in conjunction with the provisions of Article 17 of Directive 90/425/EEC and Article 17 of Directive 89/662/EEC be interpreted as giving rise to an obligation for the Commission or Council to grant an authorisation as referred to therein if the system which the requesting MS applies is in fact suitable for distinguishing protein from ruminant and non-ruminant species?
To what extent does the answer to question 4 entail a restriction of the States right or obligation to challenge an authorisation refusal?
Is a non-resident taxpayer entitled under EC law to tax credits for national insurance schemes in the case where resident taxpayers under national law are entitled to those tax credits because they are regarded as insured even if they do not pay social security either?
Are Member States allowed to apply such quantitative rules under the circumstances at hand?
Does national provision constitute a permitted restriction within the meaning of article 73 EC?
Does national provision constitute a prohibited means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on the free movement of capital within the meaning of article 73 EC?
Is the condition for obtaining a differentiated export refund laid down in Article 17(3) of Regulation No 3665/87 fulfilled when the product undergoes processing within the meaning of Article 24 of the Customs Code in a non-member country and is then re-exported to the Community, with reimbursement of the duties levied in that country?
Are concerned paragraphs in the Regulation  2341/2002 unlawful in their application to open gear beam trawlers because they are contrary to community law?
Does the requirement in Directive 90/232 or any other provision or principle of Community Law lay down restrictions in assessing the significance of the passengers own fault under national law?
Is it consistent with Community law, in any situation other than the cases mentioned in the second subparagraph of Article 2(1) of Directive 84/5,  to exclude or limit the passengers right to obtain compensation from compulsory motor vehicle insurance, when, for example, a person has entered a vehicle as a passenger although he could have foreseen the danger of an accident?
Does Community Law preclude the drivers intoxication from being regarded as such a factor to be taken into account?
Does Community law preclude the right of a car owner who is a passenger in the car to compensation for personal injury payable from compulsory motor vehicle insurance from being assessed more severely than that of other passengers on the ground that he permitted an intoxicated person to drive his car?
Is there a connection between the proceedings in the case at hand such as required for the application of Article 6(1) of the Brussels Convention?
What impact does it have on the connection assessment if the defendants are all in the same group of companies, they act on the basis of a common policy, and their alleged patent infringements are the same?
Is Regulation 1408/71 to be interpreted as extending even to employed persons whose employment relationships are still in existence but do not involve any duty to carry out work (due to unpaid leave) nor any social security obligations under national law ?
Is it the Member State of employment or that of residence that is primarily responsible for paying family benefits  under the circumstances at hand?
Must Article 49 EC be interpreted as precluding the introduction, by legislation of a national or local authority, of a tax on mobile and personal communications infrastructures used to carry on activities provided for in licences and authorisations?
Does Article 3c of Directive 90/388 preclude the introduction, by legislation of a national or local authority, of a tax on mobile and personal communications infrastructures used to carry out activities provided for in licences and authorisations?
Does the Sixth Directive allow the Member States to accept an intra&#8209;Community supply as tax&#8209;exempt only where the taxable person provides evidence in the accounts of the VAT identification number of the person acquiring the goods?
Is it relevant to the answer to that question that the person acquiring the goods was a trader with its seat in a third State, which, although it dispatched the object of the supply in the course of a chain transaction from one Member State to another Member State, is not registered for VAT purposes in any Member State, and whether tle person has proved that the person acquiring the goods submitted a tax return concerning the intra-Community acquisition?
Where a taxable person has overpaid VAT which was collected by the Member State contrary to the requirements of EU VAT legislation, does the remedy provided by a Member State accord with EU law if that remedy provides only for (a) reimbursement of the principal sums overpaid, and (b) simple interest on those sums in accordance with national legislation, such as section 78 of the VATA 1994?
Does the EU law principle of effectiveness require a Member State to disapply national law restrictions on any domestic claims or remedies and what principles should guide the national court in giving effect to this EU law right so as to accord with the EU law principle of effectiveness?
Does the second subparagraph of Article 17(6) of the Sixth Directive preclude amendments to deduction-limiting legislation such as that in question, according to which a Member State has sought to take advantage of the possibility, for which that provision provides, of (retaining) the exclusion of deduction in respect of certain goods and services if, as a consequence of those amendments, the amount excluded from deduction has been increased in most cases, but the approach and scheme of the deduction-limiting legislation have remained unchanged?
If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, should the national courts refrain from applying the deduction-limiting legislation as a whole, or is it sufficient for them to refrain from applying the legislation to the extent that it has increased the scale of the exclusion or restriction existing at the time when the Sixth Directive entered into force?
In Article 3(1) of Directive 96/9 what is meant by “databases which, by reason of the selection or arrangement of their contents, constitute the author’s own intellectual creation” and in particular: (a) should the intellectual effort and skill of creating data be excluded; (b) does “selection or arrangement” include adding important significance to a pre-existing item of data (as in fixing the date of a football match), and (c) does “author’s own intellectual creation” require more than significant labour and skill from the author, if so what?
Does the Directive preclude national rights in the nature of copyright in databases other than those provided for by Directive 96/9?
Does Article 5(1) of … [the Regulation] govern civil proceedings relating to the existence of rights in rem (in this case security deposits where the country in which the bond, and subsequently the money it represented, was deposited as a security was not a Member State of the European Union at the time when insolvency proceedings were opened in another Member State, but was a Member State of the European Union by the time the application initiating the proceedings was submitted?
Is Directive 2004/18 applicable, having regard to Article 10 of that directive and to Article 296](1)(b) EC and to the list of the Council of 15 April 1958, to a procurement which otherwise falls within the scope of the directive, when according to the contracting entity the intended purpose of the object of procurement is specifically military, but there also exist largely identical technical applications of the object of procurement in the civilian market?
In a situation where two or more companies from different Member States, in proceedings pending before a court of one of those Member States, are each separately accused of committing an infringement of the same national part of a European patent which is in force in yet another Member State by virtue of their performance of reserved actions with regard to the same product, does the possibility arise of “irreconcilable judgments” resulting from separate proceedings as referred to in Article 6(1) of Regulation No 44/2001?
Is Article 22(4) of Regulation No 44/2001 applicable in proceedings seeking provisional relief on the basis of a foreign patent, if the defendant argues by way of defence that the patent invoked is invalid, taking into account that the court in that case does not make a final decision on the validity of the patent invoked but makes an assessment as to how the court having jurisdiction under Article 22(4) would rule in that regard, and that the application for interim relief in the form of a prohibition against infringement shall be refused if, in the opinion of the court, a reasonable, non-negligible possibility exists that the patent invoked would be declared invalid by the competent court?
In order for Article 22(4) of Regulation No 44/2001 to be applicable in proceedings such as those referred to in the preceding question, must the defence of invalidity be subject to procedural requirements in the sense that Article 22(4) of the regulation is only applicable if invalidity proceedings before the court having jurisdiction under Article 22(4) of that Regulation are already pending or are to be commenced within a period to be laid down by the court or at least that a summons in that regard has been or is being issued to the patent holder, or does it suffice if a defence of invalidity is merely raised and, if so, are requirements then laid down in respect of the content of the defence put forward, in the sense that it must be sufficiently substantiated and/or that the conduct of the defence must not be deemed to be an abuse of procedural law?
If question 2 is answered in the affirmative, does the court, after a defence of invalidity has been raised in proceedings such as those referred to in question 1, retain jurisdiction in respect of the infringement action with the result that (if the claimant so desires) the infringement proceedings must be stayed until the court having jurisdiction under Article 22(4) of Regulation No 44/2001 has given a decision on the validity of the national part of the patent invoked, or that the claim must be refused because a defence that is essential to the decision may not be adjudicated, or does the court also lose its jurisdiction in respect of the infringement claim once a defence of invalidity has been raised?
If question 2 is answered in the affirmative, can Article 31 of Regulation No 44/2001 confer on the national court jurisdiction to adjudicate on a claim seeking provisional relief on the basis of a foreign patent (such as a cross-border prohibition against infringement), and against which it is argued by way of defence that the patent invoked is invalid, or (should it be decided that the applicability of Article 22(4) of that Regulation does not affect the jurisdiction of the Rechtbank to adjudicate on the infringement question) jurisdiction to adjudicate on a defence claiming that the foreign patent invoked is invalid?
If question 5 is answered in the affirmative, what facts or circumstances are then required in order to be able to accept that there is a real connecting link, as referred to in paragraph 40 of the judgment in Case C&#8209;391/95 Van Uden, between the subject matter of the measures sought and the territorial jurisdiction of the Contracting State of the court before which those measures are sought?’
Where a decision of a foreign court is accompanied by the certificate provided for in Article 54 of Regulation No 44/2001, but the defendant nevertheless objects on the ground that he was not served with notice of the action brought in the Member State of origin, is a court in the Member State where enforcement is sought competent, when considering a ground for withholding recognition provided for in Article 34(2) of Regulation No 44/2001, to examine for itself the conformity with the evidence of the information contained in the certificate, in compatibility with the principle of mutual trust in the administration of justice set out in recitals 16 and 17 to Regulation No 44/2001?
Is a decision given in default of appearance, which disposes of the substance of a dispute without examining either the subject-matter of the claim or the grounds on which it is based and sets out no reasoning as to the substantive basis of the claim, compatible with Article 47 of the Charter and does it not infringe the defendant’s right to a fair hearing?
Does Article 3 of [Regulation No 2988/95] apply also to the limitation period for claims in respect of interest due under national law in addition to the repayment of the advantage wrongly obtained on the basis of an irregularity?
If the answer to question 1 is in the affirmative: is the length of the limitation period alone to be taken into account in the comparison of limitation periods provided for in Article 3(3) of [Regulation No 2988/95], or is it also necessary to take into account national legislation that postpones commencement of the limitation period to the end of the calendar year in which a claim arises (in this case, a claim in respect of interest), without any other circumstances being required?
If the answer to question 1 is in the affirmative: does the limitation period for claims in respect of interest begin to run when an irregularity is committed or when a continuous or repeated irregularity ceases even if the claims in respect of interest relate to later periods and therefore do not arise until a later date? In the case of continuous or repeated irregularities, is commencement of the limitation period postponed under the second subparagraph of Article 3(1) of [Regulation No 2988/95] until the day on which the irregularity ceases in the case of claims in respect of interest as well?
If the answer to question 1 is in the affirmative: When does the interrupting effect of a decision by a competent authority come to an end under the second sentence of the third subparagraph of Article 3(1) of [Regulation No 2988/95] where that decision essentially establishes the claim in question (in this case, a claim in respect of interest)?
Is Article 44(2) of Regulation No 987/2009 to be interpreted as precluding an arrangement in one Member State whereby child-raising periods completed in another Member State of the European Union are to be recognised as such periods completed in the former Member State only if the child-raising parent was habitually resident abroad with the child and paid compulsory contributions during the raising or immediately before the birth of the child because of employment or self-employment there or, where spouses or partners were resident abroad together, if the spouse or partner of the child-raising parent paid such compulsory contributions or did not do so solely because he or she was a person as referred to in Paragraph 5(1) and (4) of the SGB VI [Book VI of the Sozialgesetzbuch] or was exempted from compulsory insurance pursuant to Paragraph 6 of the SGB VI (Paragraphs 56(3), second and third sentences; 57; 249 SGB VI)?
Is Article 44(2) of Regulation No 987/2009 to be interpreted, despite its wording, as meaning that, in exceptional cases, child-raising periods must be taken into account even where there has been no employment or self-employment if such a period would not otherwise be taken into account under the appropriate legislation either in the competent Member State or in another Member State in which the person was habitually resident while raising the children?
Is a clause conferring jurisdiction which has been agreed, in a chain of contracts under Community law, between a manufacturer of goods and a buyer in accordance with Article 23 of  Regulation No 44/2001 effective as against the sub-buyer and, if so, under what conditions?
Is the clause conferring jurisdiction effective as against the sub-buyer and its subrogated insurers even if Article 5(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 does not apply to the sub-buyer’s action against the manufacturer, as the Court held in its judgment in Case C-26/9] Handte?
Does the principle of the primacy of European Union law oblige a national court to give full and immediate effect to provisions of European Union law having direct effect, by disapplying provisions of domestic law in conflict with European Union law, even if they were adopted in accordance with fundamental principles of the Member State’s constitutional system?
When there is a conflict between a provision of domestic law and the ECHR, does the reference to the ECHR in Article 6 TEU oblige the national court to apply Articles 14 ECHR and Article 1 of [Protocol No 12] directly, disapplying the incompatible source of domestic law, without having first to raise the issue of constitutionality before the national constitutional court?
Does European Union law, in particular, Articles 2 [TEU] and 6 TEU, Articles 21 and 34 of the Charter and Directives 2000/43 … and 2003/109, preclude a provision of national inasmuch as that provision, with regard to the allowances concerned, and in particular the so-called housing benefit, attaches importance to nationality by treating long-term resident workers not belonging to the European Union or stateless persons worse than resident Community nationals (whether or not Italian)?
In the case of an infringement of general principles of the European Union, such as the prohibition of discrimination and the requirement of legal certainty, when there exists national implementing legislation permitting the court to “order the cessation of the damaging conduct and adopt any other suitable measure, according to the circumstances, [to put an end to] the effects of the discrimination”, requiring the court to “order the discriminatory conduct, behaviour or action, if still subsisting, to cease and its effects to be eliminated” and permitting the court to order “a plan for the suppression of the discrimination found to exist, in order to prevent its repetition, within the period fixed in the measure”, must Article 15 of Directive 2000/43 …, in so far as it provides that sanctions must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive, be interpreted as including, in discrimination found to exist and effects to be eliminated, and in order to avoid unjustified reverse discrimination, all infringements affecting the persons discriminated against, even if they are not parties to the dispute?
Is it contrary to European Union law, in particular, to Articles 2 [TEU] and 6 TEU, Articles 21 and 34 of the Charter and Directives 2000/43 … and 2003/109 …, for a provision of national [more correctly: provincial] law to require non-Community nationals only and not Community nationals also (whether or not Italian) — who receive equal treatment merely in respect of the obligation to have resided for more than 5 years in the territory of the province — to satisfy the further condition that they should have completed three years of work in order to be eligible for housing benefit?
Is it contrary to European Union law, in particular, to Articles 2 [TEU] and 6 TEU, and Articles 18 [TFEU], 45 [TFEU] and 49 [TFEU], read in conjunction with Articles 1, 21 and 34 of the Charter, for a provision of national [more correctly: provincial] law to require Community nationals (whether or not Italian) to declare that they ethnically belong to or elect to join one of the three linguistic groups of Alto Adige/South Tyrol in order to be eligible for housing benefit?
Is it contrary to European Union law, in particular, to Articles 2 [TEU] and 6 TEU, and to Articles 18 [TFEU], 45 [TFEU] and 49 TFEU, read in conjunction with Articles 21 and 34 of the Charter, for a provision of national [more correctly: provincial] law to impose on Community nationals (whether or not Italian) the obligation to have resided or worked in the territory of the province for at least five years in order to be eligible for housing benefit?
Is it contrary to the second paragraph of Article 13 of Chapter V of the Protocol on Privileges and Immunities, for the entirety of a taxpayer’s income, including Community income, to be taken into account in calculating the cap on wealth tax (“impôt de solidarité sur la fortune")?
Does the requirement that, in order to be able to reduce the taxable amount as set out in the initial invoice, the taxable person must be in possession of acknowledgment of receipt of a correcting invoice by the purchaser of the goods or services may constitute a condition for the purpose of Article 90(1) of the VAT Directive and whether the principles of VAT neutrality and proportionality preclude such a requirement?
Does the employers obligation to consult about collective redundancies, pursuant to Directive 98/59, arise (i) when the employer is proposing, but has not yet made, a strategic business or operational decision that will foreseeably or inevitably lead to collective redundancies; or (ii) only when that decision has actually been made and he is then proposing consequential redundancies?
Does clause 5(1) of the [FTW Framework Agreement implemented by Directive 1999/70] preclude a national provision, which — like point 3 of Paragraph 14(1) [TzBfG] — provides that the renewal of fixed-term employment relationships is justified for objective reasons where one employee replaces another, from being interpreted and applied as meaning that there are also objective reasons where there is a permanent need for replacement [staff] although the need for replacement [staff] could also be met by the employee concerned being employed for an indefinite duration in order to ensure replacements arising from recurring unavailability of staff, whilst allowing the employer to decide anew in each case how it is to respond to a specific loss of staff?
If the answer to the first question should be in the affirmative, does clause 5(1) of the [FTW Framework Agreement implemented by Directive 1999/70] preclude the interpretation and application of a national provision such as point 3 of Paragraph 14(1) TzBfG as set out in the first question, in the circumstances described in the first question, where the national legislature provides in a national provision such as Paragraph 21(1) of the Law on parental leave and benefit [as amended], that a fixed-term employment relationship with a replacement is justified, provided that a social-policy objective is pursued with a view to making it easier for employers to grant special leave and for employees to avail themselves thereof, inter alia for the purposes of protection of maternity or parenting?
Is subheading 6.6(c) of Annex I to Council Directive [96/61] to be interpreted as covering places for gilts?
Does the principle of freedom of movement and residence in the Member States of the European Union, as expressed in Articles 21 TFEU and 20(2) TFEU, mean that Article 10 of … Regulation … No 1408/71 … must be interpreted as meaning that old-age cash benefits acquired under the legislation of one Member State are not to be subject to any reduction, modification, suspension, withdrawal or confiscation by reason of the fact that the recipient lived simultaneously (had two habitual residences of equal status) in the territory of two Member States, including one other than that in which the institution responsible for payment of the retirement pension is situated?
Must Articles 21 TFEU and 20(2) TFEU and Article 10 of … Regulation … No 1408/71 … be interpreted as precluding the application of national provision Article 114(1) of the [Law on retirement pensions], in conjunction with Article 4 of the Convention of 9 October 1975 …, which entails re-examination of the case by the Polish pension institution and removal of the pension right of a person who, for many years, has had simultaneously two habitual residences (two centres of interests) in two countries now belonging to the European Union and who did not, prior to 2009, submit an application or declaration concerning the transfer of residence to one of those countries?
Must Articles 20(2) TFEU and 21 TFEU and Article 10 of … Regulation No 1408/71 … be interpreted as precluding the application of national provision Article 138(1) and (2) of [the Law on retirement pensions], which entails the demanding by the Polish pension institution of repayment of a retirement pension in respect of the period of the last three years from a person who, from 1975 to 2009, had simultaneously two habitual residences (two centres of interests) in two countries now belonging to the European Union, where that person had not, at the time the application for the grant of a retirement pension was examined and after the pension was received, been advised by the Polish insurance institution of the need to inform it that he has two habitual residences in two countries and of the need to submit an application or declaration concerning the choice of an insurance institution in one of those countries as competent for the purpose of considering applications concerning retirement pensions?
Is Annex A, Chapter I, point 2, indent (a), to Directive 85/73/EEC, to be interpreted as meaning that the standard fee amount laid down by that paragraph is payable only in respect of meat that is actually cut in the cutting plant, or is it to be interpreted as meaning that the standard fee amount is payable in respect of all meat entering the cutting plant, irrespective of whether it is cut?
Does a pension paid under a scheme such as that established by the BeamtVG fall within the scope of Article 119 of the Treaty and Article 141(1) and (2) EC and also within the scope of directives 86/378/EEC or Directive 79/7/EEC  relating to the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women? If it does, whether those provisions must be interpreted in such a way as to preclude legislation, such as that at hand in the main proceedings?
Should the first and second questions be answered in the affirmative, under what conditions could national legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings be regarded as justified by objective factors unrelated to any discrimination on grounds of sex?
Are Articles 49 EC and 50 EC to be interpreted as precluding rules of national law, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, under which the costs of a health cure taken in another MS are reimbursable only where it is absolutely essential that the cure be taken outside Germany because it thus offers greatly increased prospects of success?
Are Articles 49 EC and 50 EC to be interpreted as meaning that they preclude the application of national rules, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, under which reimbursement of expenditure is precluded where the person concerned has not awaited the conclusion of the court proceedings brought against the decision refusing to recognise that expenditure as eligible for assistance before commencing the cure in question?
Does the principle of freedom of establishment laid down in Article 43 of the EC Treaty preclude the introduction by a MS, for the purpose of preventing the risk of tax avoidance, of arrangements for taxing capital gains in the case of transfer of tax residence, such as the circumstances at hand?
Under Article 7(2) of Directive 86/457/EEC and Article 36(2) of Directive 96/13, for the purposes of practising as a general medical practitioner, is authorisation to practise obtained on or before 31 December 1994 to be regarded as equivalent to the acquisition of the certificate of specific training in general medical practice?
In accordance with those provisions of Community law, does the acquisition of said certificate allow the Member States, to grant to doctors in possession also of authorisation to practise acquired on or before 31 December 1994, more favourable terms with regard to access to a wider range of reserved posts than the access granted to the holders of one or other of the qualifications respectively?
Does Article 29 EC preclude the legislation of a MS which prohibits a national of another MS, on pain of criminal penalties such as imprisonment or a fine, from taking to that other State a vehicle purchased in the first MS bearing temporary number plates issued, for the purpose of exporting the vehicle to that other MS, by the competent authorities of the latter State?
Are Directives 73/23, 89/336 and 1999/5  applicable to alarm systems and networks, in particular to those which use radio transmission, and whether they produce sufficiently significant harmonisation in the field that national provisions governing the same fields, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, must necessarily conform to them?
Do  the Directives at hand preclude national provisions, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, which make subject to a prior approval procedure the placing on the market of alarm systems and networks which satisfy the requirements of those directives and which bear the appropriate CE marking?
Should Articles 28 EC to 30 EC be interpreted as meaning that the prohibition applies to national provisions, such as the 1999 decree, which require components of alarm systems and networks not covered by Community harmonisation measures to undergo the same tests in an approved laboratory as equipment placed on the market for the first time?
May a MS which claims justification for the adoption of national legislation subject to the prohibition in Articles 28 to 30 EC, merely rely on it in the abstract or must specifically demonstrate its genuineness?
Must Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention must be interpreted as meaning that a case concerning the legality of industrial action, in respect of which exclusive jurisdiction belongs, in accordance with the law of the Contracting State concerned, to a court other than the court which has jurisdiction to try the claims for compensation for the damage caused by that industrial action, falls within the definition of tort, delict or quasi-delict?
Is it necessary that any harm incurred must be a consequence of the industrial action concerned in itself, or is it sufficient that the industrial action constitutes the basis for sympathy actions which will result in harm?
Does it make any difference that the implementation of notified industrial action, after the proceedings had been brought, suspended by the notifying party until the court's ruling on the issue of its legality?
Must Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention must be interpreted as meaning that the damage resulting from industrial action taken by a trade union in a Contracting State to which a vessel registered in another Contracting State sails can be regarded as having occurred in the flag State, with the result that the shipowner can bring an action for damages against that trade union in the flag State.?
Is Article 141 EC and Article 1 of Directive 75/117/EEC to be interpreted as precluding a social plan under which all female employees aged over 50 and all male employees aged over 55 are dismissed and subsequently entitled to an allowance of 75 % of their salary?
Is the concept of "occupational social security schemes" within the meaning of Directive 86/378/EEC  to be construed as including bridging allowances in the above sense?
Is the Directive 76/207/EEC to be interpreted to the effect that the bridging allowance described above constitutes a condition governing dismissal within the meaning of Article 5?
Does the requirement laid down in the Directives 93/16 and 86/457 , to the effect that certain components of the specific training in general medical practice - completion of which confers the right to use the title general medical practitioner - must be undertaken full-time, constitute indirect discrimination on grounds of sex within the meaning of Directive 76/207/EEC?
Does the prohibition of indirect discrimination on grounds of sex constitute a basic unwritten right under Community law that overrides any conflicting rule in secondary Community legislation?
Does the national provisions at hand fall under Article 13(3), Article 5(1) or Article 5(3) in the Brussels Convention?
Is it, in relation to a claim for repayment of charges levied in breach of Community law, contrary to the principle of effectiveness of Community law for the time-limit extinguishing such a claim to be fixed at 90 days from the end of the period allowed for voluntary payment of those charges?
Are Regulation 1408/71 and Regulation 574/72 to be interpreted as allowing the application of a provision of national law which does not lay down time-limits for the recovery of undue payments arising from the belated or improper application of the relevant Community provisions?
Is it possible, given that the transitional rules for the application of the social security regulations provide for a two-year limit with retroactive effect, to apply a contrario the same time-limit under circumstances such as those in the main proceedings?
Is it compatible with the provisions on freedom to provide services and the free movement of goods for a particular commercial activity to be prohibited under national law because it offends against the values enshrined in the constitution?
Do Articles 1, 3, 4, 5 and 31 of Regulation  896/2001 conflict with the principles governing the conferment of powers upon and division of powers between the Community institutions as stated in Article 7 EC,  the enabling provision in Article 20 of the Regulation, and with the principles of non-retroactivity of laws, protection of legitimate expectations and legal certainty?
If the previous question is answered in the negative, is Article 6(c) of Regulation No 896/2001 in conflict with the fundamental right to pursue a trade or profession?
Is an application brought before a court of a Contracting State by a ship-owner seeking to have a liability limitation fund established and an action for damages brought before a court of another Contracting State by that victim against the ship-owner constitute proceedings that have the same parties, within the terms of Article 21 of the Brussels Convention ?
Is an order to establish a liability limitation fund, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, a judgement within the meaning of Article 25 of the Brussels Convention ?
Can a decision establishing a liability limitation fund, in the absence of prior service on the claimant concerned, be denied recognition by another MS  pursuant to Article 27(2) of the 1968 Brussels Convention?
Is the claimant concerned deprived of its right to rely on Article 27(2) of the 1968 Brussels Convention in the case where the claimant has appealed against the decision in order to challenge the jurisdiction of the court but without having previously objected to the default of service of the document instituting  the proceedings?
In the case of indications of vitamin content, is it possible to speak of an average value within the meaning of Article 1(k) of the Directive 90/496, where the figure given is the value which the product has at the end of the minimum conservation period?
Does the definition of average value under Article 6(8) of the directive 90/496 leave a free choice in relation to the reference date and the spread of permissible deviations?
Does Article 1(4)(k) and the first subparagraph of Article 6(8) of the Directive 90/496 infringe the principles of legal certainty and proportionality, on the ground that it is too vague in relation to the definition and the calculation of the average value and the extent of the differences tolerated between the declared value and the value established in the course of an official check?
Does Article 49 EC preclude a MS from applying rules under which winnings from lotteries held in other MS are regarded as taxable income of the winner chargeable to income tax, whereas winnings from lotteries held in the MS in question are exempt from tax?
May the requirement in Article 7(1) of Directive 96/9 for a link between the investment and the making of the database be interpreted in the sense that the "obtaining" and the investment directed at it refers, in the present case, to investment which is directed at the determination of the dates of the matches and the match pairings themselves?
Is the object of Directive 96/9 to provide protection in such a way that persons other than the authors of the fixture list may not, without authorisation, use the data in that fixture list for betting or other commercial purposes?
For the purposes of Directive 96/9, does the use by Veikkaus relate to a substantial part, evaluated qualitatively and/or quantitatively, of the database, having regard to the fact that, of the data in the fixture list, on each occasion only data necessary for one week is used in the weekly pools coupons, and the fact that the data relating to the matches is obtained and verified from sources other than the maker of the database continuously throughout the season?
Are provisions of national law such as that at hand, which require the nationality of the flag State - in this instance German nationality - for the exercise of the activity of master (captain) of a vessel used in small-scale maritime shipping and flying the flag of that MS compatible with Article 39 EC?
?Do colours or combinations of colours which are the subject of an application for registration as a trade mark under the circumstances in this case satisfy the conditions for capability of constituting a trade mark for the purposes of Article 2 of Directive 89/104?
Does the obligation imposed on Member States by Article 7 of  Directive 75/442 at hand mean that the States addressed are required to mark on a geographical map the precise locations of the planned waste disposal sites or to determine location criteria which are sufficiently precise to enable the competent authority to ascertain whether the site or installation falls within the management framework prescribed by the plan?
Do Articles 4, 5 and 7 of  Directive 75/442 preclude a Member State which has not adopted within the period prescribed one or more waste management plans relating to ?suitable disposal sites or installations? from issuing individual permits to operate waste disposal installations, such as landfills?
Is Article 187 of regulation 2913/92 to be interpreted as meaning that, where compensating products that are declared as returned goods are released for free circulation, the factual particulars required to calculate the import duties legally owed on those compensating products must also be declared and proved by the person liable to pay the duty?
Is a provision of national law, which may be interpreted as meaning that the mere transit of goods manufactured/distributed in contravention of provisions of the law on trademarks is not punishable under criminal law, contrary to Article 2 of Council Regulation (EC) No 3295/94?
Is Article 28 EC to be interpreted as precluding national legislation which prohibits any reference to the fact that goods come from an insolvent estate where, in public announcements or notices intended for a large circle of persons, notice is given of the sale of goods which originate from, but no longer constitute part of, the insolvent estate?
Is it possible to characterise as VAT , within the meaning of the provisions of the Sixth VAT Directive (77/388/EEC), the amount mentioned on an invoice by a person who provides services to the State as a salaried employee, when the person providing those services mistakenly considers that he is providing services to the State as a self-employed person whilst, in reality, he is an employee?
Can there be a departure from the formal principle governing the tax as set out in Article 21(1)(c) of the Sixth VAT Directive (77/388/EEC) (that is to say, where VAT is mentioned on the invoice or other document serving as invoice, such tax is payable to the State) under circumstances such as those at hand?
Does Regulation No 1408/71 preclude a national system of unemployment benefits, and, more specifically, a national rule against the overlapping of benefits under that system, from being applied to a former temporary member of the Commission staff who resides in a Member State and is entitled to unemployment benefits paid by the Commission?
Is it contrary to the principle of non-discrimination laid down by Article 7(4) of Regulation No 1612/68 for a person carrying on an activity as a post-graduate student, in the manner envisaged by the Fellowship Contract, to be deemed, in a Member State, to be a trainee fellowship student who is not entitled to any rights under the national system of unemployment benefits, even though in other Member States a person carrying on similar activities is deemed to be carrying on an occupational activity and is entitled to benefits under such an unemployment benefits system?
Is Article 30 of the Treaty, now Article 28 EC, to be interpreted as meaning that it precludes the implementation of procedures for detention by the customs authorities of goods lawfully manufactured in a Member State of the European Community which are intended, following their transit through French territory, to be placed on the market in a non-member country, in the present case, Poland?
May a national court (refer a question to) seek an interpretation of the Brussels Convention  even where the national court is relying on the submissions of a party to the main proceedings, when the merits of which has not yet been assessed?
Must Article 21 of the Brussels Convention be interpreted as meaning that where a court is the second court seized and has exclusive jurisdiction under an agreement conferring jurisdiction (Article 17 of the Convention), it may give judgement in the case without waiting for a declaration from the court first seized that it has no jurisdiction?
Must Article 21 of the Brussels Convention be interpreted as meaning that it may be derogated from where the duration of proceedings before the courts of the Contracting State in which the court first seized is established is excessively long?
Do the legal consequences provided for by national law justify the application of Article 21 of the Brussels Convention  even if a party is at risk of detriment as a consequence of the possible excessive length of proceedings before the national court and therefore it would not actually be appropriate to proceed in accordance with Art 21?
Under what conditions must the court other than the court first seized refrain from applying Article 21 of the Brussels Convention ?
What course of action must the court follow if it is not allowed to apply Article 21 of the Brussels Convention ?
Should Article 10, 34(2) and 249 EC together with Regulations 603/95 and 785/95 be interpreted as meaning that they preclude national provisions which lay down specific requirements with respect to green and fresh fodder for processing?
Are the words 'plan' and 'project' in Art 6(3) of the Habitats Directive to be interpreted as meaning that mechanical cockle fishing falls within the concept of the article?
What is the relationship between Art 6(2) and Art 6(3) of the Habitats Directive?
Can Art 6(2) and Art 6(3) be applied cumulatively?
Is Art 6(3) to be interpreted as meaning that there is a 'plan or project' once a particular activity is likely to have an effect on the site concerned (an 'appropriate assessment' must then be carried out to ascertain whether or not an effect is 'significant') or does it mean that an 'appropriate assessment' has to be carried out only where there is a likelihood that a 'plan or project' will have a significant effect?
On the basis of which criteria must it be determined whether or not a plan or project is likely to have a significant effect on the site?
On the basis of which criteria must it be determined whether or not there are 'appropriate steps' (6.2) or an 'appropriate assessment' (6.3) in connection with the certainty required before agreeing to a plan or project?
Do the terms 'appropriate steps' or 'appropriate assessment' have independent meaning or is account also taken to the Art 174(2) and the precautionary principle?
Can cockle fishing be authorised where there is no obvious doubt as to the absence of a possible significant effect?
Does Art 6(3) have direct effect?
Should the goods at issue in the main proceedings be classified under subheading 2101 20 92 of the CN?
Is regulation (No 306/2001) applicable by analogy to the mixtures at issue in the main proceedings?
Does Article 9(1) of the Community Customs Code, read in conjunction with Article 12(5)(a)(iii) thereof provide the customs authorities with a legal basis for withdrawing a decision where those authorities change the interpretation given therein of the legal provisions applicable to the tariff classification of the goods concerned?
Is a partnership, created for the sole purpose of establishing a capital company, entitled to deduct the VAT paid by it where the only output transaction of that partnerships was to transfer all of its assets to the company once it had been established and where such a transfer is not deemed to be a supply of goods or services within the meaning of Directive 77/388?
Is a person in the circumstances of the claimant in the present case a worker for the purposes of Regulation No 1612/68 ?
Does a person in the circumstances of the claimant in the present case have a right to reside in the MS pursuant to Directive 68/360?
Do any provisions or principles of Community law require the payment of a social security benefit with conditions of entitlement like those for income-based jobseeker allowance to a person in the circumstances of the claimant in the present case?
May Directive 77/93  be interpreted as allowing a phytosanitary certificate to be issued by the authorities of a non-member country which is not the plants' country of origin when the plants are subject to the special requirement that their packaging is to bear an appropriate origin mark, in accordance with item 16.1?
Must the certificate be issued in the country of origin even if 16.1 is interpreted in the light of items 16.2 and 16.3?
Are national provisions of the law on feedingstuffs, which prohibit imports of a feedingstuff manufactured lawfully in another Member State on the ground that the level of vitamin D 3 does not comply with the law of the State of importation, to be assessed directly in the light of Articles 28 EC and 30 EC?
Must Art 12 and 19 of Directive 70/524  be interpreted as precluding a measure by which a MS prohibits the marketing within its territory of a supplementary feedingstuff lawfully manufactured in another MS in accordance with Art 12(1) of that directive on grounds of its vitamin D level?
Is Article 19 EC Treaty and the judgment in Gillespie (C-342/02) to be interpreted as meaning that a woman is entitled to have a pay rise taken into consideration in calculating or re-calculating the earnings-related element of her Statutory Maternity Pay?
Is the answer to Question 1 affected by whether the fact that the effective date of the pay rise commences; (i) prior to the beginning of the maternity leave, (ii) prior to the end of the earnings-related period of her statutory maternity pay, (iii) on some other date?
If there is a right to have a pay rise taken into account in circumstances such as those in the main proceedings, should the pay rise be taken account of in calculating the pay due to the worker during her maternity leave and should account  also be taken of any decrease in the woman?s pay during the period following that covered by the reference pay and during her maternity leave?
Are the principles of Community law relating to European citizenship and to the freedom of movement of persons, to be interpreted as precluding the Belgian administrative authority, to which an application to change the surname of minor children residing in Belgium who have dual Belgian and Spanish nationality has been made on the ground that those children should bear the surname to which they are entitled according to Spanish law and tradition, from refusing that change by stating that that type of application is habitually rejected on the ground that, in Belgium, children bear their father's surname?
Is Directive 93/104 to be interpreted as meaning that time spent on call by an employee in a hospital constitutes working time even where the employee is permitted to sleep at times when he/she is not required to work?
Is it in breach of Directive 93/104 for a rule of national law to classify time spent on call as a rest period unless work is actually carried out, where the employee stays in a room provided in a hospital and works as and when required to do so?
Is it in breach of Directive 93/104/EC for a rule of national law to permit a reduction in the daily rest period of 11 hours in hospitals, where the amount of time actually worked during time spent on call or stand-by, not exceeding one half of the rest period, is compensated for at other times?
Is it in breach of Directive 93/104/EC for a rule of national law to permit a collective agreement or a works agreement based on a collective agreement to allow rest periods, where time is spent on call and stand-by, to be adapted to the special circumstances of such duties, including in particular reductions in rest periods as a result of work actually being carried out, with these periods of duty being compensated for at other times?
Can a taxable person exercise his right to deduct input tax only in respect of the calendar year in which he holds an invoice pursuant to Article 18(1)(a) of Directive 77/388/EEC or must the right to deduct always be exercised (even if retrospectively) in respect of the calendar year in which the right to deduct pursuant to Article 17(1) of Directive 77/388/EEC arose?
Do stuffed animals listed in Annex A [to Regulation No 338/97] fall within the definition of worked specimens?
What is covered by the term acquire in Article 8(3) of Regulation No 338/97?
Must the person who acquired the specimen more than 50 years previously be the present owner?
Is the defendant required to observe the directly applicable provisions of Directive [93/89] and Directive [1999/62], with the result that the defendant cannot charge tolls higher than if those provisions had been complied with?
Do Directives 93/89 1999/62 and have direct effect?
How and by reference to what parameters is the authorised toll for a single journey on the full itinerary to be calculated?
May Austrian hauliers too rely on the fact that the (excessive) rate for the full itinerary discriminates against them in comparison with road users who use only part itineraries of that motorway?
Is the judgment in Case C-21/94, in which it was held that the effects of Directive 93/89 were to be preserved until the Council should have adopted a new directive, to be interpreted as meaning that the effects are to be preserved until the Member States have transposed the new directive or until the period prescribed for transposition has expired?
Are the Member States under an obligation during the period from 17 June 1999 to 1 July 2000 to have regard to the new Directive?
Is it inconsistent with the Brussels Convention to grant restraining orders against defendants who are threatening to commence or continue legal proceedings in another Convention country when those defendants are acting in bad faith with the intent and purpose of frustrating or obstructing proceedings properly before the English courts?
Is community law to be interpreted as meaning that the compensatory supplement provided for under national law constitutes a special non-contributory benefit within the meaning of Regulation 1408/71, therefore the benefit can be paid only to a person habitually resident in Austria?
Is the expression "place where the harmful event occurred"  contained in Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention to be construed in such a way that  it also encompasses in any event the place where the injured party is domiciled if the investment was made in another Member State of the Community??
Is Article 93(3) of the EC Treaty to be interpreted as meaning that it may be relied on by a litigant who is not affected by distortion of cross-border competition arising from an aid measure?
Is Article 93(3) of the EC Treaty  to be interpreted as meaning that the prohibition referred to in it applies to a tax where an aid measure consists of an exemption from that tax?
Does an increase in the tax as compensation for the loss of revenue, due to the exemption, create a sufficient link between the aid and the tax? (So that the prohibition on implementation referred to in that provisions extends to the tax)
If the prohibition on implementation of the aid measure also relates to the tax, does a final decision by the Commission declaring the aid measure compatible with the common market not mean that the unlawfulness of the tax is retroactively corrected?
If the prohibition on implementation also relates to the tax, can persons on whom the tax is levied oppose such tax in law by relying on the direct effect of Article 93(3) of the EC Treaty in respect of the total amount of the tax or only in respect of part thereof?
Do specific requirements stem from Community law as regards the manner in which it must be determined which part of the tax is covered by the prohibition in the last sentence of Article 93(2) of the EC Treaty??
Must Article 93(3) of the EC Treaty  be interpreted as meaning that it applies to a tax?
Does Article 9(1)(c) of Council Directive 79/409 permit a MS to derogate from the opening and closing dates for hunting which follow from consideration of the objectives specified in Article 7(4) thereof?
What are the criteria which makes it possible to establish the limits of derogation?
Does Directive 73/148, Directive 90/364 or Article 18 EC, if appropriate, read in conjunction with Articles 8 and 14 of the ECHR such as that at issue in the main proceedings confer the right on a citizen who is minor to enter and reside in a host MS and does the mother of the citizen, a third country national, have the same rights?
Is an approval of a new set of conditions on an existing permission "a development consent" for the purposes of the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive 85/337?
Is the MS under a continuing duty to remedy its failure to require an Environmental Impact Assessment?
May an individual rely on the Directive 85/337 at issue in the main proceedings?
What is the meaning of 'substantial part' and 'insubstantial part' of the contents of a database as used in the Directive?
What is the meaning of the concept of investment in the obtaining of a database within the meaning of Article 7(1) of directive 96/9?
What is the meaning of the concept of verification of the contents of a database within the meaning of a database within Article 7(1) of directive 96/9 ?
Does a use such as that made by the claimant constitute extraction and/or re-utilisation within the meaning of the Directive 96/9
? What is the meaning of the terms extraction and re-utilisation?
What type of act is covered by the prohibition laid down by the Article 7(5) of Directive 96/9 at issue in the main proceedings?
Does the first indent of Article 2(2) of Decision 92/353 confer on an association of breeders already in existence, a right to have the competent authority refuse to recognise another, if to recognise that other association would endanger the preservation of the breed or jeopardise the operation or the improvement or selection programme of an organisation or association already in existence?
Does the first indent of Article 2(2) of Decision 92/353 preclude the application of a provision of national law which, when regulating the procedure for official approval of a new breeding association, grants existing associations only the right to be heard, and not the right to have recognition refused, and does not entitle them to contest recognition, even if they have expressed their opposition at the hearing?
Is the benefit, for persons performing military service, consisting in the taking into account of the duration of that service, to be regarded as part of their pay within the meaning of Article 141 EC and of the Directive 75/117?
Do Article 141 EC and Directive 75/117 preclude the calculation of the termination payment from taking into account as length of service the duration of military or equivalent civilian service performed mostly by men but not that of parental leave taken most often by women?
Does the Directive 94/19 , insofar as it refers in Article 3(2) to (5) thereof to the adoption of supervisory measures and an obligation to revoke a credit institution?s authorisation, preclude a national rule, such as that at hand, to the effect that the functions of the national authority responsible for supervising credit institutions are to be fulfilled only in the public interest, which under national law precludes individuals from claiming compensation for damage resulting from defective supervision on the part of that authority?
Do Directives 77/780, 89/299, 95/26 and 89/646, insofar as they contain rules on the supervision of credit institutions, preclude a national rule to the effect that the functions of the national authority responsible for supervising credit institutions are to be fulfilled only in the public interest, which under national law precludes individuals from claiming compensation for damage resulting from defective supervision on the part of that authority?
Does Article 18 EC or any other rule of Community law preclude national legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings?
Do Article 12 EC, Articles 39 EC to 42 EC and Article 45 of Regulation 1408/71 preclude national provisions concerning old-age pension such as those at issue in the main proceedings?
Can it be inferred from Article 7(1)(f) of the Regulation 536/93 that the stock accounts which producers are required to keep need to state only the quantities, per month and per product, of milk and/or milk products actually sold?
Is a term contained in a seller?s standard business conditions, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, to be regarded as unfair within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC?
When products mentioned in the annex to Directive 1999/4 are marketed, may exclusively the product names listed therein be used or may, alongside those product names, other names, such as an invented or trade name, be used in accordance with Article 2 of Directive 1999/4/EC ?
Do Article 18(1) and (2) of Directive 2000/13 preclude national legislation which prohibits references to ?slimming? and to ?medical recommendations, attestations, declarations or statements of approval? in the labelling, presentation and advertising of foodstuffs?
Must Articles 28 EC and 30 EC be interpreted as precluding national legislation which prohibits references in the advertising of foodstuffs imported from other Member States to ?slimming? and to ?medical recommendations, attestations, declarations or statements of approval?
Must Article 7 of Directive 97/67, read in the light of recital 21 thereof, be interpreted as meaning that it allows self-provision, that is postal services provided by the sender or a third party acting on his behalf, to be subject to conditions such as those at issue in the main proceedings?
May money order services be included amongst those reserved to the universal postal service provider?
Do the provisions of the TRIPs agreement apply to the question of which right has the earlier legal basis, when the alleged trademark infringement is said to continue after the date of applicability of the TRIPS agreement for the EU?
Should a trade name be regarded as a sign within the meaning of Article 16(1) of the TRIPs Agreement?
Should a trade name not registered or established by use in the State where the mark is registered be regarded as an existing prior right within the meaning of Article 16(1) of the TRIPs Agreement?
Does Article 30(1) of the Directive 93/37 constitute a logically consistent application of the principle of free competition which is already enshrined in Article 85 EC (now Article 81 EC)?
Does Article 30(1) of the Directive 93/37 preclude national rules such as those at issue in the main proceedings?
Do transactions of the kind at issue in the main proceedings constitute supplies of goods or supplies of services and an economic activity within the meaning of the Directive, when they are effected for the sole purpose of obtaining a tax advantage, without any other economic aim?
Must the Sixth Directive be interpreted as meaning that a taxable person has no right to deduct input VAT where the transactions on which that right is based constitute an abusive practice (in accordance with the EC principle of prohibiting abusive practises)?
On a proper construction of Council Directives 87/102 and 90/88, must a national court uphold the interpretation of its national law which requires that before each renewal, on the existing terms and conditions, of a credit agreement such as that at issue in the main proceedings, the lender is obliged to inform the borrower in writing of the current annual percentage rate of charge (APR)?
On a proper construction of those Directives, must the national court uphold the interpretation of its law which requires lending institutions to inform that consumer of the clause concerning the variation of that APR before each extension of such an agreement?
On a proper construction of those Directives, must the national court uphold the interpretation of its law which authorises it to raise, without any time-limit,  possible irregularities of the kind considered that vitiate the conclusion or renewal of a consumer credit agreement such as that at issue or to set aside a provision of its national law which sets a time-limit for such irregularities to be raised by the court?
Is Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention to be interpreted as subsuming under matters relating to a contract the obligation which a guarantor who paid customs duties under a guarantee seeks to enforce in legal proceedings by way of recourse against the third-party debtor who is the owner of the goods and unconnected with the contract of guarantee?
Is a stepson aged under 21 years of a Turkish worker who is duly registered as belonging to the labour force of a MS a member of the family within the meaning of the first paragraph of Article 7 of Decision No 1/80?
Is Article 3(1) of Regulation No 2988/95 directly applicable in the Member States, including in the field of export refunds for agricultural products, notwithstanding the existence of national customs measures which provide for a shorter limitation period?
Is the notification of a customs inspection made to the undertaking involved an act relating to investigation or legal proceedings which interrupts the limitation period of four years under Article 3(1) of the said Regulation?
Is it inconsistent with the Brussels Convention, where jurisdiction is founded on Article 2, for a court of a Contracting State to decline to hear proceedings brought against a person domiciled in that State in favour of the courts of a non-Contracting State, if the jurisdiction of no other Contracting State is in issue and if the proceedings have no connecting factors to any other Contracting State?
Does Article 141 EC and/or Directive 76/207 preclude a collective agreement such as the BAT-O from excluding from a qualifying period the part for which a female worker took maternity leave which was longer than the protected period of eight weeks provided for by the legislation of Germany to which that agreement refers?
Must Article 141 EC and Article 1 of Directive 75/117 be interpreted as precluding national legislation which provides that teachers, part-time as well as full-time, do not receive any remuneration for additional hours worked when the additional work does not exceed three hours per calendar month?
Are the first indent of Article 2(2) of Decision 2000/766 and Article 1(1) of Decision 2001/9, read together with other Community rules, to be interpreted as meaning that the accidental presence of a prohibited substance in fish flour may be considered to be acceptable and that, accordingly, traders are allowed a reasonable level of tolerance?
If so, in the light of the principle of proportionality, the precautionary principle and in consideration of other applicable Community provisions in which reference is made to accidental contamination of food-industry products, does an accidental contamination of not more than 0.5%, of fragments of mammalian bone in fish flour warrant the adoption of a sanction such as the  destruction of that fish flour?
Does the exclusion of any tolerance in relation to the presence of the substances mentioned in the preceding questions amount to the introduction of a technical standard within the meaning of Directive [83/189] which would have to have been notified in advance to the European Commission?
Are Article 49 EC, Article 12 EC and the Directive 77/249 to be interpreted as precluding a rule, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, laid down in the case-law of a MS, limiting the reimbursement by an unsuccessful party in a dispute to the successful party?
Must Article 49 EC and the Directive 77/249 be interpreted as precluding a judicial rule of a MS providing that the party which has been successful and was represented by a lawyer established in another MS cannot recover, in addition to the fees of that lawyer, the fees of a lawyer practising before the court seized of the dispute who, under the national legislation, was required to work in conjunction with the first lawyer?
Is Article 8a(1) of Directive 92/81/EEC  to be construed as prohibiting MS from charging duty on mineral oil contained in the standard tank of a commercial motor vehicle and used as fuel when that mineral oil has been lawfully released for consumption in another MS?
If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative, is Article 8a(1) of Directive 92/81/EEC directly applicable in relation to the claimant in order to contest national rules that are incompatible with that prohibition?
Is a statutory Scheme such as that at issue in the main proceedings, to be considered as a measure having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions on exports, contrary to Article 29 EC, by reason of the fact that potatoes sent directly from Jersey to the United Kingdom may travel via another MS but without leaving the carrying vessel?
Is a statutory Scheme such as that at issue in the main proceedings to be considered incompatible with Articles 23 EC, 25 EC, 28 EC and 29 EC?
Is Article 2(2) of Regulation 2988/95 to be interpreted as meaning that where in an application for ?livestock? aid covered by Regulation 3887/92 there is an irregularity giving rise to a penalty under  that regulation, the competent authorities must apply the provisions of Article 44 of Regulation 2419/2001 retroactively, on the ground that it prescribes less severe penalties for the conduct in question?
Is Article 12 EC, in conjunction with Article 3 of Regulation 1408/71, to be interpreted as precluding a national rule such as that at issue in the main proceedings, and does denying that child entitlement to maintenance payments in those circumstances constitute discrimination against that child?
Is the derogation contained in Article 7(1)(a) of Directive 79/7 to be interpreted as being applicable to a benefit such as the early old-age pension in connection with unemployment in respect of which different pensionable ages for men and for women are determined in national law?
Does Article 1(2) of Directive 94/62 preclude a Member State from promoting systems for the reuse of packaging, by application of a system such as that laid down in the national legislation at issue?
Does Article 18 of Directive 94/62 preclude a Member State from impeding the placing of drinks in recoverable non-reusable packaging on the market by applying national provisions such as those at issue in the main proceedings?
Does Article 7 of the Directive confer on producers and distributors of drinks in recoverable non-reusable packaging who are permitted to fulfil their deposit and return obligations by participating in a global packaging-collection system the right to continue to participate in a global system of that kind in order to meet their legal obligations?
Does Article 28 EC preclude national rules, such as those at issue, concerning the manner in which producers using non-reusable packaging may fulfil their deposit, return and recovery obligations?
Must Article 141 EC, Article 1 of Directive 75/117 and Clause 2 of the Framework Agreement on part-time work, be construed as meaning (in regard to the concept of ?worker?) that full protection is also afforded to persons such as the claimant in the present case who has a comprehensive framework contract of employment such as that at issue in the main proceedings?
Is the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers legally binding, at least in so far as other provisions of Community law have to be interpreted in light of it?
Must Clause 4 of the Framework Agreement annexed to Directive 97/81 and Articles 2(1) and 5(1) of Directive 76/207 be interpreted as precluding a provision, such as Paragraph 3 of the AZG, in circumstances where the national provisions do not determine for part-time workers neither the hours of work nor the manner in which working time is to be organised?
Must Article 141 EC, Article 1 of Directive 75/117, Article 5 of Directive 76/207 and Clause 4 of the Framework Agreement be construed as precluding a contract for part-time employment, such as that at issue in the main proceedings?
Does the Article 73 of the EC Treaty (now Article 56 and 58 EC) preclude legislation of a MS which reserves the application of definitive taxation for income from capital paid by a company established in that MS, to the exclusion of such income paid by a company established in another MS?
Does the assessment of the compatibility of such legislation with Article 73 of the EC Treaty (now Article 56 and 58 EC) depend on the level of corporation tax in the State where they are established?
Does Article 73 of the EC Treaty (now Article 56 EC) preclude tax legislation which allows a taxpayer who lives in a MS, and receives income from capital originating in another MS, to deduct pro rata from his income tax the corporation tax paid by the company in which he has a holding?
Is Article 56 of the Treaty to be interpreted as precluding a corporation tax credit system like the one in question?
Is Article 58 EC to be interpreted as meaning that the provisions of Article 56 are without prejudice to the MS right to apply the relevant provisions?
Is Article 25 of Directive 77/388 to be interpreted as meaning that a farmer who has leased part of his farm but continues his farming activity on the rest of his farm and who, in respect of the continued farming activity, is subject to the common flat-rate scheme provided for in Article 25 may treat the income from the leasing arrangement as being taxable under that scheme?
Are the relevant provisions of the Association Agreements to be interpreted as precluding the competent authority, when assessing an application submitted in the Netherlands for a full residence permit with a view to establishment in accordance with the Association Agreement, to refrain from examining the contents of the application solely on the ground that the applicant does not have a temporary residence permit, in light of the C-257/99  judgement?
Is it relevant for the purposes of answering the first question whether the person applying for a full residence permit is legally resident in the Netherlands at the time of the application?
Are the Articles in question of Regulations 2100/94 and 1768/95 to be interpreted as meaning that the holder of a variety protected under Regulation No 2100/94 can request the supplier of processing services to provide the information specified in those provisions, regardless of whether there is any indication that the supplier has processed the protected variety concerned?
If there have to be indications of the activity described in Question 1: Must the supplier provide information pursuant to the provisions in question of  Regulations 2100/94 and 1768/95, with regard to all the farmers for whom he has processed the protected variety, or only with regard to those in respect of whom the holder has some indication that the supplier has processed the protected variety concerned?
Must investment by the maker of a database in the creation as such of data be taken into account in assessing whether there was substantial investment in the obtaining, verification or presentation of the contents of a database within the meaning of Directive 96/9?
Does a database enjoy protection under Directive 96/9 only in respect of activities covered by the objective of the database maker in creating the database ?
What do the terms "a substantial part, evaluated qualitatively and/or quantitatively, of the contents of that database" in Article 7(1) Directive 96/9 mean?
Is the directive?s protection against ?extraction and/or re-utilisation? of the contents of a database limited to such use as entails a direct exploitation of the base or does the protection also cover use in cases where the contents are available from another source (second-hand) or are generally accessible?
How should the terms "normal exploitation" and "unreasonably prejudice" in Article 7(5) of Directive 96/9 be interpreted?
Is a scheme in which levies are imposed to finance collective advertising campaigns, to be regarded as (part of a measure of) aid within the meaning of Article 92(1) of the Treaty?
Does the obligation to notify under Article 93(3) of the Treaty apply only to aid which satisfies the definition in Article 92(1) of the Treaty?
When assessing the obligation to notify an aid plan, must the national court take into consideration the de minimis rule? Can it even do so retroactively?
Can the national court even do so retroactively?
Does the failure to fulfil the obligation to notify give the effect that the national court must annul both the bye-laws and the levy decisions imposed under those bye-laws and that that court must order the public body to repay the levies?
In case of failure to notify an aid as laid down in Article 93(3) of the Treaty, can a public body rely on the rule of formal legal force of the levy decision if the person to whom that decision was addressed has not challenged the decision in administrative proceedings during the period within which it could have been challenged?
Must the Directive 308/76 be interpreted as applying to customs claims which arose in one Member State under an instrument issued by that State before the Directive entered into force in the other Member State, where the requested authority is situated?
Is Article 1 of the Directive 83/183 to be interpreted as meaning that car tax charged under the national legislation in question on a vehicle imported into Finland from another MS in connection with a transfer of residence is a consumption tax within the meaning of Article 1(1) of the directive?
Must Article 9 of Regulation 1765/92 and Article 7 of Regulation 1251/1999 be interpreted as meaning that the exclusion of land under permanent crops from compensation payments requires that the land in question has been cultivated, and in particular that insecticides have been used during the growing period and harvests have been made?
Must Article 9 and 7 of the Regulations be interpreted as meaning that land ceases to be under permanent crops, in the case of apple production, at the time when the producer decides to fell the apple trees or have that done by a contractor, the time of actual felling of the apple trees, or the time when the felled trees are removed?
Must Article 9 and Article 7 of the Regulations be interpreted as meaning that, where land has ceased to be under permanent crops, it must be regarded as being used for non-agricultural purposes?
Must Article 12(2)(a) of the Directive 89/104 be interpreted as meaning that in cases where intermediaries participate in the distribution to the consumer of a product which is the subject of a registered trade mark, the relevant classes of persons whose views must be taken into account for assessing whether that trade mark has become the common name in the trade for the product in question comprise all consumers of the product and/or all those in the trade who deal with the product commercially?
Is a person who claims benefits under German unemployment insurance more than two months after completing his compulsory national service in Spain subject to Spanish legislation under Article 13(2)(e) or German legislation under Article 13(2)(f) of the Regulation?
Does compulsory national service undertaken in Spain constitute "last employment in the territory of a Member State other than the competent State" within the meaning of Article 71(1) of Regulation 1408/71?
For the purposes of examining the right to unemployment benefit; Is a competent institution obliged, under Article 67 of the Regulation 1408/71, to take into account in the calculation of periods of insurance completed a period of compulsory military service performed in another MS?
Does Article 3 of the Regulation 1408/71 (on the principle of equality of treatment), in circumstances such as those in the main proceedings, preclude a competent institution, from not taking account, in calculating periods of insurance completed, of a period of compulsory military service performed in another MS?
Must Article 9 of the Association Agreement be interpreted as precluding the application of legislation of a MS which makes entitlement to an early old-age pension in the event of unemployment conditional upon the claimant?s having received, within a certain period prior to his application for a pension, unemployment insurance benefits from that MS alone?
Does Article 45(1) of Regulation 1408/71 preclude a rule of a MS which requires as a condition of entitlement to an early old-age pension in the event of unemployment, that the worker concerned must have drawn a cash benefit on account of his unemployment from the unemployment insurance scheme of that MS within a certain period prior to the qualifying date?
Do Articles 17 and 20 of the Sixth Directive 77/388 or the European law principles of the protection of legitimate expectations and of legal certainty preclude revocation of an adjustment of VAT under circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings?
Do Regulations No 404/93, 2362/98, 2806/98, 102/1999 and 608/1999 infringe Articles I and XIII of GATT inasmuch as regards the joint quotas introduced?
Do the Regulations No 404/93, 2362/98, 2806/98, 102/1999 and 608/1999 infringe Article 4 of the Fourth ACP-EC Convention?
Do the No 404/93, 2362/98, 2806/98, 102/1999 and 608/1999 infringe the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations and the principle of good faith in international public law (GATT 1994, WTO) and international customary law?
Must Annex I to Regulation 2658/87 be construed as meaning that chairmats such as those at issue in the main proceedings, were to be classified, over the period from 15 July 1997 to 20 March 2000, under tariff subheading 3918 10 90 in Chapter 39 or under tariff subheading 9403 70 90 in Chapter 94?
Are Article 15(6), (7) and (9) of the Sixth Directive (Directive 77/388), to be interpreted as meaning that a MS is entitled not to exempt from VAT supplies to aircraft operating on a domestic route, regardless of the fact that the company using the aircraft operates chiefly on international routes?
If the Court finds that such supplies must be exempted from VAT; Which criteria are decisive under Article 15(6)  Directive 77/388 for determining whether an airline can be said to be operating ?chiefly? on international routes?
Does Article 3(a) of Directive 89/592 preclude a person, who receives inside information in his capacity as the employees? representative on a company?s board of directors or in his capacity as a member of the liaison committee of a group of undertakings, from disclosing such information to the general secretary of the professional organisation which organises those employees and which appointed that person as a member of the liaison committee?
Does Article 3(a) of Directive 89/592 preclude the general secretary of a professional organisation, who receives inside information in the circumstances set out in the first and second questions, to disclose that information to his colleagues?
Is the type of inside information that has been disclosed a relevant factor when interpreting Article 3(a) of the Directive?
Is Article 39(2) of the EC Treaty, on the free movement of workers, to be interpreted as precluding a national rule which provides that entitlement to financial compensation first legislated for in the year 2000 for persons who became prisoners of war in the course of the First or Second World War, is to be conditional on such persons holding Austrian nationality at the time of application?
?Does Article 6 of the First Companies Directive concern not only cases of failure to publish information relating to companies but also cases in which false information on companies is published?
Is compliance with the requirement of effectiveness, proportionality and dissuasiveness which penalties for infringement of Community provisions must satisfy to be assessed in regard to the nature of penalty considered in the abstract?
Are the principles set out in the Fourth and Seventh Companies Directives to be interpreted as precluding national legislation setting thresholds below which inaccurate statements in annual accounts and annual reports relating to public limited companies, limited partnerships and private limited companies are not punishable?
Should trips on board vessels within Community waters for purposes other than pleasure be included in the term ?navigation? within the meaning of the first paragraph of Article?8(1)(c) of Directive 92/81?
Are vehicles which are designed for off-highway use and intended for the transport and dumping of materials, and, in particular, are equipped for that purpose with an intricate, versatile and precise tipping function, excluded from the scope of the term "dumper" contained in (sub)heading 8704 10 of the Common Customs Tariff?
Must Article 85a of the European Communities? Staff Regulations be interpreted as conferring on the Communities the right to claim from a third party liable for the death of an official reimbursement in full of the survivor?s pension paid to the surviving spouse pursuant to Articles 79 and 79(a) of those Staff Regulations although the law applicable to entitlement to compensation for damage provides that the right to a survivor?s pension is unconnected with the obligation of the perpetrator of a wrongful act to compensate in full for the damage and the damage suffered by the surviving husband as a result of the loss of the deceased wife?s income is less than the amount of the survivor?s pension paid to him?
Is Article 39 EC infringed by the fact that for the purposes of calculating the basis of assessment of interim assistance account must be taken of the notional German tax on emoluments if the former employee lives and is subject to tax abroad?
Are trade marks (ie a “sign” which complies with the requirements of Article 2 of the Trade Marks Directive 89/104/EC) consisting of a common surname subject to specific conditions in the assessment of their capacity to distinguish products or services?
Is it of significance for the purpose of determining whether a surname is ?devoid of any distinctive character? within Article 3(1)(b) of the Directive 89/104 that the effects of registration of the trade mark are restricted under Article?6(1)(a)?
If so, is the word ?person? in Article 6(1) of the Directive 89/104 to be understood as including a corporation or a business?
Does the national legislation in question widen the meaning of the term ?customs debtor? in a manner that is contrary to Article 202(3) of the Customs Code and therefore incompatible with Community law?
Does retail trade in goods constitute a service within the meaning of Article 2 of the directive 89/104?
Is the registration of a service trade mark in respect of such services  subject to the specification of certain details?
How far it is necessary to delimit the area of similarity, within the meaning of Articles 4(1)(b) and 5(1)(b) of the directive 89/104, as between, on the one hand services provided in connection with the retail sale of goods, and on the other, other services offered in connection with the marketing of the goods or the actual goods offered for sale by the retailer?
Do transactions of the kind at issue in the main proceedings, designed to obtain a tax advantage, constitute an economic activity within the meaning of Article 4(1) and (2) of the Sixth Directive?
Do transactions of the kind at issue in the main proceedings, designed to obtain a tax advantage, constitute supplies of goods within the meaning of Article 5(1) of the Sixth Directive?
Must the Directive be interpreted as meaning that a taxable person has no right to deduct input VAT when the transactions on which that right is based constitute an abusive practice?
Does it make any difference to the answers to Questions 1 to 3 above if payment is made in respect of the relevant transactions at a time when any onward supply of the goods would have been an exempt supply with refund of VAT at the preceding stage as permitted by Article 28(2)(a) of the Directive?
Is Article 17 of the Sixth Directive to be interpreted as meaning that such a right to deduct input VAT concerning the supplies at hand does not arise under circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings?
The VAT and Duties Tribunal found that none of the individuals in a position to take decisions for the companies at hand had any motive or purpose of substance other than to carry through the VAT avoidance scheme. If that finding of fact were to be set aside, would it make any difference to the answers to Questions 1 to 6 above inclusive?
Do the 77/187/EEC, 98/50/EC and 2001/23/EC directives preclude, in the event of a transfer of an undertaking from a legal person governed by private law to the State, the latter, as new employer, from reducing the amount of the remuneration of the employees concerned for the purpose of complying with the national rules in force for public employees?
Must Article 13B(b) of the Sixth Directive (77/388) be construed as meaning that the term ?letting of immovable property? includes the letting of a boat site, such as that at issue in the main proceedings?
Must Article 13B(b)(2) of the Sixth Directive (77/388) be construed as meaning that the term ?vehicles? includes boats?
Does Directive 89/552 preclude national legislation, such a as that at issue in the main proceedings, which prohibits the advertising for alcoholic drinks on television, in the case of indirect television advertising?
Does Article 49 EC preclude national legislation, such a as that at issue in the main proceedings, which prohibits the advertising for alcoholic drinks on television, in the case of indirect television advertising?
Is Article 8 of Directive 2001/37, by which the placing on the market of tobacco for oral use is prohibited, without prejudice to Article 151 of the Act of Accession, compatible with higher-ranking law of the European Communities?
In circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings (in Sweden); Does Article 31 EC preclude national legislation which provides that retail trade in medicinal products may only be carried on by the State or by legal persons in which the State has a determining influence, the objective of which is to meet the need for safe and effective medicinal products?
Does Article 28 EC preclude legislation such as that described in Question 1, in the light of the information in that question?
Does Article 43 EC preclude legislation such as that described in Question 1, in the light of the information in that question?
Does Community law preclude legislation of a Member State which prohibits a credit institution which is a subsidiary of a company from another Member State from remunerating sight accounts in euros opened by residents of the former Member State?
If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, what kind of reasons of the public interest might in an appropriate case be relied on to justify such an obstacle?
Does Article 3(2)(ii) of Directive 98/8 preclude a MS from requiring prior authorisation for the marketing of blocks of cedar wood such as those in issue in the main proceedings?
May such blocks be classified as a product containing only a "basic substance" so that, pursuant to Article 3(2)(ii) of Directive 98/8, they may be placed on the market in Italy without prior authorisation or registration?
Does Article 4(1) of Directive 98/8 or Article 28 EC preclude a MS from requiring prior authorisation for the marketing of blocks of cedar wood such as those in issue in the main proceedings, which have been lawfully placed on the market in another MS in which there is no requirement of authorisation or registration?
What is the definition of database and what is the scope of Directive 96/9/EC?
In the light of the definition of the scope of the directive, do lists of football fixtures enjoy protection as databases over which there is a sui generis right in favour of the maker?
How exactly is the database right infringed and is it protected in the event of rearrangement of the contents of the database?
Is Article 13B(f) of the Directive to be interpreted as precluding a MS from making the organisation of gambling subject to value added tax if it is exempt when organised by a licensed public casino?
Does Article 13B(f) of the Directive prohibit a MS from making the operation of a gaming machine subject to value added tax if the operation of a gaming machine by a licensed public casino is exempt, or is it prohibited only where the games of chance organised by a licensed public casino are also comparable, in terms of the essential characteristics of the game, to the games of chance organised outside such casinos?
Does Article 13B(f) of the Directive have direct effect in the sense that it can be relied on by an operator of games of chance or gaming machines before national courts to prevent the application of rules of national law which are inconsistent with that provision?
Can a person in a situation such as that of the claimant in the main proceedings  claim a right of residence as a worker, a self-employed person or a provider or recipient of services, within the meaning of Articles 39 EC, 43 EC and 49 EC respectively?
If the first question is answered in the negative; May a person in the situation of the claimant in the main proceedings, simply by virtue of being a citizen of the European Union, enjoy a right of residence in the host Member State by the direct application of Article 18 EC?
Does Directive 75/442 preclude a provision of national law defining the concept of waste under which the holder of a substance or object discards or intends or is required to discard it only if the substance or object is subjected to a disposal or recovery operation as listed in Annexes IIA and IIB to the Directive and in the identically worded provisions of national law, or, as the case may be, where there is a corresponding intention or obligation?
Does Directive 75/442 preclude a provision of national law defining the concept of waste which provides that production or consumption residues are not waste if: they can be and are reused in the same or similar or different production or consumption cycle, without undergoing any prior treatment and without causing harm to the environment; and/or after undergoing prior treatment without requiring any of the recovery operations listed in Annex IIB to the Directive and the identically worded national provisions?
Do the general rules of Community law of legal certainly and non-retroactivity mean that, a MS is precluded from adopting rules which make it possible to penalise retroactively production in excess of production quotas introduced after the entry into force of the Community regulations but under the aegis of the national rules which have been replaced?
Must the Regulation 259/93 be interpreted as meaning that the competent authority, if it considers the classification in the consignment note incorrect, may refuse to effect the notification or reclassify it on its own initiative or must it give the notification and at the same time or subsequently raise a reasoned objection?
Does Article 13 of [Regulation No 562/2006] apply to re-entry by a third-country national into the territory of a Member State which has issued that person with a temporary residence permit, where re-entry into its territory does not require entry, transit or stay in the territory of the other Member States?
In what circumstances may a Member State issue to third-country nationals a reentry visa within the meaning of Article 5(4)(a) of that regulation in particular, may such a visa limit entry only to points of entry into the territory of that State?
Since Regulation No 562/2006 excludes all possibility of entry into the territory of the Member States for third-party nationals who hold only a temporary residence permit issued pending examination of a first application for a residence permit or an application for asylum, contrary to what was allowed under [the Schengen Convention], in the version prior to its amendment by Regulation No 562/2006, did the principles of legal certainty and protection of legitimate expectations require that transitional measures should be laid down in respect of third-country nationals who left the territory of those States when they were holders of only a temporary residence permit issued pending examination of a first application for a residence permit or an application for asylum, and wished to return there after the entry into force of Regulation No 562/2006?
Must Article 5(7) of Regulation No 800/1999 be interpreted as meaning that the holder of an export licence is entitled to an export refund only if he is registered as exporter in box 2 of the customs declaration lodged with the competent customs office.
Does Article 78(1) and (3) of the Customs Code allow, for the purpose of refunds, post-clearance revision of the export declaration in order to change the name of the exporter featuring in the box provided for that purpose, and whether the customs authorities are obliged, in a case such as that in the main proceedings, to regularise the situation and to grant the export refund to the exporter?
Must Article 5(7) of Regulation No 800/1999 and the customs legislation of the European Union be interpreted as meaning that the customs authorities, in a case such as that in the main proceedings in which the holder of an export licence has not been entered as the exporter in box 2 of the export declaration, may grant that export licence holder the export refund without prior correction of the export declaration?
Must the customs legislation of the European Union be interpreted as meaning that the customs office which is responsible for paying the export refund is bound by a subsequent amendment, made by the customs office of export, to the words in box 2 of the export declaration or the T5 control copy?
Is the office responsible for paying the refund entitled, in a case such as that of the dispute in the main proceedings, to take at face value the words in box 2 of the export declaration and to refuse an application for an export refund on the ground that the applicant for the refund is not the exporter of the goods covered by that application, or is the responsible office obliged, when there is a contradiction between the description of the exporter in box 2 of the export declaration and the previous document to which reference is made in box 40 and/or the holder of the export licence registered in box 44, to consult the applicant for a refund on that point and, if necessary, to amend of its own motion the words in box 2 of the export declaration?
Must Article 7 of Decision No 1/80 be interpreted as meaning that the family members of a Turkish worker duly registered as belonging to the labour force of a Member State cannot invoke that provision once that worker has acquired the nationality of the host Member State while retaining his Turkish nationality?
In answering the first question, is the time at which the Turkish worker concerned acquired the nationality of the host Member State of relevance?
Do Directives 2001/29 and 2004/48, in conjunction with Directives 95/46, 2000/31 and 2002/58, construed in particular in the light of Articles 8 and 10 of the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, permit Member States to authorise a national court, before which substantive proceedings have been brought and on the basis merely of a statutory provision stating that: ‘They [the national courts] may also issue an injunction against intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to infringe a copyright or related right’, to order an [ISP] to install, for all its customers, in abstracto and as a preventive measure, exclusively at the cost of that ISP and for an unlimited period, a system for filtering all electronic communications, both incoming and outgoing, passing via its services, in particular those involving the use of peer-to-peer software, in order to identify on its network the movement of electronic files containing a musical, cinematographic or audio-visual work in respect of which the applicant claims to hold rights, and subsequently to block the transfer of such files, either at the point at which they are requested or at which they are sent?
If the answer to the [first] question is in the affirmative: Do those directives require a national court, called upon to give a ruling on an application for an injunction against an intermediary whose services are used by a third party to infringe a copyright, to apply the principle of proportionality when deciding on the effectiveness and dissuasive effect of the measure sought?
Under Swedish law there must be clear support in the [ECHR] or the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights for a national court to be able to disapply national provisions which may be suspected of infringing the ne bis in idem principle under Article 4 of Protocol No 7 to the ECHR and may also therefore be suspected of infringing Article 50 of the [Charter]. Is such a condition under national law for disapplying national provisions compatible with European Union law and in particular its general principles, including the primacy and direct effect of European Union law?
Should the ne bis in idem principle laid down in Article 50 of the Charter be interpreted as precluding criminal proceedings for tax evasion from being brought against a defendant where a tax penalty has already been imposed upon him for the same acts of providing false information?
Is national legislation which allows the same court to impose tax penalties in combination with criminal penalties in the event of tax evasion compatible with the ne bis in idem principle guaranteed by Article 50 of the Charter?
Is it contrary to [European Union] law, in particular the law on consumers and users, for a national court to avoid giving a ruling of its own motion and in limine litis or at any stage during the proceedings on whether or not a term concerning interest on late payments (in this case 29%) in a consumer credit agreement is void and on whether or not that term should be modified? May the court, without prejudicing the rights of the consumer under [European Union] law, decide to leave any evaluation of such a term to the initiative of the debtor (by means of the appropriate procedural objection)?
Does Articles 2 of Directive 2009/22 and 6(1) of Directive 93/13 preclude legislation of a Member State which allows a national court, in the case where it finds that an unfair term in a contract concluded between a seller or supplier and a consumer is void, to modify that contract by revising the content of that term?
Is it possible to exclude judicial review of a courts own motion and in limine litis where the applicant clearly states in his application the rate of interest on late payments, the amount of the claim, including the principal and interest, the contractual penalties and the costs, the interest rate and the period of time for which that interest is demanded (or a statement that statutory interest is automatically added to the principal under the law of the Member State of origin), the cause of the action, including a description of the facts relied on as the basis of the claim and the interest demanded, and it is clearly stated whether it concerns statutory or contractual interest, capitalisation of interest or the interest rate for the loan, whether it has been calculated by the applicant and the number of percentage points above the Central Bank base rate, as is the case with [Regulation No 1896/2006] on the European order for payment procedure?
In the absence of their transposition, do Articles 5(1)(l) and (m) and 6(1)(i) of Directive [2008/48], where they refer to arrangements for its adjustment, and Article 10(2)(1), where it refers to arrangements for its adjustment, require the financial institution specifically to include and to highlight in the contract (not in the body of the text, in an undifferentiated manner) as pre-contractual information references to the interest rate applicable in the case of late payments, in the event of default, set out clearly and in a prominent place, and the elements taken into account when determining them (financial costs, recovery costs etc.) and to include a warning regarding the consequences connected with those cost elements?
Does Article 6(2) of Directive [2008/48] include the requirement to notify the early termination of a credit or loan agreement which gives rise to the charging of interest on late payments? Is the principle of the prohibition of unjustified enrichment contained in Article 7 of Directive [2008/48] applicable where the credit institution seeks not only the recovery of the goods (the loan capital), but also the application of an especially high rate of interest on late payments?
In the absence of any transposing provision and in the light of Article 11(2) of Directive [2005/29], may the court find of its own motion that it is an unfair practice to include in a contract a term concerning interest on late payments?
Is Article 39 of Directive 2005/85/EC to be interpreted as precluding national rules such as those established in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg by Article 20(5) of the … Law [of 5 May 2006], pursuant to which an applicant for asylum does not have a right to appeal to a court against the administrative authoritys decision to rule on the merits of the application for international protection under the accelerated procedure?
If the answer [to the first question] is in the negative, is the general principle of an effective remedy under Community law, prompted by Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 1950, to be interpreted as precluding national rules such as those established in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg by Article 20(5) of the … Law [of 5 May 2006], pursuant to which an applicant for asylum does not have a right to appeal to a court against the administrative authoritys decision to rule on the merits of the application for international protection under the accelerated procedure?
Under [Directive 2003/4], where a public authority holds environmental information, disclosure of which would have some adverse effects on the separate interests served by more than one exception (in casu, the interests of public security served by Article 4(2)(b) and those of intellectual property rights served by Article 4(2)(e)), but it would not do so, in the case of either exception viewed separately, to any extent sufficient to outweigh the public interest in disclosure, does the Directive require a further exercise involving the cumulation of the separate interests served by the two exceptions and their weighing together against the public interest in disclosure?
Do Articles 43 EC and 49 EC permit national rules establishing a State monopoly and a system of licences and authorisations which, within the context of a given number of licences tend generally to protect holders of licences issued at an earlier period on the basis of a procedure that unlawfully excluded some operators?
Do Articles 43 EC and 49 EC permit national rules establishing a State monopoly and a system of licences and authorisations which, within the context of a given number of licences in fact ensure the maintenance of market positions acquired on the basis of a procedure that unlawfully excluded certain operators (by … prohibiting new licensees from locating their kiosks within a specified distance of those already in existence)?
To what extent must Article 30(1) of Directive 2008/48 be interpreted as precluding Member States from providing that national legislation transposing the directive is also to apply to agreements concluded before the entry into force of the national implementing provision?
To what extent do the provisions of Article 85(2) of OUG 50/2010 constitute an adequate transposition of the Community provision laid down in Article 24(1) of Directive 2008/48, which requires the Member States to ensure that adequate and effective out-of-court dispute resolution procedures exist for the settlement of disputes with consumers concerning consumer credit agreements?
To what extent must Article 22(1) of Directive 2008/48 be interpreted as meaning that it introduces the maximum level of harmonisation in the field of consumer credit agreements, which precludes the Member States from: (a) extending the scope of the provisions in Directive 2008/48 to agreements expressly excluded from the scope of the directive (such as mortgage loan agreements or agreements concerning the right of ownership in immovable property)?
To what extent must Article 22(1) of Directive 2008/48 be interpreted as meaning that it introduces the maximum level of harmonisation in the field of consumer credit agreements, which precludes the Member States from: (b) introducing additional obligations for credit institutions as regards the types of charges they may levy or the categories of reference indices to which the variable interest rate may refer in consumer credit agreements falling within the scope of the national implementing provision?
If the third question is answered in the negative, to what extent must the principles of the free movement of services and the free movement of capital in general, and Articles 56 [TFEU], 58 [TFEU] and 63(1) [TFEU] in particular, be interpreted as precluding a Member State from imposing measures on credit institutions prohibiting in consumer credit agreements the application of bank charges not included in the list of permitted charges, without the latter being defined in the legislation of the State concerned?
Do Articles 213, 233 and 239 of the Customs Code prevent a jointly and severally liable debtor of a customs debt who is not the beneficiary of a decision to remit that debt from relying, against the administration responsible for collection, on a decision to remit based on Article 239 of the Code which that administration notified to another jointly and severally liable debtor, in order to be released from payment of the customs debt?
Is Article 14a(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1408/71 to be interpreted as precluding a Member State, which lacks competence under that provision, from granting family benefit under national law to a worker who is employed only temporarily in its territory, if neither the worker himself nor his children are domiciled or habitually resident in that Member State?
Do Articles 43 EC and 49 EC permit national rules establishing a State monopoly and a system of licences and authorisations which, within the context of a given number of licences provide cases in which the licence may be withdrawn with forfeiture of very large guarantee deposits, including the case in which the licensee directly or indirectly carries on cross-border betting or gaming activities analogous to those under the licence?
Do the provisions on exemption in Article 32 of Regulation No 1808/2001 mean that no assessment by the management authority in accordance with Article 2(w) of Regulation No 338/97 is required?
If the answer to Question 1 is in the negative: must Article 14(1)(a) of Regulation No 1408/71 be interpreted as meaning that, in all circumstances, a State on whose territory a worker is posted but which is not the competent Member State has the power to grant family benefits only where it has been established that, in the other Member State, no entitlement to comparable family benefits exists?
If the answer to the second question is also in the negative: do provisions of EU law preclude a provision of national law such as the first part of point 2 of Paragraph 65(1) of the EStG, read in conjunction with Paragraph 65(2) of the EStG, which excludes entitlement to family benefits where a comparable benefit is paid in another country or would be due if an application to that effect were made?
If the answer to the third question is in the affirmative: how should the overlap thus arising between, on the one hand, the entitlement in the competent State, which is also the Member State of residence of the children, and, on the other, the entitlement in the State which is neither the competent State nor the State of residence of the children, be resolved?
Is the interpretation that, under Article 51, in conjunction with Article 2, of [Directive 2004/18], taking account of the principle[s] of non discrimination and transparency in the award of public contracts, the contracting authority is obliged to seek clarification of a tender, respecting the subjective procedural right of the individual to be requested to supplement or clarify certificates and documents submitted pursuant to Articles 45 to 50 of the Directive, if a disputable or unclear understanding of the tenderer’s bid could result in the exclusion of that tenderer, in conformity with the above Directive in the wording in effect in the relevant period?
Is the interpretation that, under Article 51, in conjunction with Article 2, of [Directive 2004/18], taking account of the principle[s] of non discrimination and transparency in the award of public contracts, the contracting authority is not obliged to seek clarification of a tender if the contracting authority considers it established that the requirements regarding the subject matter of the contract have not been met, in conformity with the Directive in the wording in effect in the relevant period?
Is a provision of national law under which a committee established to evaluate tenders only may request tenderers in writing to clarify their bid in conformity with Article 51 and Article 2 of [Directive 2004/18] in the wording in effect in the relevant period?
Is a contracting authority’s procedure, according to which it is not obliged to request a tenderer to clarify an abnormally low price, in conformity with Article 55 of [Directive 2004/18], and, on the formulation of the question put by the contracting authority to the applicants in connection with the abnormally low price, did [the applicants] have the opportunity to explain sufficiently the constituent features of the tender submitted?
Does the tax exemption under Article 14(1)(b) of Directive 2003/96 apply to an undertaking whose corporate purpose is unrelated to the air navigation sector and which uses an aircraft belonging to it to take members of its staff to clients or to trade fairs in order to develop its business?
Must Articles 2(1) and 4 of the Sixth Directive be interpreted as meaning that an operator who, at his own risk, purchases defaulted debts at a price below their face value effects a supply of services for consideration and carries out an economic activity?
If the answer to Question 1 is in the affirmative: Is the assumption of the risk of loss by the purchaser of defaulted debts at a purchase price significantly lower than their face value exempt from tax, as being the provision of a different security or guarantee?
If the answer to Question 1 is in the affirmative: If the assumption of the risk is exempt from tax, is the recovery of the debts exempt from tax, as part of a single service or as an ancillary service, or taxable as a separate service?
If the answer to Question 1 is in the affirmative and no exempt service has been supplied: Is the consideration for the taxable service determined by the recovery costs presumed by the parties or by the actual recovery costs?
Does Community law preclude a Member State from rejecting a claim for reimbursement brought by an undertaking to which excise duty imposed contrary to a directive has been passed on, where such rejection – in circumstances such as those of the present case – is on the ground that it is not the undertaking that paid the duty to the State?
Does Community law preclude a Member State from rejecting a claim for damages brought by an undertaking to which excise duty imposed contrary to a directive has been passed on, where such rejection – in circumstances such as those of the present case – is on the grounds put forward by the Member State (specifically, that the undertaking is not the directly injured party and that there is no direct causal link between any loss and the conduct giving rise to liability)?
What consequences follow if the Public Prosecutors Office does not lay a charge against the debtor, holding that there is no evidence of an act that could give rise to criminal court proceedings? Will such a decision preclude any action to recover the duty not collected?
Must Articles 49 EC and 56 EC be interpreted as meaning that, in cases where foreign savings balances are concealed from the tax authorities of a MS, those articles do not prevent that MS from applying a statutory rule which provides for a recovery period of 12 years, whereas a recovery period of five years applies in the case of savings balances, or income therefrom, held in that MS, in which such effective means do exist?
Does it make a difference to the answer to Question 1 whether the credit balances are held in a Member State in which banking secrecy applies?
If the answer to Question 1 is affirmative, do Articles 49 EC and 56 EC similarly not preclude a fine for concealment of income or assets on which tax has been subsequently claimed from being determined as a proportion of the amount claimed over that longer period?
Question 1 in case 403/08: Where a conditional access device is made by or with the consent of a service provider and sold subject to a limited authorisation to use the device only to gain access to the protected service, does that device become an illicit device within the meaning of Article 2(e) of Directive 98/84?
Does Art.3(2) of Directive 98/84 preclude a member state from invoking a national law that prevents use of such conditional access devices?
Does the legislation constitute a restriction on the freedom to provide services (Article 49 of the EC Treaty)?
Do the clauses of an exclusive licence agreement such as those at hand constitute a restriction on competition prohibited by Art. 101 TFEU?
Is Art. 2(a) of the Directive to be interpreted as meaning that the reproduction right extends to transient fragments of the works within the memory of a satellite decoder and on a television screen?
Do acts of reproduction such as those at issue in the AFLP case fulfill the conditions laid down in Article 5(1) of the Directive?
Does "communication to the public" within the meaning of Art. 3(1) cover transmission of broadcast works to the customers present in a public house?
Does the Directive 93/83 have any bearing on the lawfulness of acts of reproduction performed within the memory of a satellite decoder and on a television screen?
Is the Community law at hand to be interpreted as meaning that the addition of the substances in the main proceedings are to be regarded as so small that they don't affect the classification of such a preparation under Community law?
Is the Community law to be interpreted as meaning that capsule casing consisting of the specified substances in the main proceedings are to be regarded as packing material?
Is heading 1517 of the Combined Nomenclature  to be interpreted as meaning that a capsule casing consisting of the specified substances in the main proceeding leads to the exclusion of the capsules from the Community law?
Are national public health bodies precluded from implementing a scheme, with financial incentives, to prescribe a specific named medicine, in order to reduce the expenditure on medicine, if the specific medicine is a different prescription medicine (but within the same therapeutic class) to the medicine previously prescribed to the patient?
Are national public health bodies precluded from implementing a scheme, with financial incentives, to prescribe a specific named medicine, in order to reduce the expenditure on medicine, if the specific medicine is a different prescription medicine (but within the same therapeutic class) to which otherwise might have been prescribed to the patience but for the incentive?
In relation to the provisions relating to metallic additives in Directive 2009/30/EEC with reference to that part of Article 1(8) which inserts a new Article 8(a)(2) into Directive 98/70 limiting the use of MMT in fuel to specified limits, is the impositions of such limits unlawful? If so, on which grounds?
With reference to that part of Article 1(8) which inserts a new Article 8(a)(4), Article 8(a)(5) and 8(a)(6) into Directive 98/70 requiring the labelling of all fuels which contain metallic additives with the phrase contains metallic additives´, is that imposition of such a labelling requirement unlawful?If so, on which grounds?
What are the characteristics of an exempt service that has “the effect of transferring funds and entail[s] changes in the legal and financial situation” within the meaning of Article 13B(d) of the Sixth Directive (Directive 77/388)?
Does “transactions … concerning … payments [or] transfers” apply to a service of obtaining and processing payments by credit and debit cards, regardless of who receives the codes for further transfer, where the customer’s account, be it in a bank or postal service banking system, checking account, over the counter transactions in a bank or through a credit card company, is to be debited and the taxpayer’s account to be credited automatically, will those services fall within the scope of the exemption in Article 13B(d)(3) of the Sixth Directive?
What particular factors have to be taken into account when deciding whether a charge that is applied by a taxpayer to its customer in respect of the customer’s choice to make payment to the taxpayer using a particular payment method, and which is individually identified in the contractual document and separately itemised in invoices issued to customers, is a separate supply for VAT purposes?’
Do the requirements under Article 11(2) of Directive 97/13 to ensure optimal use of scarce resources and to foster the development of innovative services preclude national legislation which dissociates the fee levied on operators but does not allocate a specific use to the income derived therefrom?
Do the requirements under Article 11(2) of Directive 97/13 to ensure optimal use of scarce resources and to foster the development of innovative services preclude national legislation which significantly increases the fee for a particular technology but leaves it unchanged for another?
Does the tax exemption under Article 15(1)(j) of Directive 2003/96 apply exclusively to fuels used by companies engaged in the manufacture, development, testing and maintenance of aircraft and as such does not cover the fuels needed for flights to and from an aircraft maintenance facility?
Can an exemption be granted under Article 11(3) of Directive 2003/96 in the case of the mixed use of an aircraft (for both private and commercial purposes), proportionate to the commercial use, for the fuel used for the purpose of maintenance or training flights?
If there is no proportional exemption under Article 11(3) of Directive 2003/96, should it be deduced that there is no exemption for maintenance and training flights in case of mixed use of the aircraft?
If a proportional exemption can be granted under Directive 2003/96, which criteria and which reference period should be taken as a basis for determining the respective proportion of use?
Does EU law preclude the application of a five-year limitation period laid down in the national legal system for claims in respect of debts owed by the State to claims for the reimbursement of charges paid in breach of EU law under a "hybrid system of aid and charges"?
Does EU law preclude national legislation which grants an individual a longer limitation period to recover charges from an individual acting as an intermediary, to whom he paid the charges and who then paid them on behalf of that first individual for the benefit of the State, whereas, if that individual had paid those charges directly to the State, the action of that first individual would have been restricted by a shorter time-limit?
Does the Court’s finding in a preliminary ruling that the retroactive nature of a national law at issue is incompatible with EU law have any bearing on the starting date of the limitation period laid down by national law in respect of claims against the State?
Are cooking wine and cooking port subject to excise duty under Directive 92/83 in the Member State of importation on the grounds that they are within the definition of "ethyl alcohol" under the first indent of Article 20 of Directive 92/83?
Are the limitations in national law consistent with the Member States obligation to give effect to the exemption contained in Article 27(1)(f) of Directive 92/83?
Should the cooking wine and cooking port, if liable to duty under the first indent of Article 20 of Directive 92/83, and/or the cooking cognac, subject to the present appeal, be treated as exempt from excise duty at the point of manufacture under Article 27(1)(f) of Directive 92/83 or, alternatively, Article 27(1)(e) of Directive 92/83?
If the products have been treated as not being subject to the exercise duty or as subject to the exemption of that duty under Directive 92/83, having been released for consumption on the market of the manufacturing Member State, and are intended to be put on the market in another Member State, can the second Member State exercise/impose the duty under Directive 92/83?
Is the specific Sky+ set-top box with a hard drive  as this case concern to be classified under subheading 8528 71 13 in Regulation 1214/2007 amending Annex 1 to Regulation 2658/87 despite the Explanatory Notes to the CN adopted by the Commission on 7 May 2008 concerning subheading  8521 90 00 and subheading 8528 71 13?
Does Article 12(5)(a) the Customs Code oblige national customs authorities to issue binding tariff information that accord with the explanatory notes to the CN , unless and until those explanatory notes have been declared to be in conflict with the wording of the relevant provisions of the CN, including the General Rules for the Interpretation of the CN, or may the national customs authorities form their own individual view of the matter and disregard the explanatory note in the event they consider there to be such a conflict?
In the event that the Sky+ set-top box with a hard drive were classified under CN subheading 8521 90 00, would the application of a positive rate of customs duty be unlawful as a matter of EU law, as a consequence of violating the EU’s obligations under the ITA and Article II:1(b) of GATT 1994 or does classification under heading 8521 entail a conclusion that the product in question falls outside the scope of the relevant part of the ITA?
Is a set-top box with a communication function and a hard disk drive to be classified under CN subheading 8528 71 13 as set out in Regulation 1549/2006 and Regulation 1214/2007 despite the Explanatory Notes to the CN adopted by the European Commission on 7 may 2008 concerning CN subheading 8521 90 00 and subheading 8521 71 13?
In the event that a set-top box with a communication function and a hard drive with the those specifications were to be classified under CN subheading 8521 90 00, would the application of a positive rate of customs duty be unlawful as a matter of EU law, as a consequence of violating the EU’s obligations under the ITA and Article II:1(b) of GATT 1994 or does classification under heading 8521 entail a conclusion that the product in question falls outside the scope of the relevant part of the ITA?
Are the provisions of Article 12(5)(a)(i) of the Customs Code to be understood to mean that the BTI dated 8 April 2005 relied upon by Pace Plc automatically ceased to be valid after 31 December 2006 on the basis that it no longer confirmed with the law laid down in Regulation 1549/2006. In particular, is Article 12(5)(a)(i) of the Customs Code to be interpreted in such a way that Regulation 1549/2006 does not fall within the concept of a “regulation” for the purposes of that Article either because it is an annual update to the CN or because it is not a specific classification regulation?
Are the provisions of Article 12(a) of the Customs Code to be understood to mean that where an annual CN update is adopted which contains no provision confirming the extent of an available grace period to BTI holders, that such holder shall not be entitled to a grace period, or should they be entitled to the usual grace period of six months for Commission classification regulations under the principle of legitimate expectation?
Do rights which are contingent upon either dismissal or premature retirement by agreement with the employer fall within the definition of rights and obligations within Article 3(1) of Directive 77/187 ?
Are early retirement benefits and benefits intended to enhance the conditions of such retirement old age, invalidity of survivors benefits under supplementary company or inter-company pension schemes excluded from the scope of the directive 77/187?
Is there an obligation on the transferor arising from the contract of employment, the employment relationship or the collective agreement within the meaning of Article 3(1) and/or 3(2) of Directive 77/187 which transfers by reason of the transfer of the undertaking and renders the transferee liable to pay the benefits to the employee upon dismissal?
May an employee agree to forego rights such as those at issue in the main proceedings, even though the terms of early retirement offered by the transferee do not provide the same benefits and though the employee became a member of the transferee's retirement  scheme upon the transfer of the undertaking?
What are the criteria under which a national court may decide whether an employee has agreed on to forego his rights?
Is directive 77/187 to be interpreted as precluding the transferee from offering transferred employees the option of taking early retirement on the basis of early retirement benefits that are less beneficial than those to which they are entitled as a consequence of the effect of the directive?
What are the consequences for those employees who have accepted early retirement on the less favourable basis, in light of Article 3 of directive 77/187 ?
Do games of chance or gambling constitute an economic activity within the meaning of Article 2 EC?
Do games of chance or gambling constitute an activity relating to goods or a provision of services within the meaning of Articles 28 and 29 EC?
Is the principle of the free movement of goods applicable?
Does a monopoly in the operation of games of chance or gambling fall within community law?
Does the national provisions such as those at issue in the main proceedings constitute a barrier to the freedom to provide services?
May national provisions such as those at issue in the main proceedings be justified by overriding public-interest reasons relating to consumer protection and to concerns over public morality and crime prevention?
Is the fact that the operation and playing of games of chance or gambling are subject, in other MS, to legislation which is less restrictive than the legislation in issue in the main proceedings sufficient to render the latter incompatible with community law?
Does community law permit the provisions governing the operation and playing of games of chance or gambling provided that such provisions meet conditions as to proportionality and necessity?
Must Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC be interpreted as meaning that motor vehicles damage assessments carried out, on behalf of its members, by an association whose members are insurance companies, are insurance transactions or related services performed by insurance brokers or insurance agents?
Is Article 13A(1)(f) of the Sixth VAT Directive  to be interpreted as meaning that the grant under that provision of VAT exemption to an association such as that in issue in the main proceedings must be refused if there is a risk that such an exemption may give rise to distortions of competition?
Would it be incompatible with Article 13A(1)(f) of the Sixth VAT Directive  to proceed on the basis that under national law it is possible to make a tax exemption that is notified pursuant to that provision limited in time in cases where there is doubt as to whether the exemption might at a later stage distort competition?
Does the fact that assessment services are provided by assessors employed by those insurance companies themselves and are thus exempt from VAT have any bearing on the answers to Questions 1 and 2?
Are the rules on procedure and on sanctions for administrative offences laid down by Law No 689 of 24 November 1981 compatible with the principles of proportionality, effectiveness and adequate legal protection of the rights conferred by Community law on individuals, laid down in the Treaty and/or set out and defined in the case-law of the Court of Justice?
Does Regulation (EC) No 2799/1999 in conjunction with its annexes contravene (a) Article 11(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1255/1999, (b) the second subparagraph of Article 34(2) EC, and (c) the general legal principles of the European Community and the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations?
Is it compatible with Articles 28 and 30 EC for a licence for a medicinal product imported as a parallel import to be revoked on the sole ground that the marketing authorisation of reference has been withdrawn at the holder's request for reasons unconnected with the safety of the product?
If the parallel importers rely on a new marketing authorisation for a directly imported medicinal product rather than on the old one; Is authorisation for the continued marketing of the medicinal product imported as a parallel import precluded by the fact that that product and the directly imported product  covered by the new marketing authorisation are different in the sense that the medicinal product imported as a parallel import is sold in the form of a capsule containing a certain acid while the directly imported medicinal product is sold in the form of a tablet containing a magnesium salt of the acid?
Is Article 2 of Council Decision 2000/168/EC invalid because the procedure prior to the adoption of the decision did not meet the criteria laid down in Article 27 of Directive 77/388/EEC?
Is the first paragraph of Article 3 of Decision 2000/168/EC, under which the decision is to have retroactive effect from 1 April 1999, valid?
Does Article 2 of Decision 2000/168/EC infringe the substantive requirements to be applied to such an authorisation and is for that reason invalid?
Is a share company which a town owns and in which the town exercises control to be regarded as a contracting authority within the meaning of Article 1(b) of Council Directive 92/50/EEC?
Does it affect the decision on the point that the town's building project endeavours to create the conditions for business activity to be carried on in the town?
Does it affect the decision on the point that the offices to be built are leased to one undertaking only?
Are Article 3(1) and the first subparagraph of Article 4(3) of the directive 80/987 to be interpreted as meaning that they allow a MS to limit the liability of the guarantee institutions to a sum which covers the basic needs of the employees concerned and from which are to be deducted payments made by the employer during the period covered by the guarantee?
Must Article 5(5) of Directive 89/104/EEC be interpreted as meaning that the possibility laid down therein for protection by Member States can be afforded only against the use of a sign which is identical to the trade mark or can it also be afforded in that case against the use of a sign similar to the trade mark?
If that protection can also be afforded against a sign similar to the trade mark, does unlawful similarity within the meaning of Article 5(5) of Directive 89/104 require that confusion can arise as a consequence or is likelihood of association sufficient?
Does the allocation to a public undertaking of a significant proportion of charges, such as the port charges at issue in the main proceedings, constitute a measure, within the meaning of Article 90(1) of the Treaty liable to give rise to abuse of a dominant position contrary to Article 86 thereof and falling outside the derogation provided for by Article 86(2) of the Treaty?
May the allocation to such an undertaking of a significant proportion of the abovementioned dues be defined as State aid, within the meaning of Article 87(1) EC, and does it therefore justify, where the Commission has not been notified or has not adopted a decision finding the aid incompatible with the common market, the exercise by the national court of the powers conferred on it to ensure disapplication of illegal and/or incompatible aid?
Does the allocation to the abovementioned public undertaking, under circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings, constitute a charge having an effect equivalent to a customs duty on imports (Article 25 EC), or internal taxation imposed on the products of other Member States, in excess of that imposed on similar domestic products (Article 90), or an impediment to imports, prohibited by Article 28?
How is the concept of genuine use within the meaning of Article 12(1) of the Directive 89/104, which is also found in Article 10(1) of the Directive, to be interpreted and, in particular, may that concept be defined using the same criteria as for normal use in Article 5 of the UBL or are there other criteria to which regard should be had?
In the light of the reply to the first question, is the use by Ansul of the Minimax mark from 1989 to 1994 in the context of the commercial activities described at paragraph 11 of this judgment normal for purposes of the UBL or genuine for the purposes of Article 12 of the Directive 89/104?
Must Directive 84/450 be interpreted as allowing stricter, national, provisions on protection against misleading advertising to be applied to comparative advertising?
Should Article 3a(1)(a) of Directive 84/450/EEC  be interpreted as authorising the comparison of branded products with unbranded ones, where the names of the manufacturers are not indicated?
May differences in the method of obtaining supplies of the products whose qualities are compared have an impact on the lawfulness of the comparative advertising according to Directive 84/450?
Does Article 3a of Directive 84/450 preclude an advertiser from carrying out a test purchase with a competitor before even commencing his own offer?
Is a price comparison which entails discrediting the competitor unlawful for the purposes of Article 3a(1)(e) of Directive 84/450 when the products are chosen in such a way as to obtain a price difference greater than the average price difference?
Is, on a proper interpretation of Article 3a(1)(e), comparative advertising  unlawful where, in addition to citing the name of the competitor, it reproduces the competitor's logo and a picture of its shop?
Does psychotherapeutic treatment, given in an out-patient facility provided by a foundation employing qualified psychologists but who are not registered as doctors, qualify as activities closely related to hospital and medical care within the meaning of Article 13A(1)(b) of the  Directive 77/388?
In order for there to be an other duly recognised establishment of a similar nature within the meaning of Article 13A(1)(b), must there be a formal recognition procedure or can recognition also derive from other rules?
Is the exemption in Article 13A(1)(c) Directive 77/388 dependent on the legal form of the taxable person who provides the service in question, in this case a foundation governed by private law?
In circumstances such as those in the main proceedings, may the provisions of Article 13A(1)(b) and (c) of the Sixth Directive be relied on by a taxable person before a national court in order to obtain an exemption for treatment provided by it?
In determining whether a three-dimensional trade mark which depicts the shape of a product has a distinctive character within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Directive 89/104 is there a stricter test for distinctive character than in the case of other forms of trade marks?
In the case of three-dimensional trade marks, does Article 3(1)(c) 89/104 have any significance independently of Article 3(1)(e) 89/104? If so, when considering Article 3(1)(c) or alternatively Article 3(1)(e), must regard be had to the interest of the trade in having the shape of the product available for use, so that registration is ruled out?
Is article 22 of Regulation 1408/71 compatible with the articles on the freedom to provide services?
Consequently, is the national authority entitled to refuse the application to reimbursement?
Is the interpretation that a change in the composition of a consortium participating in procedures for the award of a public-works contract results in the loss of that consortiums right to participate in the tender procedure consistent with the provisions and spirit of Directives 93/37/EEC and 89/665/EEC?
Does the taxation in question constitute a withholding tax within the meaning of article 5(1) of the directive 90/435?
If the taxation is such a withholding tax, is its effect preserved as a consequence of article 7(2) of the directive 90/435?
Is article 7(2) of the directive 90/435 invalid for want of reasoning or failure to consult the ESC and the European Parliament?
On the proper interpretation of Directive 84/5/EEC , must the arrangements concerning the provision of compensation include provision for the payment of interest?
On the proper interpretation of Directive 84/5/EEC, must the arrangements concerning the provision of compensation include provision for the payment of the costs incurred by a victim?
On the proper interpretation of Directive 84/5/EEC, are the procedural arrangements adopted by the MS sufficient to provide the protection to which victims of damage are entitled under the directive?
Is the agreement in question, to be regarded as fulfilling the obligation for the MS to authorise a body within the meaning of the Directive 84/5/EEC?
Does a failure to comply with the Second Motor Insurance Directive 84/5/EEC constitute a sufficiently serious breach by the MS to give rise to liability for damages?
Does the annual granting of interest-bearing loans by a holding company to companies in which it has a shareholding constitute an "economic activity" within the meaning of the Sixth Directive?
Does the performance of operations, in connection with a consortium, by a company which both is a member thereof and manages it, particularly where they exceed its share as stipulated in the contract, against payment by the other members of the consortium constitute an ?economic activity? within the meaning of the Sixth Directive?
Is an undertaking?s financial activity which generates annual income which is clearly higher than that from the activity described in its statutes as its principal activity to be regarded as ?incidental? for the purposes of Article 19(2) of the Sixth Directive
Does the time-limit laid down in Regulation 2454/93 apply also where a MS brings proceedings against the guaranteeing association for the payment of duties, and the association wishes to prove that the place where the offence or irregularity was actually committed is situated in another MS?
In such a case, does the one-year time-limit or the two-year time-limit apply (in Regulation No 2454/93 in conjunction with the TIR Convention )?
Is the MS which finds that an offence or irregularity has been committed obliged to investigate where the offence or irregularity was actually committed?
If so, must the Member State which has detected the offence or irregularity, when claiming against the guaranteeing association, demonstrate and prove that such an investigative obligation has been complied with?
Do Articles 43 EC and 49 EC preclude Italian courts from applying Article 1 of the national law at issue, to the extent to which it prohibits, in absolute terms, external undertakings providing services relating to the preparation and printing of pay slips from providing their services to undertakings having less than 250 employees?
Must article 40 of Regulation 2392/89 be interpreted as prohibiting the registration as a trade mark of a geographical reference, the use of which is not provided for by Article 11?
Are Articles 18 EC and 49 EC and/or Article 3(1) of the Regulation to be interpreted as prohibiting a MS from imposing a differentiated fiscal charge on domestic and intra-Community flights with the direct result that an amount of tax is charged on intra-Community flights double that applicable to flights within the Member State?
Must Articles 28 and 30 of the Treaty be interpreted as prohibiting a Member State from preventing the free movement and marketing of a food supplement lawfully sold in another Member State?
Do Articles 28 and 30 EC, Directive 76/768 and Directive 84/450 preclude national legislation which, in connection with the marketing of cosmetic products, makes it an offence to refer to medical opinions by the use, in particular, of the description clinically tested or dermatologically tested?
Do Articles 28 and 30 EC, Directive 76/768 and Directive 84/450, preclude national legislation which authorises the use of information as referred to in Question 1 only on condition that prior authorisation is granted by the competent Minister?
Do Articles 12 EC, 18 EC and 39 EC, the principle of proportionality and the Directive preclude a MS from adopting, as against a national of another MS, a measure for the maintenance of public order which, restricts that national's residence to a part of the national territory or in such circumstances is the only lawful measure restricting residence as against that national a measure excluding him from the whole territory?
Does the act of referring, on an internet page, to various persons and identifying them by name or by other means, for instance by giving their telephone number or information regarding their working conditions and hobbies, constitute the processing of personal data by automatic means within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 95/46?
If the answer to Question 1 is no; Can the act of setting up on an internet home page separate pages for about 15 people with links between the pages which make it possible to search by name be considered the processing otherwise than by automatic means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 95/46?
Is the processing of personal data, such as that described in Question 1, covered by one of the exceptions in Article 3(2) of Directive 95/46?
Is information on a home page stating that a named colleague has injured her foot and is on half-time on medical grounds personal data concerning health which, according to Article 8(1) of Directive 95/46, may not be processed?
Is there any transfer of data to a third country within the meaning of Article 25 of Directive 95/46 where an individual in a MS uploads personal data to a web page which can be consulted and whose hosting provider is established in that MS or in another, thereby making those data accessible to anyone who connects to the internet, including people in a third country?
Can the provisions of Directive 95/46, in a case such as the above, be regarded as bringing about a restriction which conflicts with the general principles of freedom of expression or other freedoms and rights, which are applicable within the EU and are enshrined in inter alia Article 10 of the ECHR?
Can a MS provide more extensive protection for personal data or give it a wider scope than the Directive 95/46?
Is it possible for a single specific colour which is represented as such or is designated by an internationally applied code to acquire a distinctive character for certain goods or services within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Directive 89/104?
If the answer to Question 1 is in the affirmative: In what circumstances may it be accepted that a single specific colour possesses a distinctive character in the sense used above?
In the assessment of the distinctive character of a specific colour as a trade mark, must account be taken of whether, with regard to that colour, there is a general interest in availability, such as can exist in respect of signs which denote a geographical origin?
When considering whether a sign, for which registration as a trade mark is sought, possesses the distinctive character referred to in Article 3(1)(b) of the Directive 89/104, must the competent authority confine itself to an assessment in abstracto of distinctive character?
In considering a marketing authorisation for a new product (C) under Article 4.8(a)(iii) of Directive 65/65, referencing a product (A) authorised more than 6/10 years ago, is a national competent authority entitled to cross-refer, under circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings, without consent, to data submitted in support of a product (B) which was authorised within the last 6/10 years?
Does the final subparagraph of Article 4.8(a) of Directive 65/65 (the proviso) apply only to applications made under Article 4.8(a)(iii) or to applications made under Article 4.8(a)(i) also?
Is essential similarity a prerequisite for the use of the proviso referred to in the Directive 65/65 ?
Can products ever be essentially similar for the purposes of Article 4.8(a)(i) and (iii) of the Directive 65/65 when they are not bioequivalent?
What is the meaning of the term pharmaceutical form (as used in Case C-368/96 Generics)? In particular, do two products have the same pharmaceutical form when they are administered to the patient in the form of a solution diluted to a macroemulsion, microemulsion and nanodispersion respectively?
Under circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings; does the competent authority of a MS infringe the principle of non-discrimination if, as a precondition for the grant of marketing authorisation, it requires full clinical data on the bioavailability of product B, but, having examined the data filed in support of product B, does not require the same data for product C?
Does the Regulations 2081/92 and 1107/96 and the specification for the PDO Prosciutto di Parma create a valid Community right, directly enforceable in the court of a MS, to restrain the retail sale as Parma ham of sliced and packaged ham derived from hams duly exported from Parma but which have not been thereafter sliced, packaged and labelled in accordance with the specification?
Is the MS of nationality entitled to regard the intention of the couple, when moving to the other MS, to claim the benefit of Community law rights when returning to the MS of nationality, notwithstanding the non-national spouse's lack of qualification under national legislation, as a reliance on Community law in order to evade the application of national legislation?
To what extent may the medical training required by Article 23(2) of Directive 93/16 consist of training completed in a third country?
Are the national authorities of a host Member State bound by a certificate issued in accordance with Article 9(5) of the Directive 93/16?
Does the concept of the same cause of action in Article 21 of the Brussels Convention extend also to the defence of the defendant that he has extinguished a part of the claim sued for by extra-judicial set-off, where the part of this counterclaim that is allegedly not extinguished is the subject-matter of a legal dispute between the same parties on the basis of an action that has already been brought earlier in another Contracting State?
In the examination of the question whether the same cause of action has been brought, are exclusively the pleadings of the plaintiff in the proceedings initiated by a later action decisive and the defence and submissions of the defendant therefore irrelevant?
Where, on the basis of an action to enforce a contract seeking damages for unlawful termination of a long-term obligation, the question as to whether such a long-term obligation existed at all is decided, is that decision also binding in subsequent proceedings between the same parties?
Must the provisions of Regulation 2913/92 and Article 379(1) of Regulation 2454/93, be construed as meaning that a customs debt arising by reason of an offence or irregularity in connection with external Community transit cannot be recovered from the principal by the office of departure if the principal did not, before the end of the 11th month following the date of registration of the Community transit declaration, receive the notification referred to in Article 379?
Does the fact that the office of departure did not follow an administrative instruction for the transmission of information adopted in the Customs Code Committee or that the customs authorities in the office of departure wrongly failed to notify in good time have any bearing on the answer to Question 1?
Is it compatible with Articles 28 EC and 30 EC for a national agency to decide that a marketing authorisation for a medicinal product imported as a parallel import automatically comes to an end if the original marketing authorisation for the medicinal product has been withdrawn at the holder's request for reasons unconnected with the safety of the medicinal product and despite the fact that the product has a valid marketing authorisation in the MS from which the parallel imports come?
Is it relevant that (a) the holder of the marketing authorisation has obtained a new authorisation for a replacement product which, albeit in a different form and with a slightly different active ingredient, is regarded as bioequivalent and as having the same therapeutic effect; (b) subsequent control of the  product may be more difficult because the marketing authorisation of reference has been withdrawn; and (c) the imported product has been widely used over many years so that it is unlikely to present a danger to public health?
If the answer to Question 1 is yes: Does the parallel import licence lose its validity immediately on withdrawal of the marketing authorisation of reference?
Are leftover rock resulting from the extraction of ore and/or ore-dressing sand resulting from the dressing of ore in mining operations to be regarded as waste within the meaning of Article 1(a) of Directive 75/442/EEC, having regard to points (a) to (d) below?
Does the term other legislation in Article 2(1)(b) of Directive 75/442 refer solely to Community legislation, or to national legislation?
If other legislation includes national legislation; must Article 2(1)(b) of the Directive be interpreted as meaning that other legislation must have entered into force before 1 April 1993, the date of entry into force of Directive 91/156?
If other legislation includes national legislation; must Article 2(1)(b) of the Directive be interpreted as meaning that other legislation must comply with particular community requirements as to the level of protection of the environment?
In the case where a waste treatment process includes several distinct stages, must its classification as a disposal operation or recovery operation within the meaning of the Directive, for the purpose of implementing the Regulation, be considered comprehensively, as constituting a single operation?
Is the calorific value of the waste which is to be combusted a relevant criterion for the purpose of determining whether that operation constitutes a disposal operation as referred to in point D10 of Annex IIA to the Directive or a recovery operation as referred to in point R1 of Annex IIB to the Directive?
In addition to Community law, may the Member States define distinguishing criteria to that end?
If one operation must be classified as recovery and another operation as disposal, how must the process as a whole be regarded?
Does the exclusion of the female-to-male transsexual partner of a female member of the National Health Service Pension Scheme, which limits the material dependant's benefit to her widower, constitute sex discrimination in contravention of Article 141 EC and Directive 75/117?
Does Directive 80/987, properly construed, preclude the application of a time-limit laid down by national law for the lodging of an application by an employee seeking to obtain, in accordance with the detailed rules laid down in that directive, payment of insolvency compensation?
Is the Chamber obliged, pursuant to the case-law of the Court of Justice, to refrain from applying the provision concerning the time-limit for lodging applications?
Must Article 87(1) of the Treaty be interpreted as meaning that a system such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which provides farmers and slaughterhouses with the free collection and disposal of animal carcasses and slaughterhouse waste, be considered to be State aid?
Do Article 10 EC and point 3 of the operative part of the EKW judgment, according to which Article 3(2) of the Directive may not be relied on in support of claims relating to a tax such as the duty on alcoholic beverages paid or chargeable prior to the date of that judgment, preclude the application of the national provision at issue in the main proceedings?
Must Article 26(2) of the Directive be interpreted as meaning that the total amount to be paid by the traveller includes the additional amount that a travel agent, acting as intermediary on behalf of a tour operator, must, in circumstances such as those at issue, pay to the tour operator on top of the price paid by the traveller?
Must Article 3(2)(a) of the Regulation No 1495/80 be interpreted as meaning that payments of interest are distinguished from the price of the goods if at the material time, only the invoice for the net price of the goods has been submitted to the customs office and that invoice does not reveal either expressly or by implication that in the context of the transaction to be assessed interest was also paid by the buyer to the seller?
Is it compatible with the Directive 77/388, in particular Articles 5 and 6 thereof, for a MS to treat the following event as a taxable transaction: the incurring of expenditure relating to services supplied abroad that, if they had been supplied within the national territory to the trader, would not entitle the trader to a deduction of input tax?
Must Article 22(1)(c) and (i) of the Regulation 1408/71  be interpreted as applying to a pensioner and members of his family who reside in a MS other than the one which is liable for payment of that pension and who benefit on that basis,  from the system provided for by Article 28 of that regulation, where those socially insured persons wish to go to the MS liable for payment of the pension for the purpose of receiving medical treatment there?
If the answer to Question 1 is in the affirmative, which institution is responsible for granting the authorisation referred to in Article 22(1)(c) of Regulation No 1408/71?
Do Articles 3(2) and 4(2) of Directive 80/987/EEC preclude a provision of national law such as Paragraph 183(1) of Sozialgesetzbuch III?
Is the Federal Republic of Germany liable to pay damages to the plaintiff on account of defective implementation of Directive 80/987/EEC?
In the case of claimants who are on child raising leave, is the day before that leave was taken the relevant date for the purposes of Article 3(2) of Directive 80/987/EEC?
Is Article 79 of the Conditions of Employment (Article 3 of Regulation 259/68), to be understood as a reference to the relevant national law on employment?
Are the provisions of Article 9 of the Staff Regulations (Article 2 of Regulation 259/68) and those of Annex II to the Staff Regulations, to be interpreted as laying down exhaustive rules on the collective employment law and the rights of co-decision of local staff and thus as precluding the application of the rules in the national law?
Are Articles 43 EC and 48 EC to be interpreted as precluding a MS from attaching additional conditions in national law, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, to the establishment in that MS of a branch of a company which has been set up in another MS with the sole aim of securing the advantages which that offers compared to incorporation under the law of the former MS, given the circumstances at hand?
If the first question is answered in the affirmative, must Article 46 EC be interpreted as meaning that the said Articles 43 EC and 48 EC do not affect the applicability of the national rules, on the ground that the provisions in question are justified for the reasons stated by the national legislature?
Does Article 43 of the EC Treaty, read in conjunction with Article 58 EC, or any other rule of EC law, preclude a MS from granting a parent company subject to tax in that MS a deduction on costs relating to a holding owned by it only if the relevant subsidiary makes profits which are subject to tax in the MS in which the parent company is established?
Does it make any difference to the answer to Question 1 whether, where the subsidiary is subject to tax based on its profits in the MS concerned but the parent company is not, the relevant MS takes account of the abovementioned costs in levying tax on the subsidiary?
Is Article 10(1) of Decision No 1/80 to be interpreted as precluding a provision of a Member State which excludes Turkish workers from eligibility for the general assembly of a chamber of workers?
If so, is Article 10(1) of Decision No 1/80 directly applicable Community law?
Must Article 3(2) of Regulation 1768/95  be interpreted as meaning that a limited company can constitute an ?organisation of holders? for the purposes of that provision?
If so; May the company in question invoke the rights of holders who are members not of the company but of an organisation which is itself a shareholder, and the rights of holders who are neither shareholders nor members of an association which is such a shareholder, but who appoint the company to safeguard their interests for a consideration?
Must the sixth indent of Article 14(3) of Regulation 2100/94 in conjunction with Article 8 of Regulation 1768/95 be interpreted as meaning that the holder of a plant variety right protected under Regulation No 2100/94 can require the information referred to in the abovementioned provisions from any farmer, irrespective of whether or not there is any indication that he has carried out an act of use in respect of the variety in question?
Where a lessee fills up a leased car in the name and at the expense of the lessor at filling stations, is there a supply of fuel by the lessor to the lessee and must tax be paid on this supply at the place of supply within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of the Directive or is the onward supply included in the lessor's supply of a service that is taxable under Article 9?
Having regard in particular to the interpretation of Article 2 of Directive 76/207/EEC is the fact that in Germany military service is compulsory only for men contrary to Community law?
Do the ne bis in idem principle, laid down in Article 54 of the CISA, also apply to procedures whereby further prosecution is barred, such as those at issue in the main actions?
Where an agreement between undertakings adversely affects Community trade, and where that agreement is required or facilitated by national legislation, does Article 81 EC require or permit the national competition Authority to disapply that measure and to penalise the anti-competitive conduct?
For the purposes of applying Article 81(1) EC, is it possible to regard national legislation under which competence to fix retail prices of a product is delegated to a ministry and power to allocate production between undertakings is entrusted to a consortium to which the relevant producers are obliged to belong, as precluding undertakings from engaging in autonomous conduct which prevents, restricts or distorts competition?
Is it contrary to the objectives of Directive 80/987/EEC if, in accordance with a national rule, a shareholder/employee such as that at issue in the main proceedings loses his entitlement to the guarantee in respect of claims for outstanding salary resulting from insolvency where he fails within 60 days from the time he is first in a position to know that the company is no longer creditworthy, to make any demand for payment of salary?
Does this loss of entitlement extend to all unpaid claims under the employment relationship or only to those which arise after the time at which an employee who was not a shareholder would be deemed to have resigned on the ground of non-payment of his salary?
Where a trade mark is validly registered and a third party uses in the course of trade a sign identical with that trade mark in relation to goods which are identical with those for which the trade mark is registered, and the third party has no defence to infringement by virtue of Article 6(1) of the Directive; is the trade mark proprietor entitled, in circumstances such as those in the main proceedings, to rely on Article 5(1)(a) to prevent the use?
If the third party has a defence to infringement on the ground that the use complained of does not indicate trade origin, is the fact that the use in question would be perceived as a badge of support, loyalty or affiliation to the trade mark proprietor a sufficient connection?
Must Articles 81, 82 and 85 EC, Directive 92/12 or Recommendation 81/924 be interpreted as meaning that they preclude a national measure providing for the levy of surcharges on the price of electricity such as those at issue in the main proceedings?
Must the concept of force majeure used in Article 12 of Regulation 1294/96 be interpreted so as to include unforeseen and compelling circumstances, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, of such a kind that negligence in the observance of the time-limit in question is not regarded as such?
Is it contrary to the first paragraph of Article 14 of the Protocol and Article 39 EC if German nationals, under circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings, may not deduct expenditure in respect of a household assistant employed in Luxembourg under German law, because the contributions to the statutory pension insurance scheme were not paid to the German pension insurance scheme?
Is Article 13A(1)(c) of the Sixth Directive to be interpreted as meaning that the exemption from value added tax does not apply to turnover from the activity of a doctor which consists in determining the disability, of a person applying for a pension?
Is the judgment [C-384/98] to be interpreted as meaning that medical examinations and expert opinions based on them for the purpose of establishing disability do not fall within the scope of application of Article 13A(1)(c), whether or not the doctor who acts as an expert is instructed by a court or a pension insurance institution?
Is it compatible with EC law on the freedom to provide services for a Portuguese undertaking to have to satisfy further conditions in order to carry on its activity in Germany?
Does Regulation No 2081/92 or Article 28 EC preclude the application of a provision of a bilateral agreement between a Member State and a non-member country, under which a simple and indirect indication of geographical source from that non-member country is accorded protection in the importing Member State?
Does Regulation No 2081/92 or Article 28 EC preclude the application of a provision of a bilateral agreement between a Member State and a non-member country under which a name which in that country does not directly or indirectly refer to the geographical source of the product is accorded protection in the Member State concerned?
Is the first paragraph of Article 307 EC to be interpreted as permitting a court of a Member State to apply the provisions of bilateral agreements such as those at issue in the main proceedings, concluded between that State and a non-member country even where those provisions prove to be contrary to the Treaty rules, on the ground that they concern an obligation resulting from agreements concluded before the date of the accession of the Member State concerned to the European Union?
Does the second paragraph of Article 307 EC require that national court to interpret those provisions in such a way that they are consistent with Community law?
In the case of three-dimensional trade marks which consist of the packaging of goods which are normally traded in packaged form (liquids), is the packaging of the goods to be equated with the shape of the goods for the purpose of trade mark law in such a way that the packaging of the goods is to be regarded as the shape of the goods for the purpose of Article 3(1)(e) of the Directive?
In the case of three-dimensional trade marks which consist of the packaging of goods which are normally traded in packaged form (liquids), is the packaging of the goods to be equated with the shape of the goods for the purpose of trade mark law in such a way that the packaging of the goods may serve to designate the (external) quality of the packaged goods for the purpose of Article 3(1)(c) of the Directive?
Does, for three-dimensional trade marks consisting of the packaging of goods which are generally packaged in trade, their distinctive character depend on whether an average consumer is able to recognise the characteristic features of the three-dimensional trade mark applied for, which differ from the norm or custom in the sector, so that they are capable of distinguishing the goods concerned from those of other undertakings?
Can the distinctive character of a trade mark be assessed solely by reference to national trade usage without investigating whether identical trade marks have been registered or refused registration in other Member States?
Can a Member State prevent the importation of sheep for slaughter when they arrive on its territory in the case where they are accompanied by a Model II health certificate in accordance with Directive 91/68, which is provided for trade between Member States in ovine and caprine animals intended for fattening?
Did, at the time of the facts in the main proceedings, Community law preclude a MS from imposing a requirement under national law, requiring the health certificate accompanying the animals state that they had been raised on farms in which no case of TSE had been registered during the previous six years?
Are goods which have been cleared for Community transit removed from customs supervision, within the meaning of Article 2(1)(c) of Regulation 2144/87, if the transit document T 1 is temporarily removed from the consignment?
If Question 1 is answered in the negative; Have goods cleared for Community transit been removed from customs supervision if the customs seal affixed to ensure their identification was opened and the goods were partially unloaded, under circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings?
If one of Questions 1 and 2 is answered in the affirmative; Do special circumstances exist within the meaning of Article 13 of Regulation 1430/79, if a customs investigation officer acting undercover has provoked infringements of the Community transit procedure?
Does the deception or obviously negligent conduct of persons used by the principal in fulfilling the obligations assumed by him under the Community transit procedure preclude repayment to him of the duties incurred by the removal from customs supervision of goods cleared for Community transit?
When must, for the purposes of an application for marketing authorisation of a generic medicinal product, under point 8(a)(iii) of the Directive 65/65/EEC , the reference medicinal product be marketed?
Must the term ?marketed? in Article 4, third paragraph, point 8(a)(iii) Directive 65/65/EEC , be interpreted as meaning that it is sufficient that the reference product has been granted a marketing authorisation in the MS for which the application is made?
Is the Community principle on State liability for a breach of Community law  also applicable where the alleged infringement stems from a decision of a court adjudicating at last instance?
If the answer to Question 1 is yes: Is it for the legal system of each Member State to designate the court competent to adjudicate on disputes relating to such reparation?
If the answer to Question 2 is yes: Does the legal interpretation of the Verwaltungsgerichtshof, according to which the special length-of-service increment is a form of loyalty bonus, breach a rule of directly applicable Community law, in particular Article 48 EC Treaty and the relevant settled case-law of the Court of Justice?
If the answer to Question 3 is yes: Is this rule of directly applicable Community law such as to create a subjective right for the applicant in the main proceedings?
If the answer to Question 4 is yes: Is, in the main proceedings, the liability of the Member State incurred owing to an infringement of Community law by the judgment of the Verwaltungsgerichtshof of 24 June 1998?
Does Article 2 of Directive 84/647 permit a road haulage company established in one MS, which hires out vehicles without drivers to a road haulage company established in another MS, to obtain the carriage authorisations necessary within the territory of the first State on behalf of the lessee and to manage the tachograph discs of the drivers employed by the lessee on behalf of the latter?
In the case of a cross-border hire of a vehicle without a driver, must the vehicles be registered in the Member State of the lessee?
Does the Directive 79/112 and 2000/13 preclude a national rule which provides that, where foodstuffs are offered for sale after the period of their minimum durability has expired, that fact must be indicated clearly and in a generally intelligible manner in addition to the expiry date itself?
Do Articles 1 and/or 2 of Regulation 3950/92 permit the competent body in a Member State to take legal action directly against a producer to recover levy due from that producer (otherwise than pursuant to Article 2(3) in respect of direct sales)?
In particular, may such action be taken where the purchaser to whom milk was delivered was not approved pursuant to Article 7 of Regulation 536/93 and/or has not complied with any of its obligations under Article 7 and/or has not recovered or sought to recover levy from the producers concerned?
Do Community rules, in particular Article 39 EC, preclude a Member State from requiring registration of a vehicle such as that in question, under circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings?
Do Article 43, 49 and/or Article 50 EC preclude a national provision such as that at issue in the main proceedings?
Is the first subparagraph of Article 3(4) of Regulation 258/97 to be interpreted as meaning that the presence in novel foods of residues of transgenic protein at certain levels precludes those foods from being considered substantially equivalent to existing foods and, consequently, use of the simplified procedure for placing those novel foods on the market?
What effect does the validity of the use of the simplified procedure (Regulation 258/97) have on the power of the MS to adopt, on the basis of the precautionary principle and in particular of Article 12 of the Regulation, measures, in particular so far as concerns the onus of proving the safety of novel foods and the possibility that application of the simplified procedure implies tacit consent on the part of the Commission which must be challenged?
If the use of the simplified procedure is justified notwithstanding the presence of residues of transgenic protein in the novel foods, is Article 5 of Regulation 258/97 valid, in particular in the light of Articles 153 EC and 174 EC, the precautionary principle and the principle of proportionality?
May a MS, having regard to the legislative nature of Decisions 98/692 and 1999/514, and notwithstanding the expiry of the time-limit for challenging them, validly invoke significant changes in the factual or legal circumstances occurring after the expiry of that time-limit, where those changes are such as to cast doubt on the validity of those decisions?
At the date of the decisions taken by the French authorities, were the abovementioned Commission decisions valid, having regard to the precautionary principle laid down in Article 174 EC?
May a MS draw from the provisions of Article 30 EC the power to prohibit imports of agricultural products and live animals, inasmuch as the Directives cannot be regarded as harmonising the measures needed in order to attain the specific objective of protecting the health and life of humans provided for by that article?
Do Articles 43 et seq. and Article 49 et seq. of the EC Treaty preclude domestic legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings which prohibits on pain of criminal penalties the pursuit by any person anywhere of the activities of collecting, taking, booking and forwarding offers of bets, in particular bets on sporting events, unless the requirements concerning concessions and authorisations prescribed by domestic law have been complied with?
Do films which have been made for television and which provide, from their conception, for breaks for the insertion of advertising come within the meaning of films made for television in Article 11(3) of the Directive 89/552/EEC , particularly in view of the purpose of that provision, which is to limit advertising breaks?
What must be the connections between films to enable them to come within the exemption provided for series in Article 11(3) of Directive 89/552?
Is Article 1(3) of Directive 89/665 to be interpreted as meaning that any person seeking the award of a specific public contract is entitled to institute a review procedure?
If the answer to Question 1 is in the negative: Is Article 1(3) to be understood as meaning that it does not permit a tenderer to be refused access to the review procedures on grounds such as those given in the main proceedings?
May a MS make use of the power conferred by Article 15 of Directive 84/253 in order to adopt transitional provisions on the basis of which certain classes of persons may be approved to carry out the auditing of accounting documents, without first having passed an examination of professional competence, in circumstances in which that MS had already established an examination in its domestic law before the Directive was adopted?
If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative; May the MS concerned, in the light of Article 15 in conjunction with Article 30(2) of Directive 84/253, make use of that power after 1 January 1991?
May professional persons approved in one MS to audit accounting documents under Article 11 of Directive 84/253, obtain approval to carry on that activity in another MS, without being required to pass an examination of professional competence, as provided for by the Directive?
Does Article 141 EC have direct effect so as to enable a woman to claim equal pay with a man in the circumstances of this case?
Does Article 141 EC have direct effect so as to entitle the plaintiff to claim access to the pension scheme either by comparing herself with Mr Johnson or by showing statistically that a considerably smaller proportion of female than of male teachers who are otherwise eligible to join the TSS can comply with the requirement of being employed under a contract of employment, and by establishing that the requirement is not objectively justified?
Must Article 93(3) EC Treaty be interpreted as precluding, in circumstances such as those in the main proceedings, the levying of charges which finance an aid scheme that has been declared compatible with the common market by a Commission decision, where those charges are imposed retroactively?
Has the Commission, by approving the aid measures established by the Law of 23 March 1998, also approved the retroactive effect of that law?
Are groups of sickness funds, such as the fund associations in question in the main proceedings, to be regarded as undertakings or associations of undertakings within the meaning of Article 81 EC when they determine fixed maximum amounts corresponding to the upper limit of the price of medicinal products whose cost is borne by sickness funds?
If the first question is answered in the affirmative, do those groups infringe Article 81 EC when they adopt decisions intended to determine the amounts?
If the second question is answered in the affirmative, does the derogation provided for in Article 86(2) EC apply to those decisions?
If the Treaty competition rules are infringed, is there a right against such groups to an injunction remedying the situation and to compensation for the loss suffered?
Can scallops caught in the circumstances described be regarded as imported products, notwithstanding the French legislation which applies to fish catches the law of the flag of the fishing vessel?
Does Treaty of Maastricht, which prohibits measures having an equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions on imports preclude the national Order, which prohibits the landing of scallops during the close season?
Must the first paragraph of Article 1 of the Brussels Convention be interpreted as meaning that civil and commercial matters, covers a claim by which a contracting State seeks to enforce against a person governed by private law a private-law guarantee contract which was concluded in order to enable a third person to supply a guarantee required and defined by that State?
Must proceedings which are brought by the State and which have as their subject-matter a private-law guarantee contract, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, be regarded as a customs matter within the meaning of Article 1 of the Brussels Convention, and thus be excluded from its scope of application?
Should Article 9(c) and (d) of Regulation 3950/92, read with Articles 3(2), 4(4) and 5 thereof, be interpreted as meaning that all the milk production of a farmer established in the territory of the former GDR obtained on an independent basis in leased facilities situated in that territory but in different lander should be imputed to the reference quantity provisionally allocated to him?
Is it material to the reply to these questions that the holding producing the milk was formerly in the territory of the GDR but that this territory was transferred to Niedersachsen by state treaty between the two L?nder of the Federal Republic of Germany known as Niedersachsen and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern?
May a Member State, under circumstances such as those in the main proceedings, revoke and itself claim repayment of financial assistance under Article 8 of Regulation 729/70 and Article 23 of Regulation 4253/88?
Is the granting, by the owner of premises to an owner of a cigarette vending machine, of the right to install, operate and maintain the machine in the premises for a period of two years, under conditions such as those at issue in the main proceedings, capable of amounting to the letting of immovable property within the meaning of Article 13B(b) of the Sixth Directive?
Is Article 7(1) of the Directive to be construed as conferring on the manufacturer of a product a right to apply for a second opinion where public authorities have taken from a retail outlet a sample of the manufacturers product for purposes of analysis and that sample has failed to satisfy certain criteria imposed by the legislation?
If the answer to Question 1 is in the affirmative: is Article 7(1) of directive 89/397 to be construed as giving rise to a Community-law prohibition on the use of findings based on samples removed by public authorities under circumstances such as those in the main proceedings?
Must Article 2 of Directive 89/104 be interpreted as precluding sound signs from being regarded as trade marks?
In the event that the answer to Question 1 is in the negative, does that article imply that sound signs must be capable of being regarded as trade marks?
On what conditions is a sound sign  capable of being represented graphically within the meaning of Article 2 of Directive 89/104?
Do musical notes, a written description in the form of an onomatopoeia, a written description in some other form, a graphical representation such as a sonogram, a sound recording annexed to the registration form, a digital recording accessible via the internet, a combination of those methods, or any other form meet the requirements of graphical representation?
Is a training course in a practical training school for public servants, such as the ENSP, to be treated in the same way as a diploma within the meaning of the Directive 89/48/EEC  and, if so, how was the equivalence of the diplomas from the National School of Public Health, Lisbon, and the National School of Public Health, Rennes, to be assessed?
If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative, Does Community law allow the authorities of the second MS to make that national's access to the employment in question subject to his passing a competition such as the ENSP entrance examination?
Is the Community Customs Code (Regulation 2913/92) to be interpreted as meaning that it is permissible for a customs declarant or his representative present when a sample was taken by the customs authorities of imported goods and who did not at the time dispute the representativeness of that sample to challenge its representativity when requested by those authorities to pay additional import duties following their analysis of that sample?
Does Directive 97/13/EC permit MS to require undertakings holding a licence to carry on telecommunications activities to make financial payments other than and in addition to those allowed by the Directive?
Does the provisions of Directives 92/46, 79/112 and 89/396 preclude a national provision which lays down a use-by date of four days after preparation for milk pasteurised at high temperature?
Does Article 73b(1) of the Treaty preclude national rules such as the prior authorisation procedure at issue in the main proceedings?
Can a factoring company which buys debts and assumes liability for the risk of loss in relation to those debts be said to be using goods and services received by it for the purposes of its transactions thus pursuing an economic activity within the meaning of the Directive?
Is true factoring subject to VAT or does it fall within one of the activities exempted from VAT pursuant to Article 13B(d) of the Directive?
Does the exemption under Article 13A(1)(c) of the Directive apply to the various activities described in the question referred?
Does Article 13(B)(a) of the Directive, preclude, in the case of a tax on insurance premiums such as that at issue in the main proceedings, the introduction of a special rate, so that the procedure provided for in Article 27, which obliges any MS wishing to introduce special measures for derogation from that directive to seek prior authorisation, should have been complied with before the introduction of that rate?
Is Article 33 of the Directive to be interpreted as precluding a MS from introducing a tax on insurance premiums, such as that at issue in the main proceedings?
If the higher rate of insurance premium tax constitutes a State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) EC, is Article 88 EC to be interpreted so that, where the Commission is not informed of any plans to grant such aid, the legislative measures introducing the aid should be disapplied and any tax paid under those measures should be repaid?
Does Community law preclude the authorities of a MS from refusing to enrol the holder of a legal diploma obtained in another MS in the register of persons undertaking the necessary period of practice for admission to the bar solely on the ground that it is not a legal diploma issued or confirmed by a university of the first State?
Is Article?2(8) of the Directive 89/665 to be interpreted as meaning that an authority responsible for carrying out review procedures is precluded from taking into account, of its own motion and independently of the submissions of the parties to the review procedure, those circumstances relevant under the law governing contract award procedures which the authority responsible for carrying out review procedures considers material to its decision in a review procedure?
Is Article?2(1)(c) of the Directive 89/665 to be interpreted as meaning that an authority responsible for carrying out review procedures is precluded from dismissing an application by a tenderer that is indirectly aimed at obtaining damages, on the ground that if the contested decision had not been taken the tenderer would none the less have been harmed for other reasons?
Is Directive 93/36 to be interpreted as prohibiting a public contracting authority conducting contract award procedures from taking account of references relating to the products offered by tenderers to satisfy an award criterion?
Is it compatible with Article 26 of Directive 93/36 for an award criterion to provide that product references are to be evaluated on the basis of the number of references alone, there being no substantive examination as to whether contracting authorities' experiences of the product have been good or bad, and, moreover, that only references from the geographical area comprising the part of the Alps within the European Union are to be taken into account?
Is it compatible with Community law for an award criterion to permit opportunities to inspect examples of the subject of the invitation to tender only if available within a 300 kilometre radius of the authority issuing the invitation to tender?
Is Article 2(1)(c) of Directive 89/665 to be interpreted as meaning that if the breach committed by the contracting authority consists in imposing an unlawful award criterion, the tenderer will be entitled to damages only if he can actually prove that, but for the unlawful award criterion, he would have submitted the best tender?
Can the name of the manufacturer and the product description of foodstuffs in respect of which a complaint has been made in the context of an administrative check on the ground of defective labelling, pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No 1139/98 be regarded as information relating to the environment within the meaning of Article 2(a) of Council Directive 90/313/EEC?
Are administrative documents from which it is apparent how often administrative penalties have been imposed for infringements of Regulation (EC) No 1139/98 information relating to the environment within the meaning of Article 2(a) of Council Directive?
Are administrative documents from which it is apparent which manufacturers and which products are concerned by administrative penalties for breach of Regulation (EC) No 1139/98  information relating to the environment within the meaning of Article 2(a) of Council Directive?
Is Article 13 of Decision 1/80 to be interpreted as prohibiting a MS from introducing national provisions which, in comparison with the position under national law on 1 December 1980, lay down new restrictions on access to the employment market for Turkish workers generally?
Is Article 13 of Decision 1/80 also to be applied to workers employed in Turkey, who, as long-distance lorry drivers engaged in international haulage, regularly pass through a MS of the Community without belonging to the legitimate labour force of that MS?
Is Article 41(1) of the Additional Protocol to be interpreted as meaning that a Turkish worker is entitled to plead a restriction on the freedom to provide services which is contrary to the Additional Protocol?
If the previous question is answered in the affirmative, is Article 41(1) of the Additional Protocol to be interpreted as meaning that a new restriction on the freedom to provide services also exists where a MS, from the entry into force of the Additional Protocol, restricts the access of Turkish workers to the employment market and thereby impedes the freedom to provide services of businessmen employing the workers?
Does it constitute illegal discrimination on grounds of sex, within the meaning of the Directive 76/207 if a woman, who, after she has started her parental leave wishes to shorten that leave with the consent of her employer, is under an obligation to inform the employer if she knows she is pregnant again before the agreement on her return to work is concluded?
Does it constitute unlawful discrimination on the grounds of sex, within the meaning of Directive 76/207, if the employer has the right to rescind his consent to the shortening of parental leave because he was mistaken about the fact that the woman was pregnant?
Are the principles of the free movement of goods under Article 28 EC to 30 EC infringed by national legislation whereby medicinal products for human use the sale of which is restricted to pharmacies may not be imported commercially by way of mail order through authorised pharmacies in other MS on the basis of individual orders placed by consumers over the internet?
If it does, is Article 30 EC to be interpreted as meaning that a national prohibition designed to protect the health and life of humans is justified?
Are Questions 1(a) and 1(b) to be assessed differently in the light of Articles 28 EC and 30 EC if the imported medicines in question are medicines authorised in the importing State, which a pharmacy in an EU Member State previously obtained from wholesalers in the importing State?
Do Articles 28 EC and 30 EC preclude a national prohibition on advertising the sale by mail order of medicinal products, such as that at issue in the main proceedings?
Having regard to Article 1(3) of Directive 2000/31, do Articles 28 EC and 30 EC require the internet presentation of a pharmacy of an EU Member State, or parts of that presentation, to be excluded from the definition of advertising to the general public for the purposes of Articles 1(3) and 3(1) of Directive 92/28?
Can any restriction of the definition of advertising required by Articles 28 EC and 30 EC be justified by the consideration that on-line order forms containing only the minimum information necessary for placing an order, are comparable with trade catalogues and/or price lists within the meaning of Article 1(4) of Directive 92/28/EEC?
Is it to be inferred from Articles 28 EC and 30 EC that cross-border trade in medicines which takes place with the aid of such previously mentioned presentation, must be regarded as lawful despite the prohibited advertising?
In circumstances such as those referred to in the question at issue, has the proof required by the first indent of Article 2(2) of Regulation 2670/81 been furnished in relation to that export, or that element of the relevant export, which was not covered by a valid licence?
Is the answer to Question 1 different in circumstances where the trader presented to the customs authority a customs declaration form amended in manuscript to reflect the amount actually exported; and the customs authority has endorsed the relevant licence extract against the trader's entry in the actual amount exported?
Is the answer to question 1 above different on the assumption that the circumstances were those listed in Question 3 (from the national court)?
Does Article 24 of Regulation 3719/88 enable the competent authority to withdraw the extract or the licence or certificate as well as any extracts previously issued and require the competent authority to issue without delay a corrected licence or extract in circumstances where: (a) there is no obvious or manifest error on the licence; (b) the amendment is sought to be made after the expiry of the validity? (c) does it make a difference if the trader intended to apply for a licence extract in respect of a quantity greater than that for which he called off?
If the answers to the above questions are negative, do the provisions of Article 24 of Regulation 3719/88 infringe the Community law principles of proportionality and/or equality in that the absence of any power to amend the head licence, licence extract or attributes thereto may, lead to the imposition of a fine under Article 3 of Regulation 2670/81?
Does the national court and/or the national authority have a discretion to vary (downwards) the amount of the penalty to be imposed under Article 3 of Regulation 2670/81?
In circumstances such as those at issue, is a penalty under Article 3 of Regulation No 2670/81 properly levied?
Must the second indent of the second subparagraph of Article 8(2) of Regulation 2372/95 be interpreted as meaning that Article 47(2) of Regulation 3665/87 must be simply applied by analogy, so that the 12-month time-limit for supplying proof of importation does not begin to run until  the importation into the ACP State is accomplished?
Is there, for the purposes of Article 203(1) of the Regulation, removal from customs supervision when, before the entry into force of Regulation 993/2001, non-Community goods which were subject to the customs warehousing procedure and intended for re-export from the customs territory of the Community were removed and transported from the customs warehouse to the customs office at the point of exit without having been placed under the external transit procedure?
Is there a transfer of part of a business within the meaning of Article 1 of the Directive 77/187 where a hospital authority, which has previously employed a catering undertaking, transfers, after giving notice of termination of that contract, those operations and the assets previously made available to that first undertaking to a second undertaking which does not take over the assets brought in by the first catering undertaking itself and refuses to take on the employees of the first contractor.?
Are the plastic carrier bags given to customers by retailers for taking their purchases away packaging within the meaning of Directive 94/62 and is any importance attached to the fact that the customer himself buys the bag or that the retailer provides it without additional payment?
Does the reply to the first question vary according to the interpretation of the different language versions of Article 3(1) of Directive 94/62?
Is it in conformity with Community law for the operator of the collection and recovery system set up in Austria to charge a fee even for carrier bags not covered by Directive 94/62 solely on the ground that the bags bear a mark in respect of which the operator has a right of disposal?
Is a ?producer?, within the meaning of Article 3(1) of the directive 94/62, only someone who puts goods together with, or causes them to be put together with, the product used as packaging, or is it also an undertaking which makes a product intended for use as packaging?
Where collective agreements between an employer and workers? representatives fix the timing of leave for the entire workforce, and where the dates concerned coincide with those of a worker?s maternity leave, do Article 7(1) of Directive 93/104, Article 11(2)(a) of Directive 92/85 and Article 5(1) of Directive 76/207  guarantee that worker?s entitlement to take annual leave during a period other than the one agreed, which does not coincide with her period of maternity leave?
Is the number of days of annual leave to which a worker is entitled, in circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings, the number laid down as a minimum by Directive 93/104 or the higher number laid down by national law?
Are Member States required to impose an obligation under the Directive 94/45 for central management, or the deemed central management, to provide another undertaking in the group with certain information with a view to establishing a European Works Council?
If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative: does the obligation to provide information also encompass the names of the employees representation bodies and their representatives who are to participate on behalf of the employees in the establishment of a European Works Council?
Does the Directive 96/67, in particular Article 16(3) thereof, authorise the managing body of an airport to make access to the groundhandling market in the airport subject to payment by a supplier of groundhandling services or self-handler of an access fee as consideration for the grant of a commercial opportunity, in addition to the fee payable by that supplier or self-handler for the use of the airport installations?
Does Community law preclude a MS (the State in which the property is situated) from levying on the inheritance of immovable property situated in that MS a tax on the value of that property which allows the value of the obligation to transfer title to that property to be deducted if, at the time of death, the deceased resided in the State where the property is situated but not if he resided in another MS (the State of residence)?
Does it affect the reply to the previous question if, at the time he acquired that property, the deceased no longer resided in the State in which the property is situated?
Is the distribution of the capital of the deceased between the State in which the property is situated, the State of residence and any other States relevant to the reply to the first question?
Is Article 6 of Directive 76/207 to be interpreted as meaning that the possibility required by that article of pursuing claims (in the present case, a claim for compensation) by judicial process is not adequately satisfied by the Austrian Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Administrative Court) alone, in view of that court's legally limited powers?
Is the levy of a charge on the registration of new motor vehicles, such as the registration duty charged by the Member State at issue in the main proceedings, precluded, as a rule, by Article 28 EC?
If the answer to Question 1 is yes: can that registration duty be justified on the grounds that are mentioned in Article 30 EC or follow from the Court's case-law on Article 28 EC (reference is made to Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral ( Cassis de Dijon) [1979] ECR 649)?
Does Article 39 EC or Article 12 EC preclude the imposition of a consumption tax, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, on a private individual from one MS who on taking up residence in another MS because of a change of place of work imports his or her car into the latter State?
Do Article 90 EC or Article 23 EC and Article 25 EC preclude the imposition of the standard fuel consumption tax referred to in the first question (base tax or surcharge)?
Is the surcharge payable as part of the Normverbrauchsabgabe referred to in the questions compatible with the Sixth Directive 77/388?
Are Article 1(3) of Directive 93/104 and Article 2(2) of Directive 89/391, under which those directives are not applicable, to be construed as meaning that the claimants? activity as emergency workers is caught by this exclusion?
Does the concept of road transport, for the purposes of Article 1(3) of Directive 93/104/EC, in so far as it is excluded from the scope of the directive, includes the activity of an emergency rescue service which consists, at least in part, of driving vehicles and attending to patients during the journey?
In view of the judgment of the Court in C-303/98 (Simap) Is Article 18(1)(b)(i) of Directive 93/104 to be construed as meaning that consent given individually by a worker must expressly refer to the extension of working time to more than 48 hours per week, or may such consent also reside in the contract of employment, that working conditions are to be governed by a collective agreement which itself allows working time to be extended to more than 48 hours on average?
Is Article 6 of Directive 93/104 in itself unconditional and sufficiently precise to be capable of being relied on by individuals before national courts where the State has not properly transposed the directive into national law?
Do Article 39 EC and Articles 1 and 4 of Regulation 1612/68 permit a MS to reserve the posts of captain and first officer of its merchant ships to its own nationals? If so, may that reservation be formulated in absolute terms or is it valid only in cases where it may be necessary for captains and first officers on board to carry out certain public duties?
Must Article 39 EC be interpreted as precluding a MS from making access by nationals of the other Member States to the posts of master and chief mate of merchant ships flying its flag, such as those covered by the national provision in question, subject to a condition of reciprocity?
Notwithstanding the fact that Article 5(2) of the Directive 89/104 refers expressly only to use of a sign by a third party in relation to goods or services which are not similar, is that provision to be interpreted as requiring the Member States who apply it to provide specific protection for a registered trade mark with a reputation in cases where the later mark or sign, which is identical with or similar to the registered mark, is intended to be used or is used in relation to goods or services identical with or similar to those covered by that mark?
If the answer to Question 1 is in the negative: where Article 5(2) of the Directive is implemented in a national law, must the concept of likelihood of confusion referred to in Article 5(1)(b) of the Directive be interpreted as meaning that there exists such a likelihood if a person other than the proprietor of the trade mark uses a trade mark with a reputation or a sign similar to it, in the manner and circumstances referred to in Article 5(2) of the Directive, in relation to goods or services which are identical with or similar to those for which the trade mark is registered?
If the answer to Question 1 is in the affirmative: is the protection conferred by Article 5(2) of the Directive 89/104 conditional on a finding of a degree of similarity between the mark with a reputation and the sign such that there exists a likelihood of confusion between them on the part of the relevant section of the public?
If the sign alleged to be an infringement in such a case is viewed purely as an embellishment by the relevant section of the public, what importance must be attached to that circumstance in connection with the question concerning the similarity between the trade mark and the sign?
Must Directive 89/665 be understood as meaning that a tenderer has or had an interest in obtaining a public contract only if it made a preliminary application to an advisory committee before bringing a review procedure under that directive, although such application was optional?
Upon triangular outward processing, is an operator prohibited, on a proper interpretation of the Community Customs Code, from deducting the amount of the import duties which would be applicable to the temporary export goods in accordance with their correct tariff heading?
Does the fact that an EU citizen works for a short period (two and a half months)  that is fixed from the outset in a Member State of which he is not a national confer on him the status of a worker under Article 48 of the EC Treaty?
When determining if someone is a worker within the meaning of the treaty, are any of the following circumstances significant: the fact that he took up the job only some years after his entry into the host State; the fact that shortly after the end of his short, fixed-term employment relationship he became eligible for entry to university in the host country by virtue of having completed his schooling in his country of origin; the fact that he attempted to find a new job in the period between the end of the short, fixed-term employment relationship and the time when he took up his studies?
Is a Community national, which has the status of a migrant worker, voluntarily unemployed within the meaning established by the relevant case-law of the Court, solely because his contract of employment, from the outset concluded for a fixed term, has expired?
When assessing whether the termination of the employment relationship was voluntary or not, are any of the following circumstances significant: the fact that shortly after the employment relationship ended he became eligible for entry to university in the host country by virtue of having completed his schooling in his country of origin; immediately following termination of that employment relationship until beginning his studies, he was looking for another job?
If the competent authority of a Member State deems it necessary to redistribute sugar production quotas among undertakings situated in its territory in order to safeguard competition, do the provisions of the Regulations 1785/81 and 193/82 preclude those authorities from stipulating that such a transfer or reallocation of quotas requires the recipient undertaking to pay financial consideration?
If the answer is in the negative, do the provisions of the Regulations 1785/81 and 193/82 nevertheless preclude the price of the quota to be transferred, and the distribution thereof, from being decided by public auction?
Does the entry into force of Council Regulation 1260/2001(which repeals the previous regulations) affect the interpretation of the Community legislation and the answers of the Court?
Is Article 82 EC to be interpreted as meaning that there is abusive conduct by an undertaking with a dominant position on the market where it refuses to grant a licence agreement for the use of a databank protected by copyright to an undertaking which seeks access to the same geographical and product market if  potential clients reject any product which does not make use of the databank?
Is the extent to which an undertaking with a dominant position on the market has involved persons from the other side of the market in the development of the databank protected by copyright relevant to the question of abusive conduct?
Are the lengths, particularly in terms of costs, to which pharmaceutical companies would have to go in order to acquire studies carried out on the basis of a structure differing from the database protected by copyright relevant to the question of abusive conduct?
Is an alternative tender that consists in proposing an asphalt surface instead of overlaying the carriageway with concrete as specified in the tender notice a variant within the meaning of the first paragraph of Article 19 of Directive 93/37/EEC?
Is Article 19 of the Directive 93/37/EEC to be interpreted as meaning that the obligation to set out the minimum specifications required by the contracting authority is satisfied where the contract documents refer only to a provision of national legislation, under conditions  such as those at issue in the main proceedings?
Does Article 30 of the directive 93/37/EEC in conjunction with the principles of transparency and equal treatment  preclude a provision of national legislation which makes the acceptance of a variant conditional on the criterion requiring that a tender for equivalent work be submitted where, rather than being mentioned in the tender document, that criterion is apparent only from a provision to which the tender document refers?
Does the obligation to take out an insurance policy with an insurer in Sweden in order to benefit from the tax regime for pension insurance constitute a restriction on the free movement of services, persons and capital and, in particular, Article 49 EC.
Must the second paragraph of Annex I, Chapter I, point 2, to Directive 85/73 be interpreted as meaning that the reduction it lays down applies also where the cutting plant and the establishment where the meat is obtained, which are situated in the same building, belong to two different natural or legal persons?
What criteria should govern the determination by the authority to which the fee is owed, in respect of the health controls and inspections connected with cutting operations, of the extent of the reduction referred to in the second paragraph of Annex A, Chapter I, point 2, to Directive 85/73?
May a public body which seeks, in an action for recovery, reimbursement of sums paid under public law by way of an education grant, rely on the special rule of jurisdiction in Article 5(2) of the Brussels Convention?
Is Article 9(2)(e) of the Directive applicable to services supplied indirectly to the advertiser and invoiced to a third party who in turn invoices them to the advertiser, if the advertiser does not produce goods in the price of which the cost of the services is going to be included?
Do drivers falling within the scope of Regulation 3820/85 have to satisfy the requirements set out in Article 8(1) and (2) of that regulation cumulatively where there are two drivers or is Article 8(2) a lex specialis that prevails over Article 8(1)?
Are the provisions of Article 8(1) and (2) of the Regulation 3820/85 consistent with the principle of legal certainty and consequently considered to be valid?
Where a partnership admits a partner on payment of a capital contribution in cash, does it effect a supply to him for consideration within the meaning of Article 2(1) of Directive 77/388/EEC?
Do the provisions of Community law relating to the award of public contracts (Directive 93/36/EEC) prohibit a contracting authority from laying down an award criterion in relation to the supply of electricity which is given a 45% weighting and which requires a tenderer to state how much electricity he can supply from renewable energy sources to a group of consumers not more closely defined, where the maximum number of points is given to whichever tenderer states the highest amount and a supply volume is taken into account only to the extent that it exceeds the volume of consumption to be expected in the context of the contract to which the invitation to tender relates?
Do the provisions of Community law relating to the award of public contracts (Directive 89/665/EEC) prohibit making the setting aside of an unlawful decision in review proceedings dependent on proof that the unlawful decision was material to the outcome of the procurement procedure?
Do the provisions of Community law relating to the award of public contracts (Directive 93/36/EEC) prohibit making the setting aside of an unlawful decision in review proceedings (Directive 89/665/EEC ) dependent on proof that the unlawful decision was material to the outcome of the procurement procedure, where that proof has to be achieved by the review body examining whether the ranking of the tenders actually submitted would have been different had they been re-evaluated disregarding the unlawful award criterion?
Do the provisions of Community law relating to the award of public contracts (Directive 93/36/EEC) require the contracting authority to cancel the invitation to tender if it transpires in review proceedings (Directive 89/665/EEC) that one of the award criteria it laid down is unlawful?
Are Art 6 and 73b et seq. of the EC Treaty to be interpreted as meaning that rules whereby transactions in agricultural and forestry plots are subject to restrictions imposed by the administrative authorities are also permitted in relation to Member States of the EEA as third countries, having regard to the fundamental freedoms, in particular the free movement of capital?
Is the Treaty to be interpreted as meaning that the fact that the appellant must undergo an authorisation procedure even before the property right is entered in the land register, pursuant to the national legislation, entails an infringement of Community law and of one of the appellant's fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the law of the European Union, which is also applicable to Member States of the EEA?
Where the purposes of a contract are partly private, does the status of ?consumer? for the purposes of Article 13 of the Convention depend on which of the private and the trade or professional purposes is predominant?
Does the determination of the purpose depend on the circumstances which could be objectively ascertained by the other party to the contract with the consumer?
In case of doubt, is a contract which may be attributed both to private and to trade or professional activity to be regarded as a consumer contract?
Is the conclusion of a contract preceded by advertising within the meaning of Article 13(3)(a) of the Brussels Convention where the other party to the subsequent contract with the consumer advertised his products by brochure in the Contracting State of the consumer but did not advertise the products the consumer subsequently bought in it?
Is there a consumer contract within the meaning of Article 13 of the Convention where the seller makes an offer by telephone from his own State to the buyer who lives in a different State, and the offer is not accepted but the buyer subsequently buys the product thus offered in response to a written offer?
Does the consumer take the steps necessary for the conclusion of the contract in his own State within the meaning of Article 13(3)(b) of the Convention where an offer is made to him in the State of his contracting partner and he accepts that offer by telephone from his own State?
In the light of Articles 47 and 48 of Regulation No 3665/87, are the extensions of time which can be granted to exporters under Article 47(4) subject to maximum time-limits?
Where the competent national authority has wrongly refused to grant an extension by virtue of Article 47(4) of the Regulation 3665/87, may the national court recognise the exporters right to obtain an extension of a certain duration and itself fix that duration on the basis of the time actually taken to obtain and forward the prescribed documentation?
Does Directive 91/439 preclude a Member State from refusing to recognise a driving licence where, another Member State issued that licence although the holder of the licence did not have his normal residence there?
Should Article 1(2) of Directive 91/439 be given direct effect under circumstances such as those described in the previous question?
Is the restriction on the freedom of movement of a foreign Community national with many years residence in the host MS, imposed by invoking the derogation for public policy set out in Article 39(3) EC, compatible with Community law where it can be expected, in view of his personal conduct, that he will reoffend and where it cannot be expected of that nationals family that they live in his State of origin.
Does Article 9(1) of Directive 64/221/EEC preclude national legislation which does not provide for objection proceedings in which an examination of expediency is also carried out in relation to a decision of an administrative authority to expel the holder of a residence permit from the national territory, if a special body which is independent of the administrative authority adopting the decision has not been established?
Does Directive 86/653/EEC preclude a rule of national law which makes the enrolment of a commercial agent in the register of undertakings conditional on that agent's name having been entered in an appropriate register?
Do Articles 20(2) and 17 of the Sixth Directive, or the principles of legitimate expectations and legal certainty preclude adjustment under Article 20(2) of the VAT deducted by a taxable person following a legislative amendment, the result of which is that the taxable person is no longer entitled to waive exemption for that letting under circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings?
If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, is the legislative amendment inapplicable only in respect of the deducted tax mentioned in Question 1, or is it also inapplicable (until the period of adjustment has expire) in respect of the taxed status (subject to the provisions of Article 13(C) of the Sixth Directive) of the letting referred to in Question 1?
Is Directive 2001/37/EC invalid, in whole or in part, by reason of the factors (a-g) listed in the question?
If it is valid, does Article 7 of Directive 2001/37/EC apply only to tobacco products marketed within the European Community, or does it apply also to tobacco products packaged within the European Community for export to third countries?
Is Article 5(8) of the Directive to be interpreted as meaning that the transfer of a totality of assets to a taxable person constitutes a sufficient condition for the transaction not to be made subject to value added tax?
Does Article 5(8) of the Sixth Directive require or allow a State to require that the transferee's activity be pursued in accordance with the authorisation issued by the competent authority to pursue the activity or branch of activity stipulated?
Do benefits such as payment, by the insurer against the risk of reliance on care, of the old age insurance social contributions of a carer providing care at the home of a reliant person, in the circumstances prevailing in the main proceedings, constitute ?sickness benefit? and ?old age benefit? within the meaning of Article 1 of Regulation 1408/71?
Does the Treaty, in particular Article 39 EC, Regulation No 1408/71 or other provisions of secondary law preclude the benefit from being refused on the ground that a reliant person or a third person caring for him, in the circumstances of the main proceedings, resides outwith the competent State, that is to say that of the institution insuring the reliant person against the risk of becoming reliant?
Does an infringement of a trade mark (within the meaning of Article 5(1)(a) and (b) of Directive 89/104/EEC ) occur where the defendant uses a protected sign solely to denote the particular characteristics of the goods he is offering for sale so that there can be no question of the trade mark used being perceived in trade as a sign indicative of the firm of origin?
Is the competent authority at the place of dispatch under Regulation 259/93 competent to verify the correctness of the classification by the notifier as waste for recovery under the fifth indent of Article 6(5) of Regulation No 259/93 of waste to be transported for an intended recovery operation under Annex II B to Directive 75/442/EEC and, in the event that the classification is incorrect, to prohibit the transport of such waste?
In the reasoned objection to the transport of waste on the ground that the planned transport is not for purposes of recovery but for disposal, contrary to the classification indicated by the notifier in the accompanying notification, may the competent authority at the place of dispatch rely on the matters constituting grounds for an objection under the fifth indent of Article 7(4)(a) of Regulation 259/93?
If the answer to question 2 is in the negative, on what provision of Regulation 259/93 or of Community law may the competent authority rely in refusing to authorise a transport of waste, where contrary to the information, the transport is for purposes of disposal?
Is any delivery of waste to a mine to be regarded, irrespective of the actual circumstances of such a delivery, as a disposal of waste within the meaning of the Regulation 259/93 in conjunction with the Directive 75/442?
If question 4 is answered in the negative, according to what criteria is classification under the operations listed in Directive 75/442 to be carried out?
What are the criteria for establishing whether the "involvement" of a holding company in the management of companies in which it has acquired a shareholding constitutes an economic activity within the meaning of Article 4(2) of Directive 77/388?
Where there is "involvement", do the receipts of dividends fall within the scope of the VAT Directive (77/388/EC)?
If question 2 is answered in the negative, may a holding company deduct VAT charged on expenditures incurred in respect of various services obtained in connection with the acquisition of a shareholding in a subsidiary?
Are Articles 1 to 3 of the national tax regulation introducing a tax on satellite dishes compatible with Articles 59 to 66 of the EC Treaty?
In a situation where an authority is awarding a contract pursuant to Directive 71/305, and where the authority has specified the award criteria in such a manner as is the case in the main proceedings, and where the three lowest tenderers qualifications shall not have diverged greatly, is the authority obliged to award the contract to the contractor who shall have tendered the lowest price?
Where, in implement of an obligation under Directive 93/53/EEC , a MS adopts a measure the application of which results in the slaughter of fish, are the principles of Community law to be interpreted as having placed on a MS the obligation to adopt measures providing for the payment of compensation?
Is the Directive invalid as being in breach of the fundamental right to property in not making provision for the payment of compensation?
If the Member State is required to adopt such measures, what are the criteria of interpretation needed by a national court to determine whether the measures adopted by a MS are compatible with the fundamental rights, in particular the right to property, which the Court ensures and which derive in particular from the European Convention on Human Rights?
Is Article 2(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 925/1999  invalid in so far as it defines "recertificated civil subsonic jet aeroplanes" so that re-engined aeroplanes "with engines having a by-pass ratio of three or more" are not subject to prohibitions imposed by the Regulation but aeroplanes wholly re-engined with engines having a by-pass ratio of less than three are subject to prohibitions?
Are the provisions of the Regulation No 1408/71 as amended to be interpreted as precluding the application of a national provision under which completed periods of child rearing in a second MS of the EEA are not treated as substitute periods for the purpose of old-age insurance rules, unless they were completed after the entry into force of that Regulation in the first MS and the applicant is in receipt of maternity benefits in the same MS?
Does the EC Treaty mean that the competent authority of a MS to which a Community national who holds a diploma obtained in another MS makes an application for authorisation to practise a profession access, is required to take into consideration the diploma relied upon by the applicant even where it is not included in Directive 85/384 and under circumstances such as those at hand in the main proceedings?
Must work carried out on the section of a Contracting State of the continental shelf under the North Sea by an employee be regarded as or treated as equivalent to work carried out in the territory of that State for the purposes of the application of Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention?
If so in order to answer the question whether the employee must be regarded as having carried out his work "habitually" in the MS, must account be taken of the entire period of his employment or is only his most recent period of employment relevant?
In answering question 2, must a distinction be drawn between the period before the WAMN entered into force and the period after?
Must provisions of  Directive 90/434 be understood as meaning that it is contrary to the provisions of that directive for the authorities of a MS to refuse to treat an arrangement as being covered by the directives provisions on the transfer of assets under the circumstances of the main proceedings?
Must the provisions of Directive 90/434 be understood as meaning that it is contrary to those provisions for a condition to be imposed, under which the transferring company may not provide security for the benefit of the receiving company?
Does Article 1(1) of the Directive 77/187 apply in a situation such as the one described in the main proceedings?
In the event that undertaking C is held to be the transferor, even though it continues to exist, does the directive 77/187 preclude it from being able to retain certain workers in its service?
Can the contribution introduced by the national provision at hand be regarded as public aid within the meaning of Article 92 of the Treaty?
In the event that the advantage for wholesale distributors in not being assessed to the tax on direct sales of medicines exceeds the additional costs that they bear in discharging their public service obligations, is an advantage of that kind covered by Article 90(2) of the Treaty?
Must Article 59 of the Treaty be interpreted as precluding a national legislation of the kind in the main proceedings?
Is the competent social security authorities of one MS required, pursuant to their Community obligations under the EC Treaty, to take into account,  periods of insurance completed in a non-member country by a national of a second MS in circumstances where, under identical conditions of contribution, those competent authorities will take into account such periods where they have been completed by nationals of the first MS pursuant to a bilateral international convention concluded between that MS and the non-member country?
In circumstances such as those of the main proceedings, can the non-national spouse rely on Article 49 EC and/or the Directive 73/148, to provide it with the right to reside with his or her spouse in his or her spouses MS of origin?
In the circumstances in which a Member State has failed to implement properly in its domestic legislation Article 11A of Directive 77/388, is it compatible with the principle of the effectiveness of the rights that a taxable person derives from Article 11A, or with the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, to enforce legislation which removes with retrospective effect a right under national law to reclaim sums paid, by way of VAT, more than three years before the claim is made?
Is Regulation 3887/92 to be interpreted as meaning that the unit amount of the aid must be reduced even where the discrepancy between the number of animals declared and the number found is not attributable to incorrect information given by the applicant but to the fact that the conditions for the grant of the premium are not satisfied?
Must Article 13(2) of Regulation 2081/92 be interpreted as meaning that no official measure need be adopted by the MS concerned in order to allow the use on its territory of designations which may be confused with those registered under Article 17 of that Regulation?
Do payments which an acquirer of dividend rights in a capital company does not make itself but makes through its parent company constitute a "contribution of assets of any kind" within the meaning of Article 4(1)(d) of the Directive 69/335?
Does the Directive 97/33 allow the national regulatory authorities to impose ex ante on an operator having significant market power the obligation to provide other operators with access to the subscriber loop and to offer interconnection at local and higher-level switching centres?
Can judgments be irreconcilable within the meaning of Article 27(3) of the Brussels Convention when the only difference between them lies in the specific requirements for the adoption of a particular type of autonomous provisional measure (within the meaning of Article 24 of the Convention)?
May and must the court of the State of enforcement which has declared a foreign judgment requiring the party against whom enforcement is sought to desist from certain activities to be enforceable in accordance with the Brussels Convention at the same time order the measures necessary, under the law of the State of enforcement, for enforcement of a restraining order?
If the answer to Question 2 is in the affirmative, must the measures necessary, under the law of the State of enforcement, for enforcement of the restraining order be ordered even if the judgment to be recognised does not itself include comparable measures in accordance with the law of the State of origin, and that law makes no provision at all for the immediate enforceability of such restraining orders?
Must Regulation No 1785/81 be interpreted as meaning that the classification of an area as a deficit area is to be based on a calculation method which treats as being consumed in that area sugar which is incorporated there into a processed product even if the latter is eaten in another country?
Is Regulation 1361/98 in question valid, in view of the circumstances at hand?
Does Article 2(1)(b) of Directive 89/665/EEC require the decision of a contracting authority to cancel the procedure for the award of a contract for services to be reviewable in review proceedings leading, if appropriate, to its being set aside?
If Question 1 is answered affirmatively, is there any provision of the Directives ( 89/665/EEC and 92/50/EEC) which precludes a review limited to examination of the issue whether cancellation of the award procedure was arbitrary or a sham?
If Question 1 is answered affirmatively, which is the relevant moment in time for assessing whether the decision of the contracting authority to cancel the award procedure is lawful?
Under Community law, the C-227/88 and the ECHR, may a national court having jurisdiction under circumstances such as those at hand in the main proceedings, refuse to grant leave to enter on the ground that it has not been presented with the information or evidence in the Commissions file, or that such information is not adequate to justify the measure thus sought?
If the answer to Question 1 is negative, Under Community law, may a national court having jurisdiction under circumstances such as those at hand in the main proceedings, refuse to grant such leave on the ground that the reasons given in the Commissions decision are not sufficiently informative to enable that court to verify whether the measures sought are justified?
For the purposes of the Brussels Convention, what kind of a claim does the national provision at hand describe?
Does the first paragraph of Article 95 of the Treaty allow a MS to apply to used vehicles imported from another MS a system of taxation under which the taxable value, determined by reference to the customs value as defined by the Customs Code and the implementing regulation, is defined differently depending on the marketing stage at which the importer of the vehicle operates?
Does the first paragraph of Article 95 of the Treaty preclude a Member State from applying to used cars imported from another Member State a system of taxation under which the tax on those vehicles is equal, during the first six months from the registration or bringing into use of the vehicle, to the tax charged on a similar new vehicle, and is equal, from the 7th to the 150th month of use of the vehicle, to the tax on a similar new vehicle with a linear reduction by a percentage of 0.5% per full calendar month?
In addition to using the bases of calculation prescribed in the national tax legislation, is it always necessary to establish a vehicles individual characteristics to ensure that the levying of car tax does not lead, in the individual case, to discrimination contrary to [Article 95 of the Treaty]?
Is the tax called value added tax payable on car tax under the national legislation at hand, a value added tax within the meaning of the Directive 77/388?
If the answer to Question 4 is in the negative, may such a tax nevertheless be regarded as a tax or charge the levying of which is permitted under Article 33 of the Directive 77/388?
If such national tax provisions are not regarded as contrary to the Sixth Directive, may Article 90 EC be interpreted as meaning that that those tax provisions are not discriminatory within the meaning of that article?
Does the national rule such as that at hand constitute a provision on reduction within the meaning of Articles 46a and 46b of the Regulation 1408/71?
Do Articles 46a and 46b of the Regulation preclude the application of the legislation of a Member State containing a provision against overlapping under which a survivors pension received in that Member State must be reduced because of the existence of a survivors pension acquired under the legislation of another Member State?
Are advertising services, as referred to in Article 9(2)(e) of the Sixth Directive to be understood, as regards operations designed to promote the sale of goods or services, as meaning only services supplied directly and invoiced by the supplier of services to a taxable advertiser, or, also to services of the same kind supplied indirectly to the advertiser and invoiced to a third party who in turn invoices them to that advertiser?
Do the Directives (76/307/EEC, 92/85/EEC)or other provisions in Community law preclude a worker from being dismissed on the ground of pregnancy in circumstances such as those in the main proceedings?
Does the fact that the employment occurs in a very large undertaking and that that undertaking frequently uses temporary workers have any bearing on the answer to Question 1?
Are the principles of the free movement of goods under Article 28 et seq. EC, or other provisions of Community law, to be interpreted as meaning that a MS is obliged to keep major transit routes clear of all restrictions and impediments by requiring that a political demonstration may not be authorised?
Does the failure of the MS, under the circumstances at hand in the main proceedings, constitute a sufficiently serious infringement of Community law in order to establish liability on the part of the MS under the principles of Community law, provided that the other requirements for such liability are met?
Is the objective of an officially authorised political demonstration, namely that of working for a healthy environment and public health, to be deemed to be of a higher order than the provisions of Community law on the free movement of goods under Article 28EC (thus constituting a justification of MS action such as that at hand) under circumstances such as those in the main proceedings?
Is it possible for there to be loss giving rise to a claim founded on State liability where the person incurring the loss can prove that he was in a position to earn income, under circumstances such as those in the main proceedings, but is unable to prove the loss of a specific transport journey?
If the reply to Question 4 is in the negative: In order to comply with the obligation of cooperation and solidarity incumbent under Article 10 EC, must application of national rules, such as those in the main proceedings under the circumstances at hand, be deferred pending full elucidation of the substance of the claim at Community law?
Does Article 6 of Regulation 3118/93 preclude national rules such as those in question?
Does Article 5 of Directive 93/89/EEC, in cases like that mentioned in Question 1, preclude national rules such as those in question?
Does Article 95a(4), (5) and (6) of Regulation 1408/71 apply to an application for review of a retirement pension?
Does the fact that the competent institution of a Member State applies Article 95a(4), (5) and (6) of Regulation 1408/71 to an application for review of a retirement pension constitute a serious breach of Community law?
Does Article 28 EC preclude the application of national rules such as those at issue in the main proceedings concerning maximum permitted levels of salt and, if so, may such rules be justified under Article 30 EC?
Does Article 28 EC preclude the application of such national provisions as Article 4(2) and 5 of the 1980 Decree and, if so, may such rules be justified under Article 30 EC?
Does the concept of first authorisation to place ... on the market, which appears in Article 19(1) of Regulation 1768/92, refer solely to a marketing authorisation in accordance with Directive 65/65 or  Directive 81/851/EEC, or may it also include authorisations required under national legislation on the pricing of medicinal products?
Do the words first authorisation to place ... on the market ... in the Community in Article 19(1) of Regulation 1768/92 refer to the first marketing authorisation in the Member State in which the application was submitted or the first marketing authorisation in any of the Member States?
Is there doubt as to the validity of the transitional provision in Article 19(1) of the Regulation 1768/92  in so far as it lays down different relevant dates for different Member States?
Is the list of grounds for invalidity in Article 15(1) of the Regulation 1768/92 exhaustive or must a certificate which has been issued contrary to the requirements of Article 19 also be considered invalid pursuant to Article 15?
If a breach of Article 19(1) of the Regulation 1768/92 does not constitute a ground of invalidity: May and must national law provide, as under Article 17(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1610/96, for an appeal aimed at rectifying the duration of the protection certificate for a medicinal product in the event of a breach of the transitional provision in Article 19(1)?
On a proper construction of Article 1(3) of the Directive 93/104, are all workers employed in the road transport sector, including office staff, excluded from the scope of the Directive?
Is the restriction of the right to deduct for tax purposes pension insurance contributions laid down in the National Income Tax Law, contrary to Article 59 of the EC Treaty?
Do payments which a non-member of a capital company makes to the company for the acquisition of dividend rights constitute "assets of any kind contributed or to be contributed by the members" within the meaning of Article 5(1)(a) the Directive 69/335?
Does the tax exemption provided for in Article 13(A)(1)(c) of Directive 77/388/EEC  apply only where the medical care is provided by an "individual" or is it independent of the legal form of the person providing the care?
If the exemption is also applicable to capital companies, does it cover wholly or partially the activities of a capital company in the form of out-patient nursing (therapeutic care, general care and domestic help) which is provided by qualified nurses?
Do the abovementioned services fall within the scope of Article 13(A)(1)(g) of Directive 77/388/EEC ?
May Article 13(A)(1)(g) of Directive 77/388 be considered to have direct effect, so that it may be relied upon by a taxable person before the national courts?
Can a proprietor of a trade mark use his trade mark rights to stop or hinder the import of his own goods from one MS into another or to hinder their subsequent marketing or promotion when the importation, marketing or promotion causes no, or no substantial, harm to the specific subject-matter of his rights?
In what circumstances may repackaging by a parallel importer in order to market pharmaceutical products in the importing State be considered to be necessary for the purposes of the Courts case-law?
Where an importer or someone dealing in imported goods intends to use the proprietors trade mark on, or in relation to, those goods and such use does and will not prejudice the specific subject-matter of the mark, must he nevertheless give the proprietor advance notice of his intended use of the mark?
If the previous answer is in the affirmative, does that mean that failure of the importer or dealer to give such notice has the effect of entitling the proprietor to restrain or hinder the importation or further commercialisation of those goods even though such importation or further commercialisation will not prejudice the specific subject-matter of the mark?
If an importer must give prior notice to the proprietor how much notice must be given?
Is Article 13A(1)(n) of the Directive 77/388 to be interpreted as meaning that the term other [recognised] cultural bodies used therein also covers a soloist who supplies cultural services?
If the first question is answered in the affirmative, do restrictions arise from the heading itself ...Certain activities in the public interest chosen in Article 13A?
Must Article 49 EC be interpreted to mean that, where a credit institution authorised in a Member State in which breaches of banking secrecy are a criminal offence operates, under the freedom to provide services, in another Member State where there is no analogous banking secrecy, that provision of the Treaty does not preclude a legislative provision of the host Member State pursuant to which employees of the credit institution concerned are required to give evidence in criminal proceedings concerning services provided by them, under the freedom to provide services, in the territory of the host Member State in circumstances in which employees of credit institutions of the host Member State are under a like obligation to give evidence as witnesses?
Must Article 49 EC be interpreted to mean that, where a credit institution authorised in a Member State in which breaches of banking secrecy are a criminal offence operates, under the freedom to provide services, in another Member State where there is no analogous banking secrecy, that provision precludes a legislative provision of the Member State of origin pursuant to which employees of the credit institution concerned may be rendered criminally and civilly liable if, in the context of a criminal investigation conducted in a host Member State, they give evidence concerning services provided by them in the territory of the host Member State under the freedom to provide services?
Must Article 1 of Council Directive 83/189/EEC be interpreted as meaning that the national provisions in question constitute a technical regulation?
Must Article 10 of Directive 83/189 be interpreted as meaning that the Member State was required to notify the Commission of the national provisions?
If it was so required, may an individual rely on the failure to notify in order to have the provisions declared unenforceable?
Must Article 3(2) of Directive 75/442/EEC be interpreted as meaning that the Member State was required to notify the Commission of the national provisions, and, if it was so required, that an individual may rely on the failure to notify in order to have the provisions declared unenforceable?
Does Article 28 of the EC Treaty preclude national provisions such as those in question, inasmuch as those provisions, which are applicable to all products alike, are not proportionate to the mandatory requirement related to the protection of the environment?
Does Article 37(1) of the Europe Agreement preclude the application - to Polish nationals - of national law according to which posts for foreign-language assistants may be filled by means of fixed-term contracts of employment under the circumstances at hand in the main proceedings?
If question 1 is answered in the affirmative, does Article 37(1) of the Europe Agreement also preclude the application of national law where the fixed-term employment contract was concluded before the Europe Agreement entered into force and the agreed term comes to an end after its entry into force?
Is the employees entitlement to early payment of pension and retirement lump sum and/or to the annual allowance and lump sum compensation, a right within the meaning of Article 3(3) of directive 77/187?
If the answer to Question 1 is "no", is there an obligation within the meaning of Article 3(1) and/or 3(2) of directive 77/187?
Does a preventive action brought by a consumer protection organisation be a matter which may be asserted in courts with the special jurisdiction provided for in Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention?
Is Article 5 of the Directive to be interpreted as meaning that compensation is in principle payable in respect of claims for compensation for non-material damage?
Do Articles 28 EC and 30 EC preclude national law which prohibits the marketing of medicinal product X under the circumstances in the main proceedings?
Is it of relevance to the judgment if medicinal product Y in the new formulation is placed on the market only in MS A or if it is also found on the market in other Member States?
Is it of relevance to the judgment if, when the two formulations exist side by side simultaneously in Member State A, there is a danger of incorrect storage of medicinal product X?
Where it is necessary to establish whether or not a body aims to make a profit as referred to in Article 13(A)(1)(m) of the Directive 77/388, must account be taken solely of earnings from the services referred to in that provision or must earnings from other services provided by it also be taken into consideration?
Is Article 2(1) of the Directive to be interpreted as meaning that annual subscription fees of the members of a sports association can constitute the consideration for the services provided by the association (that there exists a direct link), even though the members who do not use or do not regularly use the association's facilities must still pay their annual subscription fee?
Is Article 13A(1)(m) of the Directive 77/388, read together with the first indent of paragraph (2)(a) of that provision, to be interpreted as meaning that an organisation may be categorised as non-profit-making even if it systematically seeks to achieve surpluses which it then uses for the purposes of the provision of its services?
Does the exercise by a MS of its rights and powers under Article 4 of the Regulation 2408/92 presuppose or mean that that MS must waive its right under Article 3(2) of the Regulation 2408/92 to restrict, until 1 April 1997, competition in cabotage services within its territory?
May a MS in a public tender procedure organised in 1995 for the provision of scheduled air services on a route subject to public service obligations imposed on such a route under Article 4 of the Regulation require air carriers licensed by another MS which submit bids to meet the conditions laid down in Article 3(2)?
Must Article 1(e) of the Decision 94/698 be interpreted as meaning that Member State is precluded from exercising the power granted to MS by Article 3(2)?
Do the measures provided for in Article 2(1)(f) of First Directive 68/151/EEC and Article 47 of Fourth Directive 78/660/EEC regarding the disclosure obligation on capital companies infringe Article 44(2)(g) EC, which confers power to coordinate the safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of members and creditors, are required by Member States of companies?
Do the measures provided for in Article 2(1)(f) of First Directive 68/151/EEC and Article 47 of Fourth Directive 78/660/EEC regarding the disclosure obligation on capital companies infringe Article 44(2)(g) EC, in that they are not necessary to eliminate restrictions on establishment or to attain other objectives of the EEC Treaty (in particular the establishment of uniform general legal requirements)?
Is the fact that Article 2(1)(f) of First Directive 68/151/EEC in conjunction with Article 47 of Fourth Directive 78/660/EEC compels undertakings to reveal business secrets by imposing the obligation to disclose the balance sheet and the profit and loss account for each financial year on pain of a penalty, compatible with the general legal principle of proportionality?
Is the fact that Article 2(1)(f) of First Directive 68/151/EEC in conjunction with Article 47 of Fourth Directive 78/660/EEC compels undertakings to reveal business secrets by imposing the obligation to disclose the balance sheet and the profit and loss account for each financial year on pain of a penalty, compatible with the fundamental right to property in Community law?
Must Article 13 of the Directive 85/374/EEC be interpreted as precluding the restriction or limitation, as a result of transposition of the Directive, of rights granted to consumers under the legislation of the Member State?
For the purposes of applying Article 11 A of the Sixth Council Directive, do operating subsidies covering  part of a taxable persons running costs and affecting the final cost price of its goods or services, but which cannot be distinguished from the price of the supply, constitute a taxable amount?
Does a provision of a collective agreement for the public service which allows male and female employees to take advantage of a scheme of part-time work for older employees infringe Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women, if the provision lays down conditions such as those at hand?
Are national courts required, where provisions of collective agreements and legislative provisions are in breach of either of the Directives (76/207/EEC or 79/7/EEC), to apply the corresponding provisions in favour of the disadvantaged class, disregarding the restrictions which are contrary to Community law, until non-discriminatory rules are made by the parties to the collective agreement and/or the legislature?
Does a Turkish national who, entered the country with a visa "valid only for the purpose of vocational training" and who subsequently held a temporary residence authorisation restricted to vocational training activity with a specific employer fulfil the requirements of Article 6(1) of Decision No 1/80  if, from 1 October 1992 to 5 May 1997, he was in the training relationship in question and received for that a monthly training remuneration?
Does a Turkish national who is the child by birth of former Turkish workers in the host country fulfil the requirements of the second paragraph of Article 7 of Decision No 1/80 if he was adopted as an adult by German nationals?
Does a Turkish national fulfil the requirements of the second paragraph of Article 7 of Decision No 1/80 if, eight years after leaving the host country together with his parents who at that time were leaving definitively, he re-entered the country for the purpose of vocational training?
Does a Turkish national fulfil the requirements of the second paragraph of Article 7 of Decision No 1/80 if he did not take the last part of the final examination in the host country, but in his country of origin before the host countrys examining board which had travelled there?
Is it compatible with Article 6 or the second paragraph of Article 7 of Decision No 1/80 that, in a case where deportation has taken place, residence authorisation must be refused, by virtue of the national provision, until a time-limit has, upon application, been placed on the effects of the deportation?
Does Regulation No 4142/87 and the conditions imposed for its application in regard to imports of dates under the procedure for the suspension of customs duties by reason of the end-use of the goods preclude such goods being imported in original packings of a net content of 11 kg or less.
Do the pensions provided by the Member States retirement pension scheme for civil servants constitute pay within the meaning of the Treaty? If so, is the principle of equal pay breached by the national provisions at hand?
If the Treaty is not applicable, do the provisions of Directive 79/7/EEC prevent the Member State from maintaining in force provisions such as those at hand?
Are Articles 43 EC and 48 EC to be interpreted as meaning that the freedom of establishment of companies precludes the legal capacity, and capacity to be a party to legal proceedings, of a company validly incorporated under the law of one Member State from being determined according to the law of another State to which the company has moved its actual centre of administration, where, under the law of that second State, the company may no longer bring legal proceedings there in respect of claims under a contract?
If the answer to the first question is affirmative: Does the freedom of establishment of companies require that a companys legal capacity and capacity to be a party to legal proceedings is to be determined according to the law of the State where the company is incorporated?
Is Article 11(1) of Regulation 3665/87 laying down common detailed rules for the application of the system of export refunds on agricultural products valid in so far as it provides for a penalty even where, through no fault of his own, an exporter has applied for an export refund exceeding that applicable?
If the first question is to be answered in the affirmative: can the first indent of the third subparagraph of Article 11(1) of Regulation 3665/87  be interpreted as meaning that false information provided in good faith by the refund applicant on the basis of inaccurate data supplied by the manufacturer constitutes in principle a case of force majeure?
Does Community law preclude a national provision such as that at issue in the main proceedings?
Can a person be regarded as having been available to the employment services, within the meaning of the Regulation 1408/71, for the days in a period of unemployment on which she was prevented from pursuing gainful employment because she was caring for a sick child?
Does the Regulation 1408/71 require that a person seeking work must have been available to the employment services for an uninterrupted period of four weeks immediately preceding his departure to another Member State?
Does a public non-profit-making insurance body, such as the one at issue, to which is entrusted, the operation as a monopoly of a scheme of insurance against risks deriving from accidents at work and occupational diseases, constitute an undertaking within the meaning of Article 81 et seq of the EC Treaty?
If the first question is answered in the affirmative, does the fact that the abovementioned public entity calls for the payment of premiums even where the person concerned, a self-employed person (craft worker), is already insured with a private company against the same risks in respect of which he would be covered through affiliation to the abovementioned body constitute an infringement of Articles 86 EC and 82 EC?
May the provisions in Regulations 3950/92 and 536/93 be interpreted as meaning that it is possible, in cases of administrative or judicial challenge, to derogate from the time-limits prescribed for the allocation of quotas and the operation of adjustments and levies?
If not, are the provisions of the Regulations (3950/92 and 536/93) valid in the light of Article 33 of the EC Treaty?
How is the exemption provided by Article 13B(d)(5) of the Directive 77/388 in respect of "transactions in securities" to be interpreted? In particular, does the term transactions in securities apply only to transactions in which the parties legal rights or obligations in respect of the security are altered?
Does the term "transactions, including negotiation, in securities" of the Directive 77/388 apply to a service of providing information to potential investors and receiving and processing applications from investors for the issue of a security?
Is Directive 89/104 and Articles 28 EC and 30 EC  to be interpreted as meaning that they permit the application of national legislation under which an infringer has the burden of proof?
Is the term equitable remuneration used in Directive 92/100 a Community concept which must be interpreted and applied in the same way in all Member States?
If question 1 is answered in the affirmative, what are the criteria for determining the amount of such equitable remuneration?
Does regulation No 2200/96 give rise to a legal duty resting upon persons who trade in a fruit or a vegetable within the Community to comply with the requirements as regards variety name laid down by a quality standard, which a national court should enforce in civil proceedings brought at the suit of a person who is a substantial grower within the Community of the fruit or vegetable concerned?
Does Community law and in particular with the often stated principle of effectiveness (inter alia, Case C-343/96 Dilexport, Case C-260/96 Spac, Case C-231/96 Edis, Case C-228/96 Aprile, Case C-261/95 Palmisani) preclude national measures such as those in the main proceedings?
Must Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention be interpreted as meaning that a defendant domiciled in a Contracting State may, in another Contracting State, be sued, in matters relating to a contract, in the court for any of the places of performance of the obligation in question?
Are immunoglobulin concentrates from dried, defatted and decaseinated colostrums, standardised by means of lactose, to be classified as pharmaceutical products in Chapter 30 of the CN of Regulation Regulation 2658/87?
Does the description "orthopaedic appliances" within the meaning of the CN heading of No 9021 cover such products as those referred to in the main proceedings?
Does the term "solely" in Note 1(b) to CN Chapter 90 permit the elasticity of the material to be regarded as the sole relevant criterion even if the supportive function is strengthened by other factors?
Must Article 3(1)(c) of Directive 89/104 be interpreted as meaning that a mark consisting of a neologism composed of elements, each of which is descriptive of characteristics of the goods or services in respect of which registration is sought, may be regarded as not itself descriptive of the characteristics of those goods or services?
How are the words "managed and administered on an essentially voluntary " in Article 13A(2)(a) of Council Directive 77/388/EEC to be interpreted, having regard to the facts of the present case? In particular; Who does it refer to?
What are the criteria for determining the term "essentially voluntary basis" as used in Article 13A(2)(a) of Council Directive 77/388/EEC?
May a Member State treat the use for private residential purposes of a dwelling in business premises forming as a whole part of the assets of the business - which is equated to a supply of services for consideration under  Directive 77/388/EEC - as tax-exempt (in accordance with that directive, but without the possibility of waiving the exemption), with the result that deduction under said directive of the value added tax which arose in connection with the construction of the premises is precluded to that extent?
Is a ruling on the legal action at hand a civil matter within the meaning of Article 1 of the Brussels Convention?
Is a ruling on the legal action at hand a civil matter within the meaning of Article 1 of the Brussels Convention?
Can a trade mark, such as an odeur, that consists of a sign which is not in itself capable of being directly perceived visually be a trade mark according to article 2 of Directive 89/104?
If the first question is answered in the affirmative, are the requirements set out in article 2 of Directive 89/104 satisfied where an odeur is reproduced according to the criteria given in the question?
Does Article 235 EC Treaty preclude a national court from ordering, with respect to one of the institutions of the European Community,  proceedings for an expert report whose purpose is to determine the role of that institution in events alleged to have cause damage, with a view to subsequent proceedings against the European Community to establish its non-contractual liability?
Is a compatible ink-jet cartridge, consisting of an ink cartridge, ink and packing materials, where both the ink and the ink cartridge can be used solely in an Epson Stylus Colour printer, to be classified under code number 3215 90 80 of the Customs Code?
Are subsidies to compensate for deficits in local public transport subject at all to the prohibition on aid contained in Article 92 EC Treaty or are they incapable from the outset of affecting trade between Member States? Does this possibly depend on the specific location and significance of the relevant local transport area?
Does Article 77 of the EC Treaty generally enable the national legislature to permit public subsidies to compensate for deficits in local public transport without regard being had to Regulation 1191/69?
Does Regulation 1191/69 enable the national legislature to permit the operation of a scheduled service in local public transport which is necessarily dependent on public subsidies without regard being had to Sections II, III and IV of that regulation, and to require application of those provisions only where adequate transport provision is otherwise impossible?
Does the second paragraph of Article 8 of Regulation 1600/92 apply to sugar processed from raw sugar (sugar properly speaking, whether it comes from locally-grown sugar beet or imported raw sugar)?
Are the sales (of sugar made since 1907 outside the Azores )  covered by the concepts "traditional shipments" to "the rest of the Community" in accordance with Regulation 1600/92?
Does Community law allow shipments to mainland Portugal of white sugar produced in the Azores from sugar beet harvested in the Azores and for the production of which Community aid under the Poseima programme (Decision 91/315) is obtained?
Does Community law allow shipments to mainland Portugal of white sugar produced in the Azores from imported raw sugar which is exempt from levies under the Poseima programme (Decision 91/315)?
Does the standard fee for inspection of meet according to the Directives 85/73/EEC, 64/433/EEC, 89/662/EEC, 88/409/EEC and Decision 88/408/EEC, also cover the costs of carrying out a bacteriological examination in an individual case?
Does the situation of an employed person who was employed prior to the accession of a Member State in another Member State and sustained an accident there, fall within the scope of Council Regulation 1408/71?
Are Articles 48(2) and 51 of the EC Treaty to be interpreted as precluding national rules which, for the qualifying period for a benefit stemming from the insurance contingency of reduced capacity for work not to apply, require not only that the insurance contingency is the result of an accident at work, but also that the insurance contingency materialised in respect of a person insured compulsorily?
Are Articles 48(2) and 51 of the EC Treaty to be interpreted as precluding Article 9a of Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 and national rules which exclude in general any prolongation of the reference period in respect of the period during which a pension is received or limits such prolongation to cases of entitlement to a pension stemming from the statutory accident insurance of the Member State concerned?
What does the notion of sign which is identical to the trade mark cover?
Are the provisions of Directive 89/104 to be interpreted as entitling the MS to provide more extensive protection for marks with a reputation in cases where the later mark is used/to be used for goods/services identical with/similar to those in respect of which the earlier mark is registered?
Are the grounds mentioned in the Articles of Directive 89/104 exhaustive in regulating when it is permissible for provisions protecting marks with a reputation to be retained under national law, or may they  be supplemented by national rules?
Does Directive 92/51 and/or the relevant Treaty Articles preclude a Member state from restricting an activity such as that of a Heilpraktiker within the meaning of national law to holders of a doctors qualification?
Does  Directive 92/51/EEC and/or the relevant Treaty Articles preclude a Member State from prohibiting, firstly, the organisation of training in activities such as described in the first question  by institutions not authorised to do so and, secondly, advertising of that training?
Have the two Regulations at hand liberalised only the importation, or both importation and sale of the products in issue in the main proceedings?
In circumstances, such as those at hand, where the competent authority discovers that an applicant under the Arable Area Payments Scheme has made an error (for several years), is the competent national authority required to reduce the area actually determined on inspection pursuant to article 9 (2) of the Regulation No. 3887/92  for the purpose of calculating the aid due in respect of previous years?
Are the combined provisions of Regulations 2100/94 and 1768/95 to be interpreted as giving a holder of a Community protected plant variety right the option of requiring the information provided for by those provisions from a farmer under the circumstances at hand?
Does the term letting of immovable property in Article 13B(b) of Directive 77/388/EEC cover the provision for consideration of a building constructed from prefabricated components which is to be removed following the termination of the contract and may be re-used on another site?
Is it of any significance in that connection whether the lessor makes available to the lessee both the building and the land on which it is erected, or merely the building, which he has erected on the lessee's land?
Is the national legislation in question contrary to Article 59 of the EC Treaty (now Article 49 EC) in so far as they prevent or restrict the advertising of alcoholic drinks at sports events and the Broadcasting in the Member State of sporting events outside of said Member State where there is alcohol advertising?
If not, is the manner in which these provisions are interpreted and applied in practice by the national body contrary to Article 59 of the EC Treaty?
Is article 141 of the EC treaty directly applicable in the circumstances of this case so that it can be relied upon by the applicants in national proceedings to enable them to compare their pay with that of men in the employment of the Local Council who are performing work of equal value to that done by the applicants?
Can an applicant rely on the direct effect of article 141 of the EC treaty only if the respondent employer is in a position where he is able to explain why the employer of the chosen comparator pays his employees as he does?
Is article 43 of the EC treaty to be interpreted as precluding the national rule at hand?
Does Regulation No 1408/71 and No 574/72 preclude national legislation under which reimbursement by the institution of a pensioners place of residence of hospital treatment received by him during a stay in another Member State is subject to ex post facto authorisation which is granted only in so far as the prior authorisation normally required by that national legislation was impossible to obtain because the illness in question manifested itself suddenly during that stay, making the provision of treatment immediately necessary.?
On the basis that services comprising the provision of care within hospitals constitute services within the meaning of Article 60 of the EC Treaty, is the aforementioned national provisions, even if it were considered, not to be contrary to the above provisions of the Council Regulations, consistent to that extent with Articles 59 and 60 of the EC Treaty?
If Question 2 is answered in the negative, is the rule laid down by the national provisions  justified on grounds of public health and does it therefore fall within the exceptions in Article 56 of the EC Treaty?
On the basis that the entitlement to sickness benefits in kind and, by extension, the claim for refund of the costs relating to them constitute possessions within the meaning of Article 1 of the Protocol to the ECHR, is the aforementioned national provision  - even if it were considered not to be contrary to the aforementioned provisions Regulations and of the EC Treaty - consistent with the first paragraph of Article 1 of the Protocol?
Is Directive 93/36 to be interpreted as imposing on a national court, where it is established that by its conduct a contracting authority has rendered it impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of the rights conferred by Community law on a national of the Union who has been harmed by a decision of that contracting authority, an obligation to allow as admissible pleas as described in this case even when the period prescribed for bringing the plea has expired?
Does article 6(2) EU, with consideration of the European Convention of the Protection of Human Rights,  lead to that conclusion? (that it imposes on a national court to allow as admissible the plea in the case at hand)
Has Regulation 525/93 been validly adopted and does it state enough reasons within the meaning of article 190 of the Treaty to be valid?
Is the home child-care allowance, provided for in this case, to be regarded as a family benefit within the meaning of article 4(1)(h) of Regulation 1408/71?
If so, does the relevant articles of Regulation 1408/71, having regard also to national law, impose an obligation to pay home child-care allowance in respect of a child of a worker posted temporarily in another member state such as in this case?
If home child-care allowance does not fall within Community law by virtue of the provisions cited, do other provisions of that law impose an obligation to pay home child-care allowance in another Member State in the situation described in question 2?
Does an action against a defendant seeking to establish pre-contractual liability fall within the scope of matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict(Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention)?
If not, does it fall within the scope of matters relating to a contract (Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention)?
Was Regulation No 2078/92  validly adopted?
Does a decision on the approval of a programme under article 7 of Regulation No 2078/92 also encompass the content of the programmes submitted by the member state for approval?
Are farmers who apply for aid under that programme also to be regarded as persons to whom the decision is addressed and is the form of the notification chosen in that regard, in particular the obligation of the member state to provide farmers with appropriate information, sufficient to make the decision binding on those farmers and any conflicting contracts granting aid ineffective?
May a farmer in this instance, irrespective of the content of the programme in question, rely on the statements of the administrative bodies of the Member States so that a claim for recovery is precluded?
Is it open to the Member State under Regulation No 2078/92  to implement programmes within the meaning of that regulation either by private-sector measures or by forms of State action?
Must Article 1 of Regulation 1408/71 be interpreted as meaning that periods of notional, equivalent contribution, such as the ones described in this case, are also to be considered from a legal viewpoint as "periods of insurance"?
If yes, is the proper construction of Article 46 of Regulation 1408/71 that "the duration of the periods of insurance or of residence completed before the materialisation of the risk under the legislation which administers " also includes those periods mentioned in question 1 of this case?
Does the pension scheme under the State pensions law fall within the scope of article 141 EC or of Directive 79/7/EEC at hand?
Is the payment to the appellant made in this case a subsidy within the meaning of that word in Article 11A(1)(a) of Directive 77/388?
If yes, is that payment also directly linked to the price of the supply of the energy advice, so as to form part of the taxable amount of that supply by reason of the concluding words of Article 11A(1)(a) of Directive 77/388 ?
Is that payment nonetheless part of the taxable amount by reason of constituting the consideration (or part of the consideration) for a supply?
Is the imposition of the insurance contribution referred to in the grounds of the judgement contrary to the provisions of Community law concerning the free movement of goods, the common agricultural policy, the freedom to provide services and the relevant articles of Directive 73/239?
Is the relevant provision in Directive 93/22 at hand infringed by a national provision which departs from it and which does not require that the management of portfolios of investments should be on "a discriminatory, client-by-client basis" and "in accordance with mandates given by investors and conversely, does a national provision which, in implementing a "harmonising" directive, omits the abovementioned requirements, comply with Community law?
Must the prohibition of discrimination in the first paragraph of article 12 EC, under circumstances such as in this case, where a foreign author had already died when the Treaty entered into force in the State of which he was a national, be applied?
Must the term needs in the general interest in Article 1 (b) of Directive 93/36/EEC be interpreted as meaning that the definition of needs in the general interest must be derived from the national legal system of the Member State?
Must the term needs in the general interest in Article 1 (b) of Directive 93/36/EEC  be interpreted as meaning that the fact that a regional or local authoritys obligation is subsidiary is in itself sufficient for the existence of a need in the general interest to be assumed?
In interpreting the relevant requirements in Directive 93/36/EEC , is (a) the existence of significant competition an imperative condition or (b) are the factual or legal circumstances the determinant factors in that respect?
Is the requirement laid down in article 1 (b) of Directive 93/36/EEC that the management of the body governed by public law must be subject to supervision by the State or a regional or local authority also fulfilled by a mere review as provided for through the Kontrollamt of the city of Vienna?
Could the bona fide buying commission be dutiable as part of the price actually paid or payable for the goods under article 29 of the Customs Code (Regulation 2913/92)?
If no on the first question, could the bona fide buying commission be deductible from the declared transaction value bearing in mind the provisions of articles 32(3) and 33 of the Customs Code?
In such circumstances are the customs authorities obliged under the Customs Code to accept the amendment to the price paid or payable for the imported goods and thereby reduced customs value?
Is the importer therefore entitled under the Customs Code to a refund of the duty paid on the buying commission?
Do Article 48 of the EC Treaty and Article 7 of Regulation 1612/68 preclude a system for the avoidance of double taxation under which a resident of a MS who derives income in another MS on which he is taxed, loses in his MS of residence a proportional part of the advantage of his tax-free allowance and personal tax advantages?
If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative, do specific requirements arise from Community law with regard to the manner in which the personal and family circumstances of the employee must be taken into account in his State of residence?
Does Community law, and in particular Directive 92/96, preclude national legislation which provides that a life-assurance proposal must inform a policy-holder that termination, reduction or surrender of an existing life-assurance contract for the purpose of subscribing to another life-assurance contract is generally detrimental to the policy-holder?
Does Community law preclude legislation and/or national administrative practice which prevents economic operators from importing, marketing or holding in stock, with a view to selling, radio equipment that has not undergone national type-approval, and which does not admit other forms of evidence, to prove that such equipment is in conformity with requirements concerning the proper use of the radio frequencies authorised under national law?
Does Directive 1999/5/EC confer on individuals rights upon which they may rely before the national courts, where the Directive itself has not been formally implemented in national law within the period prescribed for implementation?
If so, does Article 7(2) of Directive 1999/5/EC allow for the maintenance in force of national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, where it has been confirmed that such equipment makes efficient and proper use of the radio frequencies authorised under national law?
On a proper construction of Article 1 of  Decision 95/3052, how is the term "measure" to be interpreted and does that term cover the situation where the administrative authorities, having seized a particular model or a particular type of product which is lawfully marketed in another MS, continue to withhold that model or product after the evidential purposes justifying the initial seizure have been served?
Does Community law, and the principles of non-discrimination and proportionality in particular, preclude penalties such as those provided for under national law?
Is it compatible with Article 4 of the Directive 69/335 to subject to capital duty the grant of an interest-free loan by a member of a company to that company, if at the time of granting the loan there existed a profit and loss transfer agreement between the company and the member?
Under the circumstances at hand in the main proceedings, is Article 20(3) of Directive 92/12 to be interpreted as meaning that the MS of departure may collect the excise duties only if the party that has guaranteed payment has been promptly put in a position to ascertain that there has been no discharge from the suspension arrangement, in such a way as to enable that party to provide, within the four-month period following the date of dispatch of the products, satisfactory evidence of the correctness of the transaction or of the place where the irregularity in fact occurred or where the offence was in fact committed?
If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative, does the same interpretation also hold good, in the same circumstances, where the MS of departure is also the MS where the offence was committed or where the irregularity occurred, or, in such a case, does the presumption set out in Article 20(2) of Directive 92/12 apply?
If Question 1 is answered in the negative, is Article 20(3) of Directive 92/12 to be interpreted, in the same circumstances, as meaning that a party that has guaranteed payment of excise duty and has not been promptly put in a position to ascertain that there has been no discharge from the suspension arrangement is entitled to furnish evidence of the correctness of the transaction even after the expiry of the four-month period following the date of dispatch of the products?
Must the word package used in Article 2(1) of the Directive 90/314 be interpreted as including holidays organised by a travel agency at the request of and according to the specifications of a consumer or a defined group of consumers?
May the expression "pre-arranged" which appears in the directive 90/314 be interpreted as referring to the moment when the contract is entered into between the agency and the customer?
Must a service which serves a single purpose, but which could be subdivided into part services, be classified as a single service consisting of a main service and accessory, supporting services in accordance with the scheme of Directive 92/50/EEC, and in particular the types of services contained in Annex I A and I B, and treated as a service listed in Annex I A or I B to the directive according to its main object?
Must the services referred to in this case  be classified as services listed in Annex I A to Directive 92/50/EEC  and contracts which have as their object such services are to be awarded in accordance with the provisions of Titles III to VI of the Directive, or must they be classified as services listed in Annex I B so that contracts which have as their object such services are to be awarded in accordance with Articles 14 and 16, and under which CPC reference number must they be subsumed?
Under the circumstances at hand in the main proceedings, is there an obligation on the contracting authority to split off non-priority part services and to award contracts for them separately in order to respect the priority nature of the service?
Does the national law at hand in the main proceedings constitute a quantitative restriction or a measure having equivalent effect within the meaning of Article 28 of the Treaty? If the answer is in the affirmative, can the requirement contained in said law be justified by reasons relating to the protection of the health and life of humans within the meaning of Article 30 of the Treaty?
Is the national provision at hand to be disapplied by the Italian court (if it is considered prohibited in accordance with  Article 28 EC)?
Must bread obtained by completing the baking of partly baked bread, whether deep-frozen or not (lawfully manufactured in and imported from France), accordingly be allowed free movement, not subject to any restriction such as that requiring prior packaging laid down in Article 14(4) of the national law at hand?
On a proper interpretation of the third subparagraph of Article 9(2) of  Regulation 1765/92, does "false declaration" refer to a culpable "positive act" in the context of an application for aid, so that failure to report to the granting authority changes which are relevant to the application but do not occur until afterwards is not penalised?
Case C-421/00: Do Articles 28 EC and 30 EC read in conjunction with the Directive 79/112 preclude national provisions such as those at issue in the main proceedings?
Does Regulation 2309/93 precludes a medicinal product from being marketed in a package consisting of two packs which have been joined together and relabelled?
If the first question is answered negative, do the rules on the free movement of goods or other rules of Community law preclude a national rule which prohibits repackaging on the ground that creating a double pack constitutes a less intrusive interference with the rights of the trademark holder?
Does Regulation 4055/86 preclude a Member State from imposing any restriction on the supply of services in the area of maritime transport both between Member States and third countries and  between domestic carriers and carriers who are nationals of other Member States engaging in maritime transport to third countries?
May a MS, in the light of Regulation 4055/86, impose on passengers whose  destination is a port in a third country harbour dues different from those imposed on passengers whose destination is domestic or in another Member State, where those dues apply irrespective of the nationality of the passengers or of the flag flown by the vessels?
Does Regulation 4055/86 permit the imposition, for journeys to ports in third countries, of harbour dues that vary according to criteria relating to the distance of those ports or their geographical location?
Do the articles of the treaty concerning freedom of establishment, and free movement of capital preclude a national provision which subjects transfers at undervalue of shares in companies to tax treatment which differs according to the nature of the transferee?
Must the second part of Article 5(1) of the Convention be interpreted as meaning that in a dispute between an employee and a first employer, in respect of which the employees obligations are suspended, the place where the employee performs her obligations to the second employer may be regarded as the place where she habitually carries out her work under her contract with the first employer?
If the first question is answered in the negative, may an employee under circumstances such as those in the main proceedings rely, with reference to the payment of rental costs and travel costs for the two journeys home each year, on the argument that the court having jurisdiction is that for the place of performance of the obligation in question, pursuant to the first part of Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention?
Is it contrary to Article 38(1) of the Association Agreement between the Communities and Slovakia, if a sports federation applies to a professional sportsman of Slovak nationality a rule that it has adopted under which clubs may field in league and cup matches only a limited number of players who come from countries not belonging to the European Communities?
Is it a requirement of Directive 94/45, that undertakings which belong to a group of undertakings whose controlling undertaking is resident outside the Community are obliged to provide the undertaking which is regarded as the central management under the Directive with information on employees, the establishments of the undertaking and the undertakings controlled by it, and on the structure of the undertaking and of the undertakings controlled by it?
If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative: Does the obligation to provide information also encompass the names and addresses of the employee representation which is to participate in the setting up of a special negotiating body in accordance with Article 5 of Directive 94/45 or in the establishment of a European Works Council?
Should a concept of the kind at issue in the present proceedings, be regarded as falling within those employees claims arising from contracts of employment or employment relationships referred to in Article 1(1) of Directive 80/987/EEC?
In the affirmative, is there an obligation under Article 1(1) of Directive 80/987/EEC to determine employees claims by way of either a judicial decision or an administrative decision, and should such claims include all those employee claims upheld in the course of any other procedure recognised at law and judicially reviewable?
Is the national court entitled to set aside national legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings where, in a discriminatory manner, the legislation excludes from the concept of pay within the meaning of Article 2(2) of  Directive 80/987/EEC claims relating to salarios de tramitacion other than those determined by judicial decision?
Have those materials been recycled, and do they cease to be waste for the purposes of Council Directive 75/442 when they have been rendered suitable for use as a feedstock?
Have those materials been recycled, and do they cease to be waste, for the purposes of directive 75/442 when they have been used by a steelmaker so as to produce ingots, sheets or coils of steel?
Have those materials been recycled for the purposes of directive 94/62/EC  when they have been rendered suitable for use as a feedstock?
Have those materials been recycled for the purposes of directive 94/62/EC  when they have been used by a steelmaker so as to produce ingots, sheets or coils of steel?
Under Community Law and the principle in Article 10 EC is an administrative body required to reopen a decision which has become final in order to ensure the full operation of Community law, as it is to be interpreted in the light of a subsequent preliminary ruling?
Is  Directive 95/46/EC in conjunction with Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union and Article 8 of the ECHR to be interpreted as precluding national legislation which requires a State control body to collect and communicate, for purposes of publication, data on the income of persons employed by the bodies subject to that control?
If the answer to the above question is in the affirmative: Are the provisions precluding such national legislation directly applicable, in the sense that the persons obliged to make disclosure may rely on them to prevent the application of contrary national provisions?
What mechanisms are there for the referring court or the parties to the proceedings to ensure that the totality of the proceedings comply with the obligations under Article 6 ECHR?
Would the reply which the Court, in its judgment in C-356/98, gave to the questions referred would have been different had the Court taken account of the facts mentioned by the referring court?
Is Article 29 [EC] to be interpreted as precluding national legislation reserving the Grana Padano designation of origin for cheese grated in the region of production, in so far as such an obligation is not indispensable for preserving the specific characteristics which the product has acquired?
Does the protection conferred on consumers by the Directive 93/13 preclude a national provision which prohibits the national court, on expiry of a limitation period, from finding, of its own motion or following a plea raised by the consumer, that a term of the contract is unfair?
May the provisions in question contained in the Regulations 3950/92 and 536/93, be interpreted as meaning that it is possible, in cases of administrative or judicial challenge to the relevant measures, to derogate from the time-limits prescribed for the allocation of quotas and the operation of adjustments and levies?
If not, are the provisions in question contained in the Regulations 3950/92 and 536/93 valid, in the light of Article 33 EC, in so far as they do not provide that derogations may be made from the periods they prescribe for circumstances such as those at hand in the main proceedings?
Are the Regulations 3950/92 and 536/93 to be interpreted as requiring that individual reference quantities should be notified to the producers?
Are the Regulations 3950/92 and 536/93, or certain of their provisions, to be interpreted as leaving it open to the MS to determine the categories of producers who must have priority in the reallocation of unused individual reference quantities and whether, in particular, mountain areas come before less-favoured areas?
May the provisions contained in the Regulations (3950/92 and 536/93 )be interpreted as meaning that it is possible, in cases of administrative or judicial challenge to the relevant measures, to derogate from the time-limits prescribed for the allocation of quotas and the operation of adjustments and levies?
If not, are the provisions at hand contained in the Regulations (3950/92 and 536/93) valid, in the light of Article 33 EC, in so far as they do not provide that derogations may be made from the periods they prescribe for the allocation of individual reference quantities and for the operation of adjustments or levies, in cases of administrative or judicial challenge to those measures?
If retrospective adjustment is not allowed, do the rules of Community law applicable permit the Member State to assume responsibility for paying the sums owed under Community law without incurring liability to penalties?
Must Article 7(f) of Directive 95/46 be interpreted as precluding national rules which (in the absence of the data subjects consent, and in order to allow such processing of that data subjects personal data as is necessary to pursue a legitimate interest of the data controller or of the third party or parties to whom the data are disclosed) requires not only that the fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject be respected, but also that the data appear in public sources?
Does Article 7(f) of Directive 95/46 have direct effect?
Does an "action programme" as required by Article 5(1) of Directive 97/676 constitute either a plan or a program in the sense of Article 3(2)(a) of Directive 2001/42?
Does Article 3(2)(b) of Directive 2001/42 require an environmental impact assessment, in the sense of Articles 6 and 7 of Directive 92/45, as part of the action programmes as required by Article 5(1) of Directive 97/676?
Do "action programmes" as referenced in Article 5(1) of Directive 91/676 fall outside of the category of Plans or Programmes of Article 3(2)(a) of Directive 2001/42, but nonetheless constitute a framework for future Development Plans in the sense of Article 3(4) of Directive 2001/42?
Did Article 14 of the First Yaoundé Convention preclude a national tax law applicable on bananas from the ACP, but not on domestically produced bananas or other domestic fruits?
If the answer to Question 1 is yes: Did the Protocol on Bananas to the Lomé Convention preclude the collection of the national tax incompatible to the First Yaoundé Convention?
If the answer to Question 2 is no: Do the Protocols on Bananas to the Lomé Conventions preclude increases of such national taxes, regardless of its specific effects on exports?
Do reprographic activities count as a supply of goods or a supply of services in the meaning of Directive 77/388, Article 5 and 6?
Does Article 5(1)(b) of Regulation 44/2001 apply if the commercial activities of an undertaking are performed in several Member States, and, if so, is the relevant jurisdiction the one where the economic center of activity of the undertaking is located?
If, for the purposes of art 5(1)(b) of Regulation 44/2001, an economic center of activity on the part of the defendant cannot be determined, is the plaintiff free to chose any jurisdiction in the EU?
If the answer to the first question is negative, is Article 5(1)(a) of Regulation 44/2001 applicable to cases where by mutual agreement the services are provided in several MS ?
Does Article 135(1)(i) of Directive 2006/112 allow Member States to exempt only certain forms of gambling from VAT while making all other forms of
gambling subjected to that tax?
Are private viewing cubicles covered by the definition of Cinema in the 7th category of Annex H to Directive 77/388 ?
Does the limit of liability in Article 22(2) of the Montreal Convention include both material damage and non-material damage for the loss of baggage?
Do the definitions of "forest" and "wooded land" in Article 3(a) and (b) of Regulation No 2152/2003 also apply to matters relating to the protection and, more generally, the management of "forests" and "wooded land", within the meaning of the above definitions, and which are not expressly governed by this Regulation, but which are, however, provided for in the national legal order?
If the answer to the first question is no, may a definition in National law of the concepts Forrest and Other Wooded Land, that is different from the definitions in Regulation 2152/2003 and that applies outside of the scope of this regulation, be different in that it adds both new constituent elements and new numerical determinations, or may it only add new constituent elements but not change the numerical determinations found in the regulation ?
Does riding gloves covered with a layer of plastic classifies as plastic goods under subheading 3926 20 00 of the Combined Nomenclature to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 of 23 July 1987?
Do Articles 87(2) and 88(2) of  the EC Treaty allow a national court to stay proceedings regarding repayment of unlawful State aid until the Commission has ruled on the compatibility of that aid with the Common Market ?
Does the fact that the Commission has made 3 separate decisions granting that a State aid is permissible, before those decisions were annulled by the Court of the EC, constitute exceptional circumstances in the sense of Article 88(3) of the ECTreaty?
How should the term operating centre in paragraph 21 of C-297/99 in light of Article 1(5) of Regulation No 3820/85 be interpreted?
Does it matter, for the concept of rest defined by Artile 1(5) Regulation No 3820/85, whether the driver drives himself, or is driven by someone else to the place with vehicles fitted with recording equipment?
Do the provisions in Article 2(1) in Regulation 2201/96 provide for producers of products with CN codes found in the Annex I of that Regulation other than 2008 70 61 (peaches in syrup or juice) to benefit from the Aid Scheme introduced in that Regulation ?
Does Article 2(1) of Regulation 2201/96 intend for products with CN code ex 2008 70 61, ex 2008 70 69, ex 2008 70 71, ex 2008 70 79, ex 2008 70 92, ex 2008 70 94 and ex 2008 70 99 to be considered finished products in the sense of that Regulation ?
Why are CN codes other than 2008 70 61 (peaches in syrup or juice) mentioned in Art 2(1) of Regulation 2201/96 ?
Are the products obtained at the end of each stage of processing peaches to be considered finished products in the sense of Regulations 2201/96 and 1535/2003, if these products have the characteristics set out in Article 2(1) of Regulation 1535/2003 ?
Was the National legislator obliged to refrain from adopting provisions liable to seriously compromise Regulation 3577/92, for the duration of the temporary exemption to that Regulation introduced by Article 6(3) in the same Regulation, according to Articles 10 and 249 of the EC Treaty ?
Can individuals cite Regulation 3577/92 in order to contest dispositions adopted before the end of the exemption period instituted by this Regulation by the national legislator, if these dispositions are thought to incur on the application of the Regulation after the exemption period has ended?
If a Member State adopts provisions within the field of Regulation No 3577/92  to which that Member State has been granted a temporary exemption without clearly noting that these provisions cease by the time the exemption period is over, does that seriously compromise that Regulation ?
Do Articles 1, 2, and 4 of Regulation 3577/92 permit the adoption of national rules under which shipowners may provide maritime cabotage services only on specific operational routes determined each year by a national authority competent for that purpose and after first obtaining an administrative licence granted under an authorisation scheme having the following characteristics: (a) it relates to all operational routes, without exception, which serve islands, and (b) the competent national authorities may approve an application submitted for the grant of a licence to operate a service by unilaterally amending, in the exercise of their discretion and without prior definition by a rule of law of the criteria applied, the elements of the application which relate to the frequency and the period of interruption of the service and to the fare tariff?
Does national legislation which requires a shipowner to provide a letter of guarantee whose amount will be forfeited if the shipowner does not offer transport services for a certain route continuously during an annual operation period, in order to be awarded a license to operate on that route, constitute an impermissible restriction on the freedom to provide services for the purposes of Article 49 of the EC Treaty ?
Does Article 4(1)(b) of Directive 89/48 oblige a Member State, in light of Articles 39 and 43 of EC, when considering imposing compensatory measures on an applicant who requests recognition of higher-education diplomas from another Member State, to take into account all of the applicants professional experience in the sense of Article 1(a),(c),(d) and (e) of that Directive?
Do general principles of the Treaty and Community law, and specifically Articles 18 EC and 49 EC, preclude national law which hinders deduction of the costs of attending university in another Member State from gross tax, while being deductible when attending domestic universities?
Do the general principles of the Treaty and Community law, and specifically Articles 18 EC and 49 EC, preclude national law which allows for the costs of attending university in another Member State to be deducted, but only up to the maximum amount set for attending a domestic State university nearest the taxpayers residence?
Can Article 4 of the Cooperation Agreement concluded between the EEC and the Cartagena Agreement and the member countries thereof, approved by Council Regulation No 1591/84 be relied upon directly by an individual in a national court of a Member State?
Does Article 87(2) of Directive 2001/83 apply only to advertisements for medical products aimed at the general public and not to citations from scientific journals included in advertisements directed at persons qualified to prescribe medicines?
Does Article 87(2) of Directive 2001/83 preclude advertisements for medical products of claims which conflict with the summary of product characteristics, and does it also require that all claims must be included in the summary of product characteristics or be derivable from information in the summary?
Does the term construction referred to in point 7(a) of Annex 1 to Directive 85/337 also encompass the operation of an airport, meaning that an environmental impact report needs to be compiled also for the operation of an airport and not only for the infrastructure work?
Is the environmental impact assessment also required for the renewal of the environmental permit for the airport, both when the renewal is not accompanied by any change, and when a change is intended?
Does it make a difference to the obligation to produce an environmental impact report, when renewing an environmental permit, whether an environmental impact report was compiled earlier, and whether the airport was already in operation when the requirement to produce such a report was introduced by the European or the national legislator?
Does Regulation No 1206/2001 oblige the requesting court to pay the costs incurred by the witness examined by the requested court, in the form of advance or subsequent reimbursement of those expenses?
Does the term advertising to the general public of Article 88(1)(a) of Directive 2001/83 cover a situation where the medical products are only available on prescription, the adverstising contains only information placed before the authorisation in the marketing authorisation procedure, accessible to every person acquiring the medicin, available on the internet but not made available on an unsolicited basis?
Is the comparison of different foodstuffs only by name, weight and price necessarily misleading when used for advertising puroposes, according to Article 3a(1) of Directive 84/450, since it does not account to differences in place of production, quality, level of pleasure in consuming the foodstuffs, etc. ?
Do Articles 3(1)(g), 4, 10, 81 and 98 of the EC Treaty preclude national legislation that prevents public officials working part-time from practicing the profession of lawyer, by providing they be removed from the Bar Council ?
Does Article 6 of Directive 77/249 preclude national legislation that prevents public officials working part-time from practicing the profession of lawyer, by providing they be removed from the Bar Council ?
Must Article 8 of Directive 98/5 be interpreted as meaning that it does not apply to lawyers in part-time public employment?
Do the general principles of European Union law on the protection of legitimate expectations and acquired rights preclude national rules, which introduce the incompatibility of the practice of law by part-time public officials and which also apply to lawyers already registered at the Bar when the national law came into effect ?
Are the members of the directorial body of a capital company to be regarded as covered by the concept of “worker” within the meaning of Community law, notably Directives 92/85 and 76/207?
Do Article 10 of Directive 92/85 and the case-law of the CJEU require Member States to establish special protections from dismissal for pregnant members of the Board of Directors of a capital company ?
May the appeal referred to in Article 243(2) of Regulation 2913/92 be brought directly before the judicial authority without the matter having first been referred to the customs authorities?
Is the power to suspend implementation of the contested decision provided for in Article 244 of Regulation 2913/92 conferred exclusively on the customs authorities or also on the judicial authority before which an appeal has been brought?
Having regard to the principle of the free movement of goods, does Directive 75/106/EEC allow Member States to implement the Directive in such a way that the national legislation prohibits the marketing of containers of a quantity not listed in Annex III to the Directive, in this case the 33 cl container for the marketing of cider?
Must the provisions of Council Directive 90/220/EEC be interpreted as meaning that if, after an application to place a genetically modified organism on the market has been forwarded to the Commission of the European Communities, no Member State has raised an objection, or if the Commission of the European Communities has taken a "favourable decision", the competent authority which forwarded the application to the Commission with a favourable opinion is obliged to give the "consent in writing" allowing the product to be placed on the market?
Must the decision of the Commission of 23 January 1997 under which "the French authorities are to authorise the placing on the market of the product ... notified by Ciba-Geigy Limited" be interpreted as requiring the French Government to give its "consent in writing"?
Is the national legislation requiring publishers to impose on booksellers fixed prices for the resale of books to consumers and to business purchasers compatible with the internal market and the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, as amended by the Single European Act and the Treaty on European Union?
On a proper interpretation of Article 2(a) of Directive 90/270/EEC, does "graphic display" within the meaning of that provision also include the replay of film clips on monitors?
Does "graphic display" within the meaning of Article 2(a) of Directive 90/270/EEC include the replay of video data files on monitors, which include film clips in digitised form?
If either Question 1 or Question 2 is answered in the affirmative, must Article 1(3)(a) of Directive 90/270/EEC be interpreted as meaning that "control cabs for ... machinery" includes a workstation at which analogue or digitised picture material is processed with the aid of technical installations and/or computer programmes?
Does the transaction value, within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Regulation 1224/80 include the "expenses" or the "costs of completing the transaction", which the importer invoices to the buyer on the basis of separate contractual agreements?
If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative: :     Is Commission Decision C(95) 2325 of 28 September 1995 null and void?
If Question 2 is answered in the affirmative:

Must the authorities refrain from post-clearance recovery of duty pursuant to Article 5(2) of Regulation 1697/79 if, at a previous on-the-spot inspection, they raised no objection to the exclusion of flat-rate expenses from the customs value of similar transactions?
May a doctor who has obtained in another Member State a diploma in specialised medicine which does not appear on the list of specialist training courses in Article 7 of Directive 93/16 rely on Article 19 of that directive to use the corresponding professional title of specialist in the host State?
Does Article 10 of Directive 93/16 confer on holders of academic titles acquired in another Member State merely the option of using their academic title, or, should the directive be interpreted to the effect that only the academic title in the language of the country in which it was awarded may be authorised, to the exclusion of equivalent titles formulated in the language and according to the terminology of the host State?
Is it open to an individual to rely on Article 10 and 12 of  Directive 69/335/EEC in his relations with the State even though the latter has not transposed that directive into its national legal system?
Must the transactions referred to in Article 4(3) of Directive 69/335/EEC be regarded as covered by the prohibition laid down in Article 10 of that Directive, in such a way as to preclude the collection, not only of capital duty but also of any other levy, in particular one that is a charge rather than a tax?
Must Articles 10 and 12(1)(e) of Directive 69/335/EEC be interpreted as meaning that notarial charges for recording in a public instrument as required by law, resolutions to increase the capital, or to amend the statutes of a company may not vary according to the amount of the increase and the amount of the capital respectively?
Must the charges be calculated solely on the basis of the cost of the services provided or may be set so as to cover the whole or part of the outgoings of the department entrusted with their provision?
Does Article 3 of Regulation 804/68 preclude national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which is designed to promote and encourage the establishment of a uniform producer price for milk?
Does Article 6 of Directive 89/592/EEC allow a Member State to provide for a more stringent definition in its legislation, whilst granting a given category, namely holding companies, specific exemption from that more stringent definition?
If the Member State has implemented Directive 89/592/EEC as Belgium has in Article 181 of the Law of 4 December 1990, and such implementation is contrary to the directive, does this mean that the more stringent provisions are deemed not to form part of the national legislation, or that they remain fully applicable, and to holding companies as well?
Must Article 41(1) of the Cooperation Agreement be interpreted as meaning that a Moroccan worker may rely on the prohibition of discrimination laid down in that provision if he no longer resides on the territory of a Member State of the European Community?
If the answer to Question 1 is in the affirmative: does that prohibition have the effect of rendering the abolition of the entitlement to receive child allowance impermissible if the effect of that abolition is such that that right is replaced by (a different) entitlement to receive a contribution to the cost of maintaining student children aged 18 or over which far more frequently benefits nationals of the MS or persons insured under the the scheme in question who reside in the Member State than workers such as the plaintiff?
Where a retailer offers, at a single price, goods and the option of a period of extended credit to pay that price - the credit to be provided by a person other than the retailer, and at no additional cost to the customer - what is the taxable amount for which the retailer must account in respect of the goods supplied, having regard to Articles 11A(1)(a) and 13B(d)(1) of Directive 77/388/EEC?
Is the answer to the previous Question affected by the facts listed in the question at hand?
Does Article 81 EC preclude a MS from adopting a law or regulation which approves, on the basis of a draft produced by a professional body of members of the Bar, a tariff fixing minimum and maximum fees for members of the profession, where that State measure forms part of a procedure such as that laid down in the Italian legislation?
Does the principle of equal treatment preclude legislation of a Member State which, first, in accordance with Article 28(3)(b) of the Sixth Directive, continues to exempt international passenger transport by air and, second, taxes international passenger transport by coach?
Can a VAT regime which favours a given sector of economic activity, such as the one at issue in the present case, constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 87 EC, even where it does not exclusively protect the interests of national industry?
Is Article 1 of Directive 83/189 to be interpreted as meaning that the national provision which states that "The operator is required to ensure that one or more proper disinfectant containers or appropriate cleaning facilities for disinfecting footwear are present on his holding" must be regarded as a technical regulation within the meaning of that Directive?
Is Article 1 of Directive 83/189 to be interpreted as meaning that the national provision which states that "Every operator is required to have pigs present on his holding vaccinated against Aujeszkys disease in accordance with the vaccination scheme set up for the animal species concerned and the individual areas by the Pig Breeding Department on the recommendation of the Veterinary Care Association" must be regarded as a technical regulation within the meaning of that Directive?
Where a draft technical regulation within the meaning of Directive 83/189 is not communicated to the Commission pursuant to Articles 8 and 9, does that render such a regulation inapplicable to the extent to which it constitutes a barrier to trade or the free movement of goods in a particular case?
Are the Explanatory Notes to the Combined Nomenclature, where they state that caseins containing by weight more than 15% water are included under heading 0406, contrary to Regulation 3174/88?
Having regard to Regulation 3174/88, are the imported goods (which have the following composition: 54% water, 0.9% fat, 5.7% phosphorus, 2% salt and casein) to be classified under customs heading 3501 10 90 0 00 000 or under customs heading 0406 90 11 01 0 000?
Are Articles 1(u)(i) and 10a of and Annexes II and IIa to Regulation 1408/71, which lay down the principle of the non-exportability of childbirth and maternity allowances, consistent with Articles 48 and 51 of the EC Treaty?
Is an allowance, such as the Member States child-raising allowance, one of the family allowances which, pursuant to (Article 77 of) Regulation No 1408/71, are to be paid to persons receiving pensions for old age, invalidity or an accident at work or occupational disease, irrespective of the Member State in whose territory they are residing?
Is Article 73 of the Regulation No 1408/71 to be interpreted as meaning that the recipient of an invalidity pension who continues to make compulsory sickness insurance contributions in the country which provides the pension, may, notwithstanding his pension, be considered in that country as an employee who is entitled to receive family benefits, including the child-raising allowance, and - in the event that the non-exportability clause is held to be incompatible with the Treaty - childbirth allowances?
Does the concept of "worker" within the meaning of Regulation 1612/68 include the recipient of an invalidity pension who resides in a different country from that which provides the pension?
Is Article 7 of Regulation 1612/68 to be interpreted as meaning that the recipient of an invalidity pension or his spouse may, on the basis of that article, enjoy social advantages which are denied him by Regulation No 1408/71?
Is Article 119 of the EC Treaty applicable to supplementary retirement pension schemes such as those at issue in the main proceedings?
Does Article 119 of the EC Treaty prohibit such supplementary retirement pension schemes from discriminating between men and women in respect of the age at which they are entitled to a survivors pension following the death of their spouse?
Do the transitional provisions contained in Article 95a of Regulation 1408/71, apply solely to recipients of pensions in respect of whom the decision granting the pension was final as at 1 June 1992, or whether they also apply to persons who, before that date, had brought proceedings before a national court, where a final decision in those proceedings had not yet been given?
If Article 95a applies to all recipients without distinction, must the application referred to in Article 95a(4) be made to the competent social security institution in accordance with the formalities required by national legislation for the bringing of an application for review, or may it be made to the court before which the dispute has been brought in accordance with the applicable rules of procedure?
Does Article 58(1)(b) of the Treaty (Amsterdam), which provides that Article 56 thereof is without prejudice to the right of Member States to take any measures which are justified on grounds of public policy or public security, permit national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which merely requires prior authorisation for direct foreign investments which are such as to represent a threat to public policy or public security?
Does Regulation 805/68 infringe the provisions of Article 40 of the Treaty in as much as it allows for the adoption of aid measures benefiting products differently according to criteria established at national level, where those products may be marketed in all of the Member States of the Community?
Is Article 11(1) and (2) of Directive 94/45/EC to be interpreted as meaning that the right to information laid down therein exists even where it is not (yet) established whether or not there is a controlling undertaking within the meaning of the Directive?
If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative: Does the right to information in Article 11(1) and (2) of Directive 94/45/EC also include the right of a works council to request from the undertaking concerned information which gives rise to the presumption referred to in Article 3(2) of the Directive?
Does Article 11(1) and (2) of Directive 94/45/EC also include the right of a works council to request documents from an undertaking to clarify and explain such information?
Does Article 44 of the Association Agreement between the EEC and the Republic of Poland confer rights of establishment upon a Polish national whose presence within the territory of a Member State is unlawful under national immigration law by reason of a breach of an express condition, imposed upon his admission to the territory as a visitor?
If the answer to the first question is "yes", does Article 44 of the Agreement have direct effect within the national legal systems of Member States, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 58 of the Agreement?
If the answer to the second question is "yes": To what extent may a Member State apply its laws and regulations regarding entry and stay, labour conditions and establishment of natural persons, and supply of services, to persons invoking Article 44 of the Agreement?
If the answer to the second question is "yes": Does Article 58 permit the refusal of an application under Article 44 of the Agreement made by someone whose presence in the Member State is otherwise unlawful?
Does an examination of goods which has been ordered by the customs authority for the purposes of verifying a declaration which has been accepted fall within the scope of Regulation 2913/92?
Are Articles 75, 201 and 233 of the Customs Code (Regulation 2913/92) to be interpreted as meaning that the customs office which has accepted a customs declaration is entitled to treat the declaration as invalid with the result that a customs debt incurred under community law is deemed not have been incurred, if the declared goods cannot be released to the declarant because they were removed from the area for which the customs office is responsible?
Is Article 203(1) of the Customs Code to be interpreted as meaning that there is an unlawful removal from customs supervision when the non-community goods declared for release for free circulation are removed from the prescribed area, even though the customs office had ordered a customs examination?
Is Article 204(1) of the Customs Code to be interpreted as meaning that the unauthorised removal of the goods from their place of storage has had "no significant effect" on the correct operation of the temporary storage if, after their removal, the goods could, on request, have been presented at another customs office?
Is it possible for a customs debt on importation to be incurred under community law (Regulation 2913/92) such as that at issue in the main proceedings where the customs declaration received by the customs office was accompanied by technically correct certificates of origin corresponding to Form A and where the zero preferential tariff applied to the goods covered by the declaration?
Is Council Directive 98/43 invalid?
Are Articles 6 and 7 of Regulation 1408/71 to be interpreted as meaning that they do not preclude the continuance in force of a convention concluded between States in the field of unemployment insurance which is more advantageous for the insured person?
Does such a rule as those in question fall within the scope of Directive 76/207/EEC?
Does such a rule amount to direct discrimination on grounds of sex within the meaning of Article 2(1) of Directive 76/207/EEC?
Does the rule give rise to indirect discrimination?
Is justification of the rules at issue on the basis of Article 2(4) of Directive 76/207 precluded because those rules automatically result in preferential admission for men, towards whom that provision is not directed, or must such a rules be accepted because those rules counterbalance disadvantages not faced by women?
Is the second paragraph of Article 215 of the EC Treaty and Article 178 of the EC Treaty, in conjunction with the provisions of Regulation 2187/93, to be interpreted as meaning that the Court of Justice also has jurisdiction in disputes which derive from a contract concluded by the competent national authority in the name and on behalf of the Council and Commission in accordance with Regulation 2187/93 providing for an offer of compensation to certain producers of milk and milk products temporarily prevented from carrying on their trade?
If that question is answered in the negative are the provisions of national procedural law or the general principles of law common to the legal systems of the Member States to be applied to such a contract?
Under what conditions may the competent national authority set aside in whole or in part a contract concluded in the name and on behalf of the Council and Commission  for reasons of the protection of legitimate expectations?
Are advances on maintenance payments for minor children of self-employed persons family benefits under Article 4(1)(h) of Council Regulation 1408/71 and is Article 3 of that regulation, concerning equal treatment, therefore applicable in such a case?
Are minor children who are German nationals but ordinarily resident in the Republic of Austria and who are applying for the grant of advances on maintenance discriminated against as family members, contrary to Article 52 of the EC Treaty or the first paragraph of Article 6 of the EC Treaty, by virtue of the fact that entitlement to such advances is withheld from them on the ground that they are German nationals?
What, on a proper construction of Article 11A and 11C of the Sixth Directive, is the taxable amount in respect of goods supplied by mail order for the customer's own use where the supplier in operating self-financed credit terms allows an "AOP discount" from the catalogue price to the customer with that discount being credited to the customer as and when instalment payments are made but where the discount which has accrued on payments made is available for immediate withdrawal or use by the customer even though future instalment payments will be due from that customer?
Does Article 48 of the Treaty and Regulation 1612/68 preclude national rules under which, as regards income tax, the joint assessment to tax of spouses who are not separated is conditional on their both being resident on national territory and that tax advantage is denied to a worker who is resident in that State, where he/she receives almost the entire income of the household, and whose spouse is resident in another MS?
Does Community law preclude the tax legislation of a Member State from establishing that an action for recovery of sums paid but not due, brought on the basis of a judgment that one rule is incompatible with a higher-ranking rule, may relate only to the period following 1 January of the fourth year preceding that of the judgment?
Does Art. 50 of TRIPs have direct effect?
Is Art. 50 of TRIPs to be interpreted as meaning that provisional measures lapse automatically by operation of law either if the substantive proceedings are not instituted within the period prescribed in the provisional measure?
When does the time-limit within which the substantive proceedings must be brought commence when its not prescribed in the provisional measures ordered?
Where a court orders a provisional measure, must it of its own motion fix a time-limit within which substantive proceedings are to be instituted, or may it fix such a time-limit only if an application is made to that effect?
Where an appeal is lodged against a provisional measure ordered by a court of first instance and the appellate court confirms the measure, is it open to the appellate court to prescribe, either of its own motion or on application by one of the parties, a time-limit within the meaning of Article 50(6) TRIPs if the court at first instance has not done so?
Is Article 50 of the TRIPs Agreement applicable where that Agreement enters into force in the Member State concerned on a date following the closure of the trial procedure at first instance but before the court seized of the first-instance proceedings has delivered its decision?
Does the decision of a contracting authority to admit to an award procedure bodies which receive subsidies of any kind, which enable those bodies to tender in an award procedure at prices which are substantially below those of their commercially active competitors, infringe the principle of equal treatment of all tenderers and candidates in an award procedure?
Does the decision of a contracting authority to admit such bodies to an award procedure constitute covert discrimination, if the bodies which receive such subsidies without exception have the nationality of the Member State in which the contracting authority is also established?
Does the decision of a contracting authority to admit such bodies to an award procedure constitute a restriction of the freedom to provide services which is not compatible with the provisions of the EC Treaty, in particular Article 59 et seq. thereof?
May the contracting authority conclude service contracts with bodies which are exclusively or at least predominantly in public ownership and provide their services exclusively or at least predominantly to the contracting authority or other State institutions, without making the service the subject of an award procedure in competition with commercially active tenderers in accordance with Directive 92/50/EEC?
Does Council Regulation 1408/71 apply to stateless persons and to members of their families if such persons have no right of free movement under the Treaty?
If the answer to Question 1 is in the affirmative: Does Regulation 1408/71 also apply to stateless workers and to members of their families who have travelled directly to a Member State from a non-member country and have not moved within the Community?
Under the EC sugar regime and in particular under Article 24(1)(c) of Regulation 1785/81, may an undertaking awarded a quota by a national authority attribute sugar as C sugar when that sugar is produced during a marketing year before the undertaking has actually completed production of a volume of sugar that is equivalent to the sum of its A and B quotas?
If the answer to Question 1 is "Yes": Was Article 4 of Regulation 2630/81 ultra vires and void for the reason that it imposed a requirement which is not found in or justified by Regulation 1785/81, namely, that an export licence for C sugar may only be issued after the manufacturer has provided the competent agency with proof that the quantity for which the licence is requested, has actually been produced in excess of the A and B quotas of the undertaking concerned?
If the answer to Question 1 or Question 2 is "No": Is the national authority, in maintaining that the sugar exported as C sugar was A or B quota sugar and/or in then seeking to impose a charge pursuant to Article 3 of Regulation 2670/81 for the failure to dispose of C sugar outside the EC, in breach of any general principles of Community law, with the effect that the demand for the charge in the present case is void and unenforceable?
If the answer to Question 1 is "No": Does the national authority have a discretion to vary the amount of the charge to be imposed pursuant to Article 3 of Regulation 2670/81?
In the circumstances of the case in the main proceedings, is the competent national authority precluded from imposing the payment of a charge on an undertaking pursuant to Article 3(1) of Regulation No 2670/81 , when it has not notified the undertaking of that requirement within the period prescribed by Article 3(2) of that regulation?
May the competent national authority, without infringing Articles 3 and 4 of Regulation No 3665/87  or the general principles of Community law, refuse to accept retrospectively an export declaration presented for the purpose of obtaining export refunds where, because the undertaking has obtained from that authority a C sugar export licence for sugar which it was impossible to regard as C sugar, the undertaking has neither applied for nor obtained the export refunds to which it would have been entitled if the sugar had been exported as A or B sugar?
Following the decision in case C-63/92, does Article 13B(b) of the Sixth VAT Directive exempt from VAT a supply made by a person who does not have any interest in immovable property, where the person agrees to accept an assignment of a lease of that property from a lessee and the lessee pays that person a sum of money in return?
Must Article 8(1)(b) of Directive 73/239/EEC be interpreted as precluding the national provisions, which allow mutual benefit societies whose sole business is that of insurance to create between them mutual benefit bodies which have legal personality and legal autonomy and engage in commercial business in the optical sector?
If the provisions of Directive 73/239/EEC are incompatible with national law, is the prohibition of commercial business imposed on the mutual benefit body set up by mutual benefit societies general and absolute, or is it open to the competent authorities of the Member State to define the conditions under which and the spheres in which a commercial business may be pursued?
On a proper interpretation of Article 10(1) of Regulation 2730/79 does an exporter lose his right to payment of an export refund if the product in respect of which the export refund was paid, and which is sold to a purchaser established in a non-member country, is, immediately after its release for home use in that non-member country, transported back to the Community and is there released for home use on payment of import duties?
Would the answer be different if, before the product was re-imported into the Community, the purchaser in the non-member country sold it to an undertaking with which he was personally and commercially connected, which is also established in that non-member country?
Is advertising by a supplier of spare parts and consumable items for an equipment manufacturers product to be regarded as comparative advertising within the meaning of Article 2(2a) of Directive 84/450 if the advertising indicates the manufacturers product numbers for the relevant original spare parts and consumable items for reference purposes in order to identify the suppliers products?
If Question 1 is to be answered in the affirmative: Does the display of the equipment manufacturers product numbers alongside the suppliers own order numbers constitute a comparison of goods permissible under Article 3a(1)(c) of Directive 84/450, in particular a comparison of the prices?
If Question 1 is to be answered in the affirmative: Are the product numbers distinguishing marks of a competitor within the meaning of Article 3a(1)(g) of Directive 84/450?
If Question 2 is to be answered in the affirmative: Does, on a proper construction of Article 3a(1)(g) of Directive 84/450, the use of a competitors distinguishing marks in catalogues of a competing supplier enable the latter to take unfair advantage of the reputation attached to them?
Does Article 10 of Directive 69/335 preclude the levying, as against insolvent capital companies lacking own revenue or whose annual revenue does not exceed a certain amount, of a minimum tax, such as that at issue in the main proceedings?
Is Article 5(1) of Regulation 3665/87 to be interpreted as meaning that payment of an export refund can be made conditional on production of additional evidence of such a kind as to show that a product which in the non-member country of import has undergone processing regarded as substantial in that it has been used in an irreversible manner in the manufacture of another product, which is itself likely to be re-exported into the Community, has actually been placed on the market in that country in the unaltered state?
Is Article 15b(8) of Regulation 1035/72 to be interpreted as meaning that, where a MS has applied Article 15b(1) of that regulation, it is entitled to exempt certain non-member producers from the payment of fees, in respect of a given product, in so far as the goods (cauliflower) produced by them are intended for industrial processing rather than for the fresh-product market?
Is point 3 of the Annex to Regulation 2184/97 valid considering the circumstances at issue in the main proceedings?
Is  the national law in question, compatible with Community law, in particular the principle of equal treatment, in so far as it limits retroactive pension payments to a greater extent when the payment is made abroad than when the payment is made in Germany?
Must Article 79 of Regulation 259/68 be construed as meaning that the European institution is permitted to depart from national legislation, with the consequence that the rules of Community origin alone are applicable, or does it impose compliance with national legislation, particularly if that national legislation is mandatory?
Is it open to an (legal) individual to rely on Articles 10 and 12 of Directive 69/335/EEC in his relations with the State where the latter has not transposed that directive into its national legal system?
Must the transactions referred to in Article 4(3) of Directive 69/335/EEC be regarded as covered by the prohibition laid down in Article 10 of the same Community measure, in such a way as to preclude the collection, with respect to those transactions, not only of capital duty but also of any other levy, of whatever kind, in particular one that is a charge rather than a tax?
Must Articles 10 and 12(1)(e) of  Directive 69/335 be interpreted as meaning that the charges payable for entry on the National Register of Legal Persons of increases of capital may not vary according to the amount of such increases?
May such variables also be regarded as a function of the cost of the service provided?
Does that cost include the salary of officials, agents or other public employees, expenses incurred in respect of minor operations carried out free of charge, and a portion of overheads attributable to registration operations?
Is it permitted, having regard to the abovementioned articles of Directive 69/335, to regard those variables deriving from increases of capital as a manifestation of standardised charges and, as such, authorised charges?
Is it permitted, having regard to the same provisions of Directive 69/335, for any charge in excess of the cost of the service to be made?
Under the circumstances in this case, does European law require a period of child-rearing under national law to be taken into account for the purpose of the grant of an old-age pension if the child was in fact raised in another Member State but the parent who brought up the child was a cross-border worker?
Does Directive 79/1072 have the effect of granting to taxable persons established in a Member State where they are taxed only on a part of their turnover a right to a partial refund of the tax charged in another Member State under the circumstances in this case?
If yes on the first question, to what method of determining the portion of refundable tax do those provisions refer?
If yes on the first question, is that portion to be determined according to the rules applicable in the State where the taxable person is established, or according to the rules in force in the State required to make the refund?
Does Article 52 of the EC Treaty preclude the application of national legislation under which a business loss incurred in that Member State during an earlier taxable period by a company established in that State can be offset against the profits made by that company during a later taxable period only to the extent to which that loss cannot be attributed to the profit made by a permanent establishment of that company in another Member State during that earlier taxable period?
Must share dividends and interest on loans always be excluded from the denominator of the fraction used to calculate the deductible proportion, even where the company receiving such dividends and interest has involved itself in the management of the undertakings paying them, save in the exercise of its rights as shareholder?
Is a national law which provide for a rebate of energy taxes on natural gas and electricity only to undertakings whose activity is shown to consist primarily in the manufacture of goods, to be regarded as State aid within the meaning of Article 92 of the Treaty?
If the answer to Question 1 is in the affirmative, is such a national law to be regarded as State aid within the meaning of Article 92 of the Treaty even if it applies to all undertakings, regardless of whether their activity is shown to consist primarily in the manufacture of goods?
Do the provisions of Article 13A(1)(m) and 13B(b) of the Sixth VAT Directive preclude national legislation providing for a general exemption from VAT for the supply of sports facilities, as laid down in the national law at issue, in the version in force before 1 January 1997?
Does Article 13, in combination with Articles 2, 6 and 17 of the Sixth VAT Directive, confer on (legal) individuals rights on which they can rely as against Member States before a national court?
In the event that the first two questions are answered in the affirmative: Does the implementation and application of the exemption provided for in the provision of the national law at issue entail a sufficiently serious (clear) infringement of Community law such as to render a Member State liable in damages?
Is Regulation 343/94 invalid, in that it was adopted although the condition laid down in subparagraph (b) of the second subparagraph of Article 39(11) of Regulation 822/87 was not fulfilled; under that provision there had to be a significant difference in the ratio between the quantities available and normal consumption compared with the ratio for the reference years?
Is Regulation 343/94 invalid, inasmuch as it appears to be defective for infringement of Article 190 of the EC Treaty in that neither Regulation 343/94 nor the measures and documents preceding it refer to any assessment as to the existence of the legislative precondition that the ratio between quantities available and normal consumption for the year 1993/94 should differ significantly from that for the reference years 1981/82, 1982/83 and 1983/84?
Is Regulation 343/94, which imposes on Italy the obligation to distil 12 150 000 hl, invalid for infringement of the principles of reasonableness, manifest error and inconsistency in relation to the object pursued, owing to the system of calculation of the quantity to be distilled by Italy, applied by the Commission?
Is Regulation 343/94, requiring the Member State to distil 12 150 000 hl, invalid in that it infringes Article 39(11)(b) of Regulation 822/87, as amended by Regulation 1972/87, because it permits the alteration of the new percentage which was determined by amending the ratio between production in 1981/82, 1982/83 and 1983/84 and normal consumption for 1993/94 compared to the ratio between production in 1981/82, 1982/83 and 1983/84 and normal consumption in 1984/85?
In the event that Article 39(11)(b) of Regulation 822/87 is to be interpreted as authorising such a system of calculation, is Article 39(11)(b), for the reasons and in the light of the calculations set out in the order for reference, unlawful for infringement of the principle of reasonableness, manifest error and inconsistency in relation to the object pursued, and for infringement of the prohibition on discrimination under Article 40 of the Treaty?
Are Article 39(3), (4) and (11) of Regulation 822/87, as amended by Regulation 1566/93, and Regulation 343/94 which implements the former measures, unlawful for infringement of the principle of reasonableness, manifest error, misuse of powers and infringement of the principle of proportionality?
Is an interpretation of Directive 96/71/EC or, if that directive is not applicable, an interpretation of Article 49 et seq. of the EC Treaty, under which overriding requirements of public interest capable of justifying a restriction on the freedom to provide services in cases involving the posting of employees can lie not only in the social protection of the employees posted but also in the protection of the national construction industry and the reduction in national unemployment for the purpose of preventing social tension, consistent with Community law?
Does the fact that a domestic employer may, in concluding a collective agreement specific to one undertaking, pay wages lower than the minimum wage laid down by a collective agreement declared to be generally binding, whilst an employer established in another Member State cannot do so, constitute an unjustified restriction on the freedom to provide services?
Can the additional pre-retirement payment be treated as a benefit payable under an occupational social security scheme falling under Art. 119 EC?
Are the provisions of the Collective Labour agreement compatible with Article 5 of Directive 76/207/EC?
Does the application of Art. 119 EC preclude the action brought by plaintiff from succeeding?
Is it impossible for practical reasons, within the meaning of the last sentence of Article 6(1)(d) of Directive 76/768, to set out the obligatory warnings in full on the packaging of a cosmetic product in the language or languages prescribed in the MS in which it is to be marketed, where the producer or distributor wishes to label the product in nine languages, for economic considerations and in order to facilitate the movement of the product within the Community, and this entails abbreviating those warnings on the packaging?
Is a situation in which the operation of bus routes passes from one bus undertaking to another as a consequence of a tender procedure under Directive 92/50/EEC on public service contracts to be regarded as a transfer of a business for the purposes of Article 1(1) of Directive 77/187/EEC?
Does Article 7 of Directive 93/104/EC allow a MS to adopt national rules under which a worker does not begin to accrue rights to paid annual leave until he has completed a minimum period of 13 weeks uninterrupted employment with the same employer?
If the answer to question 1 is yes, what are the factors that the national court should take into account in order to determine whether a particular qualifying period of employment with the same employer is lawful and proportionate?
Is Directive 77/187 to be interpreted as meaning that it is relating to the safeguarding of employees rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, business or parts of business applicable where the activity of a legal person governed by private law is transferred to a legal person governed by public law?
Is the Council Decision 89/487/EEC valid?
May nationals of a MS rely on the free movement of capital even if a capital transaction has no international element?
Is it compatible with the free movement of capital for an authorisation of the competent authority in real property matters to be necessary for a transaction concerning the purchase of a plot of building land to take effect?
What are the effects of the "standstill" clause in point 1(e) of Annex XII to the Agreement on the European Economic Area?
Is it contrary to Community law(mainly Articles 6 and 8a of the Treaty) for entitlement to a non-contributory social benefit to be granted only to nationals of the MS to whom Regulation 1612/68  applies and not to all citizens of the Union?
Alternatively, are Articles 6 and 8a of the Treaty and Directive 93/96 to be interpreted to the effect that, after a students right of residence has been acknowledged, he may subsequently be barred from entitlement to non-contributory social benefits payable by the host country?
Is Article 11 of Regulation 1999/85 concerned with the conditions laid down in the document granting the beneficiary of the arrangements authorisation for the use (functioning) thereof or, on the contrary, is it concerned with the conditions for the issue of the inward processing authorisation?
Once the rate of yield has been fixed by the customs authority, may the latter unilaterally alter that rate on the ground that the holder of the authorisation, when making use of the arrangements, has in fact obtained a higher rate of yield than that initially envisaged and approved?
Do the principle of legal certainty and the rules on inward processing relief arrangements allow the competent customs authority unilaterally to alter the rate of yield fixed in the processing authorisation if it is proved that the said customs authority has been supervising and controlling the operation of the undertaking in question since the inception of the arrangements in Portugal ?
Is it permissible under Articles 2(c) and (d) and 3 of Directive 88/357/EEC for a Member State to levy insurance tax on a legal person established in another Member State in respect of premiums paid to an insurer also established in another Member State for the business insurance of a subsidiary or sub-subsidiary established in the Member State making the levy?
Does it make any difference to the reply to Question 1 if the policy-holder is not the overall parent company but some other company in the group (for example a captive insurance company)?
Does it make any difference to the replies to Questions 1 and 2 or to the interpretation of the terms "policy-holder" or "Member State where the risk is situated" if the insurance premium relating to the insured risk is not passed on (wholly or in part) to the subsidiary or sub-subsidiary?
When determining whether a person has the nationality of a Member State for the purposes of Article 17 of the EC Treaty and the effect in Community law, are the 1972 and 1982 and 1992 Declarations necessarily to be taken into account?
In this context, what is the effect of the principle of respect for fundamental human rights under Community law claimed by the Applicant, in particular where the Applicant relies on Article 3(2) of the Fourth Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights that no one shall be deprived of the right to enter the territory of the State of which he is a national, which has not been ratified by the United Kingdom?
In the circumstances of the present case, does Article 8a(1) of the EC Treaty apply to situations which are wholly internal to a single Member State?
Where, pursuant to Article 8(5) of Regulation 3820/85, a driver who is entitled to do so elects to postpone his weekly rest period until the week following that in which it is due, must the driver take two weekly rest periods, consecutively and without break between them, in that following week?
Must the CN be interpreted as meaning that satellite television receivers such as those at issue in the main proceedings came within tariff heading 8528 between 1990 and 1992?
If Question 1 is answered in the negative: Is the definition of parts in heading 8529 of the CN or in Note 2(b) to Section XVI of the CN in the version in force from 1990 to 1992 to be interpreted as including devices such as the satellite receivers at issue, and are those devices then to be classified under heading 8529 of the CN despite Note 2(b) to Section XVI of the CN?
Is Article 7(a) of Directive 85/374 to be interpreted as meaning that a defective product is not put into circulation when the manufacturer of the product makes it and uses it in the course of providing a specific medical service, consisting in preparing a human organ for transplantation, and when the damage caused to the organ results from that preparatory treatment?
Must Article 7(c) of Directive 85/374 be construed as meaning that a publicly owned hospital is free from liability for products produced and used by that hospital in the course of providing a specific publicly financed service to the person suffering injury and in respect of which that person has not paid any consideration?
Does Community law impose requirements as to how Member States should define the expressions "damage caused by death or by personal injuries" and "damage to, or destruction of, any item of property" in Article 9 of Directive 85/374/EEC ?
Must Article 9(a) or (b) of Directive 85/374 be construed as meaning that damage to a human organ which, at the time when the damage occurred, had been removed from a donors body for immediate transplant into a certain other persons body is covered by the expressions therein in relation to the intended recipient of the organ?
May article 4 and 1 of Regulation 3577/92 be interpreted as permitting the provision of island cabotage services by undertakings covering regular shipping lines to be made subject to prior administrative authorisation?
If so, may the grant and continuation of such administrative authorisation be made subject to conditions, such as having no outstanding tax or social security debts, other than those set out in article 4 of Regulation 3577/92?
May article 4 of Regulation 3577/92 be interpreted as permitting public service obligations to be imposed on some shipping companies and public service contracts within the meaning of article 1 to be concluded with others at the same time for the same line or route, in order to ensure the same regular traffic to, from or between islands?
According to Directive 69/335 at hand, may fees paid for services, such as in this case, be calculated and collected by reference to the value of the act if the value is unlimited?
May that value be calculated in the manner described in question 1 if there is an upper limit?
Is the national administrative customs procedure which means that, automatically and without prior notice, goods not cleared by the end of the statutory periods are to be subject to the overdue-clearance procedure (sale), compatible with article 53 of the customs code  (Regulation 2913/92)?
May the national administrative customs procedure, as described in this case, be regarded as a disproportionate measure infringing taxpayers rights of defence and classifiable as an obstacle to the free movement of goods?
By immediately putting up the goods for "sale" in the circumstances in question, does the national customs procedure infringe article 6 of the Community customs code (Regulation 2913/92)?
Does the national customs  administrative procedure, by not making any notification compulsory in the overdue-clearance procedure, as provided for in the national regulation, infringe article 243 of the community customs code?
In the event that the overdue-clearance charge provided for in national regulation falls to be classified as a procedural administrative penalty, is that charge subject to VAT?
If the charge constitutes an administrative penalty, may the fact that that charge is levied on an objective basis, according to the circumstances in this case, be regarded as constituting an infringement of the principle of proportionality?
If, on the contrary, the said charge is not in the nature of a penalty but in fact represents remuneration for services provided by the customs authorities, is the levying of VAT justified?
Is the prohibition referred to in Article 85 of the Treaty applicable to an exclusive purchasing agreement as the one in this case, if all the exclusive purchasing agreements concluded by that supplier have had a significant influence on the partitioning of the market, but the agreements of similar duration to the exclusive purchasing agreement in question represent only a very small proportion of all the exclusive purchasing agreements of the same supplier?
Is it contrary to Article 19(1) of Regulation 1408/71 to make entitlement to care allowance under Austrian law dependent on the person reliant on care being habitually resident in Austria?
Is the principles of legal certainty, proportionality,  and the protection of individuals, C-257/86 (and other cases) prohibiting retroactive charges?
Is the three-year time-limit compatible with Articles 10 and 12(1)(e) of Council Directive 69/335/EEC ?
Is the interest rate compatible with Articles 10 and 12(1)(e) of Council Directive 69/335/EEC?
Does the Community law at issue in the main proceedings preclude the national provision at hand?
Does the combined provisions of Articles 5 and 85 of the EC Treaty compatible preclude national legislation which provides that the member of a profession may set at their discretion the fees for certain services which they perform?
Is the concept of an undertaking applicable to those carrying on a professional activity as architects?
May the definition of a body governed by public law contained in Directive 92/50 be deemed applicable to the Ente Autonomo Fiera di Milano (Milan International Fair)?
Is the Community law at hand to be interpreted as meaning that it confers the power to suspend implementation of a contested decision exclusively on the customs authorities?
Does Regulation 1576/95 repeal  Regulation 1521/95 and, if so, must the latter be held to have had no legal effects on 30 June 1995?
Must Regulation 1521/95 be interpreted as meaning that it may be applied to exports already underway and already completed on the same day on which the regulation itself was published and thus made available to the operators concerned?
Is Regulation 1521/95 invalid and thus of no legal effect for lack of a statement of reasons?
Is Regulation 1576/95 likewise invalid and thus of no legal effect for lack of a statement of reasons?
Do the exports of 30 June 1995 fall within the scope of Regulation 1415/95 as a result of the invalidity of the abovementioned regulations, or by the repeal referred to in Question 1?
Is a levy such as that in issue in the main proceedings capable of being a charge having equivalent effect to customs duties on exports within the meaning of Articles 9, 12 and 16 of the Treaty or of constituting discriminatory internal taxation prohibited by Article 95 of the Treaty?
If Question I is answered in the affirmative: does it make any difference to the answer that the levy scheme was, pursuant to Article 93(3) of the EC Treaty, notified to and approved by the EU Commission as being lawful State aid?
Does Article 45 of the Association Agreement between the EEC and the Republic of Bulgaria confer rights of establishment upon a Bulgarian national who, under national immigration law, is treated as having entered the territory of that Member State illegally?
If the answer to Question 1 is in the affirmative: Does Article 45 of the Agreement have direct effect within the national legal systems of Member States, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 59 of the Agreement?
Does Article 59, in any and if so what circumstances, permit the refusal of an application under Article 45 of the Agreement made by someone whose initial entry into that Member State was otherwise unlawful?
If the answer to the second question is "yes", does Article 45 and/or Article 59 of the Agreement preclude a system of prior control which makes the issue by the competent immigration authorities of leave to enter and remain subject to condition that the applicant must show that he genuinely intends to take up an activity as a self-employed person and that he possesses, from the outset, sufficient financial resources?
If the answer to the preceding questions is that a Bulgarian national who is an illegal entrant may rely upon directly effective rights of establishment under the Agreement, then in the state of Community law at the relevant time, did the approach adopted by the competent national authorities constitute a "grave and manifest disregard" of a superior rule of law?
Is Article 1(2) of Regulation (EEC) No 2849/92 invalid?
If the first question is to be answered in the affirmative, from what point in time is Article 1(2) of Regulation (EEC) No 2849/92 to be considered invalid in regard to the plaintiff?
Would a commitment assumed by an insurance company to carry out, in return for remuneration at market rates, the activities of another insurance company, which is its 100% subsidiary and which would continue to conclude insurance contracts in its own name, constitute an insurance transaction within the meaning of Article 13B(a) of the Sixth Directive?
Can import duties be repaid under Article 236 of the Customs Code (regulation 2913/92) in the case where the importer of Bourbon whiskey imported from the USA entered the Code Number 2208 30 82 in the customs declaration of 10 September 1996, and only on 2 October 1996, on submission of a certificate of authenticity corresponding to Annex 5 to the regulation, applied for classification under subheading 2208 30 11 of the CN, which would result in application of a lower rate of customs duty?
If the answer to Question 1 is in the negative: Can it be concluded that these circumstances constitute "a special situation" which - if the other legislative conditions are satisfied - may lead to repayment of the import duties under Article 239 of the Customs Code (regulation 2913/92) in conjunction with Article 905(1) of the regulation implementing the Customs Code (regulation 2454/93)?
Is a benefit such as the advance on maintenance payments provided for by national law a family benefit within the meaning of Article 4(1)(h) of Regulation 1408/71?
May such a minor child invoke Articles 73 and 74 of Regulation No 1408/71 in order to claim entitlement to a benefit of that kind?
If the answer to one of the questions under I is in the negative: Are advances on maintenance payments under national law referred to in Question I(a) social advantages within the meaning of Article 7(2) of Regulation 1612/68?
If the answer to one of the questions under I is in the negative: Does the fact that the child has to be resident in their Member State of nationality in order to be awarded advances on maintenance payments constitute a prohibited limiting provision under the second indent of Article 3(1) of Regulation 1612/68 in the light of the right to freedom of movement for workers enshrined in Article 39 of the EC Treaty?
If the answer to one of the questions under I is in the negative: Do the provisions of Regulation 1612/68 give rise to an entitlement, in the person of the child of a worker, to the award of advances on maintenance payments?
Does Article 45 of the Association Agreement have direct effect within the national legal systems of Member States, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 59 of the Agreement?
If the answer to Question 1 is "yes", to what extent may a Member State apply its laws and regulations regarding entry, stay and establishment of natural persons to persons invoking Article 45 of the Association Agreement, without violating this proviso?
If the answer to Question 1 is "no", is a natural person who is a national of the Czech Republic nonetheless entitled, in domestic legal proceedings brought for the purposes of challenging a decision of the relevant national authorities to refuse him admission to establish himself in business pursuant to the Association Agreement, to invoke Article 45 of the Agreement in order to challenge the lawfulness of a Member States laws and regulations regarding entry, stay and establishment of natural persons?
If the answer to Question 1 or Question 3 is "yes", do Articles 45 and/or 59 of the Association Agreement permit a MS to require a person who wishes to travel to a MS purely to establish himself as a self-employed person under the Agreement to apply for and obtain prior "entry clearance" (that is, prior permission to travel to that State for that specific purpose)?
If the answer to Question 4 is "yes": Is a MS entitled to make the grant of such prior entry clearance conditional upon satisfying substantive requirements relating to establishment such as those contained in paragraph 212 of HC 395; and may a MS refuse admission into its territory to a person seeking to establish himself as a self-employed person under the Association Agreement on the sole ground that such prior entry clearance has not been obtained?
Where such a person has not been granted permission to enter the territory of the Member State on any other basis, is the answer to Question 5 affected by any of the four factors listed in the question from the national court?
If a MS is not entitled to refuse entry to a person seeking to establish himself under the Association Agreement on the sole basis that prior entry clearance has not been obtained, is it legitimate for the competent authorities to grant such a person leave to enter only if his application clearly and manifestly satisfies the same substantive criteria as would have been applied had he sought prior entry clearance?
In the light of the definitions laid down in Article 1(2), (3) and (8) of Regulation  1610/96, must "product" within the meaning of Article 3 be understood as meaning an active substance or the combination of active substances, as described in more detail in Article 1(3), as they occur naturally or by manufacture, including any impurity inevitably resulting from the manufacturing process?
Are identical products involved, for the purposes of Regulation 1610/96 , in the case where, by means of a new process, a plant protection product is obtained which contains a lower amount of unavoidable impurities than an existing plant protection product with the same active component?
Does the issue of whether a new authorisation must be obtained for this new plant protection product have any bearing on the answer to Question 1(b)?
Are the conditions laid down in Article 3(1)(a) and (d) of Regulation 1610/96  satisfied if a plant protection product has been produced by means of a patented process, as a result of which it contains a lower amount of unavoidable impurities than an existing product with the same active substance, a new authorisation has been obtained for that new product, and the patent covering the manufacturing process in question was designated as the basic patent within the meaning of Article 3(1), opening passage and subparagraph (a)?
Is the second subparagraph of Article 7(1) of Directive 83/182/EEC to be interpreted as meaning that the normal residence of a national of State A is in State A, where he successfully carries on business for many years both as an architect and in commerce through a limited partnership, retains a residence and spends most of his working time, or is in State B, of which he is also a national and where, simultaneously, he starts up an independent business with a similar or at least related object, leases a house and begins to spend part of his time, while also complying with his fiscal obligations, assisted by his wife who participates in all the above activities in both State A and State B and takes shares in those businesses?
Is national legislation which provides, in the event of infringement of the temporary importation arrangements laid down by Directive 83/182/EEC, for a series of penalties including fines set at a flat rate on the basis of the sole criterion of the vehicles cubic capacity, without taking its age into account, compatible with the principle of proportionality?
Is national legislation which provides, in the event of infringement of the temporary importation arrangements laid down by Directive 83/182/EEC, for a series of penalties including increased duty which can amount to up to ten times the taxes in question, compatible with the principle of proportionality?
Does Directive 83/182/EEC or another provision give rise to an obligation on the Member States to take into account, when imposing administrative penalties in cases with which that directive is concerned, the good faith of the persons concerned and the absence of fraudulent intent?
Is the concept of a liberal profession mentioned in Annex F(2) to the Sixth Directive 77/388/EEC an independent concept of Community law?
If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative: Does the concept of a liberal profession cover the activity of a managing agent of buildings in co-ownership?
Can Polish and Czech nationals rely directly on the Agreements in the sense that they are entitled, vis-a-vis a Member State, to claim that they derive a right of entry and residence from the right laid down in the Agreements with Poland the Czech Republic?
Is a Member State free under Article 58 of the Agreement with Poland and Article 59 of the Agreement with the Czech Republic to make the right of entry and residence subject to specific conditions?
Do Article 44 of the Agreement with Poland and Article 45 of the Agreement with the Czech Republic allow prostitution to be excluded from the notion of "economic activities as self-employed persons"?
Do Article 43 of the EC Treaty and Article 44 of the Agreement with Poland and Article 45 of the Agreement with the Czech Republic permit a distinction to be drawn between the notions of "activities as self-employed persons" and "economic activities as self-employed persons"?
Is it compatible with Article 44 of the Agreement with Poland and Article 45 of the Agreement with the Czech Republic to impose minimum conditions on the self-employed persons referred to in paragraph (3) of those articles?
Is Commission Regulation 590/1999 compatible with European Community law?
Does the Court of Justices decision in C-227/89 apply also to a case in which a migrant worker has made use of "freedom of movement" before the entry into force of Regulation 1408/71, but also before the EC Treaty came into effect in her home State?
Does the judgement of C-227/89 mean that a migrant worker may rely on a legal position more favourable than Regulation No 1408/71 which derives from a bilateral convention between two Member States of the European Union for the entire period during which he was exercising his right to free movement within the meaning of the Treaty?
Must such claims be assessed in accordance with the convention only in so far as they are based on periods of insurance under compulsory unemployment insurance which were acquired before the entry into force of Regulation No 1408/71 in the State of employment?
Is it permissible from the point of view of the prohibition of discrimination under Article 39 EC in conjunction with Article 3(1) of Regulation No 1408/71 if a Member State provides in its legal system a provision more favourable than Regulation No 1408/71?
Does national legislation, which prohibits commercial advertising for transmitting equipment of a non-approved type, constitute, for the purposes of Directive 83/189, a technical regulation which should have been notified to the Commission prior to its adoption?
If the answer to Question 1 is in the affirmative: does this have the result that such a provision must be disapplied only if it constitutes a barrier to trade or to the free movement of goods in a specific case?
Are clauses in calls for tenders for public works contracts which prevent the participation of undertakings which have not submitted with their tenders explanations in respect of the price indicated, being equal to at least 75% of the basic contract value, incompatible with Article 30(4) of Directive 93/37/EEC?
Is a mechanism for automatically calculating the anomaly threshold of tenders to be subjected to a check on their authenticity, based on a statistical criterion and an arithmetical mean, such that undertakings are unable to ascertain that threshold in advance, incompatible with Article 30(4) of Directive 93/37?
Is provision for a prior exchange of views, without the undertaking which has allegedly submitted an abnormal tender having the opportunity to state its reasons after the opening of the envelopes and before the adoption of the decision excluding that tender, incompatible with Article 30(4) of Directive 93/37?
Is a provision whereby the contracting authority may take account only of explanations relating to the economy of the construction method or the technical solutions adopted or the exceptionally favourable conditions available to the tenderer incompatible with Article 30(4) of Directive 93/37?
Is the exclusion of explanations relating to items for which minimum figures can be ascertained from official lists incompatible with Article 30(4) of Directive 93/37?
Is there a withholding tax within the meaning of Article 5(1) of Directive 90/435 where national legislation provides that, in the event of distribution of profits by a subsidiary to its parent company, account is to be taken of its total net profits, including income which has been subject to special taxation entailing extinction of tax liability and also non-taxable income, when those two categories of income would not be taxable on the basis of the national legislation if they remained with the subsidiary?
On a proper construction of Article 15 of Regulation 3821/85, does the drivers obligation to record all other periods of work extend to periods necessarily spent travelling to take over a vehicle subject to the obligation to install and use a tachograph and which is not at the drivers home or the employers operating centre?
On a proper construction of Article 15 of Regulation 3821/85, does the drivers obligation to record all other periods of work extend to driving time spent by him performing a transport service falling outside the scope of Regulation 3821/85 before taking over a vehicle to which that regulation applies?
Is there a category of marks which is not excluded from registration by Article 3(1)(b), (c) and (d) and Article 3(3) of Directive 89/104/EEC which is none the less excluded from registration by Article 3(1)(a) thereof on the ground that such marks are incapable of distinguishing the goods of the proprietor from those of other undertakings?
Is the shape of an article (being the article in respect of which the sign is registered) capable of distinguishing for the purposes of Article 2 of Directive 89/104 only if it contains some capricious addition, such as an embellishment which has no functional purpose?
Where a trader has been the only supplier of particular goods to the market, is extensive use of a sign which consists of the shape of those goods sufficient to give the sign a distinctive character for the purposes of Article 3(3) of Directive 89/104 in circumstances where, as a result of that use, a substantial proportion of the relevant class of persons associates the shape with that trader, and no other undertaking, or believes that goods of that shape come from that trader in the absence of a statement to the contrary?
Must Article 3(1)(e), second indent, of Directive 89/104 be interpreted to mean that a sign consisting exclusively of the shape of a product is unregistrable if it is established that the essential functional features of the shape are attributable only to the technical result?
On a proper interpretation of Directive 89/104, does the omission of the term "exclusively" in Article 6(1)(b) mean that, even if a mark consisting of the shape of goods is validly registered, it is not infringed by virtue of said article in circumstances where the use of the shape of goods complained of is taken as an indication as to the kind of goods or the intended purpose thereof and, a substantial proportion of the relevant trade and public believe that goods of that shape come from the trade mark proprietor?
Does the exclusive right granted by Article 5(1) of Directive 89/104 extend to enable the proprietor to prevent third parties using identical or similar signs in circumstances where that use was not such as to indicate origin?
Is use of an allegedly infringing shape of goods, which is and would be seen as an indication as to the kind of goods or the intended purpose thereof, none the less such as to indicate origin if a substantial proportion of the relevant trade and public believe that goods of the shape complained of come from the trade mark proprietor?
Is the reference for a preliminary ruling admissible?
May a provision concerning a risk such as the country risk in question, affecting a commitment which appears at the foot of the balance sheet pursuant to Article 14 of the Fourth Directive (78/660), be entered on the liabilities side of the balance sheet, pursuant to Article 20(1) of that directive?